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 Abstract 
 
This thesis argues that international fundamental rights provide the most 
appropriate measure of justice for the Union’s area of ‘freedom, security and 
justice’ (AFSJ).  However, it is argued that the normative status of international 
fundamental rights in Union law is undermined by the pursuit of the objective of 
autonomy of Union law and deficiencies in the legal mechanisms for giving effect 
to those rights.  
 
This research analyses the sources and normative status of international 
fundamental rights in Union law, and in particular the AFSJ, both as currently 
constituted and under the Constitution, and assesses the robustness and 
effectiveness of the Union’s constitutional order in guaranteeing the protection of 
those rights.  
Part one investigates the relationship of Union law with international fundamental 
rights. Chapter two provides the theoretical justification for the selection of 
international fundamental rights as a standard. Chapter three critically analyses the 
pursuit of autonomy as an objective. Chapter four examines the normative status 
of international fundamental rights in Union law. Chapter five critically analyses 
the reforms in the Constitution. Part two investigates the role of justice in the 
AFSJ. Chapter six outlines the development and ideological basis of the AFSJ. 
Chapter seven critically assesses the effectiveness of fundamental rights protection 
in the AFSJ. Chapter eight undertakes a case study on the compatibility of key 
Union asylum and immigration measures with the principle of non-refoulement.  
In conclusion, Chapter nine argues that partnership rather than autonomy should 
be the basis of the relationship between the Union and national courts with the 
objective of enhancing the status of international fundamental rights in Union law. 
The reforms in the Constitution to the structure of fundamental rights protection 
and to the AFSJ would overall facilitate achievement of this objective and would 
further the attainment of justice in the AFSJ. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
This study investigates the normative status of international fundamental rights1 in 
the Union’s legal order,2 with particular reference to the Union’s ‘Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice’ (AFSJ).3 The Union is used as an umbrella term to refer to both 
the European Union and the European Community (Community).4 In particular, the 
objective of the research is to examine the relationship between the normative content 
of international fundamental rights and the Union’s constitutional structure, or 
                                                 
1 International fundamental rights is used as a term in this study to refer to fundamental rights derived 
from the sources of international law  listed in Article 38(1) of the 1945 Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, and in particular international conventions and international custom. The scope of the 
fundamental rights derived from these sources is analysed in Sections 2.3 of Chapter two and the 
relationship between them is considered in Section 2.4. The term fundamental rights has been adopted 
since this is the terminology generally adopted in the context of the Union’s legal order. However, no 
distinction is drawn in this study between fundamental rights and human rights. See for a discussion of 
the legal notion of fundamental rights: Jaqueline Dutheil de la Rochère, ‘The EU and the Individual: 
Fundamental Rights in the Draft Constitutional Treaty’ (2004) 41 CML Rev., pp. 345-354, at p. 346. 
2 ‘Legal order’ is a phrase frequently used, but less often defined, in the academic literature and indeed 
the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Reference to the ECJ, unless otherwise specified, 
also includes reference to the Court of First Instance (CFI).   Kenneth Winston suggests the following 
test: ‘Among a number of prominent theorists in the twentieth century, for example, the dominant 
criterion has been that law must take the form of a “system”, involving a master test for determining 
which norms are included in the system – and hence binding on legal subjects – and which are not. 
Any social arrangement lacking this feature fails to qualify as legal order.’: ‘Constructing Law’s 
Mandate’, in David Dyzenhaus (ed.) Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 1999), pp. 281-308, at p. 281. Legal order is often used interchangeably with legal 
system or legal regime and is closely related to the notion of  ‘constitutionalism’, which has been 
defined in the context of the Union as: ‘the process by which the EC Treaties evolved from a set of 
legal arrangements, binding upon sovereign states, into a vertically integrated legal regime conferring 
judicially enforceable rights and obligations on all legal persons and entities, public and private, within 
the sphere of application of EC law – enforceable even against the Member States and national law,’: 
J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Epilogue: The European Court of Justice: Beyond ‘Beyond Doctrine’ or the 
Legitimacy Crisis of European Constitutionalism’, in Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet and 
J.H.H. Weiler (eds.) The European Court and National Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal 
Change in Its Social Context (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998), pp. 365-391, at p. 365. See also: J. 
Shaw, ‘Process and Constitutional Discourse in the European Union’, in C. Harvey, J. Morison, and J. 
Shaw (eds.), Voices, Processes and Spaces in Constitutionalism (Oxford, Blackwell, 2000), pp. 4-37. 
3 See Chapter six for the development and scope of the AFSJ and the reasons underlying its selection 
as an appropriate area of Union policy for critical analysis in terms of international fundamental rights. 
4 However, when the context requires, and in particular in the analysis of Article 63 EC Treaty 
measures, reference will be made to the Community. Reference to the Treaties is, unless otherwise 
specified, to the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) and the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU), as amended respectively by the 1986 Single European Act (SEA), the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty, the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and the 2000 Treaty of Nice. A full list of the constitutive 
Treaties of the Community, Euratom and the European Union is in T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of 
European Community Law (5th edn.) (Oxford, OUP, 2003), at pp. 93-94. 
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operating system, within which those rights are recognized and applied.5 The 
normative content fulfills two functions attributable to a norm: a measure of justice 
and directive force.6 The justice of the AFSJ is here measured by reference to 
international fundamental rights in both a positive and negative sense: positive insofar 
as international human rights norms set the agenda for legislative and policy 
initiatives by the Union institutions; and negative insofar as they constrain the Union 
institutions from pursuing action in violation of such norms.7 The Union’s 
constitutional structure, among other features, should guarantee the rule of law,8 
identify the sources of Union law and their hierarchical ordering, determine the 
enforceability of rights, delimit the allocation of powers between the Union and 
Member States,9 establish rules of jurisdiction, and create judicial institutions to settle 
disputes.10  
Both strands of the inquiry, normative content and constitutional structure, are 
pursued in tandem since while the ‘compliance pull’ or legitimacy of fundamental 
rights norms will in part depend on their fulfilling defined characteristics,11 the 
robustness and effectiveness12 of the Union’s constitutional order in fulfilling the 
                                                 
5 The use of the term ‘operating system’, and the components of that system, draws on the conceptions 
of Paul F. Diehl, Charlotte Ku, and Daniel Zamora, ‘The Dynamics of International Law: The 
Interaction of Normative and Operating Systems’ (2003) 57 International Organization, pp. 43-75, at 
pp. 46-50.  
6 A norm being defined as: ‘a standard, rule, principle used to judge or direct human conduct as 
something to be complied with.’: Ted Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford, 
OUP, 1995), at p. 626. 
7 The directive force of the principle of non-refoulement within the Union’s legal order is examined in 
both senses in Chapter eight. 
8 T. Risse and K. Sikkink, ‘The socialization of human rights norms’, in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. 
Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change (Cambridge, CUP, 1999), pp. 1-38, at p. 5. 
9 See Alan Dashwood, ‘The Relationship Between the Member States and the European 
Union/European Community’ (2004) 41 CML Rev., pp. 355-381; and Paul Craig, ‘Competence: 
Clarity, Conferral, Containment and Consideration’ (2004) 29 EL Rev., pp. 323-344. 
10 An analysis of the extent to which the Union’s constitutional order fulfils these objectives is 
examined in Chapter five. This list is based in part on the non-exhaustive list of the components of the 
operating system of international law identified by Diehl, Ku, and Zamora, above n. 4, at p. 47. Many 
of these objectives were affirmed in the Laeken Declaration of the European Council on the Future of 
the European Union of December 2001: available at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/laeken_council/index_en.htm>.  See also Koen Laenarts and Marlies 
Desomer, ‘Bricks for a Constitutional Treaty of the European Union: values, objectives and means’ 
(2002) 27 EL Rev., pp. 377-407; and Andrew Williams, ‘EU human rights policy and the Convention 
on the Future of Europe: a failure of design?’ (2003) 28 EL Rev., pp. 794-813.  
11 See Thomas F. Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’ (1988) 82 AJIL, pp. 705-759. The 
indicators of rule legitimacy for rules of international law identified by Franck are: ‘determinacy, 
symbolic validation, coherence and adherence (to a normative hierarchy).’, ibid., at p. 712. 
12 ‘By effectiveness I accept the usual notion that regimes enable the participants to realize certain goals 
(which would otherwise have been impossible or difficult to reach) and that the rules and norms of 
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functions specified will impact on how significant a role fundamental rights norms 
play in the functioning of the Union’s legal order.  This analysis of fundamental 
rights norms and the effectiveness and robustness of the constitutional structure 
within which such norms operate in the Union’s legal order is undertaken both with 
respect to the Union’s existing constitutional order13 and the Constitution.14  
This study argues that international fundamental rights provide the most appropriate 
basis for measuring the justice of the AFSJ. However, the status of those rights in 
Union law is undermined by the pursuit of the objective of autonomy for the Union’s 
legal order and deficiencies in the legal mechanisms for giving effect to those rights. 
The Constitution would remedy a number of these failings but would not resolve the 
uncertain status of fundamental rights falling outside the ECHR or the Charter of 
fundamental rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000 (the Charter).15 The 
                                                                                                                                            
regimes are defences against unilateral action and opportunism. Robustness, on the other hand, refers 
to the ability of regimes to withstand the challenges of change and their capacity to adjust to and 
provide orderly procedures for dealing with ‘environmental shocks’.’: F. Kratochwil, ‘How do Norms 
Matter?’ in  Michael Byers (ed.) The Role of Law in International Politics (Oxford, OUP, 2000), pp. 
35-68, at p. 53. The concepts of robustness and efficiency are also linked to the notion of legitimacy as 
defined by Franck (1988), above n. 11, at p. 712; and see Kratochwil, ibid. at p. 57.  
13 There is an extensive literature on the Union’s constitutional order: see in particular: Weiler, The 
Constitution of Europe (Cambridge, 1999); J. Weiler and M. Wind (eds.), European Constitutionalism 
beyond the State (Cambridge, CUP, 2003); and the bibliography in Weiler, in Slaughter, Sweet and 
Wieler (eds.), above n. 2, at pp. 388-391. See for an analysis of the potential impact of the 
Constitution: Koen Lenaerts and Damien Gerard, ‘The Structure of the Union according to the 
Constitution for Europe: the Emperor is Getting Dressed’ (2004) 29 EL Rev., pp. 289-322, at 293-298. 
This study adopts the position that the existing constitution of the Union is based on the Treaties: ‘It 
must first be emphasized in this regard that the European Economic Community is a Community based 
on the rule of law, insomuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the 
question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, 
the Treaty.’: Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, at para. 23.  
14 Reference to the Constitution is to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe signed at Rome 
on 29 October 2004:  [2004] OJ C310/1. References to Articles of the Constitution generally refer only 
to the article number unless the context otherwise requires for clarity. The process of ratification of the 
Constitution is currently suspended following a declaration at the meeting of the European Council of 
16-17 June 2005: SN 117/05 of 18 June 2005; available at 
<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/Docs/pressData/en/ec/85325.pdf>. As of 15 July 2005 the situation 
on ratification was as follows: Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain have completed the procedures necessary for ratification of the 
Constitution; Belgium and Luxembourg have approved ratification subject to final approval by the 
Flemish regional parliament and the second reading of the Chamber respectively. France and the 
Netherlands held referenda that rejected ratification on 29 May and 1 June 2005 respectively. The nine 
other Member States have in practice postponed the ratification procedure until the matter is revisited 
by the European Council in the first half of 2006. Although the prognosis for the Constitution is 
unclear, this thesis refers to the Constitution both for the purpose of analysing the proposed changes to 
existing Union law and as an authoritative statement of the constitutional structure agreed by the Heads 
of State or Government of the Member States. Provided all the ratifications have been duly deposited, 
Article IV-447(2) of the Constitution provides it should enter into force on 1 November 2006. This 
date has been postponed following the results of the referenda in France and the Netherlands.  
15 [2000] OJ C364/1. 
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research aim is to carry out a critical analysis of the sources and normative status of 
fundamental rights in Union law, and in particular in the AFJS, both as currently 
constituted and under the Constitution and to assess the robustness and effectiveness 
of the Union’s constitutional order in guaranteeing that status. 
However, the basis for measuring the significance of normative standards in directing 
the Union’s legal order requires elucidation.  The purpose of this inquiry is not to 
measure significance empirically by seeking to establish a causal connection between 
a normative standard and the rationale for a specific legislative provision.16 There 
will be a number of factors in a politically and socially sensitive area such as the 
AFSJ that determine a specific norm.17 In such a context, it may be difficult, if not 
impossible, to identify the decisive factor in the amendment and adoption of a 
particular provision, be it in conformity or at variance with international fundamental 
rights norms.18 However, by establishing a base line of applicable fundamental rights 
standards against which to measure the conformity or otherwise of Union legislation 
and by then assessing the extent to which relevant Union legislation is moulded and 
constrained by those standards one can make a reasoned judgment as to the extent to 
which the Union’s legal order recognizes such standards and provides effective 
protection against their violation. It is this value judgment that forms the basis for 
assessing the significance of fundamental rights standards in the Union’s legal order.  
 
This evaluative exercise has similarities with that adopted by Risse and Sikkink in 
comparative studies undertaken to understand the ‘process by which international 
norms are internalized and implemented domestically’ in a process they have 
                                                 
16 On the difficulties of rules as ‘normative guidance for decisions’, see Kratochwil, in  Byers (ed.), 
above n. 12, at  p. 53 and pp. 62-68. 
17 See Chapter six for the history and development of the AFSJ. On the specific area of the Union’s 
asylum and refugee policy, see Maria Fletcher, ‘EU Governance Techniques in the Creation of a 
Common European Policy on Immigration and Asylum’ (2002) 9 EPL, pp. 544-562. 
18 This line of reasoning has been employed to justify the reluctance of the courts in the UK to rely on 
parliamentary proceedings for the purpose of interpreting statutes. This problem has been resolved in 
part by the increasing use of a ‘purposive’ approach to statutory interpretation by the English courts: 
see Tom Campbell, ‘Incorporation through Interpretation’ in T. Campbell, K.D. Ewing and A. 
Tomkins (eds.) Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 2001), pp. 79-101. In the UK 
context, remedial action taken under section 10 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) would identify 
amendments resulting from incompatibility with the ECHR following a declaration of incompatibility 
by a relevant court under section 4 of the HRA. A striking example of this process was provided by the 
repeal of section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security 2001 (ATCSA) by the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005 following the declaration of incompatibility in respect of section 23 ATCSA made 
by the House of Lords in A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 
56. 
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characterised as ‘socialization’.19  However, these studies were undertaken in 
countries with a history of substantial human rights violations, either in the recent 
past or currently, and it is doubtful whether the causal mechanisms identified equally 
apply to the Union.20  The evaluative method adopted is complementary to the critical 
studies of Union compliance with fundamental rights standards carried out both by 
NGOs and by Union institutions or appointed experts. Thus the Report on the 
Situation of Fundamental Rights in the European Union and its Member States in 
2002, drawn up by the EU Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights 
(2002 EU Network Report),21 and the European Parliament’s Committee on Citizens’ 
Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs 2003 Report on the Situation as 
regards Fundamental Rights in the European Union (2003 EP Report),22 which was 
in part based on the 2002 EU Network Report, systematically examine compliance by 
the Union’s institutions and the Member States operating within the scope of Union 
law with international fundamental rights norms.23 However, neither the 2002 EU 
Network Report nor the 2003 EP Report focused specifically on the issue of 
evaluating the impact of international norms on the Union’s legal order.  
 
1.2 SUBJECT MATTER 
Part one addresses the basis of the relationship of Union law with international 
fundamental rights law. Chapter two justifies the adoption of international 
fundamental rights as the standard for measuring the justice of the AFSJ by reference 
to three characteristics. Firstly, they are objectively ascertainable and exert normative 
force. Secondly, they lay strong, if not undisputed, claims to universality and 
neutrality. Thirdly, fundamental rights are an essential component of any meaningful 
conception of justice. 
                                                 
19 Risse and Sikkink, above n. 8, at p. 5. The countries selected for the comparative studies included 
Poland and the former Czechoslovakia.  Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic acceded to the 
Union on 1 May 2004.  
20 Indeed, Risse and Sikkink differentiate between ‘liberal democratic states’ and authoritarian or 
‘norm-violating states’ and present the Union as a paradigmatic member of the former category: ibid., 
at p. 9. 
21 Available at: < http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/cfr_cdf/doc/rapport_2002_en.pdf>. 
22 Document A5-0281/2003 of 21 August 2003. Available on the European Parliament website. 
23 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000 (the Charter) was 
the formal reference document: [2000] OJ C364/1.  
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Chapter three investigates the basis and justification for the Union’s pursuit of the 
objective of autonomy. In particular, it examines three areas where the foundations of 
the principle of Union autonomy have been subject to challenge and questions 
whether the principle needs to be redefined to ensure that international fundamental 
rights are interpreted and applied in the Union legal order in a manner that is 
consistent with the international law obligations both of the Union and the Member 
States.  The first section examines the issue of whether the ECJ has judicial 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz. The second section investigates whether the ECJ has 
competence to rule on the legality of Union law in the light of case law of the ECJ 
and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The final section addresses the 
question of the hierarchy within the Union’s legal order between judgments of the 
ECJ and those of the ECtHR.24  
Chapter four examines the normative status of international fundamental rights 
derived from treaties and customary international law in Union law. The first section 
critically analyses the legal status of fundamental rights treaties in the Union’s legal 
order. The second section examines the normative status of customary international 
law in Union law. In the final section, the developing law on the status of norms 
ascribed the status of jus cogens is addressed in the context of the relationship 
between the national legal orders of the Member States and Union law. 
Chapter five critically examines the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution 
in the framework of the constitutional objectives set the Convention on the Future of 
Europe by the European Council in the 2001 Laeken Declaration.25  The normative 
consequences of Union accession to the ECHR and incorporation of the Charter on 
the existing system for the protection of fundamental rights are analysed and 
evaluated. The retention of the doctrine of fundamental rights as general principles of 
Union law and the modifications in the Constitution to the incorporated Charter are 
on analysis found to be unnecessary and detrimental to achievement of the Laeken 
objectives.  
                                                 
24 Reference to the ECtHR includes reference to the European Commission on Human Rights 
(ECommHR) unless otherwise specified.  
25 Laeken Declaration of the European Council on the Future of the European Union of December 
2001, above n. 10.   
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Part two consists of Chapters six to eight and focuses on the normative status of 
fundamental rights in the AFSJ. Chapter six traces the development and 
characteristics of the AFSJ from its inception through to the proposed reforms in the 
Constitution and the 2005 Hague Program.26 This analysis of the development and 
ideological basis of the AFSJ provides the necessary background to the subsequent 
evaluation of the AFSJ in terms of access to justice and democratic legitimacy. In 
particular, Chapter six explores how far security has dominated the Union’s policy 
and legislative initiatives in the AFSJ at the expense of freedom and justice. 
Chapter seven analyses the restricted role and status of fundamental rights in the 
AFSJ both under Title VI TEU and Title IV TEC and assesses how far the reforms in 
the Constitution would remedy the deficiencies. In particular, the Chapter examines 
the recent case law of the ECtHR and the CFI demonstrating serious gaps in access to 
justice in respect of Third Pillar measures adopted under Title VI TEU. The analysis 
of the reforms in the Constitution of the AFSJ concludes they would mark a 
substantial improvement in the legitimacy of AFSJ legislation in terms of compliance 
with fundamental rights standards.   
Chapter eight undertakes a case study to assess the status of the international law 
principle of non-refoulement in Union law with specific reference to measures of 
primary and secondary law in the refugee and asylum field. The study first outlines 
the scope and content of critical aspects of the principle of non-refoulement in 
selected instruments of international law. It then examines the protection afforded to 
the principle in Union law both generally and in specific refugee and asylum 
measures. The final section analyses in detail the conformity of the 2004 Refugee 
Qualification and Status Directive with the principle of non-refoulement as set out in 
the selected international instruments.27 
Chapter nine sets out the conclusions by reference to the research hypothesis.  The 
first conclusion is that international fundamental rights provide the most appropriate 
                                                 
26 Hague Programme on Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in The European Union, 
Brussels, 4-5 November 2004, Annex 1 to the Presidency Conclusions (14292/04): available at 
<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/82534.pdf>. 
27 Directive 2004/83/EC of 1 May 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international 
protection and the content of the protection granted [2004] OJ L 304/12. 
 
 8
standard for assessing the justice of the AFSJ both from an internal and external 
perspective. The second conclusion is that the normative status of international 
fundamental rights in Union law is undermined by the pursuit of the objective of 
autonomy of the Union’s legal order and deficiencies in the legal mechanisms for 
giving effect to those standards. It is argued that instead a partnership model between 
the Union and national legal orders in their relation to international fundamental 
rights should be pursued.  Proposals are made for reform of the system for the 
protection of fundamental rights based on the reforms in Constitution. Finally, the 
conclusions based on the analysis of the AFSJ are set out with particular reference to 
the case study on the principle of non-refoulement.  
The law is stated as of 1 September 2005. 
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PART 1 
JUSTICE, INTERNATIONAL FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND UNION LAW 
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2 
 
JUSTICE AND UNION LAW: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This Chapter explores and justifies the analytical framework outlined in the 
Introduction in the context of scholarship by both legal and international relations 
theorists.1 Firstly, it explores why justice is relevant to the Union’s legal order, and in 
particular the AFSJ. Secondly, it identifies international fundamental rights norms 
derived from treaties and customary international law as the standard to measure the 
justice of the AFSJ. Thirdly it analyses the interrelationship between these two 
sources of international law.  Fourthly, the selection of international fundamental 
rights standards as the measure for justice is justified by reference to three 
characteristics of such standards: objectivity, neutrality and theoretical consistency 
with theories of international justice. 
 
2.2 WHY JUSTICE? 
 
What is the justification for an inquiry into how far the Union’s legal order, and in 
particular the AFSJ, meets the requirements of justice?2 Firstly, the Union asserts 
justice as an objective and value both internally and externally, although on a more 
                                                 
1 On the value of interdisciplinary scholarship between international law and international relations, 
see Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual 
Agenda’ (1993) 87 AJIL, pp.  205-239; and Stephen J. Toope, ‘Emerging Patterns of Governance and 
International Law’, in M. Byers (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics (Oxford, OUP, 2000), 
pp. 91-108.  
2 Thomas F. Franck, in his inquiry into the role of justice in the international legal order, concluded 
justice had little relevance: ‘The exposed role of legitimacy and the minimal role of justice distinguish 
the international rule system from its domestic counterparts.’: ‘Is Justice relevant to the International 
Legal System’ (1989) 64 Notre Dame Law Review, pp. 945-963, at p. 945.  See also by the same 
author: Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford, OUP, 1995). For an analysis of the 
characteristics distinguishing the Union’s legal order from public international law, see J.H.H. Weiler 
and Ulrich R. Haltern, ‘Constitutional or International? The Foundations of the Community Legal 
Order and the Question of Judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz’, in Slaughter, Sweet and Weiler (eds.), The 
European Court and National Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change in its Social 
Context (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998), pp. 331-364. 
11 
explicit basis in the Constitution than in the Treaties.3 The second Recital to the 
Preamble to the Constitution refers to Europe’s wish to ‘strive for peace, justice and 
solidarity throughout the world’. Article I-2 of the Constitution provides:  
 
‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including 
the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the 
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail’.  
 
The final paragraph of Article I-3 of the Constitution establishes, inter alia, the 
promotion of ‘social justice and protection’ as an objective of the Union. Title VI of 
Part II of the Constitution, incorporating the corresponding provisions of the Charter, 
is entitled ‘Justice’ and consists of Articles II-107 to II-110 which list the basic rights 
in civil and criminal proceedings.4 
 
The only specific reference to justice in the preambles to the EC Treaty and the TEU 
is in the eleventh Recital of the TEU which refers to the establishment of an ‘area of 
freedom, security and justice’. Article 6(1) TEU does not refer to justice as one of the 
principles on which the Union is founded nor does Article 2 EC Treaty include justice 
in the list of the Community’s tasks. However, the objectives of the Union listed in 
Article 2 TEU include the requirement for the Union: 
 
‘To maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and 
justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with 
appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, 
immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.’  
 
                                                 
3 The references to justice in the Constitution independently of the AFSJ may reflect reduced 
sensibility on the part of the Member States in the light of the mainstreaming of Third Pillar 
competences under the Constitution. The references to justice in the Preamble to the Constitution and 
in Articles I-2 and I-3 were present in the 25 November 2003 draft of the Constitution and were not 
subject to controversy in the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) proceedings: CIG 50/03  
of 25 November 2003. IGC documents are available at:  
<http://ue.eu.int/cms3_applications/Applications/igc/doc_register.asp?content=DOC&lang=EN&cmsi
d=754> (the IGC website) and are not further referenced.  
4 These rights are derived primarily, but not exclusively from the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR): see the Explanations to the Charter of 11 October 11 2000 (Charter Explanations), at 
pp. 40-45. The Charter Explanations, as updated under the authority of the Praesidium of the European 
Convention, are published as Declaration No. 12 to the Constitution: [2004] OJ C310/424-459. 
12 
Furthermore the references in both Articles 6(1) TEU and 11(1) TEU to the rule of 
law should be construed as including a reference to substantive justice.5  
 
In the case of the AFSJ, the scope and meaning of the justice component has to be 
deduced from the different contexts in which it is employed in the Treaties and the 
Constitution.6 The primary references to the establishment of the AFSJ in the TEU 
are in the eleventh Preamble, Article 2 and Article 29.  Article 61 EC Treaty contains 
the only specific reference to the AFSJ in the EC Treaty. Article I-3(2) of the 
Constitution  establishes the AFSJ as an objective of the Union and Article I-42 sets 
out specific provisions relating to the AFSJ. Chapter IV of Title III of Part III of the 
Constitution sets out in Articles III-257 to 277 the scope of the AFSJ. 
Since there is no single unifying conception of the term ‘justice’ in the Constitution or 
in the Treaties, the meaning must be determined on each usage in accordance with the 
general principles of international law for the interpretation of treaties.7 Nevertheless, 
the term justice is generally associated, at least in the Constitution, with respect for 
fundamental rights either with reference to specific rights or in general and this 
association may be taken as representing the benchmark by which the Union has 
accepted to be judged. International fundamental rights therefore provide a yardstick 
for measuring justice that is consistent with the constitutional texts of the Union.  
A second justification is that by establishing objective criteria for measuring the 
justice of the Union’s legal order the coherence and legitimacy of the Union’s policy 
in the field of fundamental rights can be assessed both internally and by non-Union 
institutions and agencies. Furthermore, pressure for reform can be applied with the 
                                                 
5 This argument is considered, but rejected, by Anthony Arnull, ‘The Rule of Law in the European 
Union’, in Arnull and Wincott (eds.) Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford, 
OUP, 2002), pp. 239-255, at pp. 252-255. 
6 For a discussion of the conceptual significance of the AFSJ, see: Hans Lidahl, ‘Finding a Place for 
Freedom, Security and Justice: the European Union’s Claim to Territorial Unity’ (2004) 29 EL Rev., 
pp. 461-484. See also Neil Walker, ‘In Search of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A 
Constitutional Odyssey’, in N. Walker (ed.) Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Oxford, 
OUP, 2004), pp. 3-37. For the security component of the AFSJ, see: Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, ‘The 
Rule of Law in the European Union – Putting the Security into the “Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice” (2004) 29 EL Rev, pp. 219-242. See Chapter six for a detailed analysis of the genesis and 
scope of the AFSJ.  
7 Namely, Articles 31 to 33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties  (1155 UNTS 331) 
(VCLT). See generally on the interpretation of the constituent instruments of international 
organisations:  Dapo Akande, ‘International Organizations’, in Malcolm D. Evans (ed.) International 
Law (Oxford, OUP, 2003), pp. 269-297, at pp. 280-282.  See also, R. Higgins, ‘The ICJ, the ECJ and 
the Integrity of International Law’ (2003) 52 ICLQ, pp. 1- 20, at pp. 6-9.  
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backing of internationally recognised standards. This method of holding the Union 
accountable for any failure to comply with such standards is of particular value since 
the Union is not integrated into either of the European systems for the protection of 
fundamental rights, not being a member of the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)8 or the Council of Europe, or party to the relevant 
treaties negotiated under its auspices,9 or into the United Nations system of human 
rights treaties.10 The Union is not, therefore, subject to the formal reporting, 
monitoring and enforcement procedures applicable to the parties to those treaties. 
Furthermore, the Union itself provides very limited formal remedies against 
fundamental rights violations resulting directly or indirectly from the Union’s foreign 
development policy.11 The advantages of using international fundamental rights 
standards for monitoring the Union’s performance in the field of fundamental rights is 
recognised both by the Union’s institutions and independent bodies. The European 
Parliament’s 2003 Report on the Situation as Regards Fundamental Rights in the 
European Union (the 2003 EP Report)12 draws extensively on international 
fundamental rights standards.13 The Report on the Situation of Fundamental Rights in 
the European Union and its Member States in 2002 (2002 EU Network Report) uses 
the Charter as its reference instrument but the authors stress the importance of 
indexing the Charter’s rights and principles to international and European human 
rights standards: 
 
                                                 
8 See for the OSCE’s legal status: Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein, Bowett’s Law of International 
Institutions (5th edn.) (London, Thomson, 2001), at pp. 199-201.  
9 Although many international human rights treaties are only open for accession by states, mechanisms 
can be devised for Union accession as shown in the case of the ECHR: see Study of Technical and 
Legal Issues of a Possible EC/EU Accession to the ECHR dated  28 September 2002 by the Steering 
Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) of the Council of Europe (the CDDH Report),  reproduced in 
Working Document  No. 8 of Working Group II of 12 July 2002. Available on the European 
Convention website at: <http//:european-convention.eu.int/>.  Documents available on the European 
Convention website are not further referenced. The documents associated with the organizations and 
bodies contributing to the European Convention up to 29 October 2004 are available on the Futurum 
website at: <http://europa.eu.int/constitution/futurum/index_fr.htm>. 
10 See Allan Rosas, ‘The European Union and International Human Rights Instruments. Discord or 
Harmony?’, in Vincent Kronenberger (ed.), The European Union and the International Legal Order: 
Discord or Harmony?  (Hague, Kluwer, 2001), pp. 53-67. 
11 See Bruno Simma, Jo Beatrix Aschenbrenner, and Constanze Schulte, ‘Human Rights 
Considerations in the Development Co-operation Activities of the EC’, in Philip Alston with Mara 
Bustelo and James Heenan (eds.) The EU and Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp. 571-626, at pp. 
618-620.  
12 Document A5-0281/2003 of 21 August 2003. Available on the European Parliament website.  
13 The sources relied on are set out in the 2003 EP Report, at p. 6. For a critique of the resources 
available to the EP for this task, see Williams, ‘EU Human Rights Policy and the Convention on the 
Future of Europe: a Failure of Design?’ (2003) 28 EL Rev., pp. 794-813, at p. 97. 
14 
‘Reading the provisions of the Charter in the light of international and 
European human rights law seems to us to be opportune primarily because it 
is objective, which avoids the institutions of the European Union of the 
Member States being surprised by the interpretation given to them.’14   
 
In this study, however, international standards are adopted as the reference 
instruments on the basis that the Charter has a number of limitations, and in particular 
uncertainty as to its legal scope and interpretation.15   
 
2.3 TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AS 
NORMATIVE STANDARDS 
 
The rules of international fundamental rights law selected in this study as standards to 
measure the justice of the Union’s legal order are those derived from the sources 
listed in Article 38(1) of the 1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ 
Statute):  
 
‘1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international 
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international 
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of 
general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognised 
by civilised nations; d. subject to Article 59, judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.’16  
 
Treaties and customary international law are the most important sources for the 
development of international fundamental rights and are the primary sources drawn 
upon in this study.17 However, the position of the Union with regard to these two 
                                                 
14 At p. 23. The working method adopted is set out in the 2002 EU Network Report, at pp. 27-29. The 
2002 EU Network Report is available at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/cfr_cdf/doc/rapport_2002_en.pdf>. 
15 See further Sections 5.2, 5.4 and 5.8 of Chapter five. 
16 Adopted on 26 June 1945, in force 24 October 1945, 1945 UKTS 67.  See generally: Hugh 
Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’, in Evans (ed.) International Law (Oxford, OUP, 2003), 
pp. 117-144.  
17 See L. Henkin, G.L. Neuman, D.F. Orentlicher, and D.W. Leebron, Human Rights (New York, 
Foundation Press, 1999). For a discussion of the reasons for custom being cited rather than general 
principles as a source for fundamental rights as norms of international law, see Martti Koskenniemi, 
‘The Pull of the Mainstream’ (1999-2000) Mich. L. Rev., pp. 1946-1961: ‘For most modern lawyers, 
and the World Court, international law consists, for all practical purposes, of only two sorts of norms: 
treaty norms and custom’: at p. 1948. Sources other than those listed in Article 38(1) ICJ Statute have 
been mooted, including jus cogens and decisions of international organizations. See generally Michael 
15 
sources is not unproblematic. The Union is not party to any of the key international or 
regional treaties for the protection of fundamental rights and it is unclear as to the 
extent it can contribute to the formation of customary international law through ‘state’ 
practice and opinio juris18 or indeed, by expressing dissent, prevent the application of 
an emerging customary rule of international law.19 However, the Union’s current 
somewhat passive relationship to the formation of international law does not detract 
from the validity of applying the norms of international law to its activities. On the 
contrary, the increasingly important role played by the Union in international affairs 
and human rights issues militates in favour of remedying this anomalous situation by 
Union membership of the key international human rights treaties and recognition of 
the Union as an actor on the international stage with equal rights and duties 
commensurate with its economy and population.20 The Constitution would further 
expand the Union’s competences and influence in international affairs, in particular 
through the provision for creation of the post of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs.21   
 
Multilateral treaties form the bedrock of international fundamental rights law and the 
core United Nations22 and European23 fundamental rights treaties to which a 
                                                                                                                                            
Akehurst, ‘The Hierarchy of Sources of International Law’, (1974-5) 47 BYIL, pp. 273-285, at pp. 280-
285; Thirlway, in Evans (ed.), above n. 16, at pp. 138-142. For a ‘neo-Kelsenian’ analysis, see Jörg 
Kammerhofer, ‘Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary International Law 
and Some of Its Problems’ (2004) 15 EJIL, pp. 523-553. For a refutation of jus cogens as a source, see 
Gennady M. Danilenko, ‘International Jus Cogens: Issues of Law-Making’ (1991) 2 EJIL, pp. 42-64. 
18 Sands and Klein do not specifically address this issue, although they do conclude that international 
organizations are bound by the rules of customary international law, including any rules of jus cogens: 
above n. 8, at pp. 458-459. Akehurst considers that ‘the practice of international organizations can also 
create rules of customary law.’: ‘Custom as a Source of International Law’ (1974-5) 47 BYIL, pp. 1-53, 
at p. 11. However, in the case of organs of international organizations composed of representatives of 
states, Akehurst argues: ‘their practice is best regarded as the practice of  States.’: ibid., at p. 11. On the 
role of resolutions of international organizations and in the particular those of the UN General 
Assembly, in creating norms of international law, see: Akehurst, ibid., at pp. 5-7; and Higgins, 
Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford, OUP, 1994), at pp. 22-26. It 
could be argued that measures adopted under the Second Pillar of the TEU, to the extent at least that 
they are adopted by unaninimity, reflect the views of the Member States and as such contribute to the 
formation of customary international law.  
19 It is generally assumed that only states can object: see R. Charney, ‘The Persistent Objector Rule and 
the Development of Customary International Law’ (1985) 56 BYIL, pp. 1-24.   
20 See Dominic McGoldrick, International Relations Law of the European Union (Harlow, Longman, 
1997), especially at pp. 181-205. 
21 Article I-28 of the Constitution. For the background to the provisions in the Constitution on the 
Union’s powers in the foreign relations field, see: Final Report of Working Group VII on External 
Action of 16 December 2002: CONV 459/02; available on the European Convention website. 
22 Key UN Conventions for the protection of fundamental rights adopted as reference standards in this 
study are listed in Annex 1 and are collectively referred to as the UN Conventions.  
23 Key European Conventions for the protection of fundamental rights adopted as reference standards 
in this study are listed in Annex 2 and collectively referred to as the European Conventions.  
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substantial majority of the Member States24 are signatory are those adopted here as 
reference standards.25 The criterion of signature by a substantial majority of the 
Member States is less demanding than the unanimity of signature required by the case 
law of the ECJ on admitting fundamental rights as general principles of Union law.26 
However, it has the advantage of conferring conformity of the standards with the 
treaty obligations of the Member States, while ensuring that failure by a minority of 
Member States to sign a relevant treaty does not prevent the standards being applied 
in assessing the Union’s legal order. The treaties concluded under the auspices of both 
the Council of Europe and the UN selected as reference treaties broadly correspond to 
those adopted by the 2002 EU Network Report save for the more specialised treaties 
listed in that Report.27 The selection of fundamental rights treaties in this study is 
based on the thematic areas covered by the Union’s AFSJ and is not meant to be 
exhaustive, immutable or indicative of a hierarchy between treaties. On the contrary, 
one of the advantages of adopting international human rights norms as standards for 
                                                 
24 The member states of the Union (the Member States) are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom. Bulgaria and Romania signed a Treaty of Accession on 25 April 2005 with 
membership, subject to ratification, foreseen for 1 January 2007. However, this target date may be 
delayed if membership requirements have not been fully met. As of June 2005, Croatia and Turkey are 
candidate countries. The status of ratifications by each of the Member States as of January 2003 to 
each of the UN Conventions and the European Conventions, including reservations and declarations, is 
annexed to the 2002 EU Network Report, above n. 14. See also the list of ratifications of UN 
Conventions as of 9 June 2004 published  by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights at: <http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf>. 
25 It may be argued that even this more liberal standard, as compared to the criteria adopted by the ECJ, 
is too restrictive and that all international treaties, and decisions interpreting them, which are germane 
to the point at issue should be included as reference standards. This appears to be the position under 
Section 39 of the South African Constitution which ‘details how courts are to approach their 
interpretative task when giving content to the Bill of Rights.’ : Max de Plessis, ‘The Application and 
Influence of U.N. Human Rights Standards in Practice: The South African Experience’ (2002) 4 
EHRLR, pp. 452-467, at p. 460. However, as de Plessis, at p. 458, explains the South African 
Constitution was drafted in the specific context of the transition from the Apartheid regime which had 
failed to sign any fundamental rights treaties. It is in this respect not comparable to the situation of the 
Union whose Member States are members of the UN and European Conventions.  
26 The common constitutional traditions of the Member States are also a source, although in practice 
one of lesser significance: see Section 4.2.4 of Chapter four for an analysis of fundamental rights as 
general principles of Union law. 
27 These treaties being:  the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (ETS 164, signed 4 April 
1997, in force 1 December 1999) and the Additional Protocol (ETS 168, signed 12 January 1998, in 
force 1 March 2001); and the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to the 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data (ETS 108, signed 28 February 1981, in force 1 October 1985).  
International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions relevant to fundamental rights are also listed in 
the 2002 EU Network Report, above n. 14, at p. 22. The Union is not a member of the ILO or party to 
any of its conventions relating to fundamental principles and rights at work, although the Commission 
has signed a series of letters of co-operation with the ILO. See for details the Commission website at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/news/2001/jun/131_en.html>.  
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the assessment of the justice of the AFSJ is the flexibility and adaptability of such a 
methodology while retaining sufficient determinacy to engender compliance.28  
  
The second primary source for international fundamental standards adopted to 
evaluate the justice of the Union’s legal order is customary international law.29 
Although opinions vary on the importance of custom as a source of international 
fundamental rights norms,30 it is established that a core minimum of fundamental 
rights are protected under customary international law.31 One frequently cited, if 
controversial, statement of such rights is set out in section 702 of the American Law 
Institute’s 1987 Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
(the 1987 Third Restatement): 
 
‘A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, 
encourages, or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the 
murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary 
detention, (f) systematic racial discrimination, or (g) a consistent pattern of 
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.’32 
 
This list has been criticised for its focus on rights protected under the law of the 
United States to the exclusion of economic, social and cultural rights.33 Furthermore, 
                                                 
28 ‘Conversely, the more determinate the standard, the more difficult it is to resist the pull of the rule 
towards compliance and to justify non-compliance.’: Franck, Fairness in International Law and 
Institutions, above n. 2, at p. 31. 
29 See generally: Akehurst, above n. 18; and Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, ‘The Sources of Human 
Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles’ (1992) 12 Australian Yearbook of 
International Law, pp. 82-108. 
30 ‘Customary law has had a smaller part in human rights law than in many other areas of international 
law.’: Henkin et al., above n. 17, at p. 304; and in the same sense L. Henkin, The Age of Rights (New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1990), at pp. 18-21. But other writers have emphasized the 
significance of custom in the formation of new norms of human rights: see Oscar Schachter, 
International Law in Theory and Practice (Dordrecht, Nijhoff. 1991), at pp. 335-341.   
31 ‘Although not as visible as treaty law, customary law represents the essential basis upon which the 
modern human rights regime is formulated.’: Javaid Rehman, International Human Rights Law 
(Harlow, Longman, 2003), at p. 20. 
32 American Law Institute (1987), Vol. 2, 161. The Comment to Section 702 of the Third Restatement 
gives guidance on the scope of the rights protected, and in particular what constitutes a ‘consistent 
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights’.  Note (n) of the Comment 
indicates that the human rights norms listed in paragraphs (a) to (f) of section 702 are also peremptory 
norms (jus cogens). Text reprinted in D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (6th edn.) 
(London, Thomson, 2004), at pp. 772-777.   See for comment on section 702 of the Third Restatement: 
T. Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (Oxford, OUP, 1989), at pp. 
95-98.    
33 Simma and Alston, above n. 29, at pp. 93-95. 
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the prohibitions listed in the Third Restatement need to be supplemented by 
recognition of new rights based on customary international law.34  
 
The principle of non-refoulement is an example of an established norm of customary 
international law not listed in the 1987 Third Restatement.35 Furthermore, a number 
of the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)36 and the 
1945 United Nations Charter (the UN Charter)37 are generally accepted as obligations 
under customary international law, notwithstanding the debate over the UDHR’s 
original and continuing legal status.38 In respect of the UN Charter, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) has held: 
 
‘As the Court stated in its Judgment in the case concerning Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States 
of America), the principles as to the use of force incorporated in the Charter 
reflect customary international law … ;  the same is true of its corollary 
entailing the illegality of territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use 
of force.’39 
 
In the same Opinion, the ICJ held: 
 
‘The Court also notes that the principle of self-determination of peoples has 
been enshrined in the United Nations Charter and reaffirmed by the General 
Assembly in resolution 2625 (XXV) cited above, pursuant to which “Every 
State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples 
referred to [in that resolution] . . . of their right to self-determination.” The 
Court indeed made it clear that the right of peoples to self-determination is 
today a right erga omnes (see East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 102, para. 29).’40  
 
                                                 
34 Schachter discusses a number of economic and social rights which ‘may be on their way to 
acceptance as general international law’: above n. 30, at p. 340. 
35 See Section 8.2 of Chapter eight. 
36 Adopted 10 December 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). On the history of 
the drafting of the UDHR, see J. Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, 
Drafting & Intent (Philadelphia, Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1999). 
37 See Annex 1. 
38 See Paul Sieghart, ‘International human rights law: some current problems’, in R. Blackburn and J. 
Taylor (eds.), Human Rights for the 1990s (London, Mansell, 1991), pp. 24-42, at pp. 29-30; Rehman, 
above n. 31, at pp. 53-61, and Schachter, above n. 30, at pp. 336-338.  
39 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, Judgment of 9 July 2004, at para 87. Available at: 
 <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm>. 
40 Ibid., at para. 88.  
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Furthermore, certain of the rules of international humanitarian law as embodied in the 
1949 Geneva Conventions41 and the 1977 Additional Protocols42 have become part of 
customary international law.43                                                                                                                  
While these examples demonstrate the significant role of customary international in 
establishing norms for the protection of fundamental rights, customary international 
law as a source has been criticised as inadequate to ‘achieve many of the goals 
appropriately sought by the strongest proponents of international human rights law.’44 
This argument points to the requirement for both state practice and opinio juris for the 
creation of norms of customary international law. In the case of fundamental rights, 
evidence of state practice in the traditional sense is hard to establish as states have 
tended to limit their reaction to human rights violations in other states to the 
protection of the interests of their citizens.45  
 
However, the response of the international community to fundamental rights 
violations is rapidly evolving and the traditional requirements for the formation of 
                                                 
41 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed forces in 
the Field, 12 August 1949, in force 21 October 1950: 75 UNTS 31; Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces 
at Sea, 12 August 1949, in force 21 October 1950: 75 UNTS 85; Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, in force 21 October 1950: 75 UNTS 135; 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, in 
force 21 October 1950: 75 UNTS 287. 
42 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, in force 7 December 1978, 
1125 UNTS 17512; and Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
relating to Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, in force 7 
December 1978, 1125 UNTS 17513. 
43 See generally: Christopher Greenwood, ‘ The Law of War (International Humanitarian Law)’, in 
Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford, OUP, 2003), pp. 789-823; Theodor Meron, ‘The Geneva 
Conventions as Customary Law’ (1987) 81 AJIL, pp. 348-370; and Michael J. Matheson, ‘The United 
States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions’ (1987) 2 American University Journal of International Law and Policy, pp. 
419–431. 
44 Simma and Alston, above n. 29, at p. 100. The issue of whether the consent of all or at least a 
majority of states to the emergence of a rule of customary international law is still disputed.  Henkin 
has argued it is unnecessary: ‘The international system, having identified contemporary human values, 
has adopted and declared them to be fundamental law, international law. But, in a radical derogation 
from the axiom of ‘sovereignty’, that law is not based on consent: at least, it does not honor or accept 
dissent, and it binds particular states regardless of their objection.’: ‘Human Rights and State 
“Sovereignty”’ (1995/1996) 31 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L., pp. 31-45, at p. 37. See on the problem of 
inferred consent, Kammerhofer, above n. 17, at pp. 533-536. For the problems of establishing the right 
to peace as a right recognised by customary international law, see: Higgins (1994), above n. 18, at p. 
103.  
45 Schachter, above n. 30, at p. 336; and Simma and Alston, above n. 29,  at pp. 90-100. 
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customary international law are under challenge.46 Moreover, notwithstanding the 
limitations of customary international law as a source of fundamental rights 
protection, it fulfils an essential role in complementing gaps in the scope and 
membership of international treaties.47 The evolutive or ‘incremental’  development 
of customary international law makes it particularly appropriate for establishing 
norms to serve as a measure of justice which are capable of responding to changes in 
circumstances without waiting for the laborious process of  codification through 
international treaty law.48 For these reasons, customary international law has been 
adopted as an essential additional source of international fundamental rights standards 
to measure the justice of the AFSJ. 
 
2.4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The relationship between treaties and custom as sources of international law is 
complex but in their function as a measure of justice the position adopted here is to 
treat them as symbiotic and non-hierarchical sources. Symbiotic because treaty 
provisions may embody existing rules of customary law or may contribute to the 
formation of a new rule of customary law49 and non-hierarchical because there is no 
shared grundnorm of international law regulating their respective ranking.50  
 
                                                 
46 See Schachter, above n. 30, at p. 342;  Higgins (1994), above n. 18, at pp. 22-28; and Frederic L. 
Kirgis, ‘Custom on a Sliding Scale’ (1987) 81 AJIL, pp. 146-151. For a critical commentary on this 
development, see Anthea Roberts, ‘Righting Wrongs or Wronging Rights? The United States and 
Human Rights Post-September 11’ (2004) 15 EJIL, pp. 721-747, at pp. 737-741. See also, C. 
Campbell, ‘‘Wars on Terror’ and Vicarious Hegemons: The UK, International Law, and the Northern 
Ireland Conflict’ (2005) 54 ICLQ, pp. 321-356, at pp. 355-356. 
47 See Simma and Alston, above n. 29, at pp. 82-88. 
48 See for an important analysis of these features of customary international law and its advantages 
over ‘premature’ codification  in the context of humanitarian intervention: Jane Stromseth, ‘Rethinking 
humanitarian intervention: the case for incremental change’, in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane  
(eds), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge, 2003),  pp. 232-
272. 
49 See Higgins, above n. 18, at pp. 28-32. On the issue of the role of multilateral treaties  in the creation 
of customary law, see: Baxter, ‘Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law’ 
(1965-66) 41 BYIL, pp. 275-300.; and  Craig L. Carr and Garry L. Scott, ‘Multilateral Treaties and the 
Environment: A Case Study in the Formation of Customary International Law’ (1999) 27 Denv. J. Int’l 
Law and Pol’y, pp. 313-335. 
50 This view follows what Kammerhofer, above n. 17, at p. 275, refers to as the ‘default theory’: ‘The 
three main formal sources are not hierarchically ordered and the sources are themselves not 
normatively connected.’: at p. 549. Akehurst, above n. 17, at p. 275, reaches a similar conclusion: 
‘Where the maxim lex specialis derogat generali provides no clear guidance, or where it is shown not 
to reflect the intention of the States concerned, it seems that treaties and custom are of equal authority.’ 
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However, the issue of hierarchical ordering arises not only between the sources of 
international law but also between different categories of norms which have been 
developed to bestow ‘higher’ normativity on one specific category of norms, whether 
derived from custom or treaty.51 Thus fundamental rights norms of international law 
overlap with other normative categories such as peremptory norms (jus cogens),52 
obligations erga omnes,53 international crimes,54 and non-derogable rights.55 The 
establishment of a hierarchy of norms in the field of fundamental rights based on such 
categories has generally been opposed on the basis that prioritising certain rights at 
the expense of others would threaten the interdependence and indivisibility of human 
rights.56  However, recent academic opinion has been more favourable to an ordering 
of fundamental rights, arguing for example that non-derogable rights can form the 
basis of understanding hierarchy in international law.57   
 
                                                 
51 See for a critique of this development, Higgins, above n. 18, at pp. 20-22. 
52 The effect of jus cogens on conflicting treaties is regulated in Articles 53 and 64 of the 1969 VCLT 
and in identical terms in Articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between 
States and International Organizations (VCLT(SIO)), adopted 21 March 1986, not in force: UN Doc. 
A/Conf. 129/15. The ICJ has cited the view of the International Law Commission in its work on 
codification of the law of treaties that the prohibition on the use of force is a ‘conspicuous example of a 
rule of international law having the character of jus cogens.’: in Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits) Judgment 27 June 1986 
(1986) ICJ Reports 14, at para. 190. See for comments: Fred L. Morrison, ‘Legal Issues in the 
Nicargua Opinion’ (1987) 81 AJIL, pp. 160-166; and John Tasioulas, ‘In Defence of Relative 
Normativity: Communitarian Values and the Nicaragua Case’ (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, pp. 85-128. Other examples of jus cogens are cited in G. Schwarzenberger, ‘International jus 
cogens?’ (1965) 43 Texas Law Review, pp. 455-478. See generally, L. Hannikainen, Peremptory 
Norms (Jus cogens) in International Law: Historical Developments, Criteria, Present Status (Helsinki, 
Finnish Lawyers Publishing, 1988); and Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations 
Erga Omnes (Oxford, OUP, 1997). See further Section 4.4 of Chapter four. 
53 The Barcelona Traction case gives examples of obligations erga omnes: ‘Such obligations derive, 
for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of 
genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning basic rights of the human person, including 
protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have 
entered into the body of general international law …; others are conferred by international instruments 
of universal or quasi-universal character.’ Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited 
(Belgium v. Spain), Judgment 5 February 1970 (1970) ICJ Reports 3, at para. 34.  
54 On the difficulties of defining an international crime, see: Claire de Than and Edwin Shorts, 
International Criminal Law and Human Rights (London, Thomson, 2003), at p. 13. On the distinction 
between international crimes and international delicts, see P. Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in 
International Law?’ (1983) 77 AJIL, pp. 413-442, at pp. 423-424. 
55 See Teraya Koji, ‘Emerging Hierarchy in International Human Rights and Beyond: From the 
Perspective of Non-Derogable Rights’ (2001) 12 EJIL, pp. 917-941.  
56 See on the issue of hierarchy in international law:  Weil, above n. 54; and for an analysis applied to 
fundamental rights: T. Meron, ‘On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights’ (1986) 80 AJIL, pp. 1-
23.  
57 Koji, above n. 55; and J. Tasioulas, above n. 52;  but see the critique of Tasioulas’ position  by J. 
Beckett, ‘Behind Relative Normativity: Rules and Process as Prerequisites of Law’ (2001) 12 EJIL, pp. 
627-650. 
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However, these categories have not been adopted in this study as the standard for 
evaluating the justice of the Union’s legal order since there remains considerable 
uncertainty in identifying the rights falling within each category.58 Another drawback 
of adopting a particular category of rights such as jus cogens or non-derogable rights 
is that it may result in prioritizing a specific sub-set of fundamental rights, and in 
particular civil and political rights, at the expense of economic, social and cultural 
rights or emerging rights such as the right to democratic governance.59   Such a result 
would run counter to the main objective of adopting a standard which is sufficiently 
demanding and dynamic to test the validity of the Union’s claim both internally and 
externally for the justice of its legal order. 
 
 
2.5 INTERNATIONAL FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AS A MEASURE OF 
JUSTICE 
 
2.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Justice is a normative concept which does not have a single settled meaning. 
Assigning a meaning to justice is therefore not a descriptive but an evaluative 
exercise: ‘Philosophers of justice understand that they are taking sides: that their 
theories are as normative as the claims about justice and injustice that politicians, 
leader writers and citizens make.’60 International fundamental rights have been 
selected in this study as the most appropriate value to be attributed to the notion of 
justice in the context of the AFSJ.  
 
                                                 
58 In the case of non-derogable rights, the uncertainty arises not from the identification of the rights but 
in determining a common rationale for non-derogable rights which vary between treaties: ‘However, 
the term of non-derogable rights is often employed with different connotations within the same treaty. 
In fact, the criteria used to identify non-derogable rights vary in both their formulation and rationale.’ 
Koji, above n. 55, at p. 921. 
59 On the need for a broad view of human rights to encompass all those listed in the UNDHR, see Mary 
Robinson, ‘From Rhetoric to Reality: Making Human Rights Work’ (2003) 1 EHRLR, pp. 1-8, at pp. 2-
4. For the emerging right to democratic governance, see Susan Marks, The Riddle of all Constitutions: 
International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology (Oxford, OUP, 2000) and Thomas M. 
Franck, The Empowered Self: Law and Society in the Age of Individualism (Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp. 
255-276. On the problems associated with the promotion of new fundamental rights outside established  
international procedures, see Philip Alston, ‘Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality 
Control’ (1984) 78 AJIL, pp. 607- 621. 
60 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy’ (2004) 24 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 1-38, at p. 8. 
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There are several reasons for adopting fundamental rights, and in particular those 
derived from international law, as a measure of the justice of the Union’s legal order. 
Firstly, such rights are objectively ascertainable and exert normative force. Secondly, 
they lay strong, if not undisputed, claims to universality and neutrality and thus avoid 
or at least mitigate the charge that they represent a particular or partial political or 
cultural tradition. Thirdly, as discussed in section 2.5.4 below, fundamental rights are 
treated by a number of leading theorists as an essential component of any meaningful 
conception of justice. Each of these justifications is examined in turn. 
 
2.5.2 OBJECTIVITY  
 
Legal theory, and in particular legal positivism, favours a clearly established legal 
source for a right to be characterised as such.61 International law as a source of norms 
generally satisfies this requirement: ‘When States enter an agreement, or when some 
behaviour is understood to turned from habit into custom, the assumption is that 
something that was loose and disputed crystallizes into something that is fixed and 
ascertainable.’62 Standards recognised by international law benefit from validity and 
universality which qualities are the consequence of their formal identification as rules 
of international law.63  
 
The identification of a fundamental rights standard as one recognised by international 
law is not, however, per se a sufficient condition for determining whether it provides 
a just standard with which the Union ought to comply.64  A norm of international law 
may violate a particular conception of justice, such as the principle of non-
                                                 
61 ‘In any legal system, whether a given norm is legally valid, and hence whether it forms part of the 
law of that system, depends on its sources, not its merits (where merits, in the relevant sense, include 
the merits of its sources.)’: J. Gardner, ‘Legal Positivism: 5 1/2 Myths’ (2001) 46 American Journal of 
Jurisprudence, pp. 199-229, at p. 222.  For a trenchant criticism of the ‘sources’ theory, see Dworkin, 
above n. 60, at pp. 19-23. See generally: D. Dyzenhaus, ‘The Genealogy of Legal Positivism’ (2004) 
24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 39-67.  
62 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘What is International Law for?’, in Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford, 
OUP, 2003), pp. 89-114, at p. 102. 
63 For the advantages of the formalist perspective of international law, and a comparison with 
instrumentalism, see Koskenniemi, ibid., at pp. 102-103. For an analysis of international law in the 
context of transitional justice, see: C. Bell, C. Campbell and A. Ní Fionnuala, ‘Justice Discourses 
in Transition’ (2004) 13 Social and Legal Studies, pp. 305-328, at p. 323. 
64 See, Dyzenhaus for a discussion of the issue of normative force and legal positivists such as Hobbes, 
Bentham and Hart: above n. 61, at pp. 57-58.  
24 
interference in a sovereign state’s internal affairs where non-interference may permit 
genocide or crimes against humanity.65   
 
2.5.3 NEUTRAL VALUES 
 
The second advantage of fundamental rights standards recognised by international 
law is that they are more resistant than fundamental rights norms based on a 
fundamentalist or objectivist approach66 to the arguments of cultural relativists that 
such norms reflect a specific moral tradition or ideological agenda, and in particular 
that of Western liberal values.67 Several arguments have been deployed against 
cultural relativism which has undoubtedly weakened its currency. In one set of 
arguments, a conflict between cultural values and the universality of human rights is 
denied on the basis that human rights are ideologically neutral,68 or it is argued that 
the fundamental source of conflict is political and ideological rather than cultural,69 or 
the conflict between human rights and cultural values is recognised but the former are 
treated as overriding such values.70 A second approach developed by John Rawls has 
been to accept that there is a valid objection to human rights foundationalism based 
on the Western liberal philosophical tradition. In response Rawls has proposed a 
theory of international justice designed to overcome the objections of cultural 
relativists by incorporating a pared down set of fundamental rights as a necessary 
                                                 
65 The relationship of justice and international law is explored further in Section 2.5.4 below. For 
an example of the consequences of non-interference, see Vaclav Havel, ‘Stop North Korea’s evil 
regime’, in the Irish Times of 18 June 2004: available at 
<http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/opinion/2004/0618/1209300306OPHVAEL.html>.   
66 For the distinction between the positivist and the objectivist conception of fundamental rights, see  
Jaqueline Dutheil de la Rochère, ‘The EU and the Individual: Fundamental Rights in the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty’ (2004) 41 CML Rev., pp. 345-354, at p. 346. 
67 See R. Rorty, ‘Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality’, in S. Schute and S. Hurley (eds.), On 
Human Rights: The Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York, Basic Books, 1993), pp. 111-134, at p. 116. 
For a survey of the debate on universalism and cultural relativism, see Henry J. Steiner and Philip 
Alston (eds.), International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (2nd edn.) (Oxford, OUP, 
2000), at pp. 366-402. An excellent analysis of the links between liberalism and human rights is 
presented by Makau wa Mutua in ‘Politics and Human Rights’, in Byers (ed.), The Role of Law in 
International Politics (Oxford, OUP, 2000), pp. 149-175. 
68 Thomas Scanlon, ‘Human Rights as a Neutral Concern’ in P. G. Brown and D. Maclean (eds.) 
Human Rights and US Foreign Policy, Principles and Applications (Lexington, Lexington Books, 
1979), pp. 83- 92. 
69 Fred Halliday, ‘Relativism and Universalism in Human Rights: the Case of the Islamic Middle East’, 
in David Beetham (ed.), Politics and Human Rights (New York, Blackwell, 1993), pp. 152-167. 
70 P. Jones, Rights (London, Macmillan, 1994). 
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condition of a regime’s legitimacy.71 In response to critiques of cultural relativism, 
recent advocates have argued for ‘a multicultural approach in the reconstruction of 
the entire edifice of human rights’ and preferred the terms ‘cultural agnostics’ or 
‘human rights pluralists’.72 However, both sides of the debate now accept that a core 
set of fundamental rights constitute an irreducible minimum for a defensible 
conception of justice. Fundamental rights recognised by international law provide a 
determinable but evolving standard. 
 
In the context of the Union, the requirement to identify a standard that accommodates 
the rich diversity of historical traditions and cultures of the Member States is 
particularly compelling. While the current Member States have primarily, but far 
from exclusively, developed within the Judaeo-Christian and Enlightenment 
traditions, other traditions have contributed to the formation of European ideas and 
future member states of the Union may not share the same background.73 Moreover, 
within each of the Member States there is a rich, diverse and cosmopolitan set of 
communities comprised both of citizens of the Union and non-citizens who are 
entitled to tolerance,74 equal consideration and equal treatment irrespective of their 
culture or beliefs. Any standard adopted for the evaluation of the justice of the 
Union’s legal order must therefore be equally applicable to Union citizens and non-
citizens alike, independently of their cultural or ideological background or beliefs.75 
                                                 
71 See John Rawls, ‘The Law of Peoples’, in S. Shute and S. Hurley (eds.), On Human Rights: The 
Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York, Basic Books, 1993), pp. 41-82.  For a critical discussion of Rawls’ 
restricted list of core rights and proposals for its extension, see:  A. Buchanan, ‘Justice, Legitimacy, 
and Human Rights’, in V. Davion and C. Wolf (eds.), The Idea of Political Liberalism: Essays on 
Rawls (Maryland, Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), pp. 73-89. 
72 See Makau wa Mutua, in Byers (ed.), above n. 67, pp. 149-175, at p. 166. 
73 Turkey is a candidate for accession, as are potentially a number of West Balkan states with a diverse 
set of religious and ideological traditions, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania. For a 
discussion of diversity and identity in the history of Europe, see: Thomas M. Franck, above n. 59, at 
pp. 6-17. 
74 On the importance of toleration ‘based on mutual recognition and mutual acceptance of divergent 
worldviews’, see: Jürgen Habermas, ‘Intolerance and Discrimination’ (2003) 1 Int. J. Constitutional 
Law, pp. 2-12. 
75 The requirement for equality is set out as a value of the Union in Article I-2 of the Constitution. 
Article II-81(1) provides: ‘Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or 
social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership 
of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited’. Article 
I-45 provides: ‘In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, 
who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.’ The retention of 
citizenship as a core criterion for the principle of equality is debatable and should not be extended to 
the field of fundamental rights. ‘But the premise of human rights is that fundamental rights flow from 
our common humanity, not from legal concepts such as nationality.’: Rabinder Singh Q.C., ‘Equality: 
The Neglected Virtue’ (2004) 2 EHRLR, pp. 140-157, at p. 144. 
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Fundamental rights norms recognized by international law most closely meet these 
requirements.76 
 
2.5.4   A RECOGNISED CRITERION OF JUSTICE  
 
Many of the arguments used to defend the universality of fundamental rights 
standards are relevant to the task of justifying the use of such standards derived from 
international law for assessing the justice of the Union’s legal order.  While, as 
discussed below, several leading contemporary theories of justice have incorporated 
fundamental rights as a core component, they have not adopted international norms 
for this purpose. This approach seems in part based on concerns that the adoption of 
international norms would leave the theory open to challenge from cultural relativists 
and this argument has been addressed in the preceding section. A second objection to 
adopting such standards is based on the view that international law is the product of 
the Westphalian state system and as such is incapable of satisfying acceptable criteria 
of justice: ‘The rules applicable among states cannot be expected to embody 
principles of justice because the notion of states, itself, is an arbitrary and unfair 
suspension of personal equality.’77  However, the view that only states are legitimate 
representatives of the interests of their citizens at the international level is 
increasingly challenged.78 In this context, international human rights constitute a 
preferable standard of justice, both in terms of determinacy and acceptability, to a sui 
generis list of fundamental rights or alternative standards such as international 
principles of equity.  
 
The following analysis of contemporary theories of international justice has the 
limited objective of justifying the adoption of international human rights as the 
standard of justice for the Union’s legal order. The theories set themselves a different 
objective, namely establishing a standard for evaluating the justice or fairness of the 
international legal order. The different characteristics of the Union’s legal order and 
                                                 
76 For the widespread popular acceptance of democracy and core fundamental rights as basic values of 
the Union, see Anne Peters, ‘European Democracy after the 2003 Convention’ (2004) 41 CML Rev., 
pp. 37-85, at p. 74. 
77 Franck, ‘Is Justice Relevant to the International Legal System’, above n. 2, at p. 963. 
78 See: Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, above n. 2, at pp. 196-223; Richard 
Falk, On Humane Governance (Cambridge, Polity, 1995); and Thomas W. Pogge, World Poverty and 
Human Rights, Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms (Cambridge, Polity, 2002), at pp. 168-195. 
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the international legal order justifies adopting a different measure of justice.79  
Nevertheless, it is useful to examine in more detail the role played by fundamental 
rights and alternative measures of justice developed in contemporary legal theory to 
assess the justice of the international legal order in order to determine how far such 
standards converge, or diverge from, fundamental rights norms as embodied in 
international law.80 If theories of international justice attribute a central role to 
fundamental rights, the argument for adopting international human rights norms as a 
measure of justice for the Union’s legal order is strengthened by analogy. 
 
Rawls in formulating his influential The Law of Peoples specifies the requirement for 
a well-ordered hierarchical society’s system of law to secure a minimum set of basic 
rights: 
 
‘… we can say that its conception of the common good of justice secures for 
all persons at least certain minimum rights to means of subsistence and 
security (the right to life), to liberty (freedom from slavery, serfdom, and 
forced occupations) and (personal) property, as well as to formal equality as 
expressed by the rules of natural justice (for example, that similar cases be 
treated similarly).’81  
 
The rights listed by Rawls, while in some cases corresponding to rights recognized in 
international instruments, are presented as an autonomous list derived from the 
requirements of his theory of the law of peoples.  
 
Buchanan has criticised the minimalism of Rawls’ list of rights within the framework 
of Rawls’ own theory: 
 
‘A plausible understanding of the burdens of judgment and the idea of fair 
terms of cooperation carries us beyond the truncated list of Rawlsian human 
                                                 
79 These separate characteristics are set out by Weiler and Haltern, in Slaughter, Sweet and Weiler 
(eds.), above n. 2, especially at pp. 336-342. See, however, Eileen Denza, ‘Two Legal Orders: 
Divergent or Convergent?’ (1999) 49 ICLQ, pp. 257-284.   
80 Theories of justice date back to the origins of political philosophy, and notably the works of Aristotle 
and Socrates. The following discussion is limited to contemporary theories. 
81 Rawls, above n. 71, at p. 62. He also refers to the right to practice a religion ‘in peace and without 
fear’ and the right of emigration: ibid., at p. 63. 
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rights and much closer to what might be called the mainstream of 
contemporary human rights doctrine.’82  
 
However, in his  ‘attempt to develop moral foundations for international law’83 
Buchanan also adopts a justice based approach which, in one of the two senses he 
posits,84 places basic human rights at the center of his conception of justice: 
 
 ‘… justice, understood chiefly as respect for basic human rights, serves as 
the fundamental vantage point from which to evaluate the existing 
international legal system and to formulate proposals for improving it;’85 
 
Buchanan defines basic human rights for this purpose as: 
 
 ‘… rights whose violation poses the most serious threat to the individual’s 
chance of living a decent human life. Put more positively, they are those 
rights that, if respected, protect those interests that are most crucial for having 
a good human life.’86  
 
Buchanan then provides a non-exhaustive list of such basic human rights which 
substantially overlaps with the list of Rawlsian basic rights outlined above, but is 
extended to include, inter alia, the right to resources for subsistence, the right to 
freedom of expression, and the right to association.87 These rights are ‘acknowledged 
in the central human rights conventions of the existing system of international law’88 
but are more limited than the full range of treaty rights since some do not meet 
Buchanan’s definition of basic rights.  
 
As indicated above, the reasons for Rawls and Buchanan restricting the list of basic 
rights as against internationally recognized standards are related to the requirements 
of their theoretical objectives: in the case of Rawls the establishment of a law of 
peoples which can legitimate certain types of hierarchical society; and in the case of 
                                                 
82 Buchanan (2000), above n. 71, at p. 88. See also: Tom Campbell, ‘Human Rights: The Shifting 
Boundaries’, in T. Campbell, J. Goldsworthy and A. Stone (eds.), Protecting Human Rights: 
Instruments and Institutions (Oxford, OUP, 2003), pp. 17-37, at pp. 34-37. 
83 Alan Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination (Oxford, OUP, 2004), at p. 1. 
84 The other is to ensure access to ‘institutions of justice – understood as institutions that protect their 
basic human rights ..’, ibid.,  at p. 73. 
85 Ibid., at p. 73. 
86 Ibid., at p. 129. 
87 Ibid.,  at p. 129. 
88 Ibid., at p. 129. 
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Buchanan the development of a moral theory of international law. However, these 
requirements do not apply to the task of measuring the justice of the Union’s legal 
order. There is no compelling reason, therefore, to adopt their approach and restrict 
the list of fundamental rights to a sub-set of fundamental rights recognized by 
international law.  
 
Another leading theorist on international justice, Thomas Pogge, also attaches a 
central role to fundamental rights in creating an internationally acceptable core 
criterion of basic justice.89  However, in order to deflect the arguments of cultural 
relativism, Pogge avoids ‘any conceptual connection of human rights with legal 
rights’ but instead defines a human right as a ‘moral claim on any coercive social 
institutions imposed upon oneself and therefore a moral claim against anyone 
involved in their imposition.’90 Pogge then postulates: 
 
‘the preeminent requirement on all coercive institutional schemes is that they 
afford each human being secure access to minimally adequate shares of basic 
freedoms and participation, of food, drink, clothing, shelter, education, and 
health care.’91  
 
Pogge’s theory is developed for establishing ‘an internationally acceptable core 
criterion of justice’ and he recognises that national institutions may be subject to a 
‘stronger criterion of justice that involves a more specific measure of human 
flourishing.’92 It is the argument advanced in this research that in the case of the 
Union’s legal order such a stronger criterion can best be provided by international 
fundamental rights. 
 
Finally, it is instructive to consider whether measures of justice based on concepts 
other than fundamental rights and applied to evaluate international law might be of 
relevance to the Union’s legal order. Thomas Franck adopts fairness rather than 
justice in his analysis of international law and breaks down fairness into ‘a composite 
                                                 
89 Pogge, above n. 78, at pp. 44-45.  For a critique, see Samantha Besson, ‘Human Rights, Institutional 
Duties and Cosmopolitan Responsibilities’ (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 507-523. 
90 Pogge, above n. 78, at p. 46. See for the difficulties of such a separation of human rights and legal 
rights: Besson, above n. 89, at pp. 519-521 
91 Pogge, above n. 78, at p. 51. 
92 Ibid., at p. 50. Although Pogge’s theory is of relevance to domestic legal orders, see Besson, above 
n. 89, at p. 514. 
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of independent variables: legitimacy and justice.’93 However, Franck selects 
principles of equity derived from common principles of municipal legal systems, and 
not fundamental rights, as fulfilling a ‘growing role in ensuring the fairness of the 
system.’94 However, equitable principles in international law are open to the criticism 
of judicial subjectivity: 
 
‘What is disturbing about ‘the equitable principles to produce equitable 
results’ formula is not that there are choices being made to achieve a result – 
but that the result is nowhere articulated other than the self-serving 
description of ‘equitable.’95    
 
Equitable principles, whether derived from international law or the national legal 
systems of the Member States, in view of their indeterminacy and excessive reliance 
on judicial subjectivity would not provide an appropriate measure of justice for the 
Union’s legal order. 
 
Two points can be made from this survey of the relationship between fundamental 
rights and conceptions of justice applied to international law. Firstly, fundamental 
rights generally form one, if not the core, element of a theory of justice which seeks 
to address the issues of cultural relativism and create a notion of justice with 
reasonable claims for universal validity and acceptability. Secondly, the basic 
fundamental rights identified in the theories of justice developed by Rawls, Buchanan 
and Pogge are too minimalist or lacking in specificity to serve as a standard to judge 
the Union’s legal order.96  In the context of the Union’s legal order, international 
fundamental rights provide the necessary determinacy, objectivity and neutrality to 
provide a fair measure of justice. 
 
 
93 Franck, Fairness in International Law, above n. 2, at p. 47. 
94 Ibid., at p. 80. 
95 Higgins, above n. 18, at p. 227.  For a reply to Higgins’ critique, see Franck, Fairness in 
International Law, above n. 2, at pp. 49-50. 
96 Rawls indeed specifies that the conception of human rights in the law of peoples has been developed 
to accommodate both liberal and hierarchical societies: above n. 71, at p. 68. There is no need for such 
accommodation when evaluating the Union’s legal order.  
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3 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE 
AUTONOMY OF UNION LAW 
  3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Union’s legal order has had an ambivalent relationship towards international law 
from its inception. In some of its earliest judgments the ECJ, while recognizing the 
international law basis of the Treaties, was at pains to stress the specificity of the 
Union’s legal order.1 The ECJ has preferred to base its judicial reasoning in 
developing general principles of law from national sources rather than international 
law.2 This approach is in part explained by the fact that the judges of the ECJ ‘have 
reasoned as national lawyers thinking about international relations’3 but also reflected 
a political judgment that the objectives of the Union would best be secured by 
securing the autonomy of the Union’s legal order.4  
Autonomy is asserted as an objective for the Union’s legal order both in the context 
of autonomy from the national legal orders of the Member States and from the 
                                                 
1 Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlands Administrtatie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1 (Van 
Gend en Loos). See for the specificity of Union law, J.H.H. Weiler and Ulrich R. Haltern, 
‘Constitutional or International? The Foundations of the Community Legal Order and the Question of 
Judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz’, in The European Court and National Courts – Doctrine and 
Jurisprudence, in Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.) (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 1998), pp. 331-364, at pp. 139-140. See also Anne Peters, ‘The Position of International 
Law within the Community Legal Order’ (1997) German Yearbook of International Law, pp. 1-77, at 
pp. 10-11. This characterisation has not been accepted by all commentators: Bruno de Witte, ‘Rules of 
Change in International Law: How Special is the European Community?’ (1994) 25 Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law, pp. 299-333; and Theodor Schilling, ‘The Autonomy of the 
Community Legal Order – An Analysis of Possible Foundations’ (1996) 37 Harvard Int’l L. J.,  pp. 
389-409; (1996a); and ‘Rejoinder: The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order.’: Jean Monnet 
Working Paper No. 10/96: available at <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/96/9610-
Rejoinde.html.> (1996b). For an analysis of the impact of the creation of the three pillar structure in 
the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht on the debate as to the nature of the Union’s legal order, see: Eileen 
Denza, ‘Two Legal Orders: Divergent or Convergent?’ (1999) 48 ICLQ, pp. 257-284, at pp. 270-273 . 
2 See Ole Spiermann, ‘The Other Side of the Story: An Unpopular Essay on the Making of the 
European Community Legal Order (1999) 10 EJIL, pp. 763-789, at p. 777. For a detailed exposition of 
the important role comparative studies of the national law of the Member States played in the 
development of Union law, see: K. Lenaerts, ‘Interlocking Orders in the European Union and 
Comparative Law’ (2003) 52 ICLQ, pp. 873-906. 
3 Spiermann, above n. 2, at p. 778.  
4 ‘The Community’s aspiration for autonomy, therefore, appears to be an attempt to achieve and 
strengthen an identity of its own.’: Robert Uerpmann, ‘International Law as an Element of European 
Constitutional Law: International Supplementary Constitutions’, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 
9/03, at p. 45; available at <http://www.jeanmonnet-program.org/papers/03/030901-02.html>.   
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international legal order.5 The keystone doctrines of direct effect and supremacy form 
the basis for the autonomy of the Union’s constitutional order:  
 
‘The essential characteristics of the Community legal order which has thus 
been established are in particular its primacy over the law of the Member 
States and the direct effect of a whole series of provisions which are 
applicable to their nationals and to the Member States themselves.’6  
 
The theory of supremacy confers on international law incorporated into Union law 
supremacy over conflicting national law, including posterior legislation and 
constitutional law.7 The theory of direct effect confers on the ECJ, and not the courts 
of the Member States, jurisdiction to determine whether or not an international treaty 
obligation of the Community confers an enforceable individual right capable of being 
invoked within the Union’s legal order.8  
The Constitution, while not expressly incorporating the doctrine of direct effect, 
enshrines the doctrine of supremacy in Title I of Part I headed ‘Definition and 
Objectives of the Union’. Article I-6 provides: ‘The Constitution and law adopted by 
the institutions of the Union in exercising competences conferred on it shall have 
                                                 
5 For an analysis of the concept of the autonomy of Community law and its possible meanings, see 
René Barents, The Autonomy of Community Law (Hague, Kluwer, 2004), at pp. 239-274. For an 
analysis of the principle of autonomy in the context of Community membership of international 
organisations: see Piet Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional 
Foundations (Oxford, OUP, 2004), at pp. 206-209. 
6 Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR 1-6079, at para. 20. The doctrine of supremacy was first established in 
Case 6/64, Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 (Costa). See generally: K. Alter, Establishing The 
Supremacy of European Law (Oxford, OUP, 2002). The doctrine of direct effect was first 
established  in Van Gend en Loos, above n. 1. For an analysis of Costa and Van Gend en Loos 
from an international law perspective see: Spiermann, above n. 2, at pp. 765-775. 
7 Peters points out that this conclusion depends on whether one accepts that a rule of international law 
accepted into the Union’s legal order law is ‘transformed’ into Union law and thus subject to the Costa 
rule of supremacy or whether it retains its character as a norm of international law and therefore its 
reception into national law depends on the constitution of each Member State: above n. 1, at pp. 23-35. 
Eeckhout argues that Article 300(7) EC Treaty does not resolve this issue: ‘The provision is limited to 
expressing the binding character of agreements concluded by the Community, and it does not describe 
the legal consequences or effects of this characteristic.’: above n. 5, at p. 277. 
8 Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641. In the case of a mixed agreement 
this jurisdiction only extends to that part of the agreement within the Union’s competence: Cases C-
390 & 392/98, Parfums Christian Dior v. Tuk Consultancy [2000] ECR I-11307. For a detailed 
discussion of the doctrine of direct effect of international agreements in Union law in the context of the 
WTO, see Uerpmann, above n. 4, at pp. 10-26. Uerpmann compares direct effect in Community law to 
the notion of ‘self-execution’ treaties in national law: ‘Norms are on the whole only self-executing if 
the courts can interpret and apply them without taking on political functions.’:  ibid., at p. 12. He also 
would apply the notion of direct effect independently of the conferral by the treaty of an individual 
right: ibid., at p. 12. See generally Eeckhout, above n. 5, at pp. 274-344. 
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primacy over the law of the Member States’. The first Declaration to the Constitution 
provides in respect of Article I-6: ‘The Conference notes that Article I-6 reflects 
existing case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and of the 
Court of First Instance.’ The combined effect of Article I-6 and the attached 
Declaration is to consolidate the existing scope of the doctrine of supremacy rather 
than provide the basis for a radical extension.9 However, constitutional recognition of 
the doctrine of supremacy would weaken the legitimacy of decisions by national 
constitutional courts contesting the doctrine.10 
However, the radical potential of the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect to 
remove from national courts of the Member States power to determine the conformity 
of Union law with their national constitutions and international law has led to 
reservations as to their scope by both national and international judicial authorities.11 
In particular, Article 103 of the UN Charter12 and the rules of jus cogens13 may be 
cited as examples of international law obligations of the Member States which take 
precedence over their obligations under the Treaties.  
This Chapter analyses the basis and justification for the Union’s pursuit of the 
objective of autonomy and argues that the objective of effective protection of 
fundamental rights in the Union’s legal order should be accorded priority. In 
particular, the Chapter focuses on one specific aspect of the autonomy of Union law 
                                                 
9 Without the Declaration, the text of Article I-6 was open to an expansionist reading: see A. 
Dashwood, ‘The Relationship Between the Member States and the European Union/European 
Community’ (2004) 41 CML Rev., pp. 355-381, at pp. 379-380. Such an extension was not the 
intention behind Article I-6 and the Declaration makes this clear.  See also the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the European Union, 6th Report, The Future Role of the European Court of Justice; HL 
Paper 47, Session 2003-2004, printed 2 March 2004, at paras. 32-53. For a discussion of the doctrine 
of supremacy in the context of secession from the Union by a Member State, see Raymond J. Friel, 
‘Providing a Constitutional Framework for Withdrawal from the EU: Article 59 of the Draft European 
Constitution’ (2004) 53 ICLQ , pp. 407-428, at pp. 411-415. 
10 See in this sense: Anneli Albi and Peter Van Elsuwege, ‘The EU Constitution, national constitutions 
and sovereignty: as assessment of a “European constitutional order”’ (2004) 29 EL Rev., pp. 741- 765, 
at p. 751. 
11 The German Bundesfinanzhof  has ruled that Community legislation in violation of international law 
‘falls outside the scope of the Member States’ constitutional authorisation of Community powers and 
therefore does not bind the Member States.’; Order of 9 January 1996 (1996) 7 Europäische Zeitschrift 
für Wirtschaftsrecht, 126, at pp. 127-128: cited in Peters, above n. 1, at p. 19, n. 45. The position of the 
ECtHR is explored in Section 3.3 below. 
12 ‘In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the 
present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under 
the present Charter shall prevail.’ See Eeckhout, above n. 5, at pp. 440-441. Article 307 EC Treaty may 
provide a solution for a Member State faced with such a conflict: see Section 4.2.3 of Chapter four. 
13 ‘ .. international jus cogens, which cannot be abrogated, is per definitionem  superior to all other 
law.’: Peters, above n. 1, at p. 37. 
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that is interpreted so as to require preservation of the position of the ECJ as ‘sole 
supreme arbiter of questions of Union law and on the validity of Union Acts’.14 This 
Chapter examines three specific areas where the foundations of the principle of the 
autonomy of Union law as applied to the status of the ECJ have been subject to 
challenge from the national and international legal orders. The principal argument 
advanced is that the principle of autonomy needs to be refined to ensure that 
international fundamental rights standards are interpreted and applied in the Union 
legal order in a manner that is consistent with the international law obligations both of 
the Union and the Member States.  The first section examines the issue of whether the 
ECJ has judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz. The second section investigates whether the 
ECJ has competence to rule on the legality of Union law, and in particular primary 
Union law. The final section addresses the question of the hierarchy within the 
Union’s legal order between judgments of the ECJ and those of the ECtHR.  
3.2 JUDICIAL KOMPETENZ-KOMPETENZ 
3.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The question of whether the ECJ is the ultimate arbiter of the Union’s legal order has 
generally been framed in terms of which body has final authority to determine the 
scope of the Union’s competences, or the issue of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz.15 
Weiler and Haltern have emphasized the significance of determining judicial 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz: ‘Since the jurisdictional limits laid out in the European 
Treaties are notoriously difficult to identify with precision, the question of who gets 
                                                 
14 Final Report of Working Group II (WGII) on “Incorporation of the Charter/Accession to the ECHR” 
(WGII Final Report); CONV 354/02: WG II 16, Brussels, October 22, 2002, at p. 12. Available on the 
European Convention website. For the political dimension to this claim, see Report on the 
Relationships between International Law, Community Law and the Constitutional Law of the Member 
States, European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights, adopted on 24 
September 1997, A4-0278/97, PE 220.225/fin, 14. Available on the European Parliament’s website: 
<http://www.europarl.eu.int/>.  
15 ‘The question as to which jurisdiction, Community or national, has the ultimate authority to declare 
the unconstitutionality of Community measures on the grounds of ultra vires and effectively to become 
the arbiter of the jurisdictional limits of the Community legal order.’: Weiler and Haltern, in Slaughter, 
Sweet and Weiler (eds.), above n. 1, at p. 331. The question of legislative Kompetenz-Kompetenz is 
separate. The Member States as Herren der Verträge can amend the allocation of competences under 
the Treaties in accordance with Article 48 TEU. This situation is fundamentally unchanged by the 
corresponding provisions in the Constitution (Articles IV-443 to IV-445). However, Schilling, in his 
rejoinder to Weiler and Haltern, has argued that ‘there is a strong  prima facie case’ that legislative 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz is a necessary prerequisite of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz: above n. 1,  at 
paragraph I. 
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to decide is of tremendous political importance.’16 The constitutional significance of 
the answer to this question, and its relevance to the issue of the allocation of powers 
between the Union and the national legal orders of the Member States for determining 
the institutional basis for the protection of fundamental rights, may be illustrated by 
reference to Opinion 2/94.17  
 
If the ECJ had reached a different conclusion in Opinion 2/94, namely that the 
Community had competence under the EC Treaty to accede to the ECHR, a 
subsequent Council decision to accede to the ECHR may have been challenged before 
a national court of a Member State on the basis that accession exceeded the 
Community’s competence.18  If a national court of final instance had decided it had 
jurisdiction and that Community accession to the ECHR was ultra vires there would 
have been the potential for a crisis of confidence between the Union and the Member 
State’s legal order on a scale similar to that arising from the judgment of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court in ‘Solange I’.19  A refusal by a national court of final 
instance to give effect to the Community’s accession to the ECHR within its national 
legal order would have exposed the Member State to the risk of infringement 
proceedings under Article 226 EC Treaty for breach of the Member State’s 
obligations under Article 300(7) EC Treaty20 and may also have exposed the Member 
State to liability in damages.21  
                                                 
16 Weiler and Haltern, in Slaughter, Sweet and Weiler (eds.), above n. 1, at p. 333. 
17 [1996] ECR 1-1759. 
18 In practice, such a challenge may have been unlikely since the proposed basis for accession was 
Article 308 (ex Art. 235) EC Treaty which requires unanimity in the Council. However, a non-state 
actor may have challenged the legality of the Council’s accession decision. In Ireland such a challenge 
was successfully made to the proposed ratification of the 1986 Single European Act (SEA) in Crotty v 
An Taoiseach [1987] 1 IR 713. The Supreme Court of Ireland held that ratification of the SEA required 
prior amendment of the Irish Constitution since Title III of the SEA would otherwise impose 
unconstitutional restrictions on the Government’s power to determine freely its foreign policy. 
Amendment of the EC Treaty to enable the Community to accede to the ECHR would also have 
required a constitutional amendment in consequence of its significant implications for the status of 
rights protected under the Irish Constitution. Union accession to the ECHR without an amendment to 
the EC Treaty would therefore have deprived the Irish people of their constitutional right to vote in a 
referendum on accession. 
19 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft GmbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel (Solange I),  Decision of 29 May 1974, BvL 52/71, BVerfGE 37, 271; [1974] 2 CMLR 
540. In Solange I, the German Constitutional Court asserted its residual right to review the 
applicability of Community legislation with the fundamental rights provisions in the Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Germany. For a discussion of the background to the case and its effects, see 
Alter, above n. 6, at pp. 87-98. 
20 See T. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (5th edn.) (Oxford, 2003), at p. 225.  
21 See the recent decision of Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich: Case C-224/01 [2003] ECR I-
10239. In Köbler the ECJ held: ‘It follows from the foregoing that the principle according to which the 
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The potential for conflict between the Union and national legal orders over the 
delimitation of competences in respect of fundamental rights would not disappear 
under the Constitution.22 For example, such a conflict may arise in relation to 
determining the scope of the Union’s mandate to accede to the ECHR or the scope of 
the incorporated Charter.23 Conflict may also arise if the Union seeks accession to 
fundamental rights treaties other than the ECHR.24  The following sections analyse 
the basis for determination of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz firstly under the 
existing Treaties and secondly under the Constitution. The concluding section argues 
that attribution of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz to a new constitutional court is the 
preferred outcome from the perspective of the effective protection of fundamental 
rights in the Union. 
3.2.2 JUDICIAL KOMPETENZ-KOMPETENZ AND THE TREATIES 
 
Two conflicting solutions to the problem of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz have been 
proposed based on an international law interpretation of the Treaties.25 Schilling 
argues that ‘the Member States, individually, must have the final word on questions 
concerning the scope of the competences they have delegated to the Community.’26 
Weiler and Halter reach the opposite conclusion: ‘Surely the reach of an international 
                                                                                                                                            
Member States are liable to afford reparation of damages caused to individuals as a result of 
infringements of Community law for which they are responsible is also applicable where the alleged 
infringement stems from the decision of a court adjudicating at last instance.’, at para. 50. In that case 
no liability of the Austrian State for a failure by the Verwaltungsgerichthof  to make an Article 234 
reference was established as the infringement of Community law was not sufficiently serious. 
22 For a detailed discussion of the impact of the Constitution on the debate over judicial Kompetenz-
Kompetenz, see the report of the House of Lords Committee on the European Union (2003/2004), 
above n. 9, at paras. 54-81. 
23 Union accession to the ECHR and incorporation of the Charter is discussed in detail in Chapter five. 
See also Stephen Carruthers, ‘Beware of Lawyers Bearing Gifts: A Critical Evaluation of the Proposals 
on Fundamental Rights in the EU Constitutional Treaty’ (2004) 4 EHRLR, pp. 424-435.  
24 On the risk of disputes over delimitation of competences in the CSFP under the Constitution, see 
Eeckhout, above n. 5, at pp. 151-152. 
25 Reliance on the rules of international law to decide the issue is appropriate since the issue turns on 
the attribution of jurisdiction to determine the boundaries of the Treaties.  Schilling and Weiler and 
Haltern proceed on this basis: Schilling (1996a), above n. 1, at p. 405 and Weiler and Haltern, in 
Slaughter, Stone Sweet and Weiler (eds.), above n. 1, at  p. 336. A resolution of the issue by reference 
to national law will vary depending on the constitutional order of each Member State. In the event of a 
conflict between Union law and a Member State’s Constitution, the ECJ has ruled that Union law 
prevails: Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727, at 3744. The manner in which 
the national law of each Member State would resolve the issue is not further considered here. The 
2003/2004 Report of the House of Lords Committee on the European Union contains a summary of 
submissions on the position of national constitutional courts on the issue of Kompetenz-Kompetenz: 
above n. 9, at paras. 65-68.  
26 Schilling (1996a). above n. 1, at p. 407. Schilling’s arguments for this conclusion are set out at pp. 
403-409. 
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treaty is a matter of international law and depends on the proper interpretation of that 
treaty. Therefore from the internationalist perspective, the ECJ must be the final 
umpire of that system.’27 The following analysis does not attempt to resolve these 
conflicting interpretations of the Treaties based on international law but focuses on 
the ECJ’s position on the question of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz. The reason for 
this approach is that while the ECJ’s position on the issue is not conclusive from an 
international law perspective,28 it is nevertheless significant in establishing the basis 
from which the Member States conducted the negotiation of the provisions of the 
Constitution relevant to the demarcation of powers between the Union and the 
Member States.  
The ECJ has consistently ruled it has judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz  in determining 
the boundaries of both the internal and external powers of the Union.29 Internally, the 
ECJ has principally relied on Article 220 EC Treaty that requires the ECJ to ‘ensure 
that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed.’30 In the 
Tobacco Advertising Directive Case the ECJ held that in order to discharge its 
functions under Article 220 (ex 164) EC Treaty it had to verify whether, inter alia, 
Article 95 (ex 100a) EC Treaty was a proper basis for the Council adopting Directive 
89/552/EEC.31 In deciding that Article 95 EC Treaty did not provide such a basis, the 
ECJ was determining the scope of the Treaties and thus exercising the power of 
judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz. In the Airport Transit Visas Case the ECJ held that it 
had jurisdiction under Article 46 (ex. Article L) TEU to determine if a measure 
adopted by the Council in relation to airport transit visas under the TEU did ‘not 
                                                 
27 Weiler and Haltern, in Slaughter, Stone Sweet and Weiler (eds.), above n. 1, at p. 363. The authors 
marshall an impressive body of international case law and state practice to refute Schilling’s reliance 
on the doctrine of auto-interpretation:  Weiler and Haltern, ibid., at pp. 345-346. 
28 Judicial decisions of national courts form part of state practice: see Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source of 
International Law’ (1974-5) 47 BYIL, pp. 1-53, at p. 10. It seems reasonable to include decisions of the 
ECJ as part of the ‘state’ practice of the Union.  However, Akande cautions against excessive reliance 
on the practice of organs of international organizations: ‘Subsequent practice of organs should 
therefore be confined to cases where it establishes the agreement of the parties, confirms a result 
already reached or to cases where other methods of interpretation lead to an ambiguity or an 
unreasonable result.’: ‘International Organizations’, in Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford, OUP, 
2003), pp. 269-297, at p. 282. However, it is unclear if Akande would include a judicial institution 
such as the ECJ as an ‘organ’ of the Union.  
29 Weiler and Haltern, in Slaughter, Stone Sweet and Weiler (eds.), above n. 1, at p. 363. 
30 The conferral of jurisdictional powers on the ECJ under Articles 228, 230 and 234 EC Treaty also 
support the view it has judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz: see Weiler and Haltern, ibid., at pp. 348-356. It 
is also significant that in the Tobacco Advertising Directive Case, below n. 31, none of the intervening 
Member States pleaded  lack of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz  on the part of the ECJ. 
31 Case C-376/98, Germany v EP and Council [2000] ECR I-8419, at para. 84.   
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encroach upon the powers conferred by the EC Treaty on the Community’ in 
violation of Article 47 (ex. Article M) TEU.32   The ECJ therefore has asserted 
jurisdiction not only to determine the boundaries of the Union’s competences under 
the EC Treaty but also the demarcation of competences between the TEU and the EC 
Treaty. 
Externally, Article 300(6) EC Treaty provides the mechanism by which the ECJ has 
asserted judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz to determine the scope of the Union’s 
external competences. Article 300(6) EC Treaty provides the European Parliament 
(EP), the Council, the Commission or a Member State may obtain the opinion of the 
ECJ ‘as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the provisions of this 
Treaty’. In Opinion 2/00 the ECJ was asked to give an opinion under Article 300(6) 
EC Treaty as to the correct legal basis under the EC Treaty for conclusion of the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety adopted on 29 January 2000.33   The ECJ first 
confirmed the scope of its jurisdiction: 
 
 ‘… the Court has consistently stated that its opinion may be obtained, 
pursuant to Article 300(6) EC, in particular on questions concerning the 
division between the Community and the Member States of competences to 
conclude a given agreements with non-member countries …’.34  
The ECJ then set out in clear terms the nature of this jurisdiction:  
‘The choice of the appropriate legal basis has constitutional significance. 
Since the Community has conferred powers only, it must tie the Protocol to a 
Treaty provision which empowers it to approve such a measure. To proceed 
on an incorrect legal basis is therefore liable to invalidate the act concluding 
the agreement and so vitiate the Community’s consent to be bound by the 
agreement it has signed’.35  
As in the internal field, the ECJ has asserted judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz.36  
                                                 
32 Case C-170/96, Commission v Council [1988] ECR I-2763, at paras. 14-17. See for analysis of the 
case: Eeckhout, above n. 5, at pp. 148-151. See Chapter seven for analysis of the jurisdiction of the 
ECJ over the Third Pillar under Article 46 TEU. 
33 Opinion 2/00 [2001] ECR I-9713.  
34 Ibid., at para. 3. 
35 Ibid., at para.5. 
36 The fact that under Article 300(6) EC Treaty the reference for an opinion by the ECJ is discretionary 
does not detract from this conclusion. Even without a reference, the ECJ has competence to review the 
legality of the basis on which a decision is made by the Council to adopt an international agreement. 
Indeed, the Council argued in the Cartagena Protocol case that the Commission could have adopted 
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It has been argued that since the Member States have not a posteriori restricted the 
ECJ’s construction of the scope of its jurisdictional powers to rule on the Union’s 
competences by an amendment at the various revisions of the Treaties this practice 
may be treated as implied confirmation of the ECJ’s case law.37  However, an 
amendment of the Treaties requires the unanimous agreement of the Member States 
and therefore a failure to amend the Treaties to restrict the ECJ’s jurisdiction does not 
necessarily represent the views of all or even a majority of the Member States. In 
such circumstances non-amendment of the Treaties would not satisfy the 
requirements of subsequent practice as set out in Article 31(3)(b) VCLT.38 In 
conclusion, the failure of the Member States to amend the Treaties to resolve the 
judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz issue is inconclusive.39   
 
3.2.3 JUDICIAL KOMPETENZ-KOMPETENZ AND THE CONSTITUTION 
 
The Constitution does not explicitly address the issue of judicial Kompetenz-
Kompetenz as between the ECJ and the national constitutional courts. However, the 
retention of Article 220 EC Treaty and the new provisions on Union competences in 
Title III of Part I of the Constitution support the view that the Member States have 
accepted the judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the ECJ.40 Article I-29(1) is on the 
same terms as Article 220 EC Treaty which formed the basis for the ECJ’s decision in 
the Tobacco Advertising Directive Case.41 Working Group V (WGV), which was 
                                                                                                                                            
this procedure by challenging the decision to sign the Protocol on behalf of the Community: ibid., at 
para. 10. 
37 See for this argument Weiler and Haltern, in Slaughter, Stone Sweet and Weiler (eds.), above n. 1, at 
p. 351.  For omissions or failure to act as constitutive of state practice in the development of customary 
international law, see Akehurst, above n. 28, at p. 10. 
38 Article 31(3) VCLT: ‘There shall be taken into account, together with the context: … (b) any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation;’.    
39 On the political and institutional difficulties of amending the Treaties, or the ‘joint-decision trap’, 
see K. Alter, ‘Who are the “Masters of the Treaty”?: European Governments and the European Court 
of Justice’ (1998) 52 International Organization, pp. 121-147, at pp. 136-142. 
40 The submissions to the House of Lords Committee on the European Union were divided on whether 
the Constitution would alter the current position on the issue of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz: see the 
Committee Report (2003/2004), above n. 9, at para. 72-74. Professor Craig submitted that the inclusion 
of the principle of conferral in Article I-11(1) and (2) and the provisions on the competences of the 
Union strengthened the view that the national courts retained judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz: ibid., at 
para. 73.  
41 Cited above n. 31. An earlier version of Article I-29(1) of 25 November 2003, and numbered Article 
1-28(1), had a different wording: ‘It [the ECJ] shall ensure respect for the law in the interpretation and 
application of the Constitution.’: CIG 50/03. The 2004-2005 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC/CIG) 
documents are available at the IGC website:  
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mandated to report to the European Convention on the issue of complementary 
competences, endorsed the ECJ’s role in determining the competences of the Union:  
 
‘Exclusive competence and shared competence should be defined in the 
future Treaty in accordance with existing jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice, and areas of exclusive and shared competence respectively 
determined in accordance with the criteria developed by the Court.’42  
 
This recommendation was implemented in Article I-11 which sets out the 
fundamental principles applicable to the competences of the Union, Article I-12 
which defines the categories of competence, and Articles I-13 and I-14 which define 
the areas of exclusive and shared competence respectively.43  
 
WG V also recommended incorporating an extended version of Article 6(3) TEU 
which obligates the Union to respect the national identities of the Member States: 
 
‘Were the Court of Justice to be given power with respect to such an article in 
a future “basic treaty of constitutional significance”, the Court could be the 
ultimate interpreter of the provision if the political institutions went beyond a 
reasonable margin of appreciation.’44 
 
This recommendation was incorporated in a modified form as Article I-5(1): 
 
‘The Union shall respect the equality of the Member States before the 
Constitution as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental 
structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-
government. It shall respect the essential State functions, including ensuring 
the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and 
safeguarding national security.’   
 
                                                                                                                                            
<http://ue.eu.int/cms3_applications/Applications/igc/doc_register.asp?content=DOC&lang=EN&cmsi
d=754>. These documents are not further referenced. However, the reversion to the text of Article 220 
EC Treaty seems to have been a technical amendment rather than based on any substantive difference 
between the two versions.  
42 Final Report of Working Group V of 4 November 2002, CONV 375/1/02, at p. 7. Available on the 
European Convention website. 
43 See generally on the Union’s competences under the Constitution: Paul Craig, ‘Competence: Clarity, 
Conferral, Containment and Consideration’ (2004) 29 EL Rev., pp. 323-344. 
44 Final Report of Working Group V, above n. 42, at p. 11. 
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The interpretation of Article I-5(1) of the Constitution would fall within the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ.45 This conclusion is supported both by the absence of an 
express exclusion of the ECJ’s jurisdiction over Article I-5(1) and by the maintenance 
in Title VI of the Constitution of the substance of the existing provisions conferring 
jurisdiction on the ECJ.46   
 
The provisions of the Constitution on the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) further support the proposition that the Constitution validates the judicial 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the ECJ. In The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com v. HM 
Treasury and Bank of England (Centro-Com) the ECJ was referred questions on the 
validity of national measures of the British Treasury blocking payments to the 
plaintiff for medical products already exported to wholesalers in Montenegro in 
conformity with the applicable Community sanctions regulation against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia implementing UN Security Council Resolution 757.47 The 
British Government argued that the national measures were adopted:  
 
‘… by virtue of its national competence in the field of foreign and security 
policy and that performance of its obligations under the Charter and under 
resolutions of the United Nations falls within that competence. The validity of 
those measures cannot be affected by the exclusive competence of the 
Community in relation to the common commercial policy or by the Sanctions 
Regulation, which does no more than implement at Community level the 
exercise of Member States’ national competence in the field of foreign and 
security policy.’48  
 
                                                 
45 Article I-5(2) is a modified version of Article 10 EC Treaty and extends to the Union in paragraph 
one the Member States’ existing duty of sincere cooperation. It is justiciable on the basis of the 
existing case law of the ECJ which has interpreted the scope of that duty in the context of the direct 
effect of directives: see Case 14/83, Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 
1891, at para. 26. There are no grounds under the Constitution for the ECJ refusing jurisdiction to 
interpret Article I-5(1) but exercising that right over Article I-5(2).  
46 For a review of the changes in the Constitution to the judicial system and jurisdiction of the ECJ, 
see:  Michael Dougan, ‘The Convention’s Draft Constitutional Treaty: bringing Europe closer to its 
lawyers?’, (2003) 28 EL Rev., pp. 763-793, at pp. 787-792. None of these changes are of direct 
relevance to the issue of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz. 
47 Case C-124/95, The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com v. HM Treasury and Bank of England [1997] ECR 
I-81.The case is commented by Eeckhout (2004), above n. 5, at pp. 431-436. 
48 Centro-Com, ibid., at para. 23.  
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While the ECJ accepted that the Member States had retained competence in the field 
of foreign and security policy, it concluded that those powers ‘must be exercised in a 
manner consistent with Community law’.49 The ECJ continued:  
 
‘Similarly, the Member States cannot treat national measures whose effect is 
to prevent or restrict the export of certain products as falling outside the scope 
of the common commercial policy on the ground that they have foreign and 
security objectives  … Consequently, while it is for Member States to adopt 
measures of foreign and security policy in the exercise of their national 
competence, those measures must nevertheless respect the provisions adopted 
by the Community in the field of the common commercial policy provided 
for by Article 113 [now Article 133] of the Treaty.’50 
 
In Centro-Com the ECJ asserted the power to adjudicate on the boundaries between 
the Common Commercial Policy and the Member States competence in the field of 
foreign and security policy. As Eeckhout has emphasised: ‘The political 
subordination to foreign policy decisions was not matched by any form of legal 
subordination.’51 The Constitution provided an opportunity for the Member States to 
remove this jurisdictional power but on the contrary they explicitly confirmed it.  
While Article III-376 in general excludes the ECJ from jurisdiction over the CFSP, 
the second paragraph of Article III-376 confers jurisdiction on the ECJ to monitor 
compliance with Article III-308 and to rule on judicial review proceedings by natural 
or legal persons under Article III-365(4) in respect of restrictive measures against 
them adopted by the Council under the CFSP. Article III-308 provides: 
 
‘The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not 
affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the 
institutions laid down by the Constitution for the exercise of the Union 
competences referred to in Article I-13 to I-15 and I-17. Similarly, the 
implementation of the policies listed in those Articles shall not affect the 
application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions 
laid down by the Constitution for the exercise of the Union competences 
under this Chapter.’  
 
                                                 
49 Ibid, at paras. 24-25. 
50 Ibid., at paras. 26-27. The ECJ referred in para. 26 to its earlier judgment Werner v Germany on the 
export of ‘dual-use’ goods by Germany to Libya: Case C-70/94 [1995] ECR I-3189.  For an analysis of 
Werner, and Case C-83/94, Leifer and Others v. Germany [1995] ECR  I-3231 that raised similar 
issues, see Eeckhout (2004), above n. 5, at pp. 36-37.   
51 Above n. 5, at p. 434.  
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Article I-13(1)(e) specifies the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) as an area of 
exclusive Union competence and therefore the second paragraph of Article III-376 
confirms the jurisdiction of the ECJ to police the boundaries between the CCP and the 
CFSP which it had asserted in Centro-Com. If the Member States were prepared to 
confirm the ECJ’s judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz in such a politically sensitive area 
then a fortiori they must be taken to have accepted it in the other areas of Union 
competence. 
 
Furthermore, in the period between signature and entry into force, the Constitution 
arguably constitutes evidence of the common agreement of the Member States to 
confer judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz on the ECJ. The normative effect of the 
Constitution between 29 October 2004, the date of its signature by all the Member 
States, and the date of its entry into force, depends on international law. Article IV-
447(1) provides for ratification by all the Member States in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements and Article IV-447(2) provides that the 
Constitution shall enter into force on 1 November 2006 or on the first day of the 
second month following deposit of the final instrument of ratification.52  However, 
signed but unratified treaties may entail legal consequences. Article 18 VCLT 
provides:  
 
‘A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and 
purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged 
instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or 
approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to 
the treaty; or (b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, 
pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into 
force is not unduly delayed.’  
 
                                                 
52 Article IV-447(2) provides the Constitution shall enter into force on 1 November 2006, subject to 
ratification by all the Member States. This date has been postponed following the rejection of the 
Constitution in the referenda in France and the Netherlands of 29 May 2005 and 1 June 2005 
respectively: see Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the 
European Union on the Ratification of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe of 18 June 
2005: available at: <http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/Docs/pressData/en/ec/85325>. 
. 
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Article 18(a) VCLT therefore applies in the case of the Constitution to restrict the 
actions of the Member States unless and until they unequivocally reject it.53 The 
rejection of the Constitution in the referenda held in France and the Netherlands did 
not constitute such an unequivocal rejection since the Declaration of the Heads of 
State or Government issued unanimously by the European Council at its meeting on 
16 and 17 June 2005 explicitly stated: ‘The recent developments do not call into 
question the validity of continuing with the ratification process.’54 Furthermore, the 
ICJ has held that: ‘…signed but unratified treaties may constitute an accurate 
expression of the understanding of the Parties at the time of signature.’55 
Independently of whether the process of elaboration by the European Convention 
provides additional legitimacy to the Constitution, as compared to previous Treaties 
resulting solely from inter-governmental negotiation,56 the Constitution prior to entry 
into force has normative effect.57 
 
Although the Constitution provides support for the view that the ECJ has judicial 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz this does not necessarily signify that the constitutional courts 
of the Member States will abandon their claims to adjudicate on the vires of Union 
law.58 However, the Constitution does place a heavier onus on national courts to 
                                                 
53 Article 18 VCLT has been applied by the CFI in the context of the period between signature and 
ratification of the EEA Agreement: Case T-115/94, Opel Austria v. Council [1997] ECR II-39, at 
paras. 78-80. 
54 SN 117/05 of 18 June 2005; available at: 
<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/Docs/pressData/en/ec/85325.pdf>. 
55 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Judgment of 16 
March 2001, (2001) ICJ Reports 40, at para 89. For a critical analysis of this case and generally on 
international tribunal decisions bestowing effect on unperfected legal acts see: W. Michael Reisman, 
‘Unratified Treaties and Other Unperfected Acts in International Law: Constitutional Functions’  
(2002) 35 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, pp. 729-747. 
56 ‘The draft Constitution also represents a powerful source of authority as the expression of a volonté 
constituante by a democratic pouvoir constituant, the composition of which should serve to identify the 
people and governments with its outcome.’: Koen Lenaerts and Damien Gerard, ‘The Structure of the 
Union according to the Constitution for Europe: the emperor is getting dressed’ (2004) 29 EL Rev., pp. 
289-322, at p. 293.  
57 It may be that for policy reasons the ECJ will be reluctant, as in the case of the Charter, to refer 
explicitly to the Constitution prior to the date of its entry into force. The results of the French and 
Netherlands referenda undoubtedly strengthened arguments for a cautious approach. However, the 
ECtHR has referred to Article I-9 of the Constitution in the recent case of Bosphorus Hava Yollari 
Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Şіrketi v. Ireland (Bosphorus), Grand Chamber, Application No. 45036/98, 
Judgment of 30 June 2005, at para. 159. Not yet reported. 
58 The German Constitutional Court has challenged the ECJ’s right to determine the limits of the 
Union’s powers: see the Maastricht Decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht of 12 October 1993:  
BVerfGE 89 [1994] 1 CMLR 57. Recent case law suggests, however, that the risk of such a conflict has 
subsided: see  Schwarze, ‘Judicial review in EC Law – Some reflections on the Origins and the Actual 
Legal Situation’ (2002) 51 ICLQ, pp. 17-33, at pp. 22-27. But compare the analysis of  Alter: ‘To use a 
Constitutional Court judge’s own metaphor, the new powers mean the BVerfG [German Constitutional 
 45
justify such an assertion of jurisdiction and it increases the political and legal risks of 
such a course of action.59   
 
3.2.4  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The assertion of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz provided the basis for the ECJ to 
pursue a policy of judicial activism by developing an expansionist reading of the 
powers of the Union under the Treaties and thereby to promote economic and social 
integration. However, the conservative approach to the Community’s fundamental 
rights competence adopted by the ECJ in Opinion 2/94 demonstrated reluctance by 
the ECJ to adopt this policy in such a sensitive area for the national judiciary of the 
Member States. In order to address the concerns of the constitutional courts of the 
Member States, there is merit in the proposals for the creation of a constitutional 
court for the Union with judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz composed of judges both 
from the ECJ and the national constitutional courts.60 However, this proposal was not 
on the agenda during the European Convention or subsequent IGC. 
 
Whether or not the Constitution is finally adopted, the issue of judicial Kompetenz-
Kompetenz will remain controversial in light of the political sensitivity over 
demarcation of Union and national competences. However, adoption of the 
Constitution would provide the ECJ with additional grounds to pursue a more 
dynamic approach to the scope of the Union’s competences in the area of 
fundamental rights. If the Constitution is abandoned, then the issue of Union 
competence to accede to the ECHR will resurface and require addressing by the 
Member States. From a fundamental rights perspective, the preferred solution would 
be an amendment of the Treaties to provide the Union with a general competence to 
accede to international fundamental rights treaties. In order to address the concerns of 
Member States relating to the potential extension of Union competences arising from 
Union accession to the ECHR and the other European Conventions and the UN 
                                                                                                                                            
Court] can play a role refereeing the rules of the European policy-making game.’: above n. 6, at p. 116. 
See also the decision of the Danish Supreme Court asserting its right of judicial Kompetenz-
Kompetenz: Carlsen v. Rasmussen, Judgment of April 6, 1998; [1999] 3 CMLR,  pp.   855-862. 
Carlsen is commented on by Albi and Elsuwege, above n. 10, at p. 745. 
59 The negative reaction to the Solange I judgment in both German and Community circles is discussed 
by Alter, above n. 6, at p. 93. 
60 See Weiler and Haltern, in Slaughter, Stone Sweet and Weiler (ed.), above n. 1, at p. 364.  
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Conventions, the proposals for creation of a constitutional court for the Union should  
also be given consideration as part of the negotiation of an alternative package of 
reforms if the Constitution is abandoned.61 
3.3 JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE VALIDITY OF UNION LAW 
3.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This section addresses the separate, but related,62 question of identifying the judicial 
institution or institutions with jurisdiction to decide on the validity of Union law, and 
in particular primary Union law.63 Recent examples of provisions of national security 
and immigration legislation being ruled unconstitutional illustrate the critical bearing 
of this inquiry on assessing the robustness of a constitutional order in times of crisis. 
Anti-terrorism legislation passed in the US and UK following the events of 11 
September 2001 has been challenged successfully for infringement of fundamental 
rights.64 In 1996 the Swiss Federal Parliament invalidated a proposed referendum on 
                                                 
61 See further Chapter nine. 
62 An ultra vires act is also unlawful. However, in this section the focus is on illegality in the sense of 
violation of a norm of international law, and in particular international fundamental rights. In the case 
of the Treaties, the consequences of invalidity are set out in Article 69(1) VCLT: ‘A treaty the 
invalidity of which is established under the present Convention is void. The provisions of a void treaty 
have no legal force.’ In the case of secondary Union measures, paragraph one of Article 231 EC Treaty 
provides that the ECJ shall declare an act void if it rules the act illegal under Article 230 EC Treaty. 
Paragraph one of Article III-366 of the Constitution is on substantially the same terms as Article 231 
EC Treaty 
63 Hartley divides the acts of the Member States into the constitutive treaties, subsidiary conventions 
and acts of the representatives of the Member States: above n. 20, at pp. 93-102. This category of acts 
is referred to here as primary law. 
64 In Doe v. Ashcroft, No. 04 Civ. 2614, Southern District of New York, Sept. 28, 2004, a federal 
district court ruled section 505 of the 2001 USA Patriot Act, amending the 1986 Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, violated the Fourth Amendment. The case is currently under appeal. See 
also the pending case of Muslim Community Association of Ann Arbor v. Ashcroft, No. 03-72913 
((Eastern District of Michigan). See generally: Penelope Nevill, ‘United States: The Bush 
administration’s “war on terrorism” in the Supreme Court’ (2005) 3 Int. J. Constitutional Law, pp. 
115-127. An extension of the USA Patriot Act of 2001, which expires at the end of 2005, is currently 
being sought by the Bush administration. See for an analysis of the existing flaws, Testimony at an 
Oversight  Hearing on sections 206 and 215 of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 before the Subcommittee 
on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the House Judiciary Committee, Gregory T. Nojeim 
and Timothy H. Edgar, American Civil Liberties Union, 28 April 2005. Available at: 
<http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=18133&c=206>. In the UK, the relevant 
legislation includes the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001(c.24) and The Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005 (c.2). In A and others and  X and another v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, the House of Lords made, inter alia, a declaration under section 4 of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 that section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was incompatible with 
Articles 5 and 14 of the ECHR insofar as it was disproportionate and permitted detention of suspected 
international terrorists in a way that discriminated on the ground of nationality or immigration status: 
[2005] 2 AC 477.  The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 was passed to address the implications of 
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the grounds that the constitutional amendment summarily to deport asylum seekers 
violated the international peremptory norm prohibiting refoulement.65 In such 
situations, ready and secure access to an authority with jurisdiction to rule on the 
validity of  contested legislation is a key indicator of the robustness of a constitutional 
order in protecting fundamental rights.  
The ECJ’s role as ultimate adjudicator of the legality of Union law is challenged by 
two specific features of the Union’s legal order. Firstly, the Union’s constitutional 
order is based on international treaties rather than on an autonomous constitutional 
instrument.66 As a result, unlike a national constitution, the interpretation and validity 
of the Treaties67 is subject to the rules of international law and in particular the 
VCLT.68 Both international tribunals and national courts may in specific 
circumstances claim jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the Treaties,69 although 
such a ruling would not create a binding precedent in international law.70 Secondly, 
                                                                                                                                            
that judgment. Following the terrorist incidents of July 7 and 21 2005 in London, further changes to the 
UK terrorist legislation have been proposed by the UK Government: see the proposals in the letter of 
15 September 2005 by Charles Clarke, Home Secretary, to David Davis and Mark Oates, published in 
The Guardian, 16 September 2005: <http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-
files/Politics/documents/2005/09/15/letterplusannexe.pdf>. 
65 Erika de Wit, ‘The Prohibition of  Torture as an International Norm of jus cogens and its 
Implications for National and Customary Law’ (2004) 15 EJIL, pp. 97-121, at pp. 112-114. The degree 
of entrenchment afforded to fundamental rights under the Constitution is considered in Section 5.8 of 
Chapter five. 
66 Several national constitutions have originated in international treaties. However once the constitution 
is adopted the treaty basis is superseded. The US Constitution, for example, was drafted by twelve 
independent states (Rhode Island later also ratified the US Constitution in 1790) but established a 
federal republic the basis of which was no longer subject to amendment by the individual states but by 
the institutions established by the constitution.  This is not the case for the Union and will not be even 
if the Constitution enters into force. See generally on the ‘original constituent power’ of constitutions, 
Schilling (1996a), above n. 1, at pp. 390-395. 
67 The same principles would apply to the Constitution. 
68 Article 5 VCLT provides it applies ‘to any treaty which is the constituent instrument of an 
international organisation.’. Hartley: ‘We have also seen that the validity of the Community Treaties 
(like that of the whole EU legal system) depends on international law’, above n. 20, at p. 95.  Some 
commentators, however, have questioned whether the VCLT is applicable to the Treaties in the light of 
the fact that the travaux préparatoires of the Treaties have never been published: see Weiler and 
Haltern, in Slaughter, Stone Sweet and Weiler, above n. 1, at p. 350, n. 87. However, Peters, in a 
review of the differences between the ECJ’s methods of interpretation of the Treaties and the principles 
of international law, concludes: ‘All in all, the differences in interpretation of international law and 
Community law are – the ‘constitutional’ approach of the ECJ notwithstanding – at best differences in 
degree, but not in kind.’: above n. 1, at p. 26.  
69 See, for example, the dispute resolution procedures relating to the application or interpretation of 
Articles 53 and 64 VCLT on jus cogens in Article 66(a) VCLT involving submission of the dispute to 
the ICJ or arbitration. Cassese argues that a third party state may also under the rules of customary 
international law be entitled to challenge the validity of a treaty that violates jus cogens:  International 
Law (2nd edn.) (Oxford, OUP, 2005), at pp. 177-178.  
70 See Cassese, referring to rules of customary international law based on Articles 59 and 38(1)(d) of 
the Statute of the ICJ: ‘It follows that judgments of such courts [international courts] do not make law, 
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the Union’s legal order is based on the principle of conferred powers71 unlike a 
sovereign state whose powers are, in theory at least, unlimited. The principle of 
conferred powers raises two significant questions for the autonomy of the ECJ: 
firstly, whether the ECJ has jurisdiction to rule on the legality of primary Union law; 
and secondly, whether, the Member States have a continuing responsibility under 
international fundamental rights treaties, and in particular the ECHR, for the legality 
of Union acts adopted under conferred powers. These questions are addressed in the 
following sections in the specific context of the jurisdiction of the ECtHR to review 
the legality of Union law. 
3.3.2 JURISDICTION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
3.3.2.1 Introduction 
The responsibility of a state for the acts of an international organisation of which it is 
a member is a matter of international law.72 In the absence of special circumstances, 
courts have generally declined to impose liability on member states for the acts of 
international organizations on the basis to do so would be to undermine the principle 
of international legal personality and the autonomy of such institutions which is a key 
reason for their establishment.73 However, the breadth of competences transferred to 
the Union by the Member States has raised issues of control for the monitoring bodies 
                                                                                                                                            
nor is the common law doctrine of stare decisis, or binding precedent, applicable.’: ibid., at p. 194. It is 
submitted this rule would apply equally to a ruling by the ECJ on the legality of Union primary law, 
although it may be argued that a judgment of the ECJ would constitute evidence of a regional custom 
as between the Member States if they failed to object to the judgment. 
71 Article 5 EC Treaty and Article I-11(1) and (2) of the Constitution.  
72 Sands and Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions  (5th edn.) (London, Thomson, 2001), at 
p. 514. 
73 ‘More precisely, arguments based on representations of agency, control, or the absence of provisions 
excluding liability have all failed.’: Sands and Klein, ibid., at p. 522. The authors analyse cases where 
these arguments have been raised, in particular in the context of unsuccessful attempts by creditors to 
pursue member states for the debts of the International Tin Council and the Arab Organization for 
Industrialisation, although they emphasise that member states may incur liability in exceptional 
circumstances: ibid., at  pp. 521-523.  See also Gerard Conway, ‘Breaches of EC Law and the 
International Responsibility of Member States’ (2002) 13 EJIL, pp. 679-695.  In  Banković and Others 
v. Belgium and Sixteen Other Contracting States, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR declared an 
application for violation of Articles 2, 10 and 13 ECHR inadmissible arising from the bombing by 
NATO of  the Serbian Radio-Television station on 23 April 1999 on the grounds the action fell outside 
the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 1 ECHR: Application No. 52207/97, Decision of 12 
December 2001: (2002) 11 BHRC 435. The ECtHR did not therefore address the issue of whether the 
contracting parties member of NATO could be held responsible for NATO’s action. See: Dr. K. 
Altiparmak, ‘Bankovic: An Obstacle to the Application of The European Convention on Human Rights 
In Iraq?’ (2004) 9 Journal of Conflict and Security Law, pp. 213-251.                                                                                   
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of international conventions for the protection of fundamental rights to which the 
Member States, but not the Union, are party.   
This section focuses on the ECtHR’s jurisdiction to review the legality of Union law 
with the ECHR since the ECHR has a special status within the Union’s legal order as 
specified both by the ECJ in its general principles case law and Article 6(2) TEU. 
Accession by the Union to the ECHR and incorporation of the Charter under Articles 
I-9(1) and I-9(2) of the Constitution would further strengthen the status of the 
ECHR.74  However, similar jurisdictional issues may be relevant to monitoring and 
compliance bodies established under other international human rights treaties. For 
example, Article 50 ICCPR provides the ICCPR ‘shall extend to all parts of federal 
states without any limitation or exception.’ Furthermore, the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) of the ICCPR has stated:  
‘The executive branch that usually represents the State Party internationally, 
including before the Committee, may not point to the fact that an action 
incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant was carried out by another 
branch of government as a means of seeking to relieve the State Party from 
responsibility for the action and consequent incompatibility.’75  
The principle of unified state responsibility could logically be extended to hold a 
Member State party to the ICCPR responsible for actions carried out by the Union in 
violation of the ICCPR under competences transferred by that state.  
 
3.3.2.2 Matthews and the Limits of the Autonomy of Union Law 
In CFDT v. European Communities, the ECommHR decided that it had no 
jurisdiction ratione personae to control decisions of the Community for its 
conformity with the ECHR since the Community was not a party to the ECHR.76 
Furthermore, it subsequently held that, since the Community provided ‘equivalent 
protection’ to fundamental rights to those guaranteed under the ECHR, the transfer of 
powers by a Member State to the Community did not require a Member State to 
                                                 
74 See Chapter five for analysis of the effect of ECHR accession and incorporation of the Charter. 
75 General Comment Number 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligations Imposed on State 
Parties to the Convention, eightieth session, adopted 29 March 2004. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13. 
76 App. No. 8030/77, 13 DR 231 (1978). The same reasoning was applied by the European 
Commission to the powers transferred by the parties to the European Patent Office established under 
the 1973 European Patent Convention: Heinz v Contracting States also Parties to the European Patent 
Convention, Appn. No. 21090/92, (1994) 18 EHRR CD 168. 
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review each Community measure for conformity with the ECHR and an application 
seeking such review therefore failed ratione materiae.77 While the ECtHR has not 
expressly departed from these decisions of the ECommHR, in Matthews v. United 
Kingdom78 and subsequent cases it has established boundaries to the autonomy of the 
Union’s legal order in terms of the Members States’ continuing obligations under the 
ECHR notwithstanding the transfer of competences to the Union. 
In Matthews,  the relevant issue turned on the status of the 1976 Act Concerning the 
Election of the Representatives of the European Parliament by Direct Universal 
Suffrage (the 1976 Act) signed by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States and 
attached to Council Decision 76/787 of 20 September 1976 (the 1976 Council 
Decision).79 An annex to the 1976 Act excluded Gibraltar citizens from participation 
in EP elections and Mrs Matthews claimed this exclusion violated her rights under 
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR. The UK Government argued that the 1976 
Act ‘had the status of a treaty, was adopted in the Community framework and could 
not be revoked or varied unilaterally by the United Kingdom’.80  Relying on the 
earlier decisions of the ECommHR, The UK Government argued that this 
characterization of the 1976 Act as an act ‘adopted by the Community or consequent 
to its requirements’ took it outside the scope of review by the ECtHR since the UK 
had no ‘power of effective control’ over the 1976 Act.81  
The applicant in Matthews agreed that the 1976 Act was an international treaty but 
drew the opposite conclusion that, unlike Union secondary legislation, it was subject 
to review by the ECtHR since the UK remained responsible for its effects. 
Alternatively, the applicant argued that if the 1976 Council Decision and the 1976 
                                                 
77 M. & Co. v. Germany, App. No. 13258/87, 64 DR 144 (1990). In Pafitis v. Greece, (1997) 27 EHRR 
566, the ECtHR summarily dismissed the argument that the length of the preliminary reference 
procedure under Article 234 (ex 177) EC Treaty contributed to a violation of Article 6(1) ECHR: ‘...to 
take it into account would adversely affect the system instituted by Article 177 of the EEC Treaty and 
work against the aim pursued in substance in that Article’: at para. 95.  See for comment: C. Costello 
and E. Browne, ‘ECHR and the European Union’, in U. Kelly (ed.) ECHR and Irish Law (Dublin, 
Jordans, 2004), pp. 35-80, at p. 69; and K. Lenaerts, ‘Fundamental Rights in the European Union’ 
(2000) 25 EL Rev., pp. 575-600, at pp. 583-584. 
78 (1999) 28 EHRR 361. 
79 The Council Decision is published in [1976] OJ L278/1.  The judgment in Matthews also examines 
the status of the EP following the Maastricht Treaty amendments and concluded it had become as a 
result a ‘legislature’ within the meaning of Article 3 of Protocol No.1 ECHR. See Lenaerts, above n 
77, at pp. 584-5.   
80 Matthews, above n. 78, at para. 26. 
81 Ibid., at para. 26. 
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Act did involve a transfer of powers to the Community institutions there was a lack of 
‘equivalent protection’ within the Community legal order as required by the decisions 
of the ECommHR. 
The ECtHR based its decision on the construction of Article 1 ECHR which requires 
the parties to ‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms 
defined in’ the ECHR. The ECtHR characterized the 1976 Act, together with the 
1976 Council Decision and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty increasing the powers of the 
EP, as international instruments ‘which were freely entered into by the United 
Kingdom’.82 The 1976 Act was not a ‘normal act of the Community’ but ‘a treaty 
within the Community legal order’ and as such ‘cannot be challenged before the 
European Court of Justice’.83 The fact that the UK had entered into these treaty 
commitments subsequent to the applicability of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 ECHR 
engaged its responsibility under Article 1 ECHR to secure the rights guaranteed by 
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.84 
Following Matthews, therefore, the review powers of the ECtHR over the Union legal 
order on the basis of the continuing responsibilities of the Member States under the 
ECHR depends on the characterization of the act in question.  If it constitutes primary 
Union law, namely a constitutive treaty or an international agreement amending such 
a treaty, the ECtHR will review the conformity of such an act with the ECHR. If it 
constitutes secondary Union legislation, the ECtHR will not review such an act 
provided ‘equivalent’ protection for fundamental rights is provided to that of the 
ECHR by the Union’s legal order.85 The ECtHR in Matthews based this distinction in 
treatment on the basis that the ECJ lacked power to adjudicate on the legality of 
Union primary law.   
                                                 
82 Ibid., at para 33. 
83 Ibid., at para. 33. 
84 Ibid., at para. 34. 
85 In Matthews the ECtHR did not expressly refer to the previous case law on its jurisdiction to review 
secondary Community legislation since it was not at issue. Indeed, the Matthews judgment is not 
entirely clear on whether the continuing obligations of the UK under Article 1 ECHR and Article 3 of 
Protocol No. 1 only extend to primary Union law. In paragraph 34 the ECtHR states: ‘To this extent, 
there is no difference between European and domestic legislation, and no reason why the United 
Kingdom should not be required to ‘secure’ the rights in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of 
European legislation, in the same way as those rights are required to be ‘secured’ in respect of purely 
domestic legislation.’ However, this is best interpreted as relating to the substance of the right 
protected by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, namely the right of a citizen to vote in elections for a 
legislature competent to legislate with effect in the territory where the citizen resides, and not equating 
primary and secondary Union law for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR.  
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The critical issue for the autonomy of the ECJ is whether the analysis of the ECtHR 
as to the lack of jurisdictional competence of the ECJ over primary Union law is 
supported by the EC Treaty.86 A literal reading of the jurisdictional powers of the 
ECJ in the EC Treaty and the Constitution supports the ECtHR’s analysis in 
Matthews.87 Article 220 EC Treaty confers on the ECJ and the CFI, each within its 
jurisdiction, a duty to ensure that ‘in the interpretation and application’ of this Treaty 
the law is observed but does not specify a duty to control the legality of the EC 
Treaty. Article 234(a) EC Treaty only confers power on the ECJ to give preliminary 
rulings concerning the interpretation of the EC Treaty whereas Article 234(b) 
specifically refers to rulings on the validity and interpretation of secondary 
Community legislation. Article 230 EC Treaty restricts the judicial review powers of 
the ECJ to the legality of acts of the Unions’ institutions. The Constitution 
incorporates provisions on substantially the same terms.88 This textual reading is 
confirmed, at least in the context of Article 230 EC Treaty proceedings, by the 
decision in Roujansky v Council.89 In that case the ECJ upheld the CFI’s decision 
rejecting the admissibility of a challenge to the legality of a declaration of the 
European Council of 29 October 1993 and the TEU: 
                                                
‘As the Court of First Instance has held, neither the declaration of the 
European Council nor the Treaty on European Union is an act whose legality 
is subject to review under Article 173 [230] of the Treaty and hence the 
appeal brought by the appellant against the finding of inadmissibility is 
clearly unfounded.’90  
Canor has argued, by reference to the principle of consistency, that the ECJ may 
construe its jurisdiction under Article 234(1) EC Treaty as extending to the 
interpretation of primary Union law amending the Treaties in a manner consistent 
with fundamental rights as protected by Union law.91 Canor refers in support to 
 
86 A ruling of the ECtHR on the ECJ’s jurisdictional competence is not binding or even authoritative 
for the purposes of the Union’s obligations under Article 6(2) TEU or the general principles doctrine 
since it does not relate to the interpretation of the rights and freedoms protected by the ECHR but the 
scope of the contracting parties’ obligations under Article 1 ECHR. 
87 See Section 7.2 of Chapter seven for the jurisdiction of the ECJ under Article 46 TEU. 
88 Article I-29(1) corresponds to Article 220 EC Treaty; Article III-365 corresponds to Article 230 EC 
Treaty; and Article III-369 to Article 234 EC Treaty. As discussed in Section 7.4 of Chapter seven, the 
Constitution confers jurisdiction on the ECJ over the AFSJ but subject to Article III-377. The ECJ’s 
powers over the CFSP remain limited under Article III-376. 
89 Case C-253/94 [1995] ECR I-7. 
90 Ibid, at para. 11. The CFI decision is: Case T-584/93 [1994] ECR 585. 
91 I. Canor, ‘Primus inter pares.  Who is the ultimate guardian of fundamental rights in Europe?’ 
(2000) 25 EL Rev., pp. 3-21, at p. 7.  
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Opinion 2/91 where the ECJ decided it had jurisdiction under Article 300(6) EC 
Treaty to review the respective competences of the Community and the Member 
States in the areas covered by ILO Convention No. 170 concerning Safety in the Use 
of Chemicals at Work.92 This decision was reached notwithstanding the textual 
argument advanced by the German and Netherlands Governments that Article 300(1) 
EC Treaty refers only to the conclusion of agreements between ‘the Community and 
one or more States or international organisations’.  Since the Community was not a 
member of the ILO, it was precluded under the ILO’s constitution from signing 
Convention No. 170 and Article 300(6) EC Treaty proceedings were therefore 
inapplicable.93 Such an interpretative approach to primary Union law would also 
accord with the ECJ’s preferred teleological approach to the interpretation of the 
Treaties.94 
However, an obligation to interpret Union law insofar as possible with fundamental 
rights standards falls short of a jurisdiction to review the legality of Union law and to 
that extent the ECtHR’s assessment in Matthews accords with the case law of the 
ECJ.  Consequently, in the absence of jurisdiction conferred on the ECJ, the legality 
of primary Union law,95 and perhaps more significantly the consequences of such 
illegality on the Union’s legal order,96 falls to be decided exclusively by the national 
constitutional courts of the Member States or by an international arbitral or judicial 
body seized with a dispute where the legality of primary Union law is at issue.97   
3.3.2.3 Extension of the Matthews Doctrine 
Matthews left open the issue of whether the ECtHR would extend its jurisdiction to 
include a power to review the legality of any Union measure which is not subject to 
                                                 
92 [1993] ECR 1061 
93 Ibid, at paras. 3-5. 
94 See generally on the ECJ’s approach to interpretation of Union law: Piet Eeckhout, ‘The European 
Court of Justice and the Legislature’ (1998) 18 Yearbook of European Law, pp. 1-28, at pp. 15-18. 
95 It is established under Union law that the ECJ has exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the legality of 
Union secondary legislation: Case 314/85, Foto-Frost (Firma) v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] 
ECR 4199 (Foto-Frost). 
96 In particular the issue would arise whether an illegal provision of primary Union law could be 
severed from the rest of the instrument. Cassese argues that in the case of a jus cogens violation 
severance should be possible notwithstanding Article 44.5 VCLT: above n. 69,  at p. 206. 
97 Cassese addresses the question of the forum in which a non-party may invoke the absolute invalidity 
of an international treaty: ‘Arguably, before an international court or tribunal having jurisdiction under 
the relevant jurisdictional clauses; if such jurisdiction is lacking, the third State is entitled to call upon 
the relevant contracting  States or State to either undertake negotiations with a view to legally settling 
the matter, or bring the issue before an arbitral or judicial body.’: ibid., at p. 178. 
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review by the ECJ.98  In Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, a judgment given on the 
same day as Matthews, the ECtHR confirmed its potential continuing jurisdiction 
over the contracting parties to the 1975 Convention for the Establishment of a 
European Space Agency:  
 
‘The Court is of the opinion that where States establish international 
organisations in order to pursue or strengthen their cooperation in certain 
fields of activities, and where they attribute to these organisations certain 
competences and accord them immunities, there may be implications as to the 
protection of fundamental rights. It would be incompatible with the purpose 
and object of the Convention, however, if the Contracting States were thereby 
absolved from their responsibility under the Convention in relation to the 
field of activity covered by such attribution. It should be recalled that the 
Convention is intended to guarantee not theoretical or illusory rights, but 
rights that are practical and effective.’99   
 
In T.I. v. UK this reasoning was confirmed in relation to the arrangements entered 
into by the Member States in the 1991 Dublin Convention concerning the attribution 
of responsibility for deciding asylum claims.100 While neither Waite and Kennedy nor 
T.I.  v. UK was decided in respect of the transfer of competences to the Union by the 
Member States under the Treaties, the principle of continuing responsibility for 
compliance with the ECHR obligations for signatories to international organizations 
if the right of access to the courts is restricted is relevant to areas of the Union’s legal 
order where such restrictions apply, in particular in respect of the CFSP and the 
AFSJ.101 
 
In Senator Lines the issue of extending Matthews to secondary Community measures 
that were subject to review by the ECJ was raised.102 While the ECtHR did not rule 
                                                 
98 See in support of this proposition: Lenaerts, above n. 77, at pp. 584-585; and Costello and Browne, 
in Kelly (ed.), above n. 77, at pp. 69-76. In Emesa Sugar v. Netherlands, the applicant challenged  the 
compatibility with Article 6(1) ECHR of the judgment of the ECJ in Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v 
Aruba (Case C-17/98 [2000] ECR I-675) on the basis it had not been allowed to respond to the 
Opinion of the Advocate General in that case: App. no. 62023/00, decision of 13 January 2005 
(unreported). However, the ECtHR did not address whether it had jurisdiction to rule on that issue but 
declared the application inadmissible on the unrelated ground that the national proceedings fell outside 
the scope ratione materiae of Article 6 ECHR. 
99 (2000) 30 EHRR 261, at paras. 67 and 68. 
 100 T.I. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 43844/98, admissibility decision of 7 March 2000; (2000) 12 
IJRL, pp. 244-267.  See Section 8.3.3.4 of Chapter eight for further analysis of this case.  
101 For details of the limits on the ECJ’s jurisdiction over the AFSJ, see Chapter seven. 
102 Senator Lines GmbH v. Member States of the European Union (App. No. 56672/00); admissibility 
decision of 10 March 2004. Not reported. 
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on this point, since it declared the case inadmissible on the unrelated ground that the 
applicant could not claim to be a victim of a violation of the ECHR within the 
meaning of Article 34 ECHR, the arguments of the parties highlight the conflicting 
pressures facing the ECtHR in deciding whether or not to extend Matthews and the 
implications such an extension would have for the principle of the autonomy of 
Union law.103  
The applicant in Senator Lines argued that the decision by the CFI and ECJ not to 
suspend the Commission’s decision to require a bank guarantee from the applicant’s 
major shareholder for payment of a competition fine imposed on the applicant 
constituted a violation of its rights of access to court guaranteed under Article 6 
ECHR and that the Member States ‘were individually and collectively responsible for 
the acts of the Community institutions’.104 The applicant accepted that the acts of the 
Community could not be challenged directly before the ECtHR but invited the 
ECtHR to distinguish the CFDT decision and treat the ‘equivalent protection’ test as 
set out in M. & Co. v. Germany as impliedly overruled by the Matthews case.105 Of 
particular interest to the issue of autonomy, the Applicant argued that the effect of 
Matthews: 
 ‘… is not limited to primary law which cannot be challenged before the 
Community organs, as such a divide would give rise to different levels of 
human rights protection depending on the formal criterion of whether the 
contested rule or act was one of Community primary law or not. Such an 
approach would create a major loophole in human rights protection’.106  
The Member States contested the admissibility of the action against them in their 
capacity as Member States. Their principal submission relied on the principles of 
international law applicable to the relations between member states and international 
organizations as applied by the ECommHR and the ECtHR. Firstly, the Member 
States argued that the acts complained of were not sovereign acts of any of the 
Member States and thus fell outside their jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 
                                                 
103 The importance of the issues raised may be judged from the number of organisations which 
submitted observations in Senator Lines, including the International Commission of Jurists and the 
Féderation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme. 
104 Senator Lines, above n. 102, at p. 4. See for the decisions of the ECJ and CFI: Case C-364/99P, 
DSR-Senator Lines v Commisssion [1999] ECR I-8733 and Case T-191/98, DSR-Senator Lines v 
Commission [1999] ECR II-2531. 
105 Senator Lines, above n. 102, at p. 4. 
106 Ibid., at p. 6. 
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ECHR. Secondly, they relied on the authority of the CFDT decision to establish that 
no application may be made under the ECHR against the Community or the Member 
States. Thirdly, they argued that the Community had separate legal personality and 
‘neither it nor its organs in any way represent its Member States’.107 In the 
alternative, the Member States relied on the authority of M & Co. v. Germany.108 
Since the ECommHR had found that in 1990 the Community provided such 
‘equivalent protection’, the Member States argued that a fortiori the ECtHR should 
refrain from a review of the contested decision of the Community on the grounds of 
the ‘principle of subsidiarity’ since the subsequent treaties of Maastricht and 
Amsterdam had strengthened the system of protection.109  
                                                
In Bosphorus,110 the ECtHR in a judgment of the Grand Chamber had the opportunity 
to address the arguments raised in Senator Lines. The applicant alleged that the 
impounding by Ireland of an aircraft leased by it from Yugoslav Airlines (JAT) in 
Ireland for maintenance pursuant to EC Regulation 990/93 of 28 April 1993 (the 1993 
EC Sanctions Regulation),111 implementing UNSC Resolution 820 (1993) of 17 April 
1993, violated its right to peaceful enjoyment of its possessions under Article 1 of 
Protocol  No. 1 ECHR. The Irish Supreme Court, on appeal from a decision of the 
High Court in favour of the applicant,112 referred under Article 234 EC Treaty an 
issue of interpretation of Article 8 of the 1993 EC Sanctions Regulation. The ECJ 
ruled that the 1993 EC Sanctions Regulation required Ireland to impound the 
applicant’s aircraft and that impoundment did not violate the fundamental rights of 
the applicant.113 The Irish Supreme Court by judgment of 29 November 1996 allowed 
 
107 Ibid., at p. 4. 
108 Ibid., at p. 5. 
109 Reference is made in Senator Lines to Articles 6 and 46(d) of the TEU in this respect: above n. 
102, at p. 5. However, as discussed in Section 7.2.3 of Chapter seven, it is hard to sustain the view 
that the introduction of those articles made any substantial improvement to the protection of 
fundamental rights in Union law. 
110 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Şіrketi v. Ireland (Grand Chamber), App. 
No. 45036/98. Judgment of 30 June 2005. Unreported. 
111 [1993] OJ L102/14. 
112 Bosphorus v Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications.  Judgment of 21 June 1994. 
[1994] 2 ILRM 551.  
113 Case C-84/95, Bosphorus v. Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications, Ireland and the 
Attorney General [1996] ECR I-1475. 
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the appeal of the Minister of Transport against the judgment of the High Court of 21 
June 1994 on the basis of the preliminary ruling by the ECJ.114 
Both the applicant and the Irish Government in their submissions in Bosphorus 
focused on whether the Irish State had any discretion in implementing the 1993 EC 
Sanctions Regulation. The Irish Government submitted that Ireland was obliged to 
impound the JAT aircraft in application of the ruling of the ECJ interpreting the 1993 
EC Sanctions Regulation and that the doctrine of equivalent protection developed in 
M & Co.115 applied rather than the Matthews doctrine where the UK Government had 
acted in exercise of its discretion.116 The applicant argued on the contrary that Ireland 
had exercised its discretion in deciding to appeal the judgment of the High Court in 
making the Article 234 EC Treaty reference, and in the manner in which it applied the 
ruling of the ECJ.117  
The ECtHR first held that Article 1 ECHR applied since the impounding of the 
aircraft leased by the applicant by the Irish authorities on Irish territory bought the 
applicant within the ‘jurisdiction’ of the Irish State ‘with the consequence that its 
complaint about that act is compatible ratione loci, personae, and materiae with the 
provisions of the Convention.’118 The ECtHR then ruled that the sole relevant legal 
basis for the impounding by the Irish authorities of the JAT aircraft was the 1993 EC 
Sanctions Regulation, and not UNSC Resolution 820, which was not part of domestic 
Irish law, or the implementing Irish S.I. 144 of 1993.119 The ECtHR  agreed with the 
submissions of the Irish Government and the Commission that the Irish authorities 
were bound to appeal the High Court decision of 21 June 1994 pursuant to their 
obligations of sincere cooperation under Article 10 EC Treaty and that the Supreme 
Court had no discretion as regards making the preliminary reference to the ECJ and 
giving effect to that ruling by reversing the decision of the High Court.120  In such 
                                                 
114 Unreported. Related proceedings before the High Court and the Supreme Court for the release of 
the aircraft are reported at Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turozm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. The Minister 
for Transport, Energy and Communications  [1997] 2 IR 1. 
115 Cited above n. 77. 
116 Bosphorus, cited above n. 110, at paras. 109-110. 
117 Ibid., at paras 115-117. 
118 Ibid., at para. 137. Although the ECtHR  did not make this explicit, this finding undermined the 
basis of the decision of the ECommHR in M & Co., above n. 77. The Joint Concurring Opinions of 
Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Traja, Botoucharova, Zagrebelsky and Garlicki and the Concurring Opinion 
of  Judge Reiss make this point explicitly,  at para. 1 of each Opinion respectively.  
119 Ibid., at para. 145. 
120 Ibid., at paras. 146-147. 
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circumstances, where a state is implementing its obligations as a member of an 
international organisation, the ECtHR affirmed the test developed in M & Co.: 
‘In the Court’s view, State action taken in compliance with legal obligations 
is justified as long as the relevant organization is considered to protect 
fundamental rights as regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the 
mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner which can be 
considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides’.121  
The ECtHR said that if such equivalent protection was found to exist, which finding 
was subject to review ‘in the light of any relevant change in fundamental rights’ 
protection,122 there existed a presumption that a state merely implementing 
obligations arising from membership of an international organisation had not violated 
the ECHR, although this presumption could be rebutted if the protection of ECHR 
rights was ‘manifestly deficient.’123 However, the ECtHR emphasised that a state 
remained ‘fully responsible’ under the ECHR for all acts falling outside its ‘strict 
international obligations’ as in the case of the ‘international instruments freely entered 
into’ by the UK in Matthews.124 Since the ECtHR found that the protection of 
fundamental rights in EC law125 did provide equivalent protection at the relevant time 
the presumption of compatibility arose in favour of Ireland’s implementation of the 
1993 EC Sanctions Regulation. This presumption was not rebutted since the ECtHR 
concluded that there was no manifest deficiency in the protection of the applicant’s 
ECHR rights.126   
In Bosphorus the ECtHR showed it is reluctant to adopt the maximalist position of 
exercising a case by case review over secondary Union legislation for conformity 
with the ECHR.127 This approach can best be attributed to pragmatism pending 
                                                 
121 Ibid.,  at para. 155. 
122 Ibid.,  at para. 155. 
123 Ibid.,  at para. 157. 
124 Ibid., at para. 157. 
125 The ECtHR refers to EC law as opposed to Union law. This may be read as a signal that it is leaving 
open the issue of whether the protection of fundamental rights in the TEU relating to Second and Third 
Pillar measures under Title V and VI TEU respectively provides equivalent protection. See Chapter 
Seven for analysis of the fundamental rights provisions affecting the Third Pillar. 
126 Bosphorus, above n. 110, at para. 166. 
127 This position was advocated in the Joint Concurring Opinions of Judges Rozakis, Tulkns, Traja, 
Botoucharov, Zagrebelsky and Garlicki in Bosphorus, at para. 3, and in the Concurring Opinion of 
Judge Reiss, at para. 2. Some academics have argued for a more generalised scrutiny by the ECtHR of 
Union measures, see: Uerpmann, above n. 4, at pp. 35-37; and Lenaerts, above n. 77, at p. 589. 
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resolution of the Constitution’s future,128 and in particular Union accession to the 
ECHR provided for in Article I-9(2). An extension of the ECHR’s jurisdiction to 
review the legality of secondary Union legislation is problematic while the Union has 
not acceded to the ECHR.129 If the Union accedes to the ECHR, the technical issues 
of the representation of the Union’s institutions in the control bodies of the ECHR 
will be addressed in the Union’s accession treaty.130 Union accession to the ECHR 
would also effectively render the debate over whether Union law provides equivalent 
protection for fundamental rights to that of the Member States moot since Union 
measures will be subject to the same review procedures under Articles 33 and Article 
34 ECHR.131 However, the issue of whether the ECtHR would continue to exercise 
jurisdiction to review the validity of primary Union law and measures of the Union 
not subject to the jurisdiction of the ECJ will remain even if the Union accedes to the 
ECHR. Since the Constitution does not confer jurisdiction on the ECJ to review its 
validity the basis of Matthews would be unaffected.132 
 
3.3.2.4  Conclusions 
The critical criterion of whether a legal order provides effective protection for 
fundamental rights in states of emergency or political crisis is the existence of an 
adjudicating authority with jurisdiction to rule on and invalidate emergency measures 
adopted in violation of such rights. In sovereign states, the identification of that 
authority is generally provided for in the constitution. The relevant adjudicating 
authority is subject to the constitution and generally lacks jurisdiction to rule on the 
validity of the constitution or constitutional amendments.133 However, this general 
                                                 
128 The judgment in Bosphorus  was delivered on 30 June 2005.  Ratification of the Constitution was 
rejected in France in the referendum of 29 May 2005 and in the Netherlands in the referendum of 1 
June 2005. 
129 There are significant drawbacks to such scrutiny resulting from the Union not being a member of 
the ECHR or party to proceedings before the ECtHR, including, the Union’s lack of formal 
representation before the ECtHR, the non-applicability of the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies 
under Article 35(1) ECHR as a condition of admissibility, and the unresolved question of how far the 
attribution by the ECtHR of a margin of discretion to the Member States would apply to the Union. See 
further Section 5.7 of Chapter five. 
130 See Section 5.7.3 of Chapter five. 
131 On the assumption that the Union will accede to all the ECHR Protocols and not make its accession 
subject to substantive reservations. 
132 However, Canor argues that the ECtHR could have decided Matthews in favour of the applicant by 
relying on a violation of Article 14 ECHR: above n. 91, at pp. 14-15. 
133 This proposition may be subject to qualification in legal systems where the courts are entitled to 
recognise the natural law rights of the citizen in priority to amendments to the constitution which 
infringe those rights. Phelan makes such an argument in the context of Irish constitutional law: 
‘Certain Irish constitutional fundamental rights are possessed by individuals by virtue of their rational 
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rule is increasingly subject to exception in the case of violations of international 
fundamental rights standards, and in particular rules of jus cogens.134 
 
The lack of ECJ jurisdiction to review the legality of primary Union law raises the 
issue of which authority does have the necessary jurisdiction to control the 
conformity of Union primary law with international fundamental rights standards. In 
Matthews the ECtHR asserted this jurisdiction insofar as concerns compliance with 
the ECHR.  However, the ECtHR has no jurisdiction to rule on the validity of primary 
Union law with international fundamental rights other than those incorporated in the 
ECHR. Indeed, no international court has general competence to rule on the legality 
of Union primary law with such rights.135   In particular, an alleged conflict of a rule 
of primary Union law with jus cogens is only subject to the jurisdiction of the ICJ 
under Article 66.1(a) of the ICJ Statute in a dispute between parties both to the VCLT 
and the instrument of primary Union law.136 In the absence of an international 
tribunal with universal jurisdiction to rule on the validity of primary Union law, the 
constitutional courts of the Member States may, depending on the relevant national 
constitution, assert a residual competence in this respect.  
 
While in practice it is unlikely that primary Union law will be subject to frequent 
challenge on grounds of incompatibility with international fundamental rights, 
Matthews demonstrates that such a scenario is realistic. The absence of a single court 
with recognised jurisdiction to adjudicate on such challenges undermines the 
effectiveness of the Union’s legal order as a bulwark against ill-conceived and flawed 
primary Union law. The conferral of jurisdiction on the existing ECJ to review 
primary Union law would risk compounding the problem that the objective of 
autonomy would take priority over the protection of fundamental rights.  As in the 
                                                                                                                                            
nature and human personality; they are antecedent to positive law and superior to it.’ D. Phelan, Revolt 
or Revolution: The Constitutional Boundaries of the European Community (Dublin, Roundhall, 1997), 
at p. 297. However, natural law is not a realistic basis for the Union’s constitutional order: see 
Schilling (1996(a)), above n. 1, at pp. 401-403.  
134 See Section 4.4 of Chapter four. 
135 The ICJ has no jurisdiction over cases involving the Union since Article 34(1) of the ICJ Statute 
provides: ‘… only States may be parties in cases before the Court.’  Sands and Klein reject the view of 
Weissberg that the UN should be treated as a state for the purposes of Article 34(1): above n. 72, at p. 
355, n. 51. The argument is made by Weissberg, The International Status of the UN (New York, 
Oceana, 1961), at p. 195.  A fortiori the Union could not be so treated. 
136 See Cassese, above n. 69, at pp. 203-204. Cassese further points out that, even if reliance is placed 
on the less restrictive rules of customary international law, there is no compulsory judicial mechanism 
for determination of a violation of jus cogens:  ibid., at p. 205. 
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case of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz, the creation of a new constitutional court for 
the Union with jurisdiction to hear such cases would be a preferable option that would 
bolster the legitimacy of the Union’s legal order.  
 
 
3.4 HIERARCHY OF JUDGMENTS INTERPRETING THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
  
3.4.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The status of judgments of the ECtHR interpreting the scope and meaning of ECHR 
rights within Union law raises questions with implications not only for the autonomy 
of the ECJ but also the coherence and authority of the ECHR system.137 This section 
addresses these questions from the perspective of the ECJ and from that of the 
national courts of the Member States. Section 3.4.2 examines the extent to which the 
ECJ is bound to apply the case law of the ECtHR as binding precedent under existing 
Union law and if the Union accedes to the ECHR.  Section 3.4.3 examines whether 
national courts are obliged in the field of Union law to follow the case law of the ECJ 
interpreting the ECHR, or in the absence of such case law to make a reference under 
Article 234 EC Treaty, or whether they may apply the ECtHR’s jurisprudence in 
accordance with the terms of incorporation of the ECHR in domestic law. Both sets 
of questions raise issues that should be addressed in the instrument of Union 
accession to the ECHR in order to establish a coherent and unified system for the 
interpretation of ECHR rights.  In the absence of Union accession, the current 
uncertain status of judgments of decisions of the ECtHR in Union law gives rise to 
substantial concerns as to whether Union law provides ‘equivalent protection’ to that 
provided by the ECHR.138                             
 
                                                 
137 See on the potential conflicts between the ECHR and Union systems for the protection of 
fundamental rights: L. Betten, ‘Human Rights’ (2001) 50 ICLQ, pp. 690-701, at pp. 697-701. 
138 Judge Reiss raised this point in his Concurring Opinion in Bosphorus, above n. 110, at para. 3: ‘One 
would conclude that the protection of the Convention right would be manifestly deficient if, in 
deciding the key question in a case, the ECJ were to depart form the interpretation or the application of 
the Convention or the Protocols that had already been the subject of well-established ECHR case-law.’ 
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In the following analysis, a distinction is drawn between the normative status of the 
rights and freedoms listed in the ECHR and that of judgments of the ECtHR.139  
While the ECHR rights determine the minimum standards the contracting parties 
must enforce,140 a judgment of the ECtHR determines the scope and meaning of those 
standards in a specific case. The status of the ECHR rights and of the judgments of 
the ECtHR may therefore be subject to separate normative consequences in the legal 
order of a contracting party.141 In the context of Union law, the treatment of each 
issue is of particular importance in light of the consequences for the national legal 
orders arising from the application of the Union law doctrines of supremacy and 
direct effect.142 An unduly simplistic application of the doctrine of supremacy may 
result in separate standards developing for the protection of ECHR rights within the 
Union sphere and the national sphere. This result would be unacceptable both from 
the perspective of maintaining equal protection of ECHR rights within the national 
and Union legal orders and in achieving transparency and coherence of fundamental 
rights protection. This section examines the problems associated with the normative 
status of judgments of the ECtHR in Union law.  The related issue of the normative 
status of ECHR rights in Union law is addressed in Section 4.2.4 of Chapter four. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
139 This distinction is artificial in the sense that the meaning of the ECHR rights can only be understood 
by reference to the judgments of the ECtHR. However, in theory at least, a national court may decide, 
depending on the terms of the legislation incorporating the ECHR, to disregard a previous judgment of 
the ECtHR if it disagrees with its interpretation of the ECHR. Although such a decision of the national 
court may ground an application under Article 34 ECHR, it would remain authoritative in the national 
legal system. 
140 Article 53 ECHR provides: ‘Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating 
from any of the human  rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any 
High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a Party.’ See for a discussion of 
how far Article 53 (ex Art. 60) ECHR sets a minimum standard in the sense both of ceding to a higher 
standard and ousting a lower standard:  L. Besselink, ‘Entrapped by the Maximum Standard: On 
Fundamental Rights, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the European Union’ (1998) 35 CML Rev., pp. 629-
680, at pp. 657-659.  
141 For example, section 1(2) of the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42) determines the status of the 
ECHR rights specified under that Act, while section 2(1) determines the status of judgments of the 
ECtHR.   
142 The two doctrines are interlinked since it is generally considered that only a directly effective rule 
of Union law operates to disapply conflicting national law: see Hartley, above n. 20, at p. 228. 
However, this limitation on the doctrine of supremacy is not accepted by all commentators: see the 
conflicting views expressed to the House of Lords European Committee (2003/2004), above n. 9, at 
paras. 35-36.  
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3.4.2 HIERARCHY OF JUDGMENTS: ECJ AND ECtHR 
 
It has been argued that the ECJ ‘is not legally obliged to follow the interpretation of 
the European Court of Human Rights’.143  This view is supported by the opinion of 
Advocate General Darmon in Orkem v. Commission: 
 
‘This Court may therefore adopt, with respect to provisions of the 
Convention, an interpretation which does not coincide exactly with that given 
by the Strasbourg authorities, in particular the European Court. It is not 
bound, in so far as it does not have systematically to take into account, as 
regards fundamental rights under Community law, the interpretation of the 
Convention given by the Strasbourg authorities.’144  
 
However, the credibility of the Union’s commitment to protect ECHR rights as 
confirmed in Article 6(2) TEU would be undermined if the ECJ failed to give due 
weight and authority to the decisions of the ECtHR.145  Developments in the case law 
of the ECJ supports this view since, following a long period of infrequent 
references,146 there has in recent years been a marked increase in references to 
decisions of the ECtHR.147 Indeed in Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij the ECJ 
explicitly recognised its duty to take account of developments since Orkem in the 
case law of the ECtHR in interpreting Article 6 ECHR relating to the right to remain 
silent and the right against self-incrimination.148 
                                                 
143 D. Spielmann, ‘Comparing ECJ and ECHR Case Law’ in Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights 
(Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp. 757-780, at p. 762, n. 21.  
144 Case 374/87, Orkem v Commission  [1989] ECR 3351, at pp. 3337-3338.  The ECJ did not in 
Orkem decide this point. See: R. Lawson, ‘Confusion and Conflict? Diverging Interpretations of the 
European Convention on Human Rights in Strasbourg and Luxembourg’, in R. Lawson and M. de 
Bloijs (eds.) The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe: Essays in Honour of Henry 
G. Schermers, Vol. III (Dordrecht, Kluwers, 1994) pp. 219-252, at pp. 228-229. 
145 See for this point: Lenaerts, above n. 77, at pp. 580-581. 
146 B. de Witte, ‘The Role of the ECJ in Human Rights’, in Alston (ed.), The EU and Human 
Rights (Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp. 859-897, at p. 878. References to the ECHR itself, however, was 
more frequent. For a detailed list of ECJ references to specific rights protected under the ECHR, 
see Hartley, above n. 20, at p. 141, n. 32. 
147 See, for example: Case C-249/96, Grant v South-West Trains Ltd. [1998] I-621, at paras. 33 and 34; 
Case T-185/95P, Baustahlgewebe GmbH v. Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, at para. 29; Case C-
274/99P, Bernard Connolly v Commsssion (2001) ECR I-1611, at paras. 39-49; Case C-60/00 
Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279, at para. 42; and Case C-
112/00, Schmidberger v Austria [2003] ECR I-5659, at para. 79; and Joined Cases  C-238/99 P to C-
254/99P, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV (LVM) and others v. Commission  [2002] ECR I-8375, at 
para. 274.  
148 Limburgse, above n. 147, at para. 247; and Case 374/87, Orkem v Commission [1989] ECR 3351. 
The relevant subsequent decisions of the ECtHR cited were: Funke v France (1993) 18 EHRR 297; 
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The increased frequency of references to decisions of the ECtHR by the ECJ has, 
however, been matched by the development of divergent interpretations of specific 
areas of the ECHR between the ECJ and the ECtHR.149  The ECHR does not impose 
a specific method on a state party implementing its obligations under the ECHR and 
this extends to the scope of a national court’s obligation to adhere to the case law of 
the ECtHR.  However, as Lawson points out, resulting divergences in the case law of 
the ECtHR and national courts can be addressed by the mechanism of individual 
applications to the ECtHR under Article 34 ECHR.150  However, since the Union is 
not party to the ECHR, that mechanism is not available in the context of ECJ 
proceedings. A litigant in proceedings involving issues of Union law therefore has no 
means of testing the interpretation of the ECHR adopted by the ECJ. 
 
Incorporation of the Charter under Article I-9(2) of the Constitution would further 
increase the risk of divergence since ‘experience tends to show that it is difficult to 
avoid contradictions where two differently worded texts on the same subject-matter 
are interpreted by two different courts’ and the ‘provisions of Article 52 and 53 of the 
EU Charter will probably not be sufficient to avoid the risk of contradictions, 
certainly not where the application and interpretation of the Charter and the ECHR by 
national courts is concerned’.151 The problem of divergence was identified by 
Working Group II (WGII) on ‘Incorporation of the Charter/Accession to the ECHR’, 
but its conclusion was to favour preserving the autonomy of the ECJ: 
 
 ‘After accession, the Court of Justice would remain the sole supreme arbiter 
of questions of Union law and of the validity of Union Acts; the European 
Court on Human Rights could not be regarded as a superior Court but rather 
                                                                                                                                            
Saunders v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 313; and J.B. v Switzerland (2001) Crim. LR 748. See 
for a discussion of whether there is a divergence between the case law of the ECJ and the ECtHR in 
this area: Janet Dine, ‘Criminal Law and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination’ in S. Peers and A. 
Ward (eds.) The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights: Politics, Law and Policy (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2004), pp. 269-286. 
149 For an analysis of divergences between the case law of the ECJ and the ECtHR, see: Spielmann, in 
Alston (ed.), above n. 143, at pp. 764-771; Costello and Browne, in Kilkelly (ed.), above n. 77, at pp. 
39-46; and Lawson, in Lawson and de Bloijs (eds.), above n. 144, at pp. 234-250.  
150 Lawson, in R. Lawson and M. de Blois (eds.), above  n. 144,  at pp. 230-231. 
151 Study of Technical and Legal Issues of a Possible EC/EU Accession to the ECHR dated  September 
28, 2002 by the Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) of the Council of Europe (the CDDH 
Report),  reproduced in WD No 8 of WG II: at pp. 26-27.  Available on the European Convention 
website. See Section 5.2.4 of Chapter five for an analysis of Article II-112 and II-113 of the 
Constitution, which correspond to Articles 52 and 53 of the Charter. 
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as a specialized court exercising external control over the international law 
obligations of the Union resulting from accession to the ECHR.’152   
 
The Declaration on Article I-9(2) of the Constitution endorses this approach but 
proposes strengthened cooperation between the two bodies as a means to avoid 
conflict: 
 
‘The Conference agrees that the Union's accession to the European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
should be arranged in such a way as to preserve the specific features of Union 
law. In this connection, the Conference notes the existence of a regular 
dialogue between the Court of Justice of the European Union and the 
European Court of Human Rights; such dialogue could be reinforced when 
the Union accedes to that Convention.’153 
 
However, there would be significant advantages to the ECJ being subject to an 
express obligation to take account of the case law of the ECtHR in its construction of 
the ECHR along the lines of Section 2(1) of the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998.154 It 
would limit the development of divergent case law between the two courts and 
minimise uncertainty as to the ECJ’s future construction of the ECHR rights in areas 
where there is well-established case law of the ECtHR.  It would also limit the 
requirement, and the associated procedural delays, for references by national courts to 
                                                 
152  WGII Final Report, above n. 14, at p. 12. This conclusion is, however, debatable. As the CDDH 
Report makes clear, a procedure before the ECJ would not be considered, at least following Union 
accession, as a procedure of  ‘international investigation or settlement’ in the sense of Article 35(2)(b) 
ECHR and ‘the mere fact that a case has been dealt with by the Luxembourg Court should not prevent 
the Strasbourg Court from accepting an application as admissible’: above n. 151, at pp. 16-17. See also 
Section 4.2.4.6 of Chapter four on Article 35(2)(b) ECHR. If the ECtHR found that a judgment of the 
ECJ had failed to protect an ECHR right, the ECJ would, following Union accession, be obliged to 
follow the decision of the ECtHR under Article 46(1) ECHR provided the Union was a party to the 
proceedings before the ECtHR.  Furthermore, Protocol No. 14 ECHR introduces in Articles 46(4)-(5) 
ECHR a new procedure whereby a refusal to comply with a judgment may be referred to the ECtHR 
by the Committee of Ministers, and if confirmed, the ECtHR must refer the matter back to the 
Committee ‘for consideration of the measures to be taken’: ETS No. 194; signed 13 May 2004 (not yet 
in force). Protocol 14 is based on  the CDDH report to the Council of Europe of 8 April 2003 on 
Guaranteeing the Long-term Effectiveness of the ECHR : CM(2003)55. Available at: 
<http://www.coe.int/T/F/Droits_de_l'Homme/2003cm55.asp#TopOfPage>.  Accessed  1 September 
2005.  
153 [2004] OJ C310/420. 
154 ‘A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right 
must take into account any – (a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European 
Court of Human rights, (b) opinion of the Commission given in a report adopted under Article 31 of 
the Convention, (c) decision of the Commission in connection with Article 26 or 27(2) of the 
Convention, or (d) decision of the Committee of Ministers taken under Article 46 of the Convention, 
whenever made or given, so far as, in the opinion of the court or tribunal, it is relevant to the 
proceedings in which that question has arisen.’  Available on the HMSO website at: < http://www.uk-
legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts.htm>. 
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the ECJ on the interpretation of the ECHR within the scope of Union law since the 
meaning of the ECHR as construed by the ECtHR could be considered as falling 
within the acte clair doctrine.155 In response to the argument that such an obligation 
would restrict the ECJ’s ability to construe the ECHR in a way that provides greater 
protection than that provided by the ECtHR’s jurisprudence,156 the ECtHR is 
established under the ECHR as the judicial institution with primary responsibility for 
its interpretation and this mandate would be undermined if the ECJ developed as a 
competing source of precedent.157 
 
The Union’s accession treaty to the ECHR should therefore recognise that the ECtHR 
is the superior court as regards interpretation of the ECHR and that the ECJ should be 
bound to take account of a ruling of the ECtHR.158 This solution would maximize the 
benefits of accession by the Union to the ECHR159 and limit possible inconsistencies 
between decisions of the ECJ and the ECtHR.160 Article II-112(3) of the Constitution 
in any event obliges the ECJ to review the relevant case law of the ECtHR in order to 
ensure that those Charter rights which correspond to ECHR rights have the same 
‘meaning and scope’ as the ECHR rights.161    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
155 The criteria for the application of the acte clair doctrine established in CILFIT would need to be 
developed accordingly:  Case 283/81, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health 
[1982] ECR 3415.   
156 Costello and Browne refer to the  ‘self-limiting tendency’ of the ECtHR, reflected in doctrines such 
as the margin of appreciation and  deference to common established values of the signatory states,  
which might not be appropriate to the ECJ in the context of judicial review, in Kilkelly (ed.), above n. 
77, at p. 45. See generally, Pietro Sardaro, ‘Jus Non Dicere for allegations of Serious Violations of 
Human Rights: Questionable Trends in the Recent Case Law of the Strasbourg Court’, (2003) 6 
EHRLR, pp. 601-630. 
157 It should also be noted that Article II-112(3) of the Constitution, which corresponds to Article 52(3) 
of the Charter, provides that Union law may provide more ‘extensive protection’ for Charter rights 
corresponding to ECHR rights than the meaning and scope of those rights laid down in the ECHR. See 
further Section 5.2.4. of Chapter five.   
158 On the proposed modalities of accession by the Union to the ECHR see the discussion paper of June 
18, 2002 forwarded to the Convention Secretariat by WG II (CONV 1116/02). Available on the 
European Convention website. See also the CDDH Report, above n. 151, at pp. 18-19.   
159 For further arguments in favour of the ECtHR as final arbiter on the protection of human rights in 
the Union see: Betten, above n. 137, at pp. 698-699 and I. Canor, above n. 91, at pp. 20-21. 
160 See the CDDH Report, above n. 151, at paras. 78-82. Conflicts could still arise where the ECtHR 
had not ruled on an issue or subsequently over-ruled its existing case law. 
161 See further on Article 112(3), Section 5.2.4 of Chapter five. 
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3.4.3 NATIONAL COURTS AND THE ECHR: A TALE OF TWO MASTERS  
 
The status of decisions of the ECtHR in Union law raises two further questions: the 
treatment by national courts of decisions of the ECJ interpreting the ECHR,162 and 
the scope of their obligation to refer questions of interpretation of the ECHR to the 
ECJ under the preliminary reference procedure.163 These issues are relevant to the 
autonomy of the Union’s legal order both under the current system, whereby ECHR 
rights are treated as general principles of Union law, and if the Union accedes to the 
ECHR when such rights will also be international obligations of the Union. In both 
cases, the existence or absence of an obligation for national courts to follow or make 
a preliminary reference for the ECJ’s interpretation of ECHR rights in cases falling 
within the scope of Union law will have substantial implications for the relative 
authority of the ECJ and the ECtHR. Moreover, the resolution of these questions will 
impact on the relationship between the national courts and the ECJ with consequences 
for the relative autonomy of the national and Union legal orders. 
On the first issue, the ECHR does not oblige the contracting parties to secure 
adherence by the national courts to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, except under 
Article 46(1) ECHR in relation to a final judgment in any case to which the state is 
party. Therefore it is left to each contracting party to determine the status in domestic 
law of judgments of the ECtHR.164  However, this relative autonomy of the national 
legal order165 may be circumscribed in the case of a judgment of the ECJ interpreting 
the ECHR and any relevant case law of the ECtHR since such an interpretation is 
technically one of general principles of Union law and not of the ECHR.166 Since the 
                                                 
162 The analysis of this issue is limited here to the precedential authority for national courts of past 
decisions of the ECJ interpreting the ECHR. The separate issue of a potential conflict in a specific case 
between the ECJ’s interpretation of the ECHR  resulting from a preliminary reference and that of a 
national court is addressed in Section 4.2.4.4  of Chapter four.  
163 As set out in Article 234 EC Treaty and Article III-369 of the Constitution. For the specific 
preliminary reference procedures applicable to the AFSJ under Article 35(1) TEU and Article 68(1) 
EC Treaty, see Chapter seven. 
164 Article 2 of the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998 provides a court or tribunal ‘must take account’ of 
any judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the ECtHR.  Section 4 of the Republic of 
Ireland’s European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 requires ‘judicial notice’ shall be taken of 
‘any declaration, decision, advisory opinion or judgment’ of the ECtHR. 
165 Relative because Articles 1 and 13 ECHR impose an overall obligation on the signatory states to 
secure the ECHR rights and freedoms and provide an effective remedy for violations. Compliance with 
this obligation is ultimately to be decided by the ECtHR. 
166 See for further analysis of the status of fundamental rights as general principles of Union law 
Section 4.2.4 of Chapter four. 
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ECJ has developed a doctrine of binding precedent, at least in the context of Article 
234 EC Treaty proceedings,167 it is arguable that the national courts of the Member 
States are therefore obliged to follow the ECJ’s ruling on the scope of ECHR rights 
within the field of Union law if the ruling satisfies the CILFIT criteria. However, this 
result would be undesirable since it could result in divergent interpretations of an 
ECHR right depending on whether the case involve issues within the field of Union 
law or national law and undermines the authority of the ECtHR. It is therefore 
submitted that the ECJ’s interpretation of ECHR rights, or rights under any other 
fundamental rights treaty forming part of the general principles case law, should be 
treated as falling outside the scope of Union law for the purposes of the CILFIT 
doctrine.168 
The second issue is to determine the circumstances under which the national courts of 
the Member States are obliged to refer a question to the ECJ that requires 
construction of the ECHR in the context of proceedings where such construction is 
necessary for the national court to determine the validity of national measures falling 
within the scope of Union law.169  Since the ECHR rights and freedoms in the Union 
legal order are currently treated as general principles of Union law,170 the position is 
the same as with respect to the obligation to refer the interpretation of any other 
                                                 
167 ‘Finally, the correct application of Community law may be so obvious as to leave no scope for any 
reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised is to be resolved.  Before it comes to 
the conclusion that such is the case, the national court or tribunal must be convinced that the matter is 
equally obvious to the courts of the other Member States and to the Court of Justice.  Only if those 
conditions are satisfied, may the national court or tribunal refrain from submitting the question to the 
Court of Justice and take upon itself the responsibility for resolving it.’: CILFIT, above n. 155, at para. 
16. See also Cases 28-30/62, Da Costa en Schaake NV, Jacob Meijer NV and Hoechst-Holland NV v 
Nederlandse Belastingadministratie [1963] ECR 31. On the development of the ECJ’s doctrine of 
precedent, see P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (3rd edn.) (Oxford, OUP, 
2003), at pp. 439-453. 
168 Of course, it may be difficult to disentangle the part of a judgment of the ECJ interpreting the 
ECHR and the part applying that interpretation to the determination of the general principle of Union 
law: see, for example, paragraphs 79 to 80 of Schmidberger, above n. 147, where the ECJ refers to 
both case law of the ECJ and the ECtHR in establishing the criteria for justified limitations to the right 
of freedom of expression and assembly under Articles 10 and 11 ECHR. 
169 Such a question was implicit in the references to the ECJ in both Schmidberger, cited above n. 147, 
and Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der 
Bundesstadt Bonn; Judgment of 14 October 2004; [2005] 1 CMLR  5. Under the Foto-Frost principle, 
cited above n. 95, national courts are always obliged to refer a question as to the invalidity of Union 
measures.                                                                                  
170 If the Union accedes to the ECHR, the interpretation of the ECHR will fall within the ECJ’s 
jurisdiction under Article III-369(b) of the Constitution on the basis of the application of the ECJ’s 
expansive interpretation of its jurisdiction under Article 234(b) EC Treaty to interpret international 
agreements concluded by the Community: Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgium [1974] ECR 449, at 
paras. 2 to 6.  See Peters, above n. 1, at p. 17. 
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general principle of Union law.  While Article 234(b) EC Treaty does not specifically 
refer to general principles as a category in respect of which the ECJ may give a 
preliminary ruling, the ECJ has provided such rulings in cases where the 
interpretation of the scope of a general principle is necessary for the interpretation of 
a provision of the EC Treaty or a Union measure or for determining its validity.171 
However, this practice of the ECJ falls short of imposing an obligation of referral of a 
question of construction of the ECHR on courts of last instance of a Member State 
within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 234 EC Treaty but rather 
highlights the uncertainties created by treating ECHR rights as general principles of 
Union law.172 It is submitted that in such circumstances the national court should be 
entitled to refer directly to the case law of the ECHR without referring the issue to the 
ECJ.  
 
Indeed, it is debatable how far an obligation on a national court to refer the 
interpretation of an ECHR right to the ECJ would be compatible with the Member 
State’s obligations under Article 55 ECHR.173 Article 55 ECHR provides: 
 
‘The High Contracting Parties agree that, except by special agreement, they 
will not avail themselves of treaties, conventions or declarations in force 
between them for the purposes of submitting by way of petition, a dispute 
arising out of the interpretation or application of this Convention to a means 
of settlement other than those provided for in this Convention.’   
 
The only decision directly on the scope of Article 55 ECHR was given by the 
ECommHR in Cyprus v Turkey.174 The ECommHR rejected Turkey’s arguments that 
Article 55 ECHR applied to render the application inadmissible on the grounds the 
parties had undertaken by ‘special agreement’ to resolve the dispute within the 
                                                 
171 The ECJ in determining the scope of its jurisdiction under Article 234 EC Treaty generally uses the 
umbrella term ‘Community law’ which includes general principles: ‘In that regard, according to settled 
case-law, the procedure provided for by Article 234 EC is an instrument of cooperation between the 
Court of Justice and national courts by means of which the former provides the latter with 
interpretation of such Community law as is necessary for them to give judgment in cases upon which 
they are called to adjudicate ..’: Carpenter, cited above n. 147, at para. 30.  See also Hartley, above n. 
20, at p. 273.  
172 See Section 4.2.4.4 of Chapter four for analysis of the situation where the ECJ does rule on the 
meaning of an ECHR provision and the referring court disagrees with that interpretation. 
173 See in this sense Besselink, above n. 140, at p. 656. 
174 App. No.  25781/94; Admissibility Decision of 28 June 1996, (1997) 23 EHRR 244. The ECtHR 
did not address the issue on being referred the case by the ECommHR and the Government of Cyprus 
in its judgment of 10 May 2001: (2002) 35 EHRR 30. 
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framework of the UN. The ECommHR stated that a contracting party could only rely 
on a special agreement within the meaning of Article 55 (ex Art. 62) ECHR to 
withdraw a dispute from the jurisdiction of the ECHR organs in ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ and held: 
 
‘The principle stipulated in Article 62 (Art. 62) is the monopoly of the 
Convention institutions for deciding disputes arising out of the interpretation 
and application of the Convention … the performance of its functions under 
… the Convention cannot in any way be impeded by the fact that certain 
aspects of the situation underlying an application filed with it are being dealt 
with, from a different angle, by other international bodies.’ 175 
 
It is, however, unclear from this decision whether Article 55 ECHR is limited to inter-
state disputes or whether it also applies to disputes within the jurisdiction of a single 
Member State.176 Since Article 55 ECHR refers simply refers to ‘a dispute arising out 
of the interpretation or application of this Convention’, and is not limited to disputes 
between ECHR contracting parties, the latter interpretation is preferable. If that is 
correct, the compatibility of the Article 234 EC Treaty reference procedure with 
Article 55 ECHR will depend on whether a reference is a ‘means of settlement’ 
within the meaning of Article 55 ECHR.177 If the national court were obliged to 
follow the ECJ’s ruling on the meaning of the ECHR there would be grounds for the 
ECtHR to take the view that such a system did constitute a ‘settlement’.178 In order to 
eliminate this uncertainty, it would be preferable in order to achieve uniform 
interpretation of the ECHR, both within the ambit of Union law and national law, that 
national courts could refer directly to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR without 
submitting the question to the ECJ. This result could be achieved by stipulating in the 
                                                 
175 Ibid., at pp. 282-283. 
176 Cyprus v Turkey involved a dispute between two contracting parties to the ECHR and therefore did 
not need to address the issue.  
177 A separate question is as to the meaning of the word ‘petition’ in Article 55 ECHR. The ECommHR  
in Cyprus v Turkey on this point simply noted that it was not provided in the agreements establishing 
intercommunal talks that any dispute as to the interpretation of the ECHR can be submitted to the 
Committee on Missing Persons  ‘by way of petition’: above n. 174, at p. 30. 
178 The ECtHR did not need to address this issue in Boshporus, cited above n. 110, since the question 
referred by the Irish Supreme Court related to the interpretation of an EC Regulation and not its 
conformity with the ECHR. 
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ECHR accession agreement that the ECJ is bound by judgments of the ECtHR or, in 
the absence of accession, by adapting the CILFIT criteria.179   
 
3.5 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
The autonomy of Union law has been a pivotal value in determining the relationship 
of Union law both to international law and the national law of the Member States. 
While securing the autonomy of Union law served a legitimate purpose in creating a 
legal order robust enough to impose itself on the Member States during its early 
development, the pursuit of autonomy as an objective in an era characterised by 
globalisation and supranationalism is outdated.180 The doctrine of supremacy should 
be adapted to recognise the plurality of sources of international norms in the field of 
fundamental rights.181 Equal status for such norms both within the Union and national 
legal orders should be the objective. This approach reflects the reality of 
interdependence rather than autonomy that forms the basis of the relationship between 
Union and national law: ‘European community law is not an autonomous legal 
system. It is integrated with the legal systems of the Member States at various levels 
and in many forms.’182  
 
It is submitted that national courts of the Member States should be empowered, 
outside the confines of a specific case referral to the ECJ, to construe international 
standards within the area of Union law in according with the canons of international 
law. This approach would foster a harmonious construction of international 
fundamental rights provisions both within and outside the scope of Union law. The 
normative status of such rights within the Union’s legal order would not be 
diminished since both the national courts and the Union’s courts would be applying 
the same principles in construing such standards. In order to facilitate this partnership, 
                                                 
179 See also the CDDH Report, above n. 151, especially its discussion at paras. 75-77 on the feasibility 
of establishing an alternative mechanism for references by the ECJ to the ECtHR on the interpretation 
of the ECHR. However, the delays associated with such a procedure are a dissuasive factor. 
180 See on the impact of globalisation on the US constitutional order: M. Tushnet, The New 
Constitutional Order (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2003).  
181 See for a discussion of alternative models for the relationship of Union and national law: Neil 
MacCormick, ‘Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-sovereign State’, in Richard Bellamy and Dario 
Castiglione (eds.) Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives 
(Oxford, Blackwell, 1996), pp. 141-155, especially at pp. 146-150.   
182 Eeckhout (1998), above n. 5, at p. 2. 
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international fundamental rights should retain their international law character and not 
be treated as transformed into Union law.183   
Pursuit of the conflicting objectives of autonomy and a system of fundamental rights 
protection based primarily on standards derived from international law has resulted in 
a constitutional order that is in its relationship to international law complex, 
restrictive and contradictory.184 Complex in that there is no clear constitutional 
ordering in the Treaties or the Constitution of the relationship between the two legal 
systems;185 restrictive insofar as the ECJ has rejected a broad Union competence in 
the field of fundamental rights, including the power to accede to the ECHR;186 and 
contradictory insofar as the ECJ has veered between a monist and dualist approach to 
the relationship.187 The prioritisation of the autonomy of the Union’s legal order by 
the ECJ, culminating in Opinion 2/94,188 has meant the Union has reached an impasse 
in its relationship to international fundamental rights, and in particular the ECHR, that 
can best be resolved through Union accession to the ECHR.189  
 
183 Peters advocates transposition: ‘However, transposing international rules strengthens them by 
allowing them to partake in the special effects of Community law. If changed into Community law, 
rules of international origin have the status of immediately valid, superior law in all Member States.’: 
above n. 1, at p. 34.  However, this presupposes that Union law affords more effective protection to 
international fundamental rights than national law.  However, there is no compelling reason to assume 
that the ECJ’s construction of such standards will be more, or less, progressive than national courts. 
184 For a perceptive analysis of the Community’s ‘aspiration for autonomy’ and its impact on how the 
Community legal order addresses international law, see Uerpmann, above n. 4, at pp. 43-46.  
185 Article 300(7) EC Treaty, which provides Article 300 EC Treaty agreements ‘shall be binding on 
the institutions of the Community and on the Member States’, has been construed as supporting either 
a monist relationship (Uerpmann, above n. 4, at p. 27) or a dualist relationship (Peters, above n. 1, at p. 
31). Eeckhout convincingly argues that it does neither: above n. 5, at p. 277. The Union’s relationship 
to international law was not specifically discussed by any of the European Convention Working 
Groups. Working Group III on Legal Personality was the logical place to address these issues but had 
no mandate to do so: see Final Report of Working Group III of 1 October 2002, CONV 305/02, WG III 
16. Available on the European Convention website. 
186 Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR 1-1759.  On whether Opinion 2/94 was motivated by autonomy concerns 
vis-à-vis the ECtHR, see Uerpmann, above n. 4, at p. 30. See also J.H.H. Weiler and S.C. Fries, ‘A 
Human Rights Policy for the European Community and Union: The Question of Competences’  in  
Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp. 147-165. 
187 Peters refers to the continuing debate as to whether monism or dualism is more appropriate to 
describe the relationship between Union and International law: above n. 1, at p. 20, n. 48. For the view 
that the ECJ has adopted a dualist perspective view based on an analysis of Fediol v. Commission 
(Case 70/87 [1989] ECR 1781) and Nakajima v. Council (Case C-69/89 [1991] ECR 1-2069) on the 
legal status of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements in the Union’s legal order, see: 
Uerpmann, above n. 4, at pp. 26-28. Peters prefers the term ‘communitarization’ of international law to 
describe ‘the incorporation of international law through alteration of the legal character of the rule, 
without modification of its language or contents’: above n. 1, at p. 35. 
188 See Canor, above n. 91, at p. 4, n. 3: ‘Clearly, the political reason for giving the opinion was to free 
the Court of Justice from obedience to the rulings of institutions external to it.’ 
189 See Chapter five for the analysis underlying this conclusion. 
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4 
THE NORMATIVE STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
IN UNION LAW 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
This Chapter examines the normative status in the Union’s legal order of international 
fundamental rights based on treaties and customary international law, including the 
specific issues raised by fundamental rights recognized as constituting jus cogens.  The 
impact of the Constitution on the existing normative status of fundamental rights in 
Union law is also assessed.  The purpose of this Chapter is to determine how effectively 
the Union’s legal order integrates these rights. The issue of normative status is addressed 
here from a general perspective while a specific case study of the normative status in 
Union law of the principle of non-refoulement is undertaken in Chapter eight.  
The first part of this Chapter critically analyses the legal status of fundamental rights 
treaties in the Union’s legal order. Since neither the Union nor the EC has acceded to any 
fundamental rights treaty, this analysis is conducted in the context of three mechanisms 
whereby normative effect may be given to such treaties in the Union’s legal order. The 
first mechanism is through the transfer of competences from the Member States to the 
Union resulting in the Union assuming the obligations and rights of the Member States 
under the relevant treaty. The second mechanism is through the application of Article 
307 EC Treaty that prohibits pre-accession agreements with third countries concluded by 
a Member State from being affected by the application of the EC Treaty. The third, and 
most significant, mechanism is the reception of international fundamental rights based on 
treaties into Union law either as general principles of Union law or through a reference in 
the TEU or the EC Treaty, and in particular the reference to the ECHR in Article 6(2) 
TEU.1  
                                                 
1 The legal consequences of the reference in Article 63(1) EC Treaty to the Geneva Convention of 28 July 
1951 (the Refugee Convention), in force 22 April 1954, 189 UNTS 137, is analysed in Section 8.3.2.3 of 
Chapter eight. Unless the context otherwise requires, reference to the Refugee Convention includes 
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The second part of this Chapter examines the normative status of rules of customary 
international law in Union law. Firstly, the status of such rules is reviewed in the context 
of a comparison with the treatment of other fundamental rights standards recognized in 
Union law as general principles of law.  Secondly, an analysis is conducted of the case 
law of the ECJ on the status of customary international law in the Union’s legal order and 
the criteria for judicial review of Union measures based on a violation of customary 
international law.  In conclusion, it is argued that insufficient weight has been attached 
by the ECJ to customary international law as a source of fundamental rights protection 
and that deficiency has not been addressed by the Constitution. 
The third part of the Chapter considers the impact of the developing international law on 
norms ascribed the status of jus cogens on the Union’s legal order. Such norms are based 
on both treaty and customary international law and as a result raise issues common to 
both sources in respect of their reception into Union law. However, unlike international 
obligations of the Union based on treaties and customary international law, jus cogens 
take precedence over both primary and secondary Union law.2 Jus cogens therefore gives 
rise to specific jurisdictional issues in the case of conflict with Union primary law. 
However, jus cogens may also give rise to problems in the relationship between national 
and Union law in the event a rule of jus cogens conflicts with a rule of primary or 
secondary Union law. The potentially conflicting obligations of the Member States under 
international law and Union law are analysed in this context. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
reference to the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967 (the New York Protocol), in force 4 October 1967: 
606 UNTS 267. 
2 ‘…it is virtually unanimously agreed that international law and Community rules stand in the following 
hierarchy: international jus cogens, which cannot be abrogated, is per definitionem superior to all other 
law. It is followed by the EC Treaty. International norms (both general rules and treaties binding the EC) 
rank below the EC Treaty. Then follows Community legislation.’: A. Peters, ‘The Position of International 
Law within the Community Legal Order’ (1997) German Yearbook of International Law, pp. 1-77, at pp. 
37-38. 
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4.2 THE NORMATIVE STATUS OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS TREATIES IN 
UNION LAW 
4.2.1 UNION ACCESSION TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS TREATIES 
 
Article 1 TEU provides: ‘The Union shall be founded on the European Communities, 
supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation established by this Treaty.’  Of 
the three constituents of the Union,3 only the EC and the European Atomic Energy 
Community have expressly been conferred with international legal personality.4 
However, notwithstanding the lack of express conferment, it is generally accepted that, at 
least since the introduction of Article 24 TEU by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Union 
also has international legal personality.5 Article 38 TEU provides Article 24 TEU 
agreements may also cover matters falling under the Third Pillar. This view has been 
confirmed by the fact that the Union has concluded a number of international agreements 
on the basis of Articles 24 and 38 TEU.6  Working Group III on Legal Personality 
recommended expressly conferring a single legal personality on the Union in the new 
Constitution and this recommendation was adopted in Article I-7 of the Constitution.7 
However, the Union does not participate directly in either the European or UN structures 
for the protection of fundamental rights. This failure is reflected in both the Union’s 
failure to adhere to the relevant international organisations for the protection of 
                                                 
3 The ECSC Treaty expired on 23 July 2002. 
4 See Article 281 EC Treaty and Article 184 Euratom Treaty. 
5 Prior to Article 24 TEU, the basis for implying international legal personality for the Union was the 
Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Services of the United Nations: 
[1949] ICJ Rep 174. For the application of the case to the Union, see Eeckhout, External Relations of the 
European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations (Oxford, OUP, 2004) at pp. 155-157. On the 
effect of the introduction of Article 24 TEU, see Eeckhout, ibid., at pp. 157-160; Hartley, The Foundations 
of European Community Law (5th edn.) (Oxford, OUP, 2003), at pp. 159-160; and Craig and de  Búrca, EU 
Law: Text, Cases and Materials (3rd edn.) (Oxford, OUP, 2003), at p. 131. See generally, Dominic 
McGoldrick, International Relations Law of the European Union (Harlow, Longman, 1997), at pp. 26-39; 
and Nanette Neuwahl, ‘Legal Personality of the European Union – International and Institutional Aspects’ 
in V. Kronenberger (ed.) , The EU and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony (Hague, Asser 
Press, 2001), at pp. 3-24. 
6 A list of such agreements is given by Eeckhout, above n. 5, at pp. 159-160, n. 86.  
7 ‘The Union shall have legal personality.’ See Final Report of Working Group III on Legal Personality of 
1 October 2002: CONV 305/02. Available on the European Convention website. 
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fundamental rights8 and its failure to accede to the UN Conventions and the European 
Conventions. The most significant attempt by the EC to adhere to a fundamental rights 
treaty, the ECHR, foundered on the ECJ’s restricted reading of the EC’s powers in 
Opinion 2/94.9 Notwithstanding Opinion 2/94, it has been argued the EC could accede to 
other Council of Europe treaties without amending the EC Treaty.10 However, attempts 
to amend the European Social Charter to allow membership of the EC have failed.11  The 
Constitution does not explicitly confer a general competence on the Union in the field of 
fundamental rights and indeed the provisions for incorporation of the Charter and Union 
accession to the ECHR were premised on the opposite basis.12 However, it has been 
argued that Articles I-2 and I-3 of the Constitution may be interpreted as conferring 
                                                 
8 Union membership of international organizations has reflected the predominant trade orientation of EC 
policy in the international arena. EC membership is currently limited to the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Trade Organization, 
and a number of specialised fisheries organisations. Eeckhout discusses in detail the powers under the 
Treaty for the EC to join international organizations and the reasons which have militated against extensive 
use of those powers: above n. 5, at pp. 199-206. 
9 Accession to the ECHR, re [1996] ECR 1-1759. Eeckhout analyses Opinion 2/94 in the context of the 
principle of the autonomy of the Union’s legal order: above n. 5, at p. 208. 
10  See Alston and Weiler, ‘An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The European 
Union and Human Rights’, in Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp. 3-66, at p. 
31. They refer as examples to: the European Social Charter of 18 October 1961, in force 26 February 1965 
(ETS No. 35): the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data of 28 February 1981, in force 1 October 1985 (ETS No. 108), and the 1997 European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the 
Application of Biology and Medicine of 4 April 1997, in force 1 December 1999  (ETS No. 164).   A 
number of recent Council of Europe Conventions provide for signature by the EC, although the EC has not 
to date signed any of them. See, for example: the 1997 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine; the 
1998 Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human 
Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition of Cloning Human 
Beings of 12 January 1998, in force 1 March 2001 (ETS No. 168); the Additional Protocol to the 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of 
Human Origin of 24 January 2002, not in force (ETS No. 186); the Additional Protocol to the Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning Biomedical Research of 25 January 2005, not in force 
(ETS No. 195); and the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of 16 May 2005, not in force (ETS No. 
196). Eeckhout, above n. 5,  at p. 471, refers to an exclusive EC competence to conclude Protocol 12 to the 
ECHR of 4 November 2000, in force 1 April 2005 (ETS 177), ‘in so far as the provisions of that Protocol 
affect Community legislation.’.  See generally: Weiler and Fries, ‘A Human Rights Policy for the European 
Community and Union: the Question of Competences’ in Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford, 
OUP, 1999), pp. 147-165. 
11 See A. Clapham, ‘Human Rights in the Common Foreign Policy’ in Alston (ed.), The EU and Human 
Rights (Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp. 627-683, at p. 676.  
12 Working Group II on Incorporation of the Charter/Accession to the ECHR (WGII) was concerned to 
ensure that accession by the Union to the ECHR ‘would thus not lead to any extension of the Union’s 
competences, let alone to the establishment of a general competence of the Union on fundamental rights’: 
WGII Final Report on Incorporation of the Charter/Accession to the ECHR; CONV 354/02: WG II 16, 
Brussels, 22 October 2002, at p. 13.  Available on the European Convention website. 
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increased powers for the Union to ‘promote human rights regardless of context and 
across the internal/exterior divide.’13 
The Union’s failure to accede to international instruments for the protection of 
fundamental right is in part to be explained by the technical difficulties of adhesion or 
accession arising from the fact that the Union is an international organisation rather than 
a state. However, the limited scope of the technical amendments necessary to permit 
Union accession to the ECHR shows such obstacles can be surmounted.14 Adoption of 
the Constitution and subsequent accession to the ECHR may, however, not be sufficient 
to overcome the substantial political barriers and competence problems that have to date 
prevented Union membership of other international treaties or organisations for the 
protection of fundamental rights.15 The following sections examine the alternative 
mechanisms for providing normative effect to fundamental rights treaties in Union law 
and assess their effectiveness as a substitute for direct Union membership. 
 
4.2.2  TRANSFER OF NATIONAL COMPETENCES TO THE UNION 
 
4.2.2.1 Introduction  
One mechanism by which the EC may be treated under Union law as bound by 
international agreements entered into by the Member States is in areas where it 
subsequently exercises internal competence.16 In International Fruit Company, the ECJ 
                                                 
13 Andrew Williams, EU Human Rights Policies: A Study in Irony (Oxford, OUP, 2004), at p. 116. 
14 See the Study of Technical and Legal Issues of a Possible EC/EU Accession to the ECHR of  28 
September 2002 by the Steering Committee for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (CDDH Report). 
Other parties to the relevant treaty may of course be unwilling to make the necessary amendments to 
facilitate Union membership. For an analysis of the various obstacles to EC membership of international 
organisations and also the problems associated with EC membership of GATT and the WTO: see 
Eeckhout, above n. 5, at pp. 200-206.  
15 For an analysis of political and ideological constraints to Union adoption of fundamental rights 
instruments, see Williams, above n. 13,  at pp. 194-196. Articles III-323 and III-327 of the Constitution 
expand the current scope of the Union’s powers to conclude agreements and maintain relations with 
international organizations. These provisions are based on recommendations of Working Group VII: Final 
Report of Working Group VII on External Action of 16 December 2002: CONV 459/02. Available on the 
European Convention website. 
16 A separate question is whether the Union is bound to comply with the international obligations of the 
Member States by the international law doctrine of succession. This theory was applied to Community 
succession to GATT and then extended in terms of ‘functional’ succession in respect of the ECHR: see, P. 
Pescatore, ‘La Cour de Justice des Communautés Européenes et la Convention Européenne des Droits de 
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held: ‘ ..in so far as under the EEC Treaty the Community has assumed the powers 
previously exercised by Member States in the area covered by the General Agreement 
[GATT], the provisions of that agreement have the effect of binding the Community’.17 
In Procureur Général v. Arbelaiz-Emmezabel, Advocate-General Capotorti stated that 
four requirements had been established in International Fruit Company  for determining 
if the EC has been ‘subrogated’ to the obligations of the Member States:  
 
‘.. the Member States were all already parties to the agreement when the 
EEC Treaty was concluded; that it was the wish of those States to pledge the 
Community to observe the agreement, its aims being shared by the 
Community; that actions should actually have been taken by the Community 
institutions within the framework of the agreement; and that the other 
contracting parties should have recognized that powers had effectively been 
transferred to the Community with respect to the subject-matter of the 
agreement.’18  
It is unclear, however, whether these requirements are specific to GATT or whether the 
ECJ would relax them in the context of other international agreements. Indeed, in 
Arbelaiz-Emmezabel the requirement for prior membership of a treaty by all Member 
States was impliedly waived. The ECJ held that the interim EC regime established to 
conserve fishing stocks in respect of Spanish vessels in French territorial waters 
‘replaced the prior international obligations existing between certain Member States, 
such as France and Spain’ notwithstanding that these prior obligations arose from the 
London Fisheries Convention of 9 March 1964 and an implementing Franco-Spanish 
                                                                                                                                                 
l’Homme’, in G. Wiarda, F. Matscher and H. Petzold (eds.), Protecting Human Rights: The European 
Dimension (Cologne, Heymann, 1988), pp. 441-455. Clapham has suggested that by, application of the 
doctrine of succession, the Community ‘is bound by the norms contained in’ the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and that in consequence the Commission may be obliged 
to comply with the monitoring and reporting obligations under the ICESCR: in Alston (ed.), above n. 11, at 
pp. 658-659. Clapham also argues the same principles may be applicable to other UN and European 
Conventions to which all the Member States are party such, as the ICEAFDW, the CRC, the ECHR, and 
the Social Charter. However, the validity of this extension in strict legal terms is doubtful:  see Uerpmann, 
‘International Law as an Element of European Constitutional Law: International Supplementary 
Constitutions’ (2003) Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 9/03, at pp. 31-37. Available at: 
<http://www.jeanmonnet-program.org/papers/03/030901-02.html>.  
17 Cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit [1972] ECR 
1219, at para. 18.  
18 Case 181/80 [1981] ECR 2961, at p. 2987.  See for comment Hartley, above n. 5, at pp. 181-182. 
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agreement of 26 March 1967, both of which post-dated the Treaty of Rome.19 It has been 
further questioned whether a transfer of exclusive competence from the Member States to 
the Union is required under the International Fruit Company doctrine.20 A relaxation of 
the requirement for all Member States to be members of the relevant international 
agreement would further expand the scope of the doctrine. 
The following sections examine the potential application of the International Fruit 
Company doctrine to the UN Charter and UN Security Council Resolutions, the Refugee 
Convention, and the ECHR. While the doctrine is of potential application to other UN 
and European Conventions, the analysis of these key international instruments allows an 
assessment to be made of the potential effectiveness of the doctrine as a substitute for 
direct Union accession to international treaties for the protection of fundamental rights. 
4.2.2.2  The UN Charter and UN Security Council Resolutions 
‘The Charter does not establish any particular regime of human rights protection and the 
emphasis is upon the non-intervention in the affairs of member States of the United 
Nations.’21 However, the UN Charter does refer to fundamental rights. Article 1(3) 
includes in the purposes of the UN the promotion and respect for ‘human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion’ 
and Article 55(c) requires the UN to promote ‘universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion.’22  
The Security Council plays an important role in the protection of fundamental rights and 
in particular under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter in the maintenance of 
                                                 
19 Arbelaiz-Emmezabel, at para. 30. See also, ibid., at para. 13 were the ECJ emphasized that the parties to 
the London Convention ‘must have known’ that at a certain time the EC institutions would exercise on 
behalf of the Member States the conservation measures provided for in the Convention.  
20 Eeckhout, above n. 5, at p. 438. 
21 Rehman, International Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach (Harlow, 2003), at p. 27.   
22 For an analsyis of the provisions in the UN Charter concerning fundamental rights see:  A. Cassese, 
International Law (2nd edn.) (Oxford, OUP, 2005), at pp. 331-333 and 377-379; and Rehman, above n. 
21, at pp. 24-26. 
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international peace and security.23 Article 41 UN Charter provides the basis for the 
Security Council to adopt sanctions against states, groups or individuals in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security: 
‘The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of 
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call 
upon the Member States of the United Nations to apply such measures. 
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations, 
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.’24 
 
This section first examines whether, independently of the application of the International 
Fruit Company doctrine, the Union is bound by the UN Charter and UN Security Council 
Resolutions in international law.25 It has been argued that insofar as obligations under the 
UN Charter exceed those obligations arising under general international law they do not 
bind non-members.26 However, Article 2(6) of the UN Charter requires the UN to ensure 
that ‘States which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these 
Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.’ While this obligation is imposed on the UN and refers to states which are non-
members, the logic of Articles 2(6) and 2(7)27 of the UN Charter and the practice of the 
Security Council in seeking compliance by non-members of the UN, including 
international organisations,28 with sanctions resolutions leads to the conclusion that the 
Union is, as a minimum, bound by measures adopted under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.  
                                                 
23 See Erika de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2004).  
24 For examples of Security Council Resolutions adopted either explicitly or by implication under 
Article 41 of the UN Charter, see Cassese, above n. 22, at p. 341, n. 2. UN Security Council resolutions 
are available at: <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>.  
25 See: S. Bohr, ‘Sanctions by the United Nations Security Council and the European Community’ 
(1993) 4 EJIL, pp. 256-268; and Ricardo Pavoni, ‘UN Sanctions in EU and National Law’ (1999) 48 
ICLQ, pp. 582-613. 
26 Eeckhout concludes that the ‘the UN Charter does not appear to bind the EU or the EC on the basis of 
international law.’: above n. 5, at p. 437.  
27 Article 2(7) of the UN Charter excludes enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
from the prohibition on the UN intervening in ‘matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter.’ 
28 See for the position of non-members of the UN: Sands and Klein, Bowett’s Law of International 
Institutions  (5th edn.) (London, 2001), at pp. 26-27; and Cassese, above n. 22, at p. 186.   
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As regards the applicability of the International Fruit Company in binding the Union 
under internal law, Eeckhout has concluded that the criteria set out in International Fruit 
Company are broadly satisfied as regards the UN Charter and UN Security Council 
resolutions except for the requirement for substitution of the Union for the Member 
States.29 However, there are strong arguments for relaxing this requirement in the light of 
the obligations under Union law of the Member States that are member of the UN 
Security Council. Article 19(2) TEU requires Member States which are also members of 
the Security Council to ‘concert and keep the other Member States fully informed’ and 
requires permanent members ‘to ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of 
the Union without prejudice to their responsibilities’ under the UN Charter. Article III-
305(2) of the Constitution substantially reproduces Article 19(2) TEU but provides, in 
sub-paragraph three, a new obligation on members of the Security Council to  request, 
when the Union has defined a position on the Security Council agenda, a hearing for the 
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
The firm political commitment of the Union to the UN further supports the view that the 
Union should be treated as bound under the International Fruit Company doctrine by the 
UN Charter and resolutions of the Security Council.30 Although recent proposals for 
reform of the Security Council do not envisage Union membership, much less a seat on 
the Security Council for the Union,31 the Union as part of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) issues joint statements through the President of the EU Council 
or through the Commission before the UN General Assembly and the UN Commission 
on Human Rights.32 The provisions of the Constitution would significantly strengthen 
                                                 
29 Above  n.  5, at pp. 437-439. See also the analysis of Bohr, above n. 25, at pp. 264--265.  
30 See: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: The European 
Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism. Brussels, 10 September 2003. COM(2003) 
526 final; and the Final Report of Working Group VII on External Action of 16 December 2002: CONV 
459/02. Available on the European Convention website. 
31 UN Report of 1 December 2004: A more secure world: our shared responsibility:  Document A/59/565 
available at <http://www.un.org/secureworld/>. For a summary of previous proposals for reforming the 
permanent membership of the UN Security Council, some of which do favour conferring a seat on the 
Union: see Michael J. Kelly, ‘U.N. Security Council Permanent Membership: A New Proposal for a 
Twenty-First Century Council’ (2000) 31 Steton Hall Law Review, pp. 319-399, at pp. 329-341.  The 2005 
World Summit held in New York from 14-16 September 2005 failed to resolve the issue of Security 
Council reform and mandated the General Assembly to report further by the end of 2005. See: 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/ga10385.doc.htm>. 
32 Clapham, in Alston (ed.), above n. 11, at pp. 644-645.  
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and extend the existing provisions in the TEU and the EC Treaty concerning the 
obligations of the Union in respect of the UN Charter.33   
Application of the International Fruit Company principles therefore provides a 
mechanism for achieving full Union adherence to the UN Charter and UN Security 
resolutions in the absence of a realistic perspective of Union membership of the UN. It 
would also mitigate the risk of conflicts between the obligations of the Member States 
under the UN Charter and their obligations under Union law. However, since the Union 
is in any event bound to comply with UN Security Council resolutions adopted under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter and all the Member States are party to the UN Charter, 
the ECJ may well adopt a broader basis for concluding that the Union is bound both by 
the UN Charter and UN Security council resolutions in general.34 
4.2.2.3  The Refugee Convention  
The Refugee Convention is another  key international instrument where the issue of 
whether the Union is bound by application of the International Fruit Company criteria 
arises. However, the artificiality of transposing criteria developed by the ECJ in respect 
of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) to the different context of refugee and asylum 
policy is even more apparent in the light of the complex inter-relationship between Union 
and national competences in this area. Although the Union acts on the express basis that 
its actions are subject to compliance with the Refugee Convention and membership of the 
Refugee Convention is a requirement for a state’s admission to the Union,35 the Union 
has not replaced the Member States in fulfilling their obligations under the Geneva 
                                                 
33 Article I-3(4) of the Constitution commits the Union to contribute , inter alia, ‘ to the strict observance 
and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations 
Charter.’ Article 11(1) TEU includes as an objective of the Union: ‘to preserve peace and strengthen 
international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the 
principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external 
borders.’ In comparison, Preamble seven of the EC Treaty provides: ‘Intending to confirm the solidarity 
which binds Europe and the overseas countries and desiring to ensure the development of their prosperity, 
in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’    
34 After analysing the various potential legal bases in Union law, Eeckhout takes this view: ‘In 
conclusion, the Court [ECJ] might well, if the question were ever to come before it, be inclined to 
recognise the binding character of the UN Charter and of Security Council resolutions, and could find 
support for such recognition in its own case law.’: above n. 5, at p. 439. 
35 G. Noll and J. Vedsted-Hansen, ‘Non-Communitarians: Refugee and Asylum Policies’, in Alston (ed.), 
The EU and Human Rights (Oxford, 1999), pp. 359-410, at pp. 374-375. 
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Convention. While the Union has adopted measures within the framework of the Refugee 
Convention both internally and externally,36 a common European asylum system (CEAS) 
has not yet been developed.37 The Member States retain shared competence with the EC 
in negotiating and concluding agreements in the asylum and refugee field, including any 
future re-negotiation of the Geneva Convention.38   
This conclusion is supported by specific powers retained by Member States in respect of 
Title IV EC Treaty. Firstly, Article 64(1) EC Treaty provides Title IV ‘shall not affect the 
exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the 
maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security’ which establishes 
limits on the internal competence of the EC which are automatically mirrored in the 
external field. 39 Secondly, Article 63 EC Treaty permits Member States to maintain or 
introduce national provisions notwithstanding the Council adopting measures under 
Article 63(3) or (4) EC Treaty, which includes in this context measures on illegal 
immigration and illegal residence, including repatriation of illegal residents (Article 
                                                 
36 A regards internal measures, see the Commission's Acquis of the European Union in the field of JHA; 
consolidated version; update December 2004; available at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/intro/docs/jha_acquis_1204_en.pdf.> As regards 
external measures, the European Council meeting at Seville on 21-22 June 2002 declared: ‘The European  
Council urges that any future cooperation, association or equivalent agreement which the European Union 
or the European Community concludes with any country should include a clause on joint management of 
migration flows and on compulsory readmission in the event of illegal immigration.’: available at 
<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72638.pdf>.  Readmission agreements have been 
signed between: the EC and Hong Kong on 27 December 2002, approved by Council Decision of 17 
December 2003 [2004] OJ L17/23; and the EC and Macao on 13 October 2003, approved by Council 
Decision of 21 April 2004 [2004] OJ L143/97. 
37 However, the 2004 Hague programme adopted by the European Council provides: ‘The aims of the 
Common European Asylum System in its second phase will be the establishment of a common asylum 
procedure and a uniform status for those who are granted asylum or subsidiary protection. It will be based 
on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention on Refugees and other relevant Treaties, 
and be built on a thorough and complete evaluation of the legal instruments that have been adopted in the 
first phase.’: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in The European Union , 4-5 November 2004. 
Available as Annex 1 to the Presidency Conclusions, at para. 1.3; available at: 
<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/82534.pdf>. 
38 The legal basis for EC competence to re-negotiate the Refugee Convention would be Article 63(1) EC 
Treaty. Article III-266 of the Constitution sets out the terms of the CEAS. It is noteworthy that the 
references in Article 63(1)(b), (c), (d) and in Article 63(2)(a) EC Treaty to the adoption of  ‘minimum 
standards’ have not been carried forward into Article III-266 of the Constitution which may arguably 
provide the legal basis for the Union to acquire exclusive competence to conclude international agreements 
in those areas. See Eeckhout for an analysis of the EC’s external powers in the area of visas, asylum and 
immigration, above n. 5, at pp. 132-134. 
39 Article 64(1) EC Treaty is retained in Article III-262 of the Constitution. See further Sections 6.2.7 and 
6.2.8 of Chapter six. 
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63(3)(b) EC Treaty), provided the national provisions ‘are compatible with this Treaty 
and with international agreements.’40 Thirdly, Declaration 18 to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam provides that ‘Member States may negotiate and conclude agreements with 
third countries’ within the scope of Article 63(3)(a) EC Treaty provided such agreements 
‘respect Community law’.41 Fourthly, the UK, Ireland and Denmark have negotiated 
complex flexibility arrangements under Protocols to the Amsterdam Treaty as to whether 
to participate in measures taken under Title IV EC Treaty which undermine the 
achievement of common standards.42 Finally, Member States have retained significant 
powers in the area of immigration policy covered by Articles 63(3) and 63(4) EC 
Treaty.43 
Moreover, additional criteria established in International Fruit Company are not met in 
respect of the Geneva Convention. The New York Protocol was concluded after the EC 
Treaty and, unlike GATT, the other parties to the Refugee Convention have not as yet 
recognized the effective transfer of powers to the Union from the Member States with 
regard to the subject matter of the Geneva Convention. In conclusion, it seems unlikely at 
the current stage of development of the Common European Asylum System that 
International Fruit Company provides a basis for concluding that the EC is bound by the 
                                                 
40 This provision has not been included in the Constitution. However, Article III-267(5) provides: ‘This 
Article shall not affect the right of Member States to determine volumes of admission of third-country 
nationals coming from third countries to their territory in order to seek work whether employed or self-
employed.’ 
41 Article 63(3)(a) covers measures on immigration policy relating to: ‘conditions of entry and residence, 
and standards on procedures for the issue by Member States of long term visas and residence permits, 
including those for the purposes of family reunion’. See on the scope of Declaration 18: S. Peers, EU 
Justice and Home Affairs (Harlow, Longman, 2000), at p. 101. There is no corresponding declaration to the 
Constitution. The Declaration on Article III-325 concerning the negotiation and conclusion of international 
agreements by Member States relating to the area of freedom, security and justice provides: ‘The 
Conference confirms that Member States may negotiate and conclude agreements with third countries or 
international organisations in the areas covered by Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Chapter IV of Title III of Part III 
of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe insofar as such agreements comply with Union law.’ 
However, this does not affect Section 2 of Chapter IV dealing with policies on border checks, asylum and 
immigration. 
42 See Protocols No. 4 and 5 to the Treaty of Amsterdam concerning the position in relation to Title IV EC 
Treaty of respectively the UK and Ireland (Protocol No. 4) and Denmark (Protocol No. 5). For a detailed 
discussion of the effect of these Protocols see Fletcher, ‘EU Governance Techniques in the Creation of a 
Common European Policy on Immigration and Asylum’ (2002) 9 EPL, pp. 544-562, at pp. 543-551. These 
special arrangements have been retained in the Constitution in Protocols 19 and 20 respectively. 
43 See: Peers, above n. 41, at  pp. 99-103; K. Hailbronner, ‘European Immigration and Asylum Law after 
the Amsterdam Treaty’ (1998) 35 CML Rev., pp. 1047-1067; and  J. Monar, ‘Justice and Home Affairs in 
the Treaty of Amsterdam Treaty’ (1998) 23 EL Rev., pp. 320-335. 
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Geneva Convention. However, under Article 63(1) EC Treaty the EC is obliged to adopt 
measures on asylum in accordance with the Refugee Convention and other relevant 
treaties. In these circumstances, the application of the International Fruit Company 
doctrine would not materially enhance the protection afforded by Article 63(1) EC 
Treaty.44  
4.2.2.4 The ECHR 
In the case of the ECHR, fulfillment of the International Fruit Company conditions is 
also problematic. France only ratified the ECHR on 3 May 1974 and the various ECHR 
Protocols entered into force after conclusion of the EC Treaty.45 Even more problematic 
would be the issue of how far the Member States have transferred to the Union 
responsibility for matters subject to the ECHR. However, as in the case of the Geneva 
Convention, the issue is largely academic since under Article 6(2) TEU the Union is 
bound to respect fundamental rights as guaranteed by the ECHR. Although the Union’s 
obligations under Article 6(2) TEU fall short of actual membership, application of the 
International Fruit Company doctrine would not confer any substantial additional 
benefits in terms of compliance and enforceability. 
4.2.2.5 Conclusions 
It remains unclear how far the doctrine developed in International Fruit Company to 
address the specific issues relating to GATT would be applied in the very different 
context of international fundamental rights treaties. In order to be effective, the ECJ 
would have to relax significantly the criteria developed in International Fruit Company. 
The fact it has not to date found it necessary to extend this mechanism to the arena of 
fundamental rights, despite the substantial academic doctrine supporting such an 
initiative, suggests it considers that the general principles mechanism for the reception of 
international treaties on fundamental rights is sufficient. The analysis of the potential 
applicability of the doctrine of International Fruit Company to the UN charter and UN 
Security Council resolutions, the Geneva Convention, and the ECHR shows that 
                                                 
44 See for analysis of Article 63(1) EC Treaty, section 8.3.2.3 of Chapter eight.  
45 See Annex II for the date of entry into force of each of the substantive ECHR Protocols. See generally, 
Uerpmann, above n. 16, at pp. 34-35. 
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alternative legal mechanisms for binding the Union to these instruments exist and the 
doctrine is unlikely to provide significant added protection in this context. The provisions 
in Article I-9 of the Constitution for the incorporation of the Charter, retention of the 
fundamental rights as general principles doctrine, and the mandate for Union accession to 
the ECHR would, if implemented, further lessen the requirement for any radical 
development of the International Fruit Company doctrine.46 
4.2.3  ARTICLE 307 EC TREATY  
  
4.2.3.1 Introduction 
The second mechanism for recognition of international treaties in Union law is provided 
under Article 307 EC Treaty and governs the extent of the Union’s obligations not to 
obstruct the performance by the Member States of their pre-existing international 
obligations.47  Article 307 EC Treaty provides: 
 
‘The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 
January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of their accession, 
between one or more Member States on the one hand, and one or more third 
countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of this Treaty. 
To the extent that such agreements are not compatible with this Treaty, the 
Member State or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to 
eliminate the incompatibilities established. Member States shall, where 
necessary, assist each other to this end and shall, where appropriate, adopt a 
common attitude. In applying the agreements referred to in the first 
paragraph, Member States shall take into account the fact that the advantages 
accorded under this Treaty by each Member State form an integral part of 
the establishment of the Community and are thereby inseparably linked with 
the creation of common institutions, the conferring of powers upon them and 
the granting of the same advantages by all the other Member States.’48  
 
                                                 
46 See Chapter five for a detailed analysis of Article I-9. 
47 Article III-435 of the Constitution substantially reproduces Article 307 EC Treaty. Article 307 EC Treaty 
(ex. Article 234) was the result of an amendment at the Treaty of Amsterdam to clarify that the provision 
also applied to agreements concluded post-1 January 1958. For an analysis of Article 307, see: Pietro 
Manzini, ‘The Priority of Pre-existing Treaties of EC Member States within the Framework of 
International Law’ (2001) 12 EJIL, pp. 781-792. See also Eeckhout, above n. 5, at pp. 333-342; and 
Hartley, above n. 5, at pp. 182-183. 
48 The relationship between Article 307 EC Treaty and Article 30 VCLT, on the application of successive 
treaties relating to the same subject-matter, is analysed by Manzini, above n. 47, at pp. 782-783. 
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One preliminary question concerning Article 307 EC Treaty is the status of fundamental 
rights treaties concluded by the Member States after 1 January 1958, or the date of their 
accession if later. Hartley is of the opinion that in such a situation ‘the position should be 
analogous to that under Article 307 [234], provided the subject matter of the agreement 
was not, under EC law, within the exclusive competence of the EC.’49 However, in Elide 
Gottardo v INPS the ECJ ruled that in the case of the Italo-Swiss Social Security 
Convention of 14 December 1962 the obligation lay on Italy to facilitate application of a 
provision of EC law ‘liable to be impeded by a measure adopted pursuant to the 
implementation of a bilateral agreement, even where the agreement falls outside the field 
of application of the Treaty’.50 In Arbelaiz-Emmezabel, Attorney General Capotorti also 
rejected the application of Article 307 EC Treaty to a treaty concluded by a Member 
State after accession to the Union but before the Union had exercised competence in the 
area covered by the EC Treaty.51 This literal interpretation of the scope of Article 307 EC 
Treaty severely limits its value as an effective mechanism for introducing into the 
Union’s legal order norms derived from international fundamental rights treaties to which 
a Member State is party. 
 In Attorney General v Juan C. Burgoa,52 the ECJ established the following principles 
concerning Article 307: firstly, it applies ‘to any international agreement, irrespective of 
subject-matter, which is capable of affecting the application of the Treaty’;53 secondly, it 
implies a duty on the EC institutions: 
‘… not to impede the performance of the obligations of Member States 
which stem from a prior agreement. However, that duty on the Community 
institution is directed only to permitting the Member State concerned to 
perform its obligations under the prior agreement and does not bind the 
Community as regards the non-member country in question’;54 
and thirdly, it: 
                                                 
49 Hartley, above n. 5, at p.183. 
50 Case C-55/00, [2002] ECR I-413, at para. 30. 
51 Cited above n. 18, at p. 2988. This construction is supported by Manzini, above n.  47, at p. 787. 
52 Case 812/79, [1980] ECR 2787.   
53 Ibid., at para 6. 
54 Ibid., at para 9. 
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‘… cannot have the effect of altering the nature of the rights which may flow 
from such agreements. From that it follows that … [Article 307] does not 
have the effect of conferring upon individuals who rely upon an agreement 
concluded prior to the entry into force of the Treaty or, as the case may be, 
the accession of the Member State concerned, rights which the national 
courts of the Member States must uphold, nor does it adversely affect the 
rights which individuals may derive from such an agreement’.55  
An analysis of these principles reveals that Article 307 EC Treaty provides an inadequate 
basis for an effective judicial remedy in the event a Union measure conflicts with an 
international fundamental rights treaty concluded by a Member State prior to 
membership of the Union.56   The legality of a Union measure will only be reviewable on 
the basis that it infringes Article 307 EC Treaty if it can be shown that the measure 
impedes a Member State from fulfilling its obligations under a pre-existing international 
treaty.57 However, the applicant would not derive a directly effective right under Union 
law from the pre-existing treaty, as made clear in Burgoa.58  Even if, according to the 
Member State’s domestic law, the applicant had such a right under the relevant treaty it 
might prove difficult to mount a challenge to the Union measure before the national 
courts of a Member State. A preliminary reference would not be available in respect of 
such an agreement since it does not fall within the scope of Article 234 EC Treaty.59 In 
the absence of a reference, application of the Foto-Frost principle would prevent a 
national court making a ruling that the Union measure was unlawful.60 Moreover, Article 
307 EC Treaty does not oblige the Union to uphold a right protected under an 
                                                 
55 Ibid.,at para 10. 
56 See Hilson for a discussion of the related problems facing an individual seeking to rely on a fundamental 
right guaranteed by Union law but outside the scope of application of the Treaties: ‘What’s in a Right? The 
Relationship between Community, Fundamental and Citizenship rights in EU law’ (2004) 29 EL Rev., pp. 
636-651, at p. 641. 
57 Subject to the applicant satisfying the requirements for exercising a judicial review remedy available 
under the EC Treaty. 
58 Case 812/79, Attorney General v Juan C. Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787.  
59 Hartley, above n. 5, at p. 183, n. 79.  This view is supported by Case C-158/91 Ministère Public  et 
Direction de Travail et de l’Emploi v. Levy [1993] ECR I-4287, at para 13. Manzini argues that this rule 
should only apply to the interpretation of a Union measure and not to its validity: above n.  47, at pp. 786-
787. Eeckhout supports the view that the ECJ has no jurisdiction under Article 234 EC Treaty to rule on 
the interpretation of the international agreement in question but argues that under Article 226 EC Treaty 
proceedings the ECJ may exercise greater control over a Member State’s obligations under the UN Charter: 
above n.  5, at p. 442. 
60 Case 314/85, Foto-Frost (Firma) v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199. 
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international fundamental rights treaty: ‘it merely requires the Community not to prevent 
the Member State from upholding it.’61  
4.2.3.2  The European Convention on Human Rights  
Even if the problems of establishing grounds under Union law for judicial review of 
Union measures can be overcome, there remain serious doubts as to how far Article 
307 EC Treaty is an effective mechanism for enforcing international fundamental 
rights standards in Union law.  The ECHR is a treaty frequently cited in the context of 
Article 307 EC Treaty on the basis that the Member States, except for France,62 all 
satisfy the temporal criteria for its application.63  Moreover, as is generally the case 
for fundamental rights treaties, the ECHR is a treaty that is not realistically open to 
denunciation or termination by the Member States.64 However, the juridical rationale 
for Article 307 EC Treaty is to ensure the Member States are not obliged under Union 
law to breach their international law obligations rather than impose specific 
obligations on the Union to protect individual rights guaranteed under the ECHR.65 
Furthermore, the ECtHR has held it is satisfied, subject to ongoing verification, that 
Union law provides equivalent protection to fundamental rights to those guaranteed 
under the ECHR.66 In consequence, a conflict between Union secondary legislation 
and the ECHR leading to a Member State’s obligations under the ECHR being 
‘affected’ for the purposes of Article 307 EC Treaty is unlikely.67  
                                                 
61 Hartley, above n. 5, at p. 141, n. 30. 
62 France signed the ECHR on 4 November 1950 and ratified on 3 May 1974. Article 307(1) EC Treaty 
refers to ‘agreements concluded before 1 January 1958, or for acceding States, before the date of their 
accession.’ However, Manzini convincingly argues that this must be construed as referring to agreements 
in force: above n.  47, at pp. 785-786. 
63 See Besselink, ‘Entrapped by the Maximum Standard: On Fundamental Rights, Pluralism and 
Subsidiarity in the European Union’ (1998) 35 CML Rev., pp. 629-680, at pp. 659-663; Uerpmann, above 
n.  16, at pp. 37-38; and Canor, ‘Primus inter pares.  Who is the ultimate guardian of fundamental rights in 
Europe?’ (2000) 25 EL Rev., pp.  3-21, at pp. 10-11. 
64 See Manzini on the scope of the obligation on Member States to denounce pre-existing agreements under 
Article 307 EC Treaty, and in particular the effect of Case C-62/98, Commission v. Portugal [2000] ECR 
1-5171 and Case C-84/98, Commission v. Portugal [2000] ECR I-5215: above n.  47, at pp. 788-792. See 
also: Uerpmann, above n.  16, at p. 38; and Eeckhout, above n. 5, at pp. 340-342. 
65 See Canor, above n.  63, at p. 9.  
66 See case law cited in Sections 3.3.2.2 and 3.3.2.3 of Chapter three.   
67 See in this sense, Canor: above n. 63, at p. 10. Besselink, however, adopts a wider view as to the scope 
of Article 307 EC Treaty in the context of the ECHR, based on Article 55 (ex. Art. 62) ECHR and a critical 
view of M. & Co. v. Germany, and concludes: ‘In case of conflict of the Community measure with the 
 90
4.2.3.3 The UN Charter 
In the case of the UN Charter, the temporal applicability of Article 307(1) EC Treaty is 
satisfied for all the Member States and ‘they are therefore entitled not to fulfill their 
obligations under the EC Treaty if doing so would put them in breach of their obligations 
under the Charter.’68 The Centro-Com case supports this conclusion.69 The United 
Kingdom Government argued in Centro-Com that national measures which conflicted 
with the EC’s sanctions regime were required by its obligations under the UN Charter 
and under UN Security Council Resolution 757 (1992).70 The ECJ, in reply to the second 
question referred by the Court of Appeal on the scope of Article 307 EC Treaty, held that 
it was a matter for the national court to determine if the measures adopted by the United 
Kingdom Government were so required but, if they were so required, the United 
Kingdom Government could rely on Article 307 EC Treaty.71 However, it should be 
emphasized that the effect of the application of Article 307 EC Treaty in such 
circumstances is not to invalidate the conflicting Union measures but insulate national 
measures from being overridden by application of the doctrine of supremacy. As such 
Article 307 EC Treaty does not provide an effective mechanism for conferring normative 
status on international fundamental rights norms in the Union’s legal order.  
4.2.3.4 Conclusions 
Article 307 EC Treaty is of potential application to other international fundamental 
rights conventions, such as the Refugee Convention,72 but in most cases similar 
                                                                                                                                                 
ECHR, Article 234 [307] EC entails that the national court cannot apply the Community measure.’: above 
n.  63, at p. 662. 
68 Eeckhout, above n. 5, at p. 441. Eeckhout also considers the scope of Article 297 EC Treaty and its 
relationship to Article 307 EC Treaty: ibid., at pp. 443-444. Article 297 EC Treaty has been retained in 
Article III-131 of the Constitution. 
69 Case C-124/95, The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com v. HM Treasury and Bank of England [1997] ECR I-
81. See for analysis, Section 3.2.3 of Chapter three. 
70 Ibid., at para. 23. 
71 Ibid., at paras. 58-61. For a discussion of the Centro-Com case in the context of Article 307 EC Treaty, 
see Eeckhout: above n. 5, at pp. 441-442. 
72 The six original members of the EC all signed and ratified the Refugee Convention before 1 January 
1958 but not the New York Protocol.  On a literal interpretation, Article 307 EC Treaty is therefore of 
limited application. The subsequent accession states all signed and ratified the Refugee Convention and the 
New York Protocol prior to accession and therefore Article 307 EC Treaty is applicable. The dates of 
signature and ratification of the Refugee Convention and the New York Protocol are available on the 
UNHCR website: < http://www.unhcr.ch/>. 
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obstacles to its effectiveness will apply. It is of most assistance in the case of a 
fundamental rights treaty that has not been signed by a substantial majority of the 
Member States, and thus is not introduced into Union law under the general principles 
doctrine, but has been ratified by one or more Member States prior to 1 January 1958 
or the date of accession to the Union.73   However, even in these cases the limited 
availability of judicial review proceedings in Union law against Union measures 
violating such a treaty means Article 307 EC Treaty is a mechanism of limited 
effectiveness. Direct Union accession to international treaties protecting international 
fundamental rights is therefore a preferable mechanism for the effective protection of 
fundamental rights.  
 
4.2.4 TREATY NORMS AS GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF UNION LAW 
 
4.2.4.1  Introduction 
The third, and most comprehensive, mechanism for the introduction of norms derived 
from international fundamental rights treaties is as general principles of law developed 
by the ECJ.74 The ECJ has defined the sources for the fundamental rights forming an 
integral part of the general principles of law as follows: 
 
‘The Court has consistently held that fundamental rights form an integral 
part of the general principles of law whose observance the Court 
ensures…….. For that purpose, the Court draws inspiration from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the 
guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of human 
rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are 
signatories. In that regard, the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms …has particular significance.”75 
                                                 
73 Eeckhout points out that Article 307 EC Treaty is likely to be of most significance for Member States 
who acceded to the Union after I January 1958: above n. 5, at p. 334.  
74 See generally: T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law (Oxford, OUP, 1999);  J. Usher, General 
Principles of EC Law (Harlow, Longman, 1998); J. Coppel and A. O’Neill, ‘The European Court of 
Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?’ (1992) 29 CML Rev., pp. 669-692; and J.H.H. Weiler and  N. Lockhart,  
‘“Taking Rights Seriously” Seriously: The European Court and its Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence’ 
(1995) 32 CML Rev., pp. 51-94 and pp. 579-627. 
75 Case C-7/98, Krombach v. Bamberski [2000] ECR 1-1935, at para. 25. It seems unlikely that failure by 
one Member State to sign would exclude a treaty from the ECJ’s definition. The ECJ refers to signature or 
collaboration, so it seems signature is not required by each Member State. Signature rather than ratification 
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The ECJ has also specified that Article 6(2) TEU, which was introduced by the 
Maastricht Treaty and unmodified by either the Amsterdam or Nice Treaties, embodies 
its case-law.76  The Charter rights and principles, although not formally incorporated into 
the Union’s legal order, have become a further source of fundamental rights standards.77  
This section focuses on the normative status of international treaties for the protection of 
fundamental rights as general principles of Union law. 
 
The criteria established by the ECJ for identifying a treaty which forms a source of 
fundamental rights as general principles of Union law (‘Qualifying Treaty’) provide a 
greater degree of certainty than in the case of the common constitutional traditions.78 
However, the normative status of Qualifying Treaties is undermined by the ECJ’s 
formulation that such treaties only provide guidelines from which it draws inspiration.79 
In Watson and Belmann, Advocate General Trabucchi emphasised the limited reach of 
international instruments in the Union’s legal system:  
 
‘The extra-Community instruments under which those States have 
undertaken international obligations in order to ensure better protection for 
those rights can, without any question of their being incorporated as such in 
the Community order, be used to establish principles which are common to 
the States themselves.’80  
 
This restrictive view of the normative status of international fundamental rights norms in 
Union law has been confirmed by the ECJ in the case of ECHR rights the protection of 
which is guaranteed in Union law under Article 6(2) TEU. In Limburgse the ECJ upheld 
                                                                                                                                                 
is the criterion adopted by the ECJ presumably on the basis once signed by the parties the text of the 
agreement is settled. See for an analysis of the ECJ’s formulation: Besselink, above n. 63, at pp. 650-651. 
76 Krombach, ibid., at para. 27. 
77 See for a list of references as of 1 July 2003 to the Charter by Advocates General and the CFI: Appendix 
1 to S. Peers and A. Ward (eds.), The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2004). The normative status of the Charter is considered separately in Section 5.8 of Chapter 
five. 
78 See on the problems of the constitutional traditions common to the Member States as the basis for 
protection of fundamental rights: Besselink, above n. 63, at pp. 633- 650. See also Section 5.2.2 of Chapter 
five.  
79 Krombach, above n. 75, at para. 25. 
80 Case 118/75, Lynne Watson and Alessandro Belmann [1976] ECR 1185, at 1207. The judgment of the 
ECJ does not specifically address the issue of the normative status of international treaties as general 
principles. 
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on appeal the position of the CFI that ECHR rights form part of the Union’s legal order 
as general principles both under the case law of the ECJ and under Article 6(2) TEU:  
 
‘As to the substance, the Court of First Instance, referring to the wording of 
Article F.2 [6(2)] of the Treaty on European Union, correctly held that, in 
the Community legal system, the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
ECHR are protected as general principles of Community law.’81  
 
The hierarchical status of ECHR rights and principles is on this authority equated to that 
of other general principles of Union law. However, this equation of ECHR rights with 
other general principles of Union law undermines the special status of ECHR rights in 
the Union’s legal order conferred by Article 6(2) TEU.82 It signifies that, in the event of a 
conflict between an ECHR right and another general principle of Union law, the ECJ 
would in principle have discretion as to which principle to apply.83 However, the 
discretionary application of international fundamental rights norms radically undermines 
the normative status of such rights. In order to avoid this result, Article 6(2) TEU should 
be construed as establishing a binding obligation on the Union to respect ECHR rights 
irrespective of conflict with other general principles of Union law.84 Any conflict 
between ECHR rights and the general principles derived from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, which are given equal status with ECHR based 
general principles under Article 6(2) TEU, is unlikely since all the Member States are 
members of the ECHR. 
 
The detrimental consequences for the effective protection of fundamental rights in Union 
law flowing from the current status of international fundamental rights treaties as general 
                                                 
81  Case C-238/99 P, et. seq., Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV (LVM) and others v. Commission [2002] 
ECR I-8375; at paras. 170-171. The CFI judgment is Case T-305/94,  et. seq., [1999] ECR II-931.  
82 For a discussion of conflicting opinions on whether Article 6(2) TEU creates binding internal obligations 
for the Union in respect of the ECHR, see Uepermann, above n. 16, at pp. 39-40.  
83 In practice, the ECJ: ‘acknowledges, quite properly, that the ECHR embodies minimum standards, and 
that EU law can and does provide higher level of protection in some areas.’ : C. Costello and E. Browne, 
‘ECHR and the European Union’, in U. Kelly (ed.) ECHR and Irish Law (Dublin, Jordans, 2004), pp. 35-
80, at p. 39. They refer in support of this conclusion to the Opinion of AG Lenz in Case 137/84 Ministère 
Public v Mutsch [1985] ECR 2681. The judgment of the ECJ in that case, however, does not refer to the 
ECHR. 
84 Support for this proposition may be found is in the Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl (at para. 50) in Case C-
36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt 
Bonn: Judgment of 14 October 2004; [2005] 1 CMLR. 5. 
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principles of Union law is demonstrated by analysis of the following three scenarios: 
firstly, a conflict between fundamental rights recognised as general principles of Union 
law and the fundamental freedoms protected under the EC Treaty and the TEU;85 
secondly, the ECJ failing to take account of a qualifying treaty relevant to the case before 
it; and thirdly, a conflict between the ECJ’s interpretation of a qualifying treaty and the 
interpretation of that treaty’s principle adjudicating organ or of the national courts of the 
Member States.  
 
4.2.4.2 Conflict between ECHR Rights and Community Fundamental Freedoms 
A conflict between ECHR rights and Community fundamental freedoms arose in a 
preliminary reference in Schmidberger v Austria: 
 
‘… the question of the need to reconcile the requirements of the protection 
of fundamental rights in the Community with those arising from a 
fundamental freedom enshrined in the Treaty and, more particularly, the 
question of the respective scope of freedom of expression and freedom of 
assembly, guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR, and of the free 
movement of goods, where the former are relied upon as justification for a 
restriction of the latter.’86 
 
The ECJ referred to its case law on international fundamental rights as general principles 
as confirmed by Article 6(2) TEU and concluded:  
 
‘It follows that measures which are incompatible with observance of the 
human rights thus recognised are not acceptable in the Community … Thus, 
since both the Community and its Member States are required to respect 
fundamental rights, the protection of those rights is a legitimate interest 
which, in principle, justifies a restriction of the obligations imposed by 
Community law, even under a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the 
Treaty such as the free movement of goods.’87 
                                                 
85 See for a definition of fundamental, EC and citizen rights: Hilson, above n. 56, at pp. 636-640. 
86 Case C-112/00 [2003] ECR I-5659, at para. 77. The facts of the case involved the orderly closure of the 
Brenner motorway for thirty hours to allow a peaceful demonstration by environmentalists by local 
Austrian authorities with a consequent impact on the applicant’s trucking business which transited goods 
on the Brenner motorway in Austria while transporting goods between Germany and Italy. See for 
commentary: Matthew Humphreys, ‘Free Movement and Roadblocks: the Right to Protest in the Single 
Market’ (2004) 6 EL Rev., at pp. 192-197; and G. Facenna, ‘Freedom of Expression and Assembly vs Free 
Movement of Goods’ (2004) 1 EHRLR, pp. 73-79. 
87 Schmidberger, ibid., at paras. 73 and 74. 
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 However, the ECJ undermined the clarity of this analysis by referring to the need ‘to 
reconcile the requirements of the protection of fundamental rights in the Community with 
those arising from a fundamental freedom enshrined in the Treaty’.88 Firstly, the ECJ 
noted that the principle of free movement of goods might be subject to restriction either 
under Article 30 EC Treaty or one of the ‘mandatory requirements’ established in and 
after Cassis de Dijon.89 Secondly, it noted that paragraph 2 of Articles 10 and 11 ECHR 
permitted restrictions on the freedom of expression and assembly: 
 
 ‘justified by objectives in the public interest, in so far as those derogations 
are in accordance with the law, motivated by one or more of the legitimate 
aims under those provisions and necessary in a democratic society, that is to 
say justified by a pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued.’90 
 
 The ECJ then analysed whether ‘the restrictions placed upon intra-Community trade are 
proportionate in the light of the legitimate objective pursued, namely, in the present case, 
the protection of fundamental rights.’91 The ECJ concluded: 
 
‘Consequently, the national authorities were reasonably entitled, having 
regard to the wide discretion which must be accorded to them in the matter, 
to consider that the legitimate aim of that demonstration could not be 
achieved in the present case by measures less restrictive of intra-Community 
trade.’92  
 
It is submitted that the ECJ’s approach in Schmidberger is unsatisfactory since, instead of 
focusing solely on the restrictions permitted under paragraph two of Articles 10 and 11 
ECHR, it imports the principles of EC law regulating the free movement of goods, 
                                                 
88 Ibid., at para. 77. 
89 Case 120/78  Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649. 
90 Schmidberger, above n. 86, at para. 79. The ECJ referred in support of this formulation to both its own 
case law and that of the ECHR: Case C-368/95 Vereinigte Familiapress  Zeitungsverlags- und Vertreibs 
Gmbh v. Heinrich Bauer Verlag [1997] ECR I-3689, at para. 26; Case C-60/00 Carpenter v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279, at para. 42; and Steel and Others v. The United 
Kingdom (1998) 28 EHRR 603. 
91 Schmidberger , above n. 86, at para. 82. 
92 Ibid., at para. 93. 
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including derogations from those principles, into the permitted restrictions.93 A 
preferable approach, which would have bolstered the normative status of ECHR rights in 
Union law, would have been to lay down that provided the national court was satisfied 
that the measures adopted were required by Austria’s obligations under the ECHR there 
could be no violation of Union law. In other words, ECHR and other fundamental rights 
protected as general principles of Union law should trump conflicting principles of Union 
law. 
 
4.2.4.3 Fundamental Rights as General Principles of Union Law: a Right of Redress? 
The second scenario raises the question of the redress available for a litigant if the ECJ 
fails to take account of a Qualifying Treaty relevant to the case before it. Since there is 
no appeal from decisions of the ECJ,94 the litigant could argue that a national court with 
jurisdiction should refuse to give effect to the ECJ’s ruling on the grounds of 
incompatibility with the Member State’s international obligations to give effect to the 
relevant Qualifying Treaty.95 Alternatively, having exhausted domestic remedies, the 
applicant could pursue any available remedy before the competent adjudicatory organ 
under the Qualifying Treaty on the basis the Member State signatory to the Qualifying 
Treaty remained responsible for violations notwithstanding a transfer of competences to 
the Union.96 However, a litigant pursuing either option is likely to face both procedural 
and substantive obstacles and lacks any remedy in Union law. 
 
                                                 
93 See also:  Peers, ‘Taking Rights Away? Limitations and Derogations, in Peers and Ward (eds.), The 
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights: Politics, Law and Policy (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2004), pp. 140-179, at p. 148. 
94  The problems from a fundamental rights perspective of the lack of a review mechanism of ECJ 
judgments is illustrated by Lenaerts in the context of an alleged infringement of Article 6(1) ECHR by ECJ 
proceedings, although he suggests the ECtHR may exercise its Matthews jurisdiction and hold the Member 
States to account for such an infringement: ‘Fundamental Rights in the European Union’ (2000) 25 EL 
Rev., pp. 575-600, at p. 585. In Emesa Sugar v. Netherlands, the ECtHR side-stepped this issue by deciding 
the application was inadmissible on other grounds: App. No. 62023/00, Admissibility Decision of 13 
January 2005. Unreported.  
95 In most cases this would mean the national court refusing to implement the ECJ’s ruling on the questions 
submitted under Article 234 EC Treaty. Such a refusal would open the Member State to an enforcement 
action by the Commission under Article 226 EC Treaty and might also lead to an action in damages against 
the Member State for breach of Union law resulting from the national court’s refusal: a possibility raised in 
Case C-224/01,Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-10239. 
96 In effect relying on similar reasoning to that adopted by the ECtHR in Matthews as discussed in Section 
3.3.2.2 of Chapter three. 
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4.2.4.4  A Conflict of Rulings 
The third scenario arises if a preliminary ruling of the ECJ based on the interpretation of 
a fundamental right protected by a Qualifying Treaty, and in particular the ECHR, 
conflicts with the interpretation adopted by the Qualifying Treaty’s principle adjudicating 
organ or by the national courts where the preliminary reference originated.97  In 
Schmidberger this conflict would have arisen if the ECJ had held that the Austrian 
authorities’ decision to close the Brenner motorway could not be justified under Union 
law but the Austrian courts98 nevertheless held that the decision to close was required by 
the case law of the ECtHR.99 The doctrine of primacy requires the national courts where 
the preliminary reference originated to give effect to the ECJ’s ruling since the ECJ is 
interpreting the provisions of the ECHR as general principles of Union law.100 In the 
specific case in which the ruling of the ECJ was made, therefore, the national court 
would be bound to apply the ruling under Union law.101  Moreover, the national court’s 
application of the ruling would on current case law of the ECtHR be difficult to challenge 
unless the ECtHR adopts a wider version of the Matthews doctrine.102 This outcome is 
unsatisfactory as it denies a litigant the possibility of having the ECJ’s interpretation of 
                                                 
97 Such a conflicting result is a realistic scenario in the light of the differences in the criteria adopted by the 
ECJ and the ECtHR Court for determining if a limitation of fundamental rights is lawful under Union law 
and the ECHR respectively: see Peers for an analysis of the two approaches, in Peers and Ward (eds.), 
above n. 93, at pp. 140-152. See also Section 3.4.3 of Chapter three for an analysis of the related issues of 
the scope of a national court’s obligation under Union law to follow a prior judgment of the ECJ 
interpreting the ECHR and  to refer a question of interpretation of the ECHR for a preliminary ruling by the 
ECJ. 
98 The Article 234 EC Treaty reference was made by the Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck. 
99 In Schmidberger the rights of the demonstrators to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly were 
also guaranteed by the Austrian Constitution: above n. 86, at para. 69. The basis on which a national court 
could apply the national constitutional standard of protection of fundamental rights in preference to the 
Union standard is considered by Besselink in the context of the constitutional position of Union law in 
specific Member States: above n. 63, at pp. 643-650. 
100 As Besselink points out in respect of an interpretation by the ECJ of the ECHR: ‘It is an interpretation 
of a Community general principle, not an interpretation of the ECHR provision as such’: above n. 63, at p. 
654. If the Union accedes to the ECHR, the status of its rulings will change to that of interpreting an 
international obligation of the Union: see Section 5.7 of Chapter five.   
101 For the precedential authority of such a ruling, see Section 3.4 of Chapter three. 
102 See Section 3.3.2.3 of Chapter three for analysis of post-Matthews case law of the ECtHR. Besselink 
argues that, notwithstanding the primacy of Union law, Member States in which the ECHR is incorporated 
in the national legal order in such a situation face a conflict between their obligations under the ECHR and 
under Union law and rejects the argument that national courts may rely on either Article 35(2)(b) (ex 
Article 27(1)) ECHR or the line of reasoning adopted by the ECommHR in M & Co v. Federal Republic of 
Germany to give effect to the Union standard: above n. 63, at pp. 653-657. See Section 4.2.4.5 below for 
an analysis of Article 35(2)(b) ECHR in the different context of admissibility of proceedings before the 
ECtHR. 
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the ECHR reviewed by the ECtHR. Union accession to the ECHR would provide such a 
mechanism and consequently provide a significant improvement in judicial protection. 
 
4.2.4.5  The Absence of Control Mechanisms 
In addition to the inferior normative status conferred on international fundamental rights 
treaties as general principles of Union law, there are a number of significant additional 
disadvantages arising from the general principles mechanism. Firstly, the reporting and 
monitoring requirements of the Qualifying Treaties, which form an essential element of 
control over a signatory’s compliance, do not apply to the Union.103  Secondly, the 
enforcement mechanisms of the relevant treaties, whether collective or individual, are not 
applicable in respect of the Union institutions.104 Four universal human rights treaties 
provide for an individual remedy at the international level: the first Optional Protocol of 
the ICCPR (ICCPR-P1); the Article 14 procedure under the Convention against Racial 
Discrimination (CERD); the Article 22 procedure under the Convention against Torture 
(CAT); and the 1999 Optional Protocol to the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW-P).105  
 
4.2.4.6 Treaty Reservations and Alternative International Proceedings 
The non-accession of the Union to the UN Conventions raises potential additional 
obstacles to the ability of an individual to exercise a complaint under the relevant 
individual complaints mechanisms. Article 5(2)(a) ICCPR-P1 provides:  
‘The Committee shall not consider any communication from an individual 
unless it has ascertained that: (a) The same matter is not being examined 
under another procedure of international investigation or settlement; (b) The 
                                                 
103 But see Clapham, in Alston (ed.), above n. 11, at pp. 658-9. Clapham proposes that the Commission 
‘volunteer reports to the United Nations treaty bodies and to the relevant treaty monitoring mechanisms of 
the Council of Europe.’: ibid., at p. 659. 
104 See generally on these mechanisms: P. Alston and J. Crawford (eds.), The Future of UN Human Rights 
Monitoring (Cambridge, CUP, 2000); H. J. Steiner and P. Alston, International Human Rights in Context 
(2nd edn.) (Oxford, 2000), pp. 592-862; and Rehman, above n. 21. 
105 See Annex 1 for references to these UN Conventions. For a discussion of proposals to introduce a 
complaints procedure in relation to the ICESCR, see: Walter Vandenhole, ‘Completing the UN Complaints 
Mechanisms for Human Rights Violations Step by Step: Towards a Complaints Procedure Complementing 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2003) 21 Netherlands  Quarterly of 
Human Rights, pp. 432-462. 
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individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies. This shall not be 
the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged.’ 
 
Reservations have been entered by a number of Member States in respect of Article 
5(2)(a) ICCPR-P1.106 The precise terms of the individual reservations vary but in 
substance they are intended to prevent the possibility of an appeal from decisions of the 
ECtHR.107 However, with the exception of the reservation made by Austria, which 
specifically refers to matters previously examined by the ECommHR, reservations made 
by Member States refer generally to other procedures of international investigation or 
settlement and thus have a wider scope. Similar reservations have been entered by a 
number of Member States in respect of Article 14 CERD.108 Article 22(5)(a) CAT makes 
such reservations unnecessary since it precludes the CAT Committee from considering 
any individual communication under Article 22 CAT unless it has ascertained that ‘the 
same matter has not been, and is not being, examined under another procedure of 
international investigation or settlement’.109 Similarly, Article 4(2) of CEDAW-P 
provides: ‘The Committee shall declare a communication inadmissible where: (a) The 
same matter has already been examined by the Committee or has been or is being 
examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement;’.110 In the 
light of these provisions, the question arises whether proceedings before the ECJ are to 
                                                 
106 For a list of the reservations entered by each Member State to the ICCPR-P1, see: the Annex to the 
2002 EU Network Report, of 31 March 2003 by the EU Network of Independent Experts in 
Fundamental Rights , at pp. 269-273.  Available at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/cfr_cdf/doc/rapport_2002_en.pdf>. 
The content of the declarations and reservations entered by each party to the ICCPR is available at: 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty6_asp.htm.>. 
107 The effect of the reservations, as interpreted by the HRC, has been to extend the prohibition under 
Article 5(2)(a) ICCPR-P1 from the case where contemporaneous proceedings are before the ECtHR to 
exclude any individual communication if a decision has been reached on the substance of a claim, as 
opposed to a procedural ruling, by the ECtHR. See S. Joseph, J. Schultz and M. Castan, International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (2nd edn.) (Oxford, 2004), at 
pp. 100-104.  
108 For a list of the reservations entered by each Member States to Article 14 CERD, see: the Annex to the 
2002 EU Network Report, above n. 106, at pp. 269-273. The content of each reference can be accessed at: 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet>. 
109 Rehman interprets the Article 22 CAT prohibition to exclude examination of cases examined by the 
ECHR and the HRC but that ‘it does not affect those situations considered under the ECOSOC Resolution 
1503 procedure or those situations under the consideration of the Special Rapporteur on Torture.  Similarly 
it would not be affected by a consideration of such bodies as the UN working group on indigenous peoples 
or the working group on minorities.’: above n. 21, at p. 428. 
110 Under Article 17 of CEDAW-P no reservations to the Protocol are permitted. 
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be treated as ‘another procedure of international investigation or settlement’ so as to bar 
individual proceedings under the relevant treaty.  
Although the issue has not yet been directly addressed by any of the adjudicative bodies 
of the relevant UN Conventions, guidance may be obtained from the ECtHR’s recent 
Decision on the Competence of the Court to give an Advisory Opinion.111 The Grand 
Chamber refused as inadmissible a request for an advisory opinion under Article 47 
ECHR by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe as to whether the Human 
Rights Commission of the Commonwealth of Independent States established under the 
1995 Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States112 constituted ‘another procedure of international investigation or 
settlement’ for the purposes of Article 35(2)(b) ECHR. Article 35(2)(b) ECHR provides:  
 
‘The court shall not deal with any individual application submitted under 
Article 34 that … (b) is substantially the same as a matter that has already 
been examined by the Court or has already been submitted to another 
procedure of international investigation or settlement and contains no 
relevant new information.’   
 
The ECtHR endorsed the earlier decisions of the ECommHR in respect of Article 
35(2)(b) (ex. Art. 27 (1)(b)) ECHR to the effect that: 
 
‘… an examination of the question whether the same matter has already been 
submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement 
may be required and that this examination is not limited to a formal 
verification but extended, where appropriate, to ascertaining whether the 
nature of the supervisory body, the procedure which it follows and the effect 
of its decisions are such that the Court’s jurisdiction is excluded by Article 
35(2)(b)’.113  
 
                                                 
111 Decision of 2 June 2004. Unreported. Copy supplied.by the Registry of the ECtHR. 
112 (1996) 17 HRLJ 159. 
113 Advisory Opinion, cited above n. 111, at p. 12. The ECtHR referred to the following decisions of the 
ECommHR directly on the issue: Calcerrada Fornieles and Cabeza Mato v. Spain, no. 17512/90, decision 
of 6 July 1992, DR 73, p. 214; Pauger v. Austria, no. 24872/94, decision of 9 January 1995, DR 80, p. 170; 
C.W. v. Finland, no. 17230/90, decision of 9 October 1991, unreported; Cereceda Martin v. Spain, 
no. 16358/90, decision of 12 October 1992, DR 73, p. 120; Lukanov v. Bulgaria, no. 21915/93, decision of 
12 January 1995, DR 80, p. 108; and Varnava and others v. Turkey, nos. 16064-66/90 and 16068-73/90, 
decision of 14 April 1998, DR 93, p. 5.  
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On the basis of the ECtHR’s view that the Union guarantees equivalent protection for 
fundamental rights to that available under the ECHR,114 this formulation suggests that 
decisions of the ECJ may be treated as constituting ‘another procedure of international 
investigation or settlement’. Union accession to the ECHR would, however, resolve the 
issue as regards the ECHR:  
 
‘Irrespective of the question of whether the procedure before the 
Luxembourg Court should today be considered as a procedure of 
“international investigation or settlement” in the sense of Article 35, 
paragraph 2.b of the ECHR, it is clear that the answer would be negative as a 
necessary consequence of accession.’115  
 
Similarly, if the Union acceded to the ICCPR-P1, CEDAW, CAT or CERD-P, the 
relevant instrument of accession would be able to clarify that proceedings before the ECJ 
do not constitute a procedure of international investigation or settlement for the purposes 
of those Conventions. 
 
A further area of uncertainty as to the normative effect of obligations in a qualifying 
Treaty in Union law relates to the treatment in Union law of reservations, objections and 
declarations to Qualifying Treaties entered into by the Member States.116 The 
formulation adopted by the ECJ as regards Qualifying Treaties as general principles of 
                                                 
114 See Sections 3.3.2.2 and 3.3.2.3 of Chapter Three. 
115 Study of Technical and Legal Issues of a Possible EC/EU Accession to the ECHR dated September 
28, 2002 by the Steering Committee for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (CDDH Report), at p. 
17. Available at: < http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/wd2/1711.pdf>. 
The CDDH Report does not opine on the current position, but does, in n. 11 to p. 17, refer to the fact the 
issue was raised in Senator Lines GmbH v. Member States of the European Union, App. No. 56672/00; 
admissibility decision of 10 March 2004. Unreported. As discussed in Section 3.3.2.3 of Chapter three, the 
case was dismissed as inadmissible on other grounds and so the ECtHR did not rule on the issue.  
116 The normative effect of reservations to international treaties is addressed in the Advisory Opinion of the 
ICJ in the Reservation to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (ICJ 
Reports 1951, p. 15) and Articles 19-23 VCLT. For a general review of reservations and declarations, see: 
Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘The Practical Working of the Law of Treaties’, in Evans (ed.), International Law 
(Oxford, OUP, 2003), pp. 173-201, at pp. 191-196.  The specific issue of reservations to human rights 
treaties has given rise to controversy in the light of HRC General Comment No. 24 of 11 November 1994: 
Issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional 
Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant 
(CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6; reproduced in (1995) 15 HRLJ 262) and the HRC decision in  Rawle Kennedy 
v. Trinidad and Tobago, Comm. No. 845/1999, Decision, 2 November 1999, UN Doc A/55/40, vol.  II, 
Annexe XI, A. See for analysis:  Cassese, above n.  22, at p. 175; and Fitzmaurice, above n. 116, at pp. 
194-195. 
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Union law does not refer to any limitation on the normative status of the qualifying 
treaties by reference to reservations, objections or declarations entered by a Member 
State. It may therefore be assumed that the Union’s obligations to respect the substantive 
rights protected by a Qualifying Treaty are unaffected by such reservations, objections or 
declarations. However, it is anomalous that Qualifying Treaties in Union law should be 
applied regardless of reservations made by Member States. Indeed, WGII specifically 
pointed out that upon Union accession to the ECHR the issue of reservations, as well as 
which ECHR Protocols would be acceded to by the Union, would need to be decided by 
the Council.117 
 
The failure of the general principles doctrine to take account of reservations is 
unsatisfactory in view of the fact that in areas of Union law subject to shared competence 
between the Union and the Member States different fundamental rights standards may be 
applicable depending on the specific reservations entered by an individual Member State. 
Further examples of the inadequacies of the general principles mechanism include 
uncertainty as to the status of the various protocols to the qualifying treaties in Union law 
and the effect of enlargement of the Union on the status of a specific Qualifying Treaty 
or protocol to which an acceding Member State is not party. These inadequacies 
demonstrate the relatively unsophisticated nature of general principals as a mechanism 
for integrating human rights treaties into Union law in comparison to Union accession to 
the Qualifying Treaties and militate in favour of Union accession. 
 
4.3 THE NORMATIVE STATUS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
UNION LAW 
 
4.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This section examines the normative status of the rules of customary international law in 
the Union’s legal order with specific reference to international fundamental rights 
standards. The role and status of customary international law in the development of 
                                                 
117 Document 295/02 of 26 September 2002, at p. 2. Available on the European Convention website. 
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fundamental rights norms in international law has been outlined in Chapter two. It is 
generally recognized that customary international law plays a significant and developing 
role alongside treaty law as a source of fundamental rights norms.118 In the context of the 
Union, which is not party to any international treaty for the protection of fundamental 
rights, customary international law is of particular significance as a source of human 
rights protection. However, the status afforded in the Union’s legal order to fundamental 
rights norms recognized in customary international law has been limited compared to that 
of norms contained in treaties. Thus, the formulation by the ECJ of the general principles 
doctrine is limited to treaty based international law as a source of fundamental rights 
derived from international law. This position is reflected both in Article 6(2) TEU and 
Article I-9(3) of the Constitution.119 Moreover, the case law of the ECJ on the normative 
status of rules of customary international has not to date explicitly addressed the status of 
fundamental rights norms derived from customary international law.  
 
In international law the obligations of the Union under customary international law 
prevail over both primary and secondary Union law.120 It is incumbent on the Union to 
integrate fundamental rights based on customary international law in a manner which 
gives effect to this primacy. Effective recognition and integration of customary 
international law is also critical in order to ensure the Member States are not exposed to a 
potential conflict between their overriding obligations under international law to comply 
with fundamental rights based on customary international law and their obligations under 
Union law.121 
 
                                                 
118 Although the development of this source has created problems of determinacy, see: Bruno Simma and 
Philip Alston, ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles’ (1992) 12 
Australian Yearbook of International Law, pp. 82-108. 
119 Article I-9(3) is analysed in Section 5.2.2 of Chapter five. 
120 Peters, above n. 2,  at p. 36. The primacy of international law obligations is acknowledged  in the 
objectives of the Union set out in Article I-3(4) of the Constitution: ‘In its relations with the wider world, 
the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests.  It shall contribute to …the protection of 
human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of 
international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.’ 
121 ‘General international law therefore continues to bind the Member States and this indirectly primes the 
EC Treaty and EC legislation as far as the legal relations between the EC and third states or other subjects 
are concerned.’: Peters, above n. 2, at p. 36. 
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As the scope of Union competences expands in the AFJS, norms of customary 
international law, and in particular those that are categorized as peremptory norms, will 
assume greater significance as a key normative element in regulating the AFJS. The 
increasing significance of customary international law in setting the normative standards 
applicable to Union legislation is particularly visible in the field of immigration and 
asylum policy. This development is examined in Chapter eight on the normative status in 
Union law of the principle of non-refoulement. The focus here is on a more general 
analysis of the status of fundamental rights norms of customary international law in 
relation to other sources of Union law. In particular, the case law of the ECJ on the 
availability of judicial review as a remedy for a violation of customary international law 
is analysed in the context of its application to a violation of fundamental rights.  
 
4.3.2  CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UNION LAW 
 
The Union is bound by the rules of customary international law both under international 
law and Union law. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has held: ‘International 
organisations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by any obligation 
incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under their constitutions 
or under international agreements to which they are parties.’122 Notwithstanding its 
specific features, the Union continues to fulfil the key characteristics of an international 
organisation and is thus bound by the general rules of international law.123 The 
Constitution would not fundamentally alter that characterisation since these key 
                                                 
122 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 
[1980] ICJ Reports, p. 73 at pp. 89-90. 
123 Sands and Klein refer to the following characteristics of an international organisation: ‘.. its 
membership must be composed of states and/or other international organisations; it must be established 
by treaty; it must have an autonomous will distinct from that of its members and be vested with legal 
personality; and it must be capable of adopting norms addressed to its members.’: above n.  28,  at p. 
16.  For an argument that an international organization such as the UN may, for certain objectives, be 
treated as a state, see: Guenter Weissberg, The International Status of the UN (New York, 1961), at p. 
195. Sands and Klein, however, reject Weissberg’s argument that the UN may be treated as a state for 
the purposes of Article 34(1) of the Statute of the ICJ: above n. 28, at p. 355, n. 51. See for an analysis  
of alternative ‘metaphors’ for the form of state most appropriate to describe the Union:  J. Caporaso, 
‘The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory and Post-Modern’ (1996) 34 
Journal of Common Market Studies, pp.  29-52; and the contributions in J. Weiler and M. Wind (eds.), 
European Constitutionalism beyond the State (Cambridge, CUP, 2003).  
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characteristics are maintained.124  As a consequence of being bound by the rules of 
customary international law, the Union is obliged under international law to ensure its 
internal law is in conformity with those rules.125 The international responsibility of the 
Union would also be engaged in the event of the violation by the Union of a rule of 
customary international law.126 It is therefore incumbent on the Union to ensure that the 
normative status of customary international law in its internal law is sufficiently robust to 
ensure conformity with its obligations under general international law. 
 
The ECJ has held that under Union law the rules of international customary law are 
binding on the Union’s institutions and form part of the Union’s legal order.127 In 
Poulsen and Diva Navigation the issue arose in the context of a criminal prosecution in 
Denmark against the Danish master of a Panamanian registered vessel and a Panamanian 
company as to the construction of Article 6 of Regulation (EEC) No. 3094/86 which 
prohibited the handling of salmon or sea trout in the Union even though the fish had been 
caught outside waters under the jurisdiction of the Member States.128 In reply to an 
Article 234 EC Treaty reference, the ECJ  held: 
 
‘As a preliminary point, it must be observed, first, that the European 
Community must respect international law in the exercise of its powers and 
that, consequently, Article 6 above-mentioned must be interpreted, and its 
scope limited, in the light of the relevant rules of international law of the 
sea.’129  
 
                                                 
124 Although it has been argued that the participation in the European Convention not only of 
representatives of the Member States but also of civil society constitutes a ‘major element to found the 
transition from a treaty-based system to a constitutional regime.’: K. Lenaerts and D. Gerard, ‘The 
structure of the Union according to the Constitution for Europe: the emperor is getting dressed’ (2004) 29 
EL Rev., pp. 289-322, at p. 298. 
125 Peters, above n. 2, at p. 36. 
126 For the potential liability of the UN for the action of its officials, see: Difference Relating to Immunity 
from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory opinion, ICJ 
Reports 1999, p. 62, at para. 66. See for the responsibility of international organizations under general 
international law: James Crawford and Simon Olleson, ‘The Nature and Forms of International 
Responsibility’, in Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford, OUP, 2003), pp. 445-472, at pp. 446-447. 
127 For a discussion of the case law, see: R. Higgins, ‘The ICJ, the ECJ and the Integrity of International 
Law’ (2003) 52 ICLQ, pp. 1- 20, at pp. 6-9; and Eeckhout, above n.  5, at pp. 324-333.  
128 Case C-286/90, Anklagemyndigheded v Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp. [1992] ECR I-6019.  
129 Ibid,  at para. 9. 
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The ECJ then applied the relevant rules of the international law of the sea, including 
treaty law insofar as it codified general rules recognized by international custom, to 
construe the relevant provisions of Community law.  
 
4.3.3 JUDICIAL REVIEW AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Poulsen left open whether the validity, as opposed to the construction, of a measure of 
Union law could be challenged for infringement of customary international law.130 The 
subsequent case of Opel Austria did not resolve this issue since the decision is explicable 
on the grounds that the relevant rule of public international law, the principle of good 
faith as codified by Article 18 VCLT, was the corollary of the principle of protection of 
legitimate expectations which formed part of the Union’s legal order.131 In Racke, 
however, the ECJ directly addressed the issue of the availability of judicial review in the 
context of a challenge to the validity of Council Regulation on the grounds of violation 
of the customary rules of international law embodied in Article 62 VCLT.132 The ECJ 
ruled it had jurisdiction under Article 234 EC Treaty to rule on ‘all grounds affecting the 
validity’ of acts of the institutions of the EC including examining ‘whether their validity 
may be affected by reason of the fact that they are contrary to a rule of international 
law’.133 The validity of Regulation (EEC) No. 3300/91 could therefore be challenged 
indirectly under Article 234 EC Treaty for alleged violation of the ‘rules of customary 
international law governing the termination and suspension of treaty relations’.134   
However, the ECJ qualified the scope of the right of judicial review, and in particular in 
the context of Article 234 EC Treaty proceedings, by ruling the test to be applied was 
                                                 
130 See Eeckhout, above n.  5,  at p. 326. 
131 Case T-115/94, Opel Austria GmbH v Council of the European Union [1997] ECR II-39, at para. 93. 
See for comment, Eeckhout, above n. 5, at pp. 326-327. 
132 Case C-162/96, Racke GmbH & Co v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR I-3655. The Council Regulation 
at issue suspended trade concessions provided for by an earlier Cooperation Agreement of 2 April 1980 
between the EEC and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1980 Co-operation Agreement) 
following the outbreak of hostilities in Yugolsavia. 
133 Ibid., at paras. 26 and 27. Such grounds may also found a challenge based on the other judicial review 
proceedings  specified in the EC Treaty: see Hartley, above n. 5, at pp. 418-420; and Peters, above n. 2,  at 
pp. 12-14. For a general analysis, see ‘Thomas Eilmansberger, ‘The Relationship between Rights and 
Remedies in EC Law: In Search of the Missing Link’ (2004) 41 CML Rev., pp. 1199-1246. For an analysis 
of Racke, see Eeckhout, above n. 5, at pp. 328-333. 
134 Racke, above n. 132, at para. 51.  
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whether the EC institution had ‘made manifest errors of assessment concerning the 
conditions for applying those rules’.135  On the facts of the case, there had been no such 
manifest error of assessment by the Council.136 
 
It seems that the requirement for a ‘manifest error of assessment’ adopted in Racke as a 
precondition for judicial review was predicated on the assumption that rules of customary 
international law relating to the termination and suspension of treaties were not capable 
of producing direct effect and therefore this higher standard was required for a successful 
challenge. The issue of direct effect was critical because in the International Fruit 
Company case the ECJ had established two conditions for judicial review: 
 
‘Before the incompatibility of a Community measure with a provision of 
international law can affect the validity of that measure, the Community 
must first of all be bound by that provision. Before invalidity can be relied 
upon before a national court, that provision of international law must also be 
capable of conferring rights on citizens of the Community which they can 
invoke before the courts.’137  
 
In Racke, Jacobs AG reviewed the ECJ’s case law on the direct effect of international 
agreements entered into by the EC and the status of customary international law in the 
national legal systems of the Member States and concluded that rules of customary 
international law relating to treaties were not conducive to direct effect.138 Although the 
ECJ in Racke did not consider it necessary to rule on the direct effect of the relevant rules 
of customary international law, since the plaintiff’s case depended rather on the direct 
effect of provisions of the 1980 Cooperation Agreement, it is submitted that their 
reasoning on this point is unconvincing and they in effect adopted Jacobs AG’s 
analysis.139  
                                                 
135 Ibid., at paras. 51 and 52.  
136 Higgins notes the ECJ’s cautious approach compared to earlier judgments in allowing the EC 
institutions such a wide margin of assessment: above n. 127, at p. 9. 
137 Cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company v. Produuktschap voor Greoenten en Fruit [1972] ECR 
1219, at paras  7 and 8. 
138 Racke, above n. 132,  at para. 84 of the Opinion of AG Jacobs. 
139 Eeckhout, above n. 5,  points out that in both Racke and International Fruit Company the material issue 
was ‘the validity of a regulation under rules of international law.’: at p. 332. In Racke the ECJ seemed to 
address the issue of direct effect when referring to the ‘complexity of the rules in question and the 
imprecision of some of the concepts to which they refer’: above n. 132, at para. 52. 
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On this reading of Racke, it may be deduced that in the case where a norm of customary 
international law does satisfy the requirements of direct effect a lower standard is 
required to establish a successful challenge to Union measures for infringement of that 
norm. While the customary international law of treaties regulates primarily relations 
between states and does not confer rights on individuals, the same reasoning is not 
applicable to fundamental rights provisions that are designed to protect individuals 
against violations by the state of those rights. Indeed, Jacobs AG acknowledged this 
distinction in Racke: ‘It may be noted in passing that there may be other types of rules of 
customary international law which do intend to confer rights on individuals, for example 
rules of international humanitarian law.’140 Adoption of a less stringent test for judicial 
review for violation of fundamental rights based on customary international law would 
enhance the normative status of those rights and should it is submitted be the course 
taken by the ECJ.  
 
4.3.4  CONCLUSIONS  
 
The status of fundamental rights based on customary international law in Union law has 
not been as yet fully determined by the ECJ. In comparison to fundamental rights 
protected under international treaties that qualify as general principles of Union law, 
fundamental rights based on customary international law have not featured in the 
protection developed by the ECJ or been afforded explicit protection in the Treaties. 
Article I-4 of the Constitution would provide the basis for the development of a 
jurisprudence according equal status to fundamental rights recognized in customary 
international law with that accorded in Union law to fundamental rights protected under 
international treaties. Even if the Constitution does not enter into force, however, the ECJ 
has the latitude to develop its case law in such a way as to provide equal status to 
fundamental rights protected by customary international law  with that accorded to 
international treaty rights in Union law. 
 
                                                 
140 Opinion of Jacobs AG, above n. 132, at para. 84. 
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4.4 THE NORMATIVE STATUS OF JUS COGENS IN UNION LAW 
 
4.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Jus cogens, or peremptory norms of general international law,141 are rules based either on 
customary international law or treaty law.142 The definition of a peremptory norm of 
general international law and the consequences of its violation on a treaty is regulated by 
the VCLT.143 Article 53 VCLT provides: 
 
‘A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the 
present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a 
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character.’144   
 
Article 64 VCLT provides: ‘If a new peremptory norm of general international law 
emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and 
terminates.’ Article 66(a) VCLT provides:  
 
‘(a) any one of the parties to a dispute concerning the application or the 
interpretation of Articles 53 or 64 may, by a written application, submit it to 
the International Court of Justice for a decision unless the parties by 
common consent agree to submit the dispute to arbitration;’145  
 
                                                 
141 The terms jus cogens and  peremptory norms are used interchangeably:  Dina Shelton, ‘International 
Law and “Relative Normativity”’ in Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford, OUP, 2003),  pp. 145-172, at 
p. 150, n. 13. 
142  See Malcolm N. Shaw, International law (5th edn.) (Cambridge, CUP, 2003), at p. 118. This view is not 
shared by all commentators:  Simma and Alston argue that jus cogens is incapable of meeting the 
requirements of customary international law and should be treated as general principles of law within the 
meaning of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute: above n. 118, at p. 104.  
143 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations of 21 
March 1986 VCLT(SIO), which is not yet in force,  has identical provisions to the VCLT on peremptory 
norms of general international law. 
144 For an analysis of the Article 53 VCLT tests for the existence of jus cogens, see M. Ragazzi, The 
Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (Oxford, OUP, 1997), at pp. 51-59. 
145 However, Article 66(a) VCLT would not confer jurisdiction on the ICJ in a case involving the Union as 
a party since Article 34(1) of the Statute of the ICJ provides: ‘Only states may be parties in cases before the 
Court.’  
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Article 71 VCLT sets out the consequences of the invalidity of a treaty which conflicts 
with a peremptory norm of international law.  
Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
has extended the scope of application of jus cogens beyond that set out in the VCLT.146 
The ICTY ruled in Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija:  
‘The fact that torture is prohibited by a peremptory norm of international law 
has effects at the inter-state and individual levels. At the inter-State level, it 
serves to internationally delegitimise any legislative, administrative or 
judicial act authorizing torture … at the individual level, that is of criminal 
liability, it would seem that one of the consequences of the jus cogens 
character bestowed by the international community upon the prohibition of 
torture is that every State is entitled to investigate, prosecute and punish or 
extradite individuals accused of torture, who are present in a territory under 
its jurisdiction.’147  
National courts and legislatures have also considered the impact of jus cogens on 
conflicting national law and claims of sovereign immunity.148  
The scope of the substantive content of jus cogens is disputed: ‘Except for the general 
acceptance of the peremptory character of the prohibition of aggression and the 
protection of some, but not all, human rights, the definition of the precise content of jus 
cogens is uncertain.’149  As in the case of customary international law there is, however, 
a core set of norms which are generally acknowledged as constituting peremptory 
                                                 
146 The extension of jus cogens outside the field of  international treaty law is controversial: see, the 
reference cited in Caplan, ‘State Immunity, Human Rights, And Jus Cogens: A Critique Of The Normative 
Hierarchy Theory’ (2003) 97 AJIL, pp. 741-781, at p. 772, n. 233.  
147 Case no. IT-95-17/1-T10; Trial Chamber; Judgment of 10 December 1998; at paras. 155-157; available 
at: <www.un.org/icty>. For an analysis of the case, see Erika de Wet, ‘The Prohibition of  Torture as an 
International Norm of jus cogens and its Implications for National and Customary Law’ (2004) 15 EJIL, 
pp. 97-121, at pp. 97-100. 
148 See Shelton, above n. 141, at pp. 156-157; and Cassese, above n. 22, at p. 203. On the Swiss federal 
authorities reaction to a violation of peremptory prohibition of refoulement, see E. de Wet, above n. 147, at 
pp. 101-105. The interaction of jus cogens and the doctrine of state immunity is analysed by Caplan, above 
n. 146, in the context of Al-Adsani v United Kingdom [2002] 34 EHRR 273. 
149 Ragazzi, above n. 144, at p. 48. National courts have been granted universal jurisdiction to adjudicate on 
specific violations of jus cogens. See, for example, section 5(1) of the Criminal Justice (United Nations 
Convention against Torture) Act 2000 which confers universal jurisdiction on the Irish courts over 
commission of the offence of torture. 
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norms.150 Moreover recent judgments of the ICTY have identified specific rules of 
international law as jus cogens. In Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija  the Trial Chamber held 
in relation to the principle proscribing torture: ‘Because of the importance of the values it 
protects, this principle has evolved into a peremptory norm or jus cogens, that is, a norm 
that enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even 
“ordinary” customary rules.’151 In Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et al., the Trial 
Chamber held:  ‘Furthermore, most norms of international humanitarian law, in particular 
those prohibiting war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, are also peremptory 
norms of international law or jus cogens, i.e. of a non-derogable and overriding 
character.’152  However, it remains unclear to what extent the views of the ICTY will be 
adopted by the ICJ and other international and national tribunals.153 
The following analysis of jus cogens focuses on its normative status in the Union’s legal 
order both in terms of the obligations it creates for the Union under international law and 
the potential conflicts that it may generate between national law and Union law. The 
extension of the competences of the Union in the field of refugee and asylum law both 
under the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Amsterdam significantly increased the 
                                                 
150 Caplan refers to an emerging consensus as to the status of certain norms as jus cogens, including 
‘piracy, genocide, slavery, aggression, and torture’: above n. 146, at p. 772. Cassese, above n. 22, at pp. 
202-203, refers to the examples listed in the draft version of Article 19 of the International Law 
Commission (ILC) Draft Articles on State Responsibility, but removed from the final version adopted by 
the International Law Commission (ILC) at its 53rd Session held in November 2001: Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Official Records of the General Assembly, 
Fifty-sixth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1. Available at: 
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/State_responsibility/responsibilityfra.htm>. The former Article 19 of the 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility referred to the norms prohibiting aggression, the establishment or 
maintenance by force of colonial domination, slavery, genocide, or apartheid, and massive pollution of the 
atmosphere or seas. Cassese also refers to norms prohibiting the use or threat of force, customary rules 
banning racial discrimination or torture, the general rules on self-determination, and the fundamental 
principles of humanitarian law: ibid., at p. 203. As discussed in section 8.2.3 of Chapter eight, it has also 
been argued that the principle of non-refoulement constitutes a peremptory norm. For a discussion of the 
International Law Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility, see David D. Caron, ‘The ILC 
Articles On State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship Between Form and Authority’ (2002) 96 
AJIL, pp. 857-873. 
151 See above at n. 147, at para. 153. The defendant appealed the decision to the Appeals Chamber of the 
ICTY but not on the  jus cogens aspect of the Trial Chamber’s decision. 
152 Case no. IT-95-16-T; Trial Chamber; Judgment, of 14 January 2000; at para. 520. Available at: 
<www.un.org/icty>. 
153 For a discussion of the assertion of jus cogens in various international and national fora, see Shelton, in 
Evans (ed.), above n. 141, at pp. 150-159 
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potential impact of jus cogens in the Union’s legal order. The adoption of the 
Constitution would further extend the Union’s powers in sensitive areas of the AFSJ.154  
4.4.2 JUS COGENS AND UNION LAW 
 
As in the case of customary international law, jus cogens applies not only to states but 
also to international organisations.155 The consequences of breach of a peremptory norm 
by the Union would therefore be to engage the international responsibility of the 
Union.156 Moreover, under international law the Union would have an obligation to 
cooperate in bringing an end to serious violations of jus cogens since the principles in 
Articles 40 and 41 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility would apply in 
broadly similar terms to an international organization such as the Union.157 If a provision 
of one of the Treaties or the Constitution, at the time of its conclusion or upon creation of 
a new norm of jus cogens, violated a peremptory norm of international law, the Treaty or 
the Constitution would be void.158  
                                                 
154 See Chapter six for a discussion of Union competences under the AFSJ. See Chapter eight for further 
analysis of the Union’s powers in relation to refugee and asylum policy. 
155  Shelton refers to the Commentary on the VCLT(SIO): ‘it is apparent from the draft articles that 
peremptory norms of international law apply to international organizations as well as to states, and this is 
not surprising.’ : in Evans (ed.), above n. 141,  at p. 153, n. 23.  See also in the same sense: Sands and 
Klein, above n. 28, at pp. 456-461. The implications of the developing law on jus cogens for customary 
international law is discussed by E. de Wet, above n. 147, at pp. 114-119. 
156 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1999, p. 62, at para 66: cited by Crawford and Olleson, in 
Evans (ed)., above n.  126, at pp. 446-447. See also Sands and Klein, above n. 28, at p. 519: ‘Finally, it is 
clear that international organisations are responsible under international law for breaches of international 
norms binding upon them.’ 
157 Article 40: ‘1. This chapter applies to the international responsibility which is entailed by a serious 
breach by a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law. 2. A 
breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by the responsible State to 
fulfil the obligation.’ Article 41: ‘1. States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any 
serious breach within the meaning of article 40. 2. No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by 
a serious breach within the meaning of article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation. 
3. This article is without prejudice to the other consequences referred to in this Part and to such further 
consequences that a breach to which this chapter applies may entail under international law.’: above n. 150.  
Article 57 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility provides: ‘These articles are without prejudice 
to any question of the responsibility under international law of an international organization, or of any State 
for the conduct of an international organization.’ However, Sands and  Klein argue persuasively, in the 
context of the practice and jurisprudence relating to the UN,  that similar rules apply to international 
organisations: above n. 28, at pp. 519-521. 
158 This assumes that Articles 53 and 64 VCLT reflect rules of customary international law. In this sense, 
see Cassese, above n. 22, at pp. 176-177 and 204-205. Cassese also argues that, notwithstanding the 
provisions of Article 44.5 VCLT, a court may be entitled to ‘disregard or declare null and void a single 
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The Union is also bound by the rules of jus cogens according to Union law. This follows, 
a fortiori, from the case law of the ECJ on the effect of customary international law and 
is confirmed in Article I-3(4) of the Constitution which commits the Union to ‘strict 
observance and development of international law, including respect for the principles of 
the United Nations Charter.’ Moreover it has been argued that jus cogens enjoys a higher 
ranking than both treaty and customary international law in Union law since it also 
prevails over conflicting primary Union law.159 As regards the Union’s internal legal 
order, therefore, any conflict of primary or secondary Union law with jus cogens would 
result in the invalidity of the act in question. It is submitted that, as argued in the case of 
fundamental rights protected under customary international law, the standard for judicial 
review of secondary Union measures for violation of jus cogens should not include the 
requirement for a manifest error of assessment by the Union authorities.  
4.4.3 JUS COGENS IN NATIONAL LAW: CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
The most problematic area of jus cogens, however, is how it impacts on the Union legal 
order’s relationship with the national legal orders of the Member States. Traditionally, 
the basic principle has been that international law ‘leaves each country complete freedom 
with regard to how it fulfils, nationally, its international obligations.’160 However, the 
dicta of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija indicate that a violation of the jus 
cogens norm against torture may ‘delegitimise any legislative, administrative or judicial 
act authorizing torture.’161 Furthermore, a number of international treaties that include a 
                                                                                                                                                 
treaty provision that is contrary to jus cogens, if the remaining provisions of the treaty are not tainted with 
the same legal invalidity.’: ibid., at p. 206. The difficult question of which court or courts would have 
jurisdiction to rule on the invalidity of primary Union law is considered in Section 3.3 of Chapter three.  
159 See in this sense, Peters, above n. 2, at pp. 37-38. It should be noted, however, that this conclusion has 
not been confirmed by a judgment of the ECJ or other competent court. 
160 Cassese above n. 22, at p. 219.  Although according to international law a state may not rely on its 
internal law as justification for its failure to perform its international law obligations. This rule is, in the 
context of treaty obligations, embodied in Article 27 VCLT.  
161 See above n. 147, at para. 155. 
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prohibition of specific violations of jus cogens require the parties to enact specific 
legislation to give effect to the prohibition.162  
In such conditions, a national court faced with a measure of Union law that conflicted 
with jus cogens would have to address two challenges to the validity of that measure 
notwithstanding the doctrine of the supremacy of Union law. Firstly, if the national court 
recognized or gave effect to the Union measure the Member State would be in violation 
of its international law obligations since it could not rely on its obligations under the 
Treaties, or the Constitution, to give effect to that measure notwithstanding conflicting 
rules of international or national law.163 Such a course of action would be unacceptable 
to the court of the Member State concerned and it would either construe the Union 
measure in a way that renders it in conformity with the norm of jus cogens or disregard 
the measure.164 Secondly, national legislation of the Member State giving effect to a 
norm of jus cogens would be violated if the national court gave effect to a conflicting 
measure of Union law.165 In such a case the national court would have to consider 
whether the constitutional basis for giving effect to the primacy of Union law extended to 
shield such a measure of Union law.166  
                                                 
162 For example, see: Article 5 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide of 9 December 1948, in force 12 June 1951, 78 UNTS 277; Article 2(1)(d) CERD; Article 2(2) 
ICCPR; and Articles 4 and 5 CAT. See generally, Cassese, above n.  22, at pp. 218-219. 
163 See for a similar argument in the context of resolutions of the UN Security Council which conflict with 
jus cogens: Cassese, above n. 22, at pp. 206-207; and de Wet, above n. 23, at pp. 99-100. 
164 If the requirements of Article 307 EC Treaty were satisfied the national court would in any event be 
entitled to disregard the Union measure: see Section 4.2.3 above. The approach of the court would be 
guided by the national rules on the status of international law in the domestic legal system.  See generally, 
Eileen Denza, ‘The Relationship between International and National Law’, in Evans (ed.), International 
Law (Oxford, OUP, 2003), pp. 415-442. 
165 It may also possibly constitute a violation of the Member State’s constitution. As an example, outside 
the Union’s membership, the Swiss Constitution prohibits popular proposals for reform of the Swiss 
Constitution in violation of jus cogens: see E. de Wet, above n. 147, at pp. 101 -105.  
166 The German Bundesfinanzhof  has ruled that effect should not be given to a measure of Union law:in 
violation of international law: Order of 9 January 1996, Europäische Zietschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, Bd. 7, 
1996, 126, 127-128: cited in Peters, above n. 2, at p. 19, n. 45. Article 29(10) of the Irish Constitution 
provides: ‘No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the 
State which are necessitated by the obligations of membership of the European Union or of the 
Communities, or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the European Union or by the 
Communities or by institutions thereof, or by bodies competent under the Treaties establishing the 
Communities, from having the force of law in the State.’ A provision of Union law that violated jus cogens 
would not be construed by the Irish courts as ‘necessitated’ by the obligations of membership.  
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Both these scenarios demonstrate the importance for the integrity of Union law that any 
violation of jus cogens is effectively sanctioned. It is therefore submitted that if a 
challenge to the validity of a measure of Union law on grounds of a violation of jus 
cogens is raised in judicial review proceedings before the ECJ, whether as the result of a 
direct action or a preliminary reference, the ECJ should adopt a standard of review that in 
all circumstances requires compliance with the norm of jus cogens and does not require 
the applicant to prove a manifest error of assessment by the Union’s authorities. This 
approach would minimize the risk that the ECJ and the national courts would adopt 
divergent views on the compatibility of a Union measure with jus cogens.   
In the case of a conflict between national legislation implementing an international 
agreement containing a rule of jus cogens and a provision of Union law, the Article 234 
EC Treaty reference procedure provides a mechanism to resolve the conflict by allowing 
the ECJ to control whether the violation by the Union measure of the implementing 
national legislation also constituted a violation of jus cogens for the purposes of Union 
law. Although Article 234 EC Treaty does not expressly provide the ECJ with 
jurisdiction to interpret treaties to which the EC is not party, the ECJ nonetheless has 
assumed such jurisdiction in the context of the GATT agreement ‘in order to ensure the 
uniform interpretation of Community law.’167  Moreover in SPI the ECJ ruled that its 
jurisdiction under Article 234 EC Treaty extended to interpret the GATT treaty both in 
the context of the validity of EC law and implementing national measures: ‘In that regard 
it does not matter whether the national court is required to assess the validity of 
Community measures or the compatibility of national legislative provisions with the 
commitments binding the Community.’168  
However, a rigid application of the principles in the SPI case would have the 
disadvantage of imposing the ECJ’s interpretation of the relevant rule of jus cogens 
on the national courts. Such an approach would be inconsistent with the argument 
advanced in this study that a decentralized approach to the interpretation of 
                                                 
167 Case 267-9/81, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Società Petrolifera Italiana SpA (SPI) and 
SpA Michelin Italiana (SAMI) [1983] ECR 3415, at para. 15. But see Hartley for a critical analysis of the 
ECJ’s reasoning in this case: ‘This is the reasoning of politics, not law.’: above n. 5, at p. 275. 
168 SPI, ibid., at para. 15.  
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international fundamental rights standards is to be preferred.169 It is therefore 
submitted that a national court should be entitled to refer directly to the interpretation 
in international law of the relevant norm of jus cogens and disapply any conflicting 
provision of Union law without being obliged to make a preliminary reference to the 
ECJ. This approach would require a development of the doctrines in CILFIT  and 
Foto-Frost.170 
 
4.5   GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The Union is obliged to comply with international law by virtue of its status as an 
international organization endowed with legal personality. It is also subject to constraints 
based on the international law treaty obligations of the Member States arising either from 
treaties entered into prior to membership of the Union under Article 307 EC Treaty or in 
respect of treaties to which the Member States are all party and fall within an area of 
competence transferred to the Union. The ECJ has also developed through its general 
principles of law doctrine, as confirmed in Article 6(2) TEU, an obligation on the 
Union’s institutions and the Member States, in implementing or derogating from Union 
law, to respect fundamental rights protected by international treaties to which the 
Member States are party.   
However, the current mechanisms in Union law for providing legal effect to international 
fundamental treaty rights are unsatisfactory.  Article 307 EC Treaty and the International 
Fruit Company doctrine provided incomplete and inconsistent mechanisms for the 
protection of treaty based fundamental rights. Although the general principles doctrine is 
more comprehensive in its scope of application, it suffers from a number of deficiencies 
in terms of accountability and transparency.171  
                                                 
169 See,  for the development of this argument in the context of the ECHR, Section 3.4.3 of Chapter 
three. 
170 Case 283/81, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health [1982] ECR 3415; and  
Case 314/85, Foto-Frost (Firma) v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199. 
171 See Section 5.2.2 of Chapter five for a detailed analysis.  
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In the case of fundamental rights established in customary international law and jus 
cogens, there is no provision in the Treaties or ruling by the ECJ clearly establishing their 
normative status. However, uncertainty as to the identification and scope of such rights 
should not be grounds for restricting their enforceability. Effective recognition and 
enforcement of such rights will become of increasing significance as the Union’s activity 
in the AFSJ is extended and deepened.172 The lack of clarity on their normative status 
undermines their contribution to the protection of fundamental rights in the Union’s legal 
order and has the potential for creating conflicts with the national legal orders of the 
Member States.  
The recognition in Article I-3(4) of the Constitution of the protection of fundamental 
rights and respect for international law as an objective of the Union provides a potential 
basis for strengthening the normative status of fundamental rights derived from both 
treaty law and custom. Union accession to the ECHR, as mandated by Article I-9(2) of 
the Constitution, would be a milestone in achieving effective protection of fundamental 
rights in Union law. However, ECHR accession needs to be complemented by Union 
accession to the other European Conventions and the UN Conventions. Direct 
membership by the Union of fundamental rights treaties should be the preferred strategy 
since the more securely international fundamental rights standards are integrated into the 
Union’s legal order and the more effectively compliance is monitored by external and 
independent bodies the greater the accountability and legitimacy of the Union’s legal 
order both domestically and internationally.173  
Finally, the rules on the judicial review of the legality of Union measures should be 
eveloped to take account of the specific characteristics of fundamental rights norms. Both 
norms of customary international law and jus cogens should be recognised as grounding 
                                                 
172 See Sections 6.2.8 and 6.2.9 of Chapter six. 
173 On the relationship between accountability and legitimacy, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Governing  
Through Government Networks’, in Byers (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics (Oxford, OUP, 
2000), pp. 177-205, at pp. 195-196. See generally Anthony Arnull and Daniel Wincott (eds.), 
Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford, OUP, 2002). On the dichotomy between 
internal and external Union policy on fundamental rights, see Clapham, in Alston (ed.), above n. 11, at p. 
659; and Williams, above n. 13, passim. 
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an absolute right to judicial review to determine compliance of Union measures with 
such norms. Notwithstanding a transfer of competences to the Union, the continuing 
obligations of the Member States to comply with their fundamental rights obligations 
under both treaty and customary international law, and in particular those obligations 
which constitute jus cogens, requires that the ECJ and the national courts adopt a co-
operative approach to the resolution of conflicts in the interpretation and application of 
international fundamental rights norms based on the primacy of international law. 
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5 
 
THE CONSTITUTION AND REFORM OF THE PROTECTION OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE UNION LAW 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This Chapter analyses the extent to which the reforms in the Constitution1 would 
improve the Union’s existing normative system for the protection of international 
fundamental rights. The two principal reforms in the Constitution to the structure of 
fundamental rights protection in Union law are the obligation in Article I-9(1) for the 
Union ‘to recognize the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter which 
constitutes Part II’ of the Constitution and the obligation in Article I-9(2) for the Union 
to accede to the ECHR.2 The substance of these reforms were included in the draft 
Constitution establishing a Constitution for Europe presented by the Presidency of the 
Convention on the Future of Europe (the European Convention)3 to the President of the 
European Council in Rome on 18 July 2003,4 on the basis of the final report of Working 
Group II (WGII Final Report).5   
 
The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which opened at Rome on 4 October 2003 
under the Italian Presidency and ended under the Irish Presidency at the European 
Council meeting of 17-18 June 2004, accepted these reforms in principle but adopted 
                                                 
1 [2004] OJ C310/1. Reference throughout this Chapter is, unless otherwise specified, to the numbering of 
articles in the Constitution. Previous versions of the Constitution during its negotiation had different 
numbering. 
2 Article I-9(2) refers to Union accession to the ECHR. The question of the Protocols of the ECHR to 
which the Union would accede has been left open for resolution during the accession negotiations. 
3 See the Report from the Presidency of the Convention to the President of the European 
Council of 18 July 2003 (CONV 851/03). Available on the European Convention website at: 
<http//:european-convention.eu.int/>.  Documents available on the European  Convention website are not 
further referenced. The documents associated with the organizations and bodies contributing to the 
European Convention up to 29 October 2004 are available on the Futurum website at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/constitution/futurum/index_fr.htm>.  
4 The 18 July 2003 draft text of the Constitution is available on the European Convention website.  
5 The Final Report of Working Group II on ‘Incorporation of the Charter/Accession to the ECHR’ (WGII 
Final Report): CONV 354/02: WGII 16, Brussels, 22 October 2002. Available on the European Convention 
website. For a detailed study of the issues raised in WGII Final Report, see the 6th report of the Select 
Committee on European Union of the House of Lords, The Future Status of The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (Session 2002-2003); HL Paper 48; published 4  February 2003. 
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amendments both of a substantive and technical nature to the fundamental rights 
provisions in the 18 July 2003 draft Constitutional Treaty.6 The Italian Presidency 
proposed amendments strengthening the status of the Explanations to the Charter of 11 
October 2000 (the Charter Explanations),7 amending Article I-9(2) by requiring the 
Union to accede to the ECHR rather than, as in the draft Constitutional Treaty  of 18 July 
2003, ‘to seek accession’, and replacing the requirement for unanimity in the Council in 
negotiating the Union’s accession to the ECHR under Article III-325(8) by a qualified 
majority throughout the accession procedure.8  
 
Following failure of the IGC to reach agreement at the European Council meeting of 12-
13 December 2003, the Irish Presidency submitted a report to the European Council 
meeting of 25-26 March 2004 which was broadly positive on the perspectives for 
adoption of the Constitution.9  On 29 April 2004, the Irish Presidency submitted a 
working document based on the proposals of the Italian Presidency which included a new 
Protocol relating to Article I-9(2) on the accession of the Union to the ECHR (the ECHR 
Protocol).10 Draft texts subject to a broad consensus were circulated by the Irish 
Presidency in May and June 2004 which included proposed amendments relating to the 
terms of Union accession to the ECHR, the ECHR Protocol and a new draft Declaration 
relating to Article I-9(2).11  Issues requiring further discussion, in preparation for the 
meeting of Heads of State or Government in Brussels on 17-18 June 2004, were 
subsequently circulated, including proposals on the status of the Charter Explanations.12  
                                                 
6 IGC documents are available at:  
<http://ue.eu.int/cms3_applications/Applications/igc/doc_register.asp?content=DOC&lang=EN&cmsid=75
4> (the IGC website). IGC documents  are not further referenced.  
7 The Charter Explanations as updated under the authority of the Praesidium of the European Convention 
are published as Declaration No. 12 to the Constitution: [2004] OJ C310/424-459. 
8 The Italian Presidency proposals are in CIG 60/03 of 9 December 2003; CIG 60/03 ADD1 of 9 December 
2003; and CIG 60/03 ADD 2 of 11 December 11 2003. Available on the IGC website.  
9 CIG 70/04 of 24 March, 2004. Available on the IGC website. 
10 CIG 73/04 of 29 April, 2004. Available on the IGC website. The modified version of the ECHR Protocol 
annexed as Protocol 32 to the Constitution is set out in Section 5.7.2. below.  
11 CIG 76/04 of 13 May 2004; CIG 79/04 of 10 June 2004; and CIG 81/04 of 16 June 2004. See Section 
3.4.2 of Chapter three for the final version of the Declaration relating to Article I-9(2).  
12 CIG 75/04 of 13 May 2004; CIG 80/04 of 12 June 12 2004; and CIG 82/04 of 16 June 2004. Available 
on the IGC website. 
 121
Agreement on the Constitution was finally reached on 18 June 2004.13 Signature of the 
Constitution took place in Rome on 29 October 2004. The ratification process has been 
effectively suspended until the first half of 2006 pending a review by the European 
Council of national debates on the Constitution’s future following rejection of the 
Constitution in referenda in France and the Netherlands of 29 May 2005 and 1 June 2005 
respectively.14  
 
A central issue in any reform process, in particular when it involves establishing a 
constitutional bill of rights, is identifying the objectives to be achieved by a particular 
constitutional provision: ‘When a legal norm is expressed as an article in an institutional 
framework, it is articulated in a particular manner for a particular purpose.’15  This 
Chapter critically analyses the reform of the Union’s constitutional structure for the 
protection of fundamental rights in the Constitution in the context of assessing how far it 
achieves key objectives critical to the effective protection of fundamental rights in the 
Union’s legal order:16 transparency;17 the rule of law;18 a balanced relationship between 
the Union and national legal orders;19 the strict control of derogations and limitations on 
fundamental rights;20 an effective system of judicial redress, including Union accession 
to the ECHR; and the entrenchment of fundamental rights.  
 
                                                 
13 The documents presented during the 17-18 June 2004 meeting are in CIG 83/04, CIG 84/04 and CIG 
85/04 of 18 June 2004. Available on the IGC website. 
14 Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the European Union on the 
Ratification of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe of 18 June 2005: available at: 
<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/Docs/pressData/en/ec/85325>.  
15 Teraya Koji, ‘Emerging Hierarchy in International Human Rights and Beyond: From the Perspective of 
Non-Derogable Rights’ (2001) 12 EJIL, pp. 917-941, at p. 922. 
16 Some of these objectives were affirmed in the Laeken Declaration of the European Council on the Future 
of the European Union of  December 2001: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/laeken_council/index_en.htm>.   
See also: Koen Lenaerts and Marlies Desomer, ‘Bricks for a Constitutional Treaty of the European Union: 
Values, Objectives and Means’ (2002) 27 EL Rev., pp. 377-407; and Andrew Williams, ‘EU Human Rights 
Policy and the Convention on the Future of Europe: a Failure of Design?’ (2003) 28 EL Rev., pp. 794-813.  
17 See Peter Dryberg, ‘Accountability and Legitimacy: What is the Contribution of Transparency?’ in 
Arnull and Wincott (eds.), Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford, OUP, 2002), pp. 
81-96. 
18 See Anthony Arnull, ‘The Rule of Law in the European Union’ in Arnull and Wincott (eds.), 
Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford, OUP, 2002),  pp. 239-256.  
19 See Alan Dashwood, ‘The Relationship Between the Member States and the European Union/European 
Community’ (2004) CML Rev., pp. 355-381.  
20 See S. Peers, ‘Taking Rights Away? Limitations and Derogations’, in Peers and Ward (eds.), The 
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights: Politics, Law and Policy (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2004), pp. 140-179. 
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While a number of these objectives overlap, each of the following sections focuses on 
one objective as a critical tool for assessing how far the fundamental rights reforms in the 
Constitution contribute to achievement of a constitutional structure that is robust and 
effective.21 This analysis lends strong support to incorporation of the Charter and 
accession by the Union to the ECHR, but concludes that other provisions in the 
Constitution, and in particular the retention of general principles of law as a source of 
fundamental rights and the amendments to the Charter, undermine respect for these 
objectives. In the light of these conclusions, the current impasse over the ratification of 
the Constitution provides an opportunity for further reflection and improvement on the 
current proposals in the Constitution. 
 
5.2 SOURCES OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 
 
5.2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
‘If we are to have greater transparency, simplification is essential.’22 This section argues 
that the goal of transparency would be undermined by the complexity engendered by 
retention of general principles as a source of fundamental rights in the Union’s legal 
order in Article I-9(3) and by the amendments to the Charter in Articles II-112(4) -(7) of 
the Constitution. The section is divided into three sub-sections: the first sub-section 
addresses the problems raised by the retention of general principles in Article I-9(3); the 
second sub-section analyses critically the new provisions in Articles II-112(4)-(7); and 
the third sub-section examines the hierarchical ordering of the sources of fundamental 
rights law specified in Article I-9 of the Constitution.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 See Chapter one for an explanation of this methodology. 
22 Laeken Declaration, above n. 16. On the requirement for transparency and clarity in the Union’s 
instruments and procedures, see the Final Report of Working Group IX on Simplification, CONV 424/02, 
Brussels 29 November 2002. Available on the European Convention website 
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5.2.2 ARTICLE I-9(3) AND THE RETENTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AS 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
 
The sources of fundamental rights norms in Union law are exceptionally fluid as a result 
of the development of protection by the ECJ on the basis of fundamental rights as general 
principles of Union law.23 The ECJ has interpreted Article 6(2) TEU as embodying24 or 
reaffirming25 its previous case law on fundamental rights as general principles of Union 
law and has continued to employ its wider pre-Article 6(2) TEU formulation of the 
sources for general principles of Union law.26 International fundamental rights 
instruments other than the ECHR therefore continue to provide a source for general 
principles of Union law notwithstanding the restrictive terms of Article 6(2) TEU.27 The 
Charter rights and principles, although not formally incorporated into the Union’s legal 
order, have become a further source of fundamental rights standards.28  
 
Article I-9(3) of the Constitution corresponds to Article 6(2) TEU: ‘Fundamental rights, 
as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.’29 The 
                                                 
23 See Section 4.2.4 of Chapter four.  
24 Case C-7/98, Krombach v. Bamberski [2000] ECR 1-1935, at para. 27.  
25 Case C-112/00, Schmidberger v Austria [2003] ECR 1-5659, at para. 72. 
26 For example, in Grant v. South West Trains Ltd., decided after the entry into force of the Maastricht 
Treaty but before the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the ECJ stated that the ICCPR is ‘one of 
the international instruments relating to the protection of human rights of which the Court takes account in 
applying the fundamental principles of Community law’: Case C-249/96 [1998] ECR I-621, at para. 44. 
However, in that case the ECJ did not apply the  Human Rights Committee’s interpretation of Article 28 
ICCPR in Communication No. 488/1992 (Toonen v Australia).  
27 In practice the ECJ has mainly referred to the ECHR on the basis it is an international instrument of 
‘special significance’: Schmidberger, above n. 25, at para. 71. However, Opinions of Advocates-General 
continue to refer to other international conventions: see, for example, the reference by AG Stix-Hackl to 
the preambles to the UNDHR, the ICCPR and ICESR as sources of the right to human dignity in Case C-
36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt 
Bonn; [2005] 1 CMLR 5, at para. 82. The ECJ, while not specifically referring to those sources, in Omega 
endorsed the AG’s approach:  ibid., at para. 34. 
28 See A. Ward, ‘Access to Justice’, in A. Ward and S. Peers (eds.), The European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: Politics, Law and Policy (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004), pp. 123-140, at pp. 126-
132. 
29 Article I-9(3) substitutes for the obligation for the Union to ‘respect’ as general principles of 
‘Community’  law  fundamental rights as guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, the stipulation that such rights shall ‘constitute’ 
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retention of the substance of Article 6(2) TEU in Article I-9(3) should provide a 
sufficient basis for the ECJ’s continued reference to international treaties other than the 
ECHR. Indeed, the contrary interpretation would render the retention of Article I-9(3) 
largely nugatory. In any event, the existing principle established by the ECJ that 
international human rights treaties other than the ECHR may be used as an interpretative 
tool in determining the general principles of fundamental rights law applied by the ECJ 
would remain applicable.30   
 
The retention of the reference to the common constitutional traditions and the ECHR as 
sources of general principles of law in Article I-9(3) is designed to retain a dynamic 
element to the protection of fundamental rights in Union law. 31  However, in the case of 
both the reference to the common constitutional traditions and to the ECHR it is difficult 
to identify any additional benefits for the protection of fundamental rights from those 
accruing from incorporation of the Charter and Union accession to the ECHR. The 
difficulty of identifying a core set of constitutional traditions in a Union with a regularly 
expanding membership has resulted in a paucity of such common traditions being cited.32  
The ECJ has rejected the argument that each and every constitutional provision of a 
Member State should be guaranteed protected status under Union law33 and the common 
                                                                                                                                                 
general principles ‘of the Union’s law’. However, the reference in Article I-9(3) to Union law as opposed 
to Community law in Article 6(2) TEU does not constitute a substantive change: see S. Peers, ‘Human 
Rights and the Third Pillar’, in Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp. 167-186,  
at p. 171. The substitution of the obligation for the Union to ‘respect’ fundamental rights by the 
terminology that such rights shall ‘constitute’ general principles also does not seem substantive. 
30 See Peers, in Alston (ed.), above n. 29, at p. 171, n. 27. 
31 While WGII made no recommendation on retention, those members in favour argued that such a 
reference ‘could serve to complete the protection offered by the Charter and clarify that Union law is open 
for future evolutions in ECHR and Member States’ human rights law’: WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p. 
9. Available on the European Convention website.  
32 Indeed, the ECJ’s references to such common constitutional traditions has been described as perfunctory: 
‘One could even say that the Court of Justice is not genuinely interested in finding out whether there is a 
‘common tradition’ among the Member States concerning the legal regime of a particular rule. References 
to specific national legal systems are perfunctory and haphazard. A national constitutional judgment has 
never been cited.’: B. de Witte, ‘The Role of the ECJ in Human Rights’, in P. Alston with M. Bustelo and 
J. Heenan (eds.) The EU and Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp. 859-897, at p. 878. 
33 This argument was advanced by A. G. Warner in Case 7/76, Industria Romana Carni e Affini, S. p. A. v. 
Amminstrazione dell Finanze dello Stato [1976] ECR 1213; but rejected in Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land 
Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727.  See J. Weiler and U. Haltern, ‘Constitutional or International? The 
Foundations of the Community Legal Order and the Question of Judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz’, in A. 
Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet and J. Weiler (eds.) The European Court and National Courts – Doctrine and 
Jurisprudence: Legal Change in its Social Context (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998), pp. 331-364, at pp. 
 125
constitutional traditions exist as a source of Union fundamental rights only insofar as 
recognised by the ECJ as a matter of policy.34  
 
The reference in Article I-9(3) to the ECHR is also of limited benefit following 
incorporation of the Charter since, even without Union accession to the ECHR, the 
Charter substantially recognises the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR.35  
WGII emphasized that Article 52(3) of the Charter, incorporated unamended as Article 
II-112(3), means that if Charter rights correspond to ECHR rights they shall have the 
same scope and meaning as laid down in the ECHR but that,  in accordance with the 
second sentence of Article II-112(3), this does not prevent Union law providing more 
extensive protection if Union legislation subsequently so provides or provisions of the 
Charter, although based on the ECHR, provide more extensive protection.36 In the light 
of the minimum standard of protection guaranteed by Article II-112(3), retaining ECHR 
rights as a source of general principles of Union law would not materially add to the 
same, or enhanced, rights set out in the Charter. 
 
One argument in favor of retaining Article I-9(3) is that it could be used in conjunction 
with Article II-113 to recognize rights not protected under the Charter but protected 
under other qualifying international fundamental rights treaties.37 This problem arises 
because of the more limited scope of application of the Charter:  ‘In that sense the scope 
of application ratione materiae of the Charter is more limited than the protection offered 
by the present system of guaranteeing respect of fundamental rights in the EU flowing 
                                                                                                                                                 
356-357. See generally, J. Weiler, ‘Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries: On Standards and 
Values in the Protection of Human Rights’ in N.A. Neuwahl and A. Rosas (eds.) The European Union and 
Human Rights  (Hague, Kluwer, 1995), pp. 51-76; and L. Besselink: ‘Entrapped by the Maximum 
Standard: On Fundamental Rights, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the European Union’ (1998) 35 CML Rev, 
pp.  629-680. 
34 See T. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (5th edn.) (Oxford, OUP, 2003), at pp. 
138-141. 
35 ‘It means that, by and large, the substantive provisions of the European Convention have been 
incorporated [in the Charter], although not exactly in the same wording’: L. Betten, ‘Human Rights’ (2001) 
50 ICLQ, pp. 690-701, at p. 692.  
36 WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p. 7. WG II refers to Articles 47 and 50 of the Charter as examples of 
provisions providing more extensive protection.  
37 See Section 5.2.4 below for an analysis of Article II-113. 
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from Article 6(2) juncto Article 46(d) EU.’38 However, it is submitted a preferable 
solution to this problem would be accession by the Union to the relevant international 
treaties.39 The inclusion of Article I-9(3) in the Constitution undermines certainty and 
transparency in identification of the sources of the Union’s fundamental rights.40 
 
 
5.2.3 AMENDMENTS TO THE CHARTER 
 
5.2.3.1 Introduction 
WGII Final Report recommended a number of amendments to the Charter to be 
incorporated in the Constitution with further amendments resulting from the IGC 
process.41 In general WG II did not provide policy justification for the recommendations 
in the WGII Final Report, justifying its technical and legal approach42 on the grounds of 
its limited terms of reference.43  This approach was, however, pursued selectively insofar 
as several recommendations in WGII Final Report were influenced by political pressure 
from the Member States and resulted in changes of substance, in particular as regards the 
Charter,44 while in other cases it was used to avoid addressing potentially beneficial 
                                                 
38 K. Lenaerts and E.E. de Smijter, ‘A “Bill of Rights” for the European Union’ (2001) 38 CMLR, pp. 273-
300, at p. 281. See for an analysis of Article 46(d) TEU, Section 7.2.3 of Chapter seven.  
39 For a discussion of options for enhancing protection of human rights under Community law see: G. Gaja, 
‘New Instruments and Institutions for Enhancing the Protection of Human Rights in Europe?’ in Alston 
(ed.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp. 781-800, at pp. 796-800. See generally, Section 
4.2.1 of Chapter four. 
40 WGII discussion paper of 18 June 2002 sets out admirably the objections to retaining an equivalent to 
Article 6(2) TEU: CONV 116/02, at p. 10. Available on the European Convention website. See also 
Engel’s recommendation to eliminate Article 6(2) TEU if the Charter were incorporated: ‘lest the 
Community create a ‘lawyers paradise’ on fundamental rights’:  ‘The European Charter of Human Rights: 
A Changed Political Opportunity Structure and its Normative Consequences’ (2001) 7 ELJ, pp. 151-170, at 
p. 167. 
41 The proposals of WGII are set out in the Annex to WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p. 17. The 
amendments negotiated during the IGC are referred to below. For an analysis of the amendments, see  
Peers, in Peers and Ward (eds.), above n. 20, at pp. 171-179. 
42 For a valuable synthesis of the arguments against a technocratic view of the lawyer’s role see: J.H.H. 
Weiler and A.L .Paulus, ‘The Structure of Change in International Law or is there a Hierarchy of Norms in 
International Law?’(1997) 8 EJIL, pp. 545-565. 
43 The mandate of WGII is set out in CONV 72/02. Available on the European Convention website. 
44 The British Government made this explicit: ‘We and some other Member States worked hard in the 
Convention on the Future of Europe to help get more clarity and legal certainty into the Charter. The 
changes we helped pushed through have put the whole package in much better legal shape.’: A 
Constitutional Treaty for the EU, The British Approach to the European Intergovernmental Conference 
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reforms to fundamental rights protection in the Union. Each of the amendments to the 
Charter is analysed below in the context of assessing how far they contribute to achieving 
the objectives of transparency and simplicity in the sources of Union law. It is concluded 
that the amendments achieve neither of these objectives but detract from the Charter’s 
clarity and legal certainty. 
 
5.2.3.2  Article II-112(4)  
Article II-112(4) provides: ‘Insofar as this Charter recognizes fundamental rights as they 
result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, those rights shall 
be interpreted in harmony with those traditions.’ WGII, with two members dissenting, 
justified Article II-112(4) on the basis it served to emphasize the ‘firm roots’ of the 
Charter in the common constitutional traditions of the Member States and ‘in the interest 
of smooth incorporation of the Charter as a legally binding document’.45  This argument 
suggests the purpose of inserting Article II-112(4) was political expediency rather than 
an objective analysis of its merits. Apart from the difficulty of identifying such 
traditions,46 the rule of interpretation set out in Article 112(4), if applied literally, 
requires an unduly restrictive interpretation of the relevant Charter articles based on the 
constitutional traditions of the members of the Union at the time the Charter was 
proclaimed on 7 December 2000.  
 
WGII sets out how it considers Article II-112(4) should be applied: ‘the Charter rights 
concerned should be interpreted in a way offering a high standard of protection which is 
adequate for the law of the Union and in harmony with the common constitutional 
traditions.’47 This contradictory terminology seems to reflect academic arguments for the 
application of differential standards of human rights to Union and national measures,48 
although WGII claims to reject the argument that the ECJ should adopt a ‘lowest 
common denominator’ approach to Charter rights derived from the common 
                                                                                                                                                 
2003, Cm5934 (September 2003), at para. 101. Available at 
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/FoE_IGC_Paper_cm5934_sm,0.pdf>. 
45 WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p. 7. 
46 See Peers for an analysis of the problem of establishing a complete list of Charter rights resulting from 
the common constitutional traditions: in Peers and Ward (eds.), above n. 20, at pp. 173-174. 
47 WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at pp. 7-8. 
48 See Section 5.2.4  below. 
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constitutional traditions.49  However, the reference to an interpretation ‘in harmony with 
those traditions’ is so vague that it is hard to see how the ECJ could give it any 
substantive effect. A further objection to Article II-112(4) is that since the Charter does 
not, with good cause, explicitly identify the rights derived from the common 
constitutional traditions nor which traditions form the source of such rights, one is 
obliged to refer to the Charter Explanations which weakens the authority of the Charter 
and risks solidifying the rights protected by it.  
 
5.2.3.3  Article II-112(5) 
 WGII also proposed, with two members having reservations, a new provision which has 
been inserted in a slightly modified version as Article II-112(5): 
 
‘The provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be implemented by 
legislative and executive acts taken by the institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are 
implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers. They shall 
be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling 
on their legality.’  
 
According to WG II Article II-112(5) would be consistent both with the case-law of the 
ECJ and ‘with the approach of the Member States’ constitutional systems to “principles” 
particularly in the field of social law’.50  WGII argued that ‘future jurisprudence’ would 
be able to rule on the ‘exact attribution of articles to the two categories’ (right or 
principle) by referring to the wording of the respective articles of the Charter and ‘taking 
into account the important guidance’ provided by the Charter Explanations as 
supplemented by explanations in WGII Final Report.51  
 
                                                 
49 WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p. 7. 
50 WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p. 8. WGII Final Report refers to Cases T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health 
SA  v Council [2002] ECR II-3305 and Case C-265/85 Van den Bergh en Jurgens BV et Van Dijk Food 
Products (Lopik) BV v Commission [1987] ECR-1155. The relevance of the cases to Article II-112(5) is 
difficult to discern. 
51 WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p. 8. The Charter Explanations list Articles 1, 34(1), 35, 36, 37, and 38 
of the Charter as principles but, as Peers points out, this designation is not free from doubt: in Peers and 
Ward (eds.), above n. 20, at p. 175. 
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Several criticisms may be made of Article II-112(5).52 Firstly, the first sentence of 
Article II-112(5) is either an attribution of competence for the Union and Member States 
to adopt measures implementing the Charter principles without defining the modalities of 
its exercise, which is misplaced in a constitutional enumeration of rights and conflicts 
with Article II-111(2),53 or, more plausibly, an affirmation of competences established 
elsewhere in the Constitution, in which case it is superfluous. Secondly, by restricting 
judicial cognisance of Charter principles to implementing acts it deprives the Charter 
principles of legal enforceability in the absence of such acts. Since the Charter principles 
relate to areas where Union action may be controversial and difficult to achieve, Article 
II-112(5) risk relegating the Charter principles to the fate of Christmas poinsettias: left to 
wither after due credit has been taken for their initial bloom.  Thirdly, Article II-112(5)  
creates a rigid distinction between the legal effect of those provisions of the Charter 
recognizing rights and those containing principles, whereas Article II-111(1) of the 
Charter simply provides the Member States shall, in respect of the provisions of the 
Charter, ‘respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in 
accordance with their respective powers …’. Article II-112(5) therefore constitutes an 
unwarranted and substantive change to the structure of the Charter which undermines its 
transparency. 
 
5.2.3.4  Article II-112(6). 
Following the recommendation of WGII, Article II-112(6) provides: ‘Full account shall 
be taken of national laws and practices as specified in this Charter.’ WGII Report 
justifies this new provision by reference to the principle of subsidiarity referred to in the 
Charter’s Preamble, Article 51(1) of the Charter and ‘from those Charter Articles which 
make references to national laws and practices’.54 It is difficult to attribute any specific 
meaning to this provision.55 Firstly, the principle of subsidiarity was relevant to 
determining the original scope of the Charter, as made clear in Article 51(1) of the 
                                                 
52 Peers argues that the ‘most logical explanation’ for Article II-112(5) is that it ‘would rule out direct 
effect of the principles’: in Peers and Ward (eds.), above n. 20, at p. 175. 
53 See further Section 5.4.2 below. 
54 WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p. 5. 
55 Peers construes Article 112(6) as, potentially at least, conferring substantial freedom on the Member 
States to derogate from the Charter articles referring to national laws and practices: in Peers and Ward 
(eds.), above n. 20, at pp. 176-178.   
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Charter, but not to the interpretation of the Charter provisions, whether or not referring to 
national laws and practices. Secondly, on each occasion the Charter refers to national 
laws and practices it is clear from the relevant article that the exercise of the right shall be 
determined in accordance with such national laws and practices. Article II-112(6) 
therefore adds nothing to the Charter’s existing text, as indeed the text of Article II-
112(6) itself recognises by providing that full account shall be taken of national laws and 
practices ‘as specified in the Charter’. 
 
5.2.3.5  Article II-112(7). 
WG II emphasized the importance of the Charter Explanations as a tool in ensuring a 
‘correct understanding of the Charter’ and recommended that reference should be drawn 
to them ‘in an appropriate manner’ upon incorporation of the Charter and that they 
should be more widely publicized.56   Following negotiation over the status of the 
Charter Explanations during the IGC process,57 this status was significantly strengthened 
by the addition of Article II–112(7): ‘The explanations drawn up as a way of providing 
guidance in the interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights shall be given due 
regard by the courts of the Union and of the Member States.’ In addition, a new sentence 
is added at the end of the fifth recital to the Charter:  
 
‘In this context the Charter will be interpreted by the courts of the Union and the 
Member States with due regard to the explanations prepared under the authority 
of the Praesidium of the Convention which drafted the Charter and updated under 
the responsibility of the Praesidium of the European Convention.’ 
 
However, the Charter Explanations were formulated on the basis they should have ‘no 
legal value’58 and a change to their status undermines the transparency of the Charter as a 
source of fundamental rights in the Constitution and jeopardize a dynamic interpretation 
of the Charter rights and principles by the ECJ. As has been aptly stated: ‘Good 
                                                 
56 WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p. 10. WGII also proposed the explanations contained in WGII Final 
Report should be ‘fully integrated with the original Explanations’. This suggestion was not followed up by 
the IGC. The British Government endorsed the European Convention’s  proposal for enhancing the legal 
status of the Charter Explanations:  in Cm5934, above n. 44, at para. 102.   
57 See Section 5.1 of this Chapter.  
58 See the Charter Explanations, above n. 7, at p. 1. 
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constitutions are short and enigmatic.’59 Article II-112(7) would confront the ECJ with 
the difficult task of reconciling the requirement to take account of the Charter 
Explanations with the fact that their references to ECJ case law, the Treaties, and 
secondary Union legislation will become outdated.60 Similar problems will arise in 
respect of the Charter articles based wholly or in part on international sources referred to 
in the Charter Explanations since subsequent instruments will affect these sources.61 This 
process will increasingly undermine the transparency of the Charter as reference to the 
Charter Explanations will provide an increasingly confusing and incomplete guide to the 
Charter. 
 
5.2.4 HIERARCHY OF SOURCES OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE 
CONSTITUTION 
 
Article I-9 of the Constitution complicates the sources of fundamental rights in the Union 
legal order by providing for three overlapping streams of fundamental rights norms: the 
Charter, the ECHR, and general principles.62  The question therefore arises as to how 
these sources will be ordered in the case of conflict.63 In general, the establishment of a 
hierarchy of norms in the field of fundamental rights has been opposed on the basis that 
prioritizing certain rights at the expense of others would threaten the indivisibility of 
                                                 
59 Engel, above n. 40, at p. 151.  
60 For example in respect of Article 41 of the Charter (Right to Good Administration), the Charter 
Explanations refer to extensive case law of the ECJ but the principle of good administration has been 
subsequently developed: see K. Lenaerts, ‘“In the Union We Trust”: Trust-Enhancing Principles of 
Community Law’ (2004) 41 CML Rev., pp. 317-343, at pp. 336-340. As regards the reference to the TEU 
and the EC Treaty they may have to be read in the light of the corresponding articles in the Constitution. 
The Charter makes frequent references to secondary Community legislation, especially in Chapter IV 
(Solidarity). For example, Directive 77/187/EEC (transfers of undertakings) referred to in the explanation 
to Article 27 of the Charter has since been repealed by Directive 2001/23 of 12 March 2001 [2001] OJ 
L82/16. 
61 For a list of the international sources for the Charter referred to in the Charter Explanations: see Peers, in 
Peers and Ward (eds.), above n. 20, at p. 172. 
62 See Sections 4.3 and 4.4 of Chapter four for analysis of customary international law and jus cogens as 
sources of fundamental rights norms in Union law. 
63 The existing hierarchy between international and Community law has been characterised as follows: ‘..it 
is virtually unanimously agreed that international and Community law stand in the following hierarchy: 
international jus cogens, which cannot be abrogated, is per definitionem superior to all other law. It is 
followed by the EC Treaty. International norms (both general rules and treaties binding the Community) 
rank below the Treaty. Then follows Community legislation.’ A. Peters, ‘The Position of International Law 
within the Community Legal Order’ (1997) German Yearbook of International Law, pp. 1-77, at pp. 37-38. 
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fundamental rights.64 However an ordering of fundamental rights norms according to 
their source would be unavoidable under the Constitution in view of the substantial 
overlap in the rights protected under the three sources specified in Article I-9. A clear 
constitutional ordering of the potentially competing norms arising from the Charter, the 
ECHR and fundamental rights as general principles would enhance the transparency and 
democratic legitimacy of fundamental rights protection under the Constitution.65 
 
The Constitution establishes, albeit in disparate provisions, an ordering of the sources of 
fundamental rights specified in Article I-9.66 Article II-113, which is on the same terms 
as Article 53 of the Charter, provides specific constitutional authority for the primacy of 
fundamental rights recognized by Union law either as general principles or as 
international law obligations of the Union over Charter rights and principles in the event 
the latter provide a lesser standard of protection:67 
 
 ‘Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized, in their respective fields 
of application, by Union law and international law and by international 
agreements to which the Union or all the Member States are party, including the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, and by the Member States’ constitutions.’ 
 
 The Charter Explanations provide in respect of Article 53: 
 
‘This provision is intended to maintain the level of protection currently afforded 
within their respective scope by Union law, national law and international law. 
Owing to its importance, mention is made of the ECHR. The level of protection 
afforded by the Charter may not in any instance be lower than that guaranteed by 
                                                 
64 See Section 2.4 of Chapter two. 
65 On the relationship between transparency and democracy, see Dryberg, in Arnull and Wincott (eds.), 
above n. 17, at pp. 81-84. 
66 For a comparative survey of how other constitutions address this issue, see: Eileen Denza, ‘The 
Relationship between International law and National Law’ in Evans (ed.),  International Law (Oxford, 
OUP, 2003),  pp. 415-442, at pp. 422-428. 
67 See for a detailed analysis of the drafting history of Article 53 of the Charter and its relationship to 
Article 53 ECHR and the national constitutions of the Member States:  J.L. Liisberg, ‘Does the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights Threaten the Supremacy of Community Law?’ (2001) 38 CML Rev., pp. 1171-
1199. By reference to the ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 53 ECHR, Liisberg rejects the idea that Article 
53 of the Charter could be used to resolve conflicting ‘human rights norms of different legal origins.’: ibid., 
at pp. 1197-1198. 
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the ECHR, with the result that the arrangements for limitations may not fall 
below the level provided for in the ECHR.’68 
 
Article II-113 therefore provides Charter rights must not restrict or adversely affect more 
favorable international fundamental rights standards either as contained in the ECHR or 
other qualifying international agreements or that are binding on the Union as general 
principles of Union law.69 
 
The principle established by Article II-113 is subject, insofar as concerns Charter rights 
corresponding to ECHR rights, to Article II-112(3):70 
 
 ‘In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed 
by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same 
as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent 
Union law providing more extensive protection.’  
 
In the unlikely event a ruling of the ECtHR interpreting the ECHR fell short of a higher 
standard established by international law,71 then Article II-112(3) would entitle the ECJ 
to interpret the corresponding Charter right in line with the higher international standard. 
If the conflicting ECHR provision also formed part of Union law through accession by 
the Union to the ECHR then the more favorable international law norm would also 
prevail by reason of Article 53 ECHR.72 
 
                                                 
68 Liisberg points out the confusing nature of this explanation: ibid., at pp. 1192-1193. 
69 It is difficult to interpret the reference in Article II-113 to the Charter not restricting or adversely 
affecting fundamental rights recognised by international law in its ‘field of application’.  Liisberg  argues 
that  this reference should be deleted: ‘It is illogical  and only causes confusion.’: ibid., at p. 1199.  
70 See in support of this order of precedence based on the drafting history of the two articles, Liisberg, 
ibid., at pp. 1192-1193. See generally on Article 112(3): Section 5.2.2 of this Chapter; and Peers, in Peers 
and Ward (eds.), above n. 20, at pp. 156-158. 
71 ‘Its [the Court of Human Rights] starting point is that human rights law, including the Convention on 
Human Rights, is part of international law.’ R. Higgins, ‘The ICJ, the ECJ and the Integrity of 
International Law’ (2003) 52 ICLQ, pp. 1- 20, at p. 10.  
72 The same result may be achieved under existing Union law: ‘One may therefore conclude – tentatively – 
that an international agreement entered into by the Community will be of no effect within the Community 
legal system if it is outside the capacity of the Community or if it conflicts with one of the constituent 
Treaties or (possibly) with a general principle of law’: Hartley, above n. 34, at pp. 185-186.  
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Finally there is the issue of ordering fundamental rights constituting general principles of 
Union law as specified in Article I-9(3).73 Clearly no such general principle should be 
admitted by the ECJ insofar as it provided a lower standard than that established under 
international law and that is confirmed by Article I-3(4).74 Further, as regards general 
principles resulting from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, no 
such tradition should be admitted as a general principle insofar as it as it provided a 
lower standard than the ECHR or the Charter. The recognition of any such lower 
standard in the case of the Charter would conflict with Article I-9(1) and in the case of 
the ECHR would be incompatible both with Union accession to the ECHR mandated 
under Article I-9(2) and the ECHR as a source of fundamental rights under the general 
principles case law. Accession by the Union to the ECHR would in addition make the 
recognition of such a principle a breach of the Union’s obligations under international 
law. In the event fundamental rights constituting general principle of Union law provide 
a higher standard than the Charter or the ECHR, Article 53 ECHR and Article II-113 
respectively would provide the basis for the ECJ to recognize such principle in priority 
over the corresponding provision in the ECHR or Charter.  
 
5.2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The principal conclusion to be drawn from the analysis in this section is that retention of 
general principles as a source of fundamental rights law under Article I-9(3) is 
unnecessary from the perspective of the substantive protection of fundamental rights and 
confusing in terms of its impact on the ordering of potentially conflicting norms arising 
from the various sources of fundamental rights norms under the Constitution. The great 
merit of the incorporation of the Charter and Union accession to the ECHR is to provide 
clarity and transparency in the sources of fundamental rights law in the Union’s legal 
order. The development by the ECJ of the general principles doctrine served a valuable 
function in the absence of adequate fundamental rights protection in the EC Treaty and 
                                                 
73 On the existing hierarchical relationship between general principles and the Treaties, see: T. Kyriakou, 
‘The impact of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights on the EU system of protection of rights: much ado 
about nothing?’ (2001) 5 Web JCLI: at < http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2001/issue5/kyriakou5.html.>  Accessed 1 
September 2005. 
74 See Section 4.2.2.2 of Chapter four for an analysis of Article I-3(4) of the Constitution. 
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subsequently the TEU. However, the adoption of the Constitution would remove the 
rationale for the protection of fundamental rights as general principles. Any residual 
benefit from the doctrine could be better and more transparently achieved by Union 
accession to the European and UN Conventions.  The second conclusion is that the 
amendments to the Charter in Articles II-112(4) to (7) add to the complexity of 
interpreting the Charter without any corresponding benefit from the perspective of 
protection of Charter rights and freedoms. The amendments undermine achievement of 
the objectives of simplification and transparency set for the Union by the European 
Council in its Laeken Declaration.   
 
5.3  UNION FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 
 
5.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
‘The dominant way of safeguarding fundamental rights is the rule of law’.75 The rule of 
law is an integral part of fundamental rights protection and recognition of the rule of law 
is embedded in the principal international conventions for the protection of fundamental 
rights recognized by the ECJ as sources for the general principles of Union law.76  In 
Golder the ECtHR emphasized the importance of references to the rule of law in the 
Statute of the Council of Europe and the ECHR as an interpretative aid to the substantive 
rights conferred by the ECHR:  
 
‘It may also be accepted, as the Government have submitted, that the Preamble 
does not include the rule of law in the object and purpose of the Convention, but 
points to it as being one of the features of the common spiritual heritage of the 
member States of the Council of Europe. The Court however considers, like the 
Commission, that it would be a mistake to see in this reference a merely “more or 
less rhetorical reference”, devoid of relevance for those interpreting the 
                                                 
75 Armin von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? Human Rights and the 
Core of the European Union’ (2000) 37 CML Rev. pp. 1307-1338, at pp. 1311-1312.  For a useful survey of 
legal scholarship relating to the rule of law see: David Dyzenhaus, ‘Recrafting the Rule of Law’, in David 
Dyzenhaus (ed.) Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1999), 
pp. 1-14. See also: Brian Z. Tamanaha, On The Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge, CUP, 
2004). 
76 See, for example, Articles 6 and 7 of the UDHR and Article 16 ICCPR. 
 136
Convention. One reason why the signatory Governments decided to “take the 
first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the 
Universal Declaration” was their profound belief in the rule of law.’77 
 
The TEU and the EC Treaty likewise affirm the importance of respecting the rule of 
law.78 Recital two of the Preamble to the Charter also refers to the rule of law and the 
substantive Articles of the Charter enshrine a number of the basic rights constituting both 
the formal and substantive elements of the rule of law. The Constitution consolidates 
these provisions in Article I-2:  
 
‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the 
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.’ 
 
Article I-59, incorporating provisions relating to suspension of membership rights, 
retains the reference to ‘a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values 
referred to in Article I-2’ as the trigger for sanctions. Article I-57(1) refers to the values 
of the Union as the basis for developing a special relationship with neighboring 
countries.  The incorporation of the Charter by Article I–9(1) and the obligation for the 
Union under Article I-9(2) to seek accession to the ECHR would strengthen the link 
between the protection of fundamental rights and the rule of law in the Constitution. 
 
Although no definition of the rule of law is provided in the fundamental rights treaties 
where the term is employed or in the EC Treaty or TEU, the basic requirements 
necessary to achieve the rule of law are subject to a broad consensus among political and 
legal theorists: ‘… laws must be open, clear, coherent, prospective, and stable; legislation 
and executive action should be governed by laws with those characteristics; and there 
                                                 
77 Golder v United Kingdom (1975) 1 EHRR 524, at para. 34.  
78 The third preamble of the TEU and Articles 6(1) TEU and 7 TEU. Article 177 EC Treaty refers to 
‘developing and consolidating’ the rule of law in Community development co-operation policies and 
Article 220 EC Treaty provides: ‘The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application 
of this Treaty the law is observed’. For an analysis of the role played by Article 220 EC Treaty in the 
relationship between the rule of law and fundamental rights developed by the ECJ as general principles 
see: T. Kyriakou, above n. 73, at pp. 3-4.  
 137
must be courts that impose the rule of law’.79 This conception of the rule of law is the 
one adopted in this section. Although it has been argued that an autonomous conception 
of the rule of law should be developed in the context of Union law,80 it seems 
undesirable and unnecessary to have a specific meaning in Union law attributed to an 
ideal that is shared across such a wide range of international and national instruments for 
the protection of fundamental rights. 
                                                
 
5.3.2 THE UNION AND THE RULE OF LAW 
 
One issue central to discussions on the rule of law is the respective roles of the judiciary 
and the legislature in the determination and protection of fundamental rights.81 In the 
context of the Union, the tension between the role of the judiciary and the legislature in 
the field of fundamental rights reflects the more general problem of democratic 
legitimacy.82 In a political structure where fundamental rights are constitutionalised, 
encroachment of judicial powers on those of the legislature is circumscribed, but in the 
case of the Union the lack of an original constitutional basis for fundamental rights 
protection allowed scope for judicial activism both as regards the content of fundamental 
rights in Union law and the scope of their application to the Member States in 
determining when they are acting within the field of Union law and therefore subject to 
Union fundamental rights standards.83  The degree of autonomy asserted by the ECJ in 
 
79 T. Windicott, ‘The Impossibility of the Rule of Law’ (1999) 19 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 1-
19, at p. 1. This conception of the rule of law may be classified as ‘formal’ in the sense described by  P. 
Craig in: ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework’ (1997) 
Public Law, pp.  467-487; or ‘thin’ in the sense adopted by J. Goldsworthy in ‘Legislative Sovereignty and 
the Rule of Law’ in T. Campbell, K.D. Ewing and A. Tomkins (eds.) Sceptical Essays on Human Rights 
(Oxford, OUP, 2001). pp. 61-78. 
80 Arnull, in Arnull and Wincott (eds.), above n. 18, at p. 240. 
81 For an analysis of rights’ constitutionalism in the context of the Union and the UK, see Neil Walker, 
‘Human Rights in a Postnational Order: Reconciling Political and Constitutional Pluralism’, in Campbell, 
Ewing and Tomkins (eds.), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 2001), pp. 119-141. In the 
Canadian context, see Allan Hutchinson, ‘The Rule of Law Revisited: Democracy and Courts’, in  
Dyzenhaus (ed.), Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1999), 
pp. 196-226. For a discussion of the arguments about ‘majoritarian democracy’ as the preferred system of 
protecting the rule of law see: Goldsworthy, ‘Legislative Sovereignty and the Rule of Law’, in Campbell, 
Ewing and Tomkins (eds.), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 2001), pp. 61-78. 
82 See Walker, in Campbell, Ewing and Tomkins (eds.), above n. 81, at pp. 134-136. For the impact of the 
reforms in the Constitution on addressing the ‘democratic deficit’, see: Peters, ‘European Democracy After 
the 2003 Convention’ (2004) 41 CML Rev., pp. 37-85. 
83 See on this latter point, Section 5.4 below. 
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developing fundamental rights as general principles of Union law was countered by the 
Member States through the development of the Three Pillar structure in the Maastricht 
Treaty whereby judicial review of Union activity in the politically sensitive areas covered 
by the Second and Third Pillars was severely curtailed or excluded. Although these 
restrictions were partially relaxed as regards the AFSJ in the Treaty of Amsterdam, the 
relationship between fundamental rights protection and the rule of law remains 
problematic in Union law in at least three critical areas.84 
 
Firstly, protection of fundamental rights in the Union’s legal order has been developed by 
the ECJ on the basis of general principles of law rather than on the basis of a 
constitutional bill of rights.85 As such the principles originally depended for their 
legitimacy on the integrity of the judicial process rather than democratic validation.86  
Secondly, the Charter recognises rather than creates the ‘rights, freedoms and principles’ 
set out in the Charter and is not as yet integrated into the Union’s legal order.87  
Nevertheless, Advocates-General and the Court of First Instance (CFI) have referred to 
the Charter as an authoritative statement of fundamental rights standards applicable in 
Union law88 raising the issue of how far such judicial activism is consistent with the 
principles of the rule of law.89  Thirdly, Title IV EC Treaty and Title VI TEU provide 
more limited access to judicial review of Union AFSJ measures than other areas of Union 
law.90   
 
Articles I-9(1) and (2) of the Constitution significantly alter the terms of debate over the 
relationship between fundamental rights protection and the rule of law in the Union. 
                                                 
84 See for additional concerns Arnull, in Arnull and Wincott (eds.), above n. 18, at pp. 248-252. 
85 See for a summary of the development of the ECJ’s role: Bruno De Witte, in Alston (ed.), above n. 32, 
pp. 859-897. 
86 Article 6(2) TEU, introduced in the Maastricht Treaty as Article  F(2), provided partial validation but did 
not resolve the problems of status and certainty. 
87 For an appraisal of the normative status of the Charter see Engel, above n. 40. 
88 See the references to the Charter by the Advocates General and the CFI as of 1 July 2003, listed in 
Appendix 1 to Peers and Ward (eds.), The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights: Politics, Law 
and Policy (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004).   
89 See for a summary of the position of ‘democratic positivists’ who contest the role of the judiciary in 
developing rules of law and ‘liberal anti-positivists’ who support such a role: D. Dyzenhaus, 
‘Recrafting the Rule of Law’, in Dyzenhaus (ed.), Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal 
Order (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1999), pp. 1-14, at pp. 2-3.  
90 See Chapter seven for analysis of the ECJ’s jurisidiction over the AFSJ. 
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Incorporation of the Charter and Union accession to the ECHR would provide the Union 
with a clearly defined constitutional basis for the protection of fundamental rights. In 
particular, accession to the ECHR would weaken the argument that the rule of law does 
not apply fully to the Union on the basis of a lack of autonomy on the part of the ECJ.91  
Incorporation of the Charter would alter its normative status by allowing direct judicial 
reference to the Charter rather than through the indirect route of the general principles 
case law.92  Finally, the ECJ has jurisdiction to review acts adopted under Chapter IV of 
Title III of Part III of the Constitution establishing the AFSJ on substantially the same 
conditions as other measures of Union secondary law, subject to the retention of an 
ouster of jurisdiction in Article III-377 that corresponds to Article 35(5) TEU.93  
 
5.3.3  CONCLUSIONS 
 
An analysis of the Constitution in terms of its contribution to the enhancement of respect 
for the principles underlying the rule of law leads overall to a positive assessment. The 
unfortunate dichotomy resulting from the creation of the Three Pillar structure in terms of 
the level of fundamental rights protection would be removed. The Union would for the 
first time benefit from a constitutionally entrenched catalogue of rights both as set out in 
the Charter and as resulting from Union accession to the ECHR. However, Article I-9(3) 
and Articles II-52(4) to II-52(7) undermine these benefits from a rule of law perspective 
since they introduce an undesirable degree of indeterminacy and vagueness into the 
                                                 
91 Two views on the application of the rule of law to the Union  have been identified: ‘pro-ECJ scholars’ 
who concluded that ‘the traditional characteristics of the rule of law are preserved at the E.U. level: along 
the lines of the traditional Rechsstaat, independence from other institutional actors and consistency of 
adjudication obtains throughout the system’ and ‘juro-sceptics’ who argue ‘that a rule of law other than one 
confined exclusively to economic integration is unlikely to emerge in the near future’ on the basis that the 
ECJ ‘lacks the necessary autonomy to keep the other political institutions from enacting arbitrary and 
inconsistent policies’: J.P. McCormick, ‘Supranational Challenges to the Rule of Law: The Case of the 
European Union’ in Dyzenhaus (ed.), Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 1999), pp. 267-282, at pp. 280-281. WGII Final Report concentrated on a different aspect of 
autonomy, namely whether accession of the Union to the ECHR would impact adversely ‘on the principle 
of autonomy of Community (or Union) law including the position and authority of the European Court of 
Justice’: above n. 5, at p. 12.  See Chapter three for analysis of the principle of autonomy. 
92 See Jaqueline Dutheil de la Rochère, ‘The EU and the Individual: Fundamental Rights in the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty’ (2004) CML Rev., pp. 345-354, at p. 351. 
93 See Sections 7.4 of Chapter seven. 
 140
determination of the scope of fundamental rights protection by retaining general 
principles as a source and by qualifying the normative status of the Charter. 
 
5.4   INCORPORATION OF THE CHARTER AND THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN NATIONAL AND UNION LAW 
 
5.4.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Fundamental rights norms can have an integrating or destabilizing effect on the 
relationship between the Union’s legal order and the national legal orders of the Member 
States.94 The initial impetus for the development by the ECJ of fundamental rights norms 
within the Community legal system was provided by the decisions of the constitutional 
courts of Germany and Italy challenging the legitimacy of the principle of supremacy of 
Community law developed by the ECJ in the absence of such norms.95  In this context 
the development of fundamental rights norms had an integrating function. However, the 
extension by the ECJ of the application of these norms to actions by the Member States 
both in implementing Community law96 and in derogating from the application of 
Community law97 created the potential for conflicts between the requirements of national 
constitutionally protected rights and those developed by the ECJ.98  This has led some 
commentators to argue that different standards should be applied by the ECJ to the 
protection of fundamental rights for Community measures from those measures adopted 
by the Member States in derogation of their Community obligations in order to protect 
the Member State’s margin of appreciation in such situations.99 However, such an 
                                                 
94 See on the integrating effect of the Charter: Engel, above n. 40, at p. 154.  
95 See de Witte, in Alston (ed.), above n. 32, at pp. 863-867.  
96 Case 5/88, Wachauf v. Germany [1989] ECR 2609. 
97 Case C-260/89, ERT v DEP & Sotirios Kouvelas [1991] ECR 1-2925. 
98 An example of such conflict occurred in Kreil v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C-258/98 [2000] 
ECR I-69, where the conformity of the provision of the German Constitution prohibiting women from 
military service involving the use of arms with the Community equal treatment Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 
February 1976, [1976] OJ L39/40,  was at issue.  For critical analysis of Kreil, see J. Schwarze, ‘Judicial 
review in EC Law – Some reflections on the Origins and the Actual Legal Situation’ (2002) 51 ICLQ, pp. 
17-33, at pp. 28-29.  SPUC v. Grogan is an example of a case where the ECJ avoided having to resolve 
such a conflict: Case C-159/90 [1991] ECR I-4685. 
99 J. Weiler, ‘Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries: On Standards and Values in the Protection 
of Human Rights’ in  N.A. Neuwahl and A. Osas (eds.) The European Union and Human Rights  (Hague, 
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approach is unduly complex leading to a loss of transparency and uniformity in 
fundamental rights protection. A preferable approach would be for the ECJ to delimit 
rigorously the boundaries of Union law and reject arguments for extending the 
competences of the Union on the basis of differential standards of fundamental rights 
protection in the Member States.100 
 
5.4.2 THE CHARTER AND NATIONAL COMPETENCES  
 
The proclamation of the Charter outside the legislative framework of the EC Treaty and 
the TEU reflected the tensions between conflicting national and Union perceptions as to 
the role of fundamental rights norms in the Union legal order. Concerns over 
incorporation of the Charter related both to extension of Union competence through the 
backdoor of fundamental rights protection and also the relationship between the Charter 
provisions and national fundamental rights standards.101 The ‘horizontal’ provisions of 
the Charter, and in particular Articles 51(1) and (2) and Article 53, were designed to limit 
the potential for such conflicts.102  WGII recommended drafting amendments to Articles 
51(1) and (2) and additional  ‘horizontal’ provisions in Articles II-112(4), (5) and (6) and 
these were adopted verbatim in the Constitution.103 Despite WG II’s claim that these 
changes to the Charter were ‘technical drafting adjustments’,104 an analysis of the 
changes shows they are potentially substantive in nature and reflect the overriding 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kluwer, 1995), pp. 51-76.  However, Weiler’s thesis is challenged by Besselink who favours a 
‘maximalist’ approach in Union law to fundamental rights standards, above n. 33, at pp. 670-674. See also 
Armin de Bogdandy’s arguments in favor of differential fundamental rights standard to be applied by the 
Union in the field of foreign relations, national measures implementing Union law, and acts of the Union’s 
institutions: above n. 75, at pp. 1318-1319. 
100 The most notable expression of this expansionist tendency was by AG Jacobs in Konstantinidis v. Stadt 
Altensteig, Standesamt and Landesratsamt Calw, Ordnungsamt, Case C-168/91 [1993] ECR I-1191: ‘In 
other words he [the Community national] is entitled to say ‘civis europeus sum’ and to invoke that status in 
order to oppose any violation of his fundamental rights.’: at pp. 1211-1212. 
101 See generally P. Eeckhout, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question’ (2002) 
39 CML Rev., pp. 945-994; and Liisberg, above n. 67.   
102 On Article 51 of the Charter see the detailed analysis by Eeckhout, above n. 101, at pp. 979-981. On 
Article 53 of the Charter see: Liisberg, above n. 67, passim.                                                  
103 The proposed amendments are set out in the Annex to WGII Report. Article II-112(7) was added 
subsequently during the IGC. Article II-113 is on substantially the same terms as Article 53 of the Charter. 
104 WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p. 4. 
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concern of WGII to ensure that ‘incorporation of the Charter will in no way modify the 
allocation of competences between the Union and the Member States’.105   
 
Article 51(1) of the Charter is modified in Article II-111(1) by the addition of ‘offices 
and agencies’ to the existing reference in the first sentence to ‘institutions and bodies’ of 
the Union as addressees of the provisions of the Charter106 and the insertion at the end of 
the second sentence of the phrase ‘and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as 
conferred on it in the other Parts of the Constitution’.  Article 51(2) is amended in Article 
II-111(2) to read: ‘This Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law 
beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or 
modify powers and tasks defined in the other Parts of the Constitution.’ The reasons that 
led WGII to recommend these modifications emphasizing the jurisdictional boundaries of 
the Charter are difficult to discern from WGII Final Report.107 WGII Final Report 
acknowledges that the existing text of Article 51(2) of the Charter addresses the issue of 
allocation of competences between the Union and the Member States.108 The underlying 
rationale for these amendments, as part of the strategy of making incorporation of the 
Charter more palatable to wavering Member States,109 seems to have been to reinforce a 
restrictive interpretation of the scope of the Charter as constituting a record of existing 
fundamental rights protection under Union law rather than an interpretation of the 
Charter as a dynamic contribution to ‘strengthening EU fundamental rights 
protection’.110  
                                                
 
Article II-111(1) also retains the provision from the first sentence of Article 51(1) of the 
Charter whereby the Charter provisions are addressed ‘to the Member States only when 
 
105 WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p. 5.  
106 This amendment was not proposed by WGII.  
107 WGII Final Report does refer in support of the amendment to Article 51(2) of the Charter to the 
established case law of the ECJ and in particular Case C-249/96, Grant v. South West Trains Ltd [1998] 
ECR I-621. However, it is unnecessary for the Charter to be amended to confirm case law of the ECJ.   
108 WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p. 5. 
109 The reference with approval to the amended text of Article 51(2) of the Charter by the British 
Government indicates the political pressure exerted on WGII in this area: A Constitutional Treaty for the 
EU, Cm5934, above n. 44, at para. 102.  
110 Eeckhout, above n. 101, at p. 981.  See also on the ‘constitutional dynamic’ introduced by the Charter, 
Walker, in Campbell, Ewing and Tomkins (eds.), above n. 81, at pp. 119-121. 
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they are implementing Union law’. WGII specifically endorsed this provision by 
reference to the principle of subsidiarity.111 However, the principle of subsidiarity set out 
in Article I-11(3)112 is ‘a principle of an essentially political nature’113 relating to the 
allocation of legislative competence between the Union and the Member States and is not 
relevant to the issue of determining the scope of Charter rights.  On a literal reading of 
Article II-111(1), the Charter will therefore not apply to the exercise of derogations by 
the Member States from their obligations under Union law,114 unless the ECJ adopts a 
strained interpretation of Article II-111(1) to bring it into line with its general principles 
case law.115  An alternative route would be for the ECJ to bypass the limitation under 
Article II-111(1) by continuing to apply the wider criteria developed in its general 
principles case law on the basis of Article I-9(3). Such an approach, however, would 
create an unfortunate dichotomy between the scope of protection for Charter rights and 
rticle I-9(3) protected rights. 
.4.3. CONCLUSIONS 
as substantially altering the scope of application of the Charter. Any future renegotiation 
                                                
A
 
5
 
WGII Final Report contributed little of substance to the debate over the boundaries 
between Union protection of fundamental rights and national constitutional protection. Its 
proposals were of a conservative nature designed to assuage the concerns of Member 
States opposed to incorporation of the Charter. On this basis, it is doubtful if the changes 
to Articles 51(1) and (2) of the Charter in Articles II-111(1) and (2) and the new 
provisions incorporated in Article II-112(4), (5), and (6) would be interpreted by the ECJ 
 
111 WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p. 5. 
112 This principle is an amended version of Article 5 EC Treaty and resulted from the recommendations of 
Working Group I (WGI) on the Principle of Subsidiarity: Final Report of 23 September 2002; CONV 
286/02. Available on the European Convention website. 
113 Final Report of WGI, ibid., at p. 2. 
114 WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p. 5 (n.2), states: ‘It should be noted that, upon possible incorporation 
of the Charter into the Treaty, the current wording of Article 46(d) TEU would have to be brought in line 
with existing case law and Article 51 of the Charter on the (limited) application of fundamental rights to 
acts of Member States’. This avoids the issue of the conflict between the existing case law on the scope of 
the Member States obligations to comply with the Union’s fundamental rights norms when derogating 
from Union law, discussed further at Section 5.5 below, and Article 51(1) of the Charter. 
115 For the reported view of the Bar European Group and Professor Arnull that such an interpretation is 
unlikely, see the House of Lords European Union Committee, 6th Report (2002/2003), above n. 5, at para. 
60. 
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of the Constitution should reconsider these provisions to achieve a more transparent and 
principled basis for incorporation of the Charter. 
 
5.5 THE CONTROL OF DEROGATIONS FROM UNION FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION 
 
5.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The history of Nazi Germany, Vichy France and apartheid South Africa116 exemplify the 
dangers of a failure of judicial integrity in countering attempts to circumvent 
constitutional protection of fundamental rights by the expedient of derogations117 based 
on concepts such as  ‘public emergency’, ‘terrorism’ or ‘state security’.118 The responses 
of governments to the events of 11 September have highlighted the contemporary need 
for vigilance in times of public emergency.119 Since the Union lacks some of the key 
characteristics of a sovereign state, and in particular an autonomous military capability, 
police force, and security service,120 the fact that it has not developed a coherent legal 
framework for regulating the use of derogations from fundamental rights protection in 
emergency situations has not been seen as of such critical importance as in the case of the 
                                                 
116 See M. Stolleis, The Law under the Swastika: Studies on Legal History in Nazi Germany (trans. by 
Thomas Dunlap) (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998) and reviewed by L. Lustgarten, ‘Taking 
Nazi Law Seriously’ (2000) 63 MLR, pp. 128-133; R. H. Weisberg, Vichy Law and the Holocaust in 
France (New York, New York University Press, 1996) and reviewed by F.C. DeCost, 
‘Law/Holocaust/Academy’ (1999) 62 MLR, pp. 792-802; R. Abel, Politics by other Means: Law in the 
Struggle Against Apartheid, 1980-1994 (New York, Routledge, 1995) reviewed by D. Dyzenhaus (1997) 
60 MLR, pp. 866-873. See also the contributions in D. Dyzenhaus (ed.), Recrafting the Rule of Law: The 
Limits of Legal Order (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1999); and  Marti Koskenniemi, ‘By their Acts You Shall 
Know Them … (And Not by Their Legal Theories)’ (2004) 15 EJIL, pp. 839-851.                                                                       
117 Derogations, depending on the context, refer here both to formal derogation from fundamental rights 
obligations, as for example under Article 15 ECHR, and to restrictions and limitations on fundamental 
rights resulting from legislative provision or judicial interpretation.  
118 See: Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘Emergency, War and International Law: Another 
Perspective’ 1/2 (2001) Nordic Journal of International Law, pp. 29-63; and, by the same authors, ‘To 
Know Where We Are Going, We Need To Know Where We Are: Revisiting States of Emergency’, in A. 
Hegarty and S. Leonard (eds.), Human Rights: An Agenda for the Twentieth-First Century (London, 
Cavendish, 1999), pp. 79-114; and C. Campbell, ‘‘Wars on Terror’ and Vicarious Hegemons: The UK, 
International Law, and the Northern Ireland Conflict’ (2005) 54 ICLQ, pp. 321-356.   
119 See Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘Balancing Human Rights: International Legal Responses to September 11’ 
(2003) Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, pp.63-84. See also Section  6.2.7 of Chapter six.  
120 But see Sections 6.2.8 and 6.2.9 of Chapter six for the provisions in the Constitution enabling an 
expansion of Europol and Eurojust. 
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national legal systems. However as the Union’s powers are extended into areas prone to 
generate conflicts with fundamental rights, and in particular the AFSJ,  the development 
of such a framework is critical to provide effective protection against repressive 
measures.121 In this section, the sources and control of the use of derogations under 
Union law will be examined in the context of the relevant provisions in the Constitution 
in order to assess how far the Constitution provides such a framework. 
 
5.5.2 DEROGATIONS FROM FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER UNION LAW  
 
The principal international human rights treaties provide for derogations,122 but only 
from non-core rights which vary from treaty to treaty.  However, even in respect of 
derogable rights, international treaties have been interpreted to restrict the freedom of 
states in the exercise of such derogations.123 As regards derogations from fundamental 
rights under Union law, three scenarios are analysed here:124 firstly, derogations which 
                                                 
121 The UK government’s legislative proposals following the terrorist attacks in London of July 7 and July 
21 2005 demonstrate the political  pressures for such measures even if they conflict with international 
obligations: see the outline of the UK Government’s anti-terrorism proposals in the Letter of Charles 
Clarke, Home Secretary, of 15 September 2005: The Guardian of 16 September 2005: 
<http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Politics/documents/2005/09/15/letterplusannexe.pdf>. 
122 For example, Articles 4(1) and (2) ICCPR; Articles 27(1) and (2) of the American Convention of 
Human Rights, 9 ILM 673 (1970); and Articles 15(1) and (2) ECHR. See generally: J. Fitzpatrick, 
‘Protection against Abuse of the Concept of “Emergency”’, in L. Henkin and J. Lawrence (eds.) Human 
Rights: An Agenda for the Next Century  (Washington, American Society of International Law, 1993), pp. 
203-227;  and J. Oraá, Human Rights in States of Emergency in International Law (Oxford, OUP, 1992). 
123 On Article 27 of the American Convention on Human Rights: see Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (1987) 11 EHRR 33 on the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in 
times of emergency. It has been argued that one conclusion to be drawn from this Opinion is that ‘no 
European state should be permitted to derogate from its duties under Article 5(4) of the European 
Convention, even though this is not expressly excluded by Article 15(2)’: M. Janis, R. Kay and A. Bradley, 
European Human Rights Law (2nd Edn.) (Oxford, 2000), at p. 401. On Article 4  ICCPR, see: ‘The Siracusa 
Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights’ (1985) 7 HRQ, p. 3; and HRC General Comment No. 29:  States of Emergency (Article 4), 31 
August 2001: U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 11 (2001). In respect of derogations under Article 15(2) 
of the ECHR, see: Lawless v Ireland (No 3) (1961) 1 EHRR 15; Brannigan and McBride v. United 
Kingdom [1993] 17 EHRR 539; and A and others and X and another v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2004] UKHL 56. On all three provisions, see Oren Gross, ‘Once More unto the Breach: The 
Systemic Failure of Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies’ 
(1998) 23 Yale Journal of International Law, pp. 437-498, at pp. 455-457. 
124 A regards derogations from jus cogens, Article 53 VCLT provides that one characteristic of a 
peremptory norm of general international law or jus cogens is that it is a ‘a norm from which no derogation 
is permitted.’.  As a result neither the Union nor a Member State may derogate from a rule of jus cogens. 
See generally on derogations from jus cogens, M. Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga 
Omnes (Oxford, OUP, 1997), at pp. 58-59. 
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form part of the Union’s general principles of law as they apply either to the institutions 
of the Union or to the Member States implementing or derogating from their obligations 
under Union law; secondly, derogations from Charter rights which may be broadly sub-
divided into rights which result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States, rights which correspond to ECHR rights, and rights which are based on the EC 
Treaty or the EU Treaty;125 and thirdly, the specific case of the terms on which the Union 
could avail of the derogations provisions under Article 15 ECHR.  
 
5.5.2.1 Derogations from Fundamental Rights as General Principles of Union Law  
The ECJ has established that fundamental rights derived from the common constitutional 
traditions apply to the acts of the institutions and the Member States but that the rights 
are subject to limitations: 
 
‘Within the Community legal order it likewise seems legitimate that these rights 
should, if necessary, be subject to certain limits justified by the overall objectives 
pursued by the Community, on condition that the substance of these rights is left 
untouched.’126  
 
In respect of fundamental rights as general principles derived from the ECHR and 
capable of being subject to restriction, the ECJ has applied a similar test.127  As regards 
the scope of its jurisdiction to review derogations by a Member State from its obligations 
under the Treaties, the ECJ initially held that it had no power to control the conformity of 
national law with general principles of Union law, including fundamental rights, which 
falls outside the scope of Union law.128 In subsequent case law, however, the ECJ has 
narrowed the scope of those judgments by holding that when a Member State seeks to 
justify a restriction on a fundamental freedom under the Treaties by relying on a 
                                                 
125 The Preamble to the Charter refers to a wider range of non-exhaustive sources for Charter rights: the 
constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the TEU, the 
Community Treaties, the ECHR, the Social Charters adopted by the Community and by the Council of 
Europe, and the case law of the ECJ and ECtHR. See Peers, in Peers and Ward (eds.), for a complete list of 
sources for the Charter as referred to in the Charter Explanations: above n. 20, at p. 172. 
126 Case 4/73, Nold  v. Commission [1974] ECR 491, at para.14. 
127 Case C-112/00, Schmidberger v Austria [2003] ECR 1-5659, at paras. 79 and 80. See the analysis of this 
case in Section 4.2.4.2 of Chapter four.  
128 Cases 60 and 61/84, Cinéthèque v. Fédèration Nationale des Cinémas Français [1985] ECR 2605; and 
Case 12/86, Demirel v. Stadt Schäbish Gmünd [1987] ECR 3719.  
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derogation provision of the Treaties that justification would be reviewed for its 
compatibility with the general principles of Union law, including fundamental rights.129    
 
5.5.2.2  Derogations from Charter Rights  
Insofar as Charter rights are concerned, the general provision controlling the exercise of 
derogations is Article 52(1) of the Charter, reproduced in Article II-112(1):  
 
‘Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this 
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and 
freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made 
only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.’  
 
This provision is based on the ECJ’s case law on the permitted scope of derogations.130  
Charter rights corresponding to ECHR rights have, however, also to be read subject to 
the first sentence of Article 52(3) of the Charter, reproduced in Article II-112(3), which 
provides that the ‘meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid 
down’ by the ECHR. WGII interpreted this provision to mean it ‘includes notably the 
detailed provisions in the ECHR which permit limitations of these rights’.131  WGII does 
not, however, clarify whether the second sentence of Article 52(3) of the Charter, 
retained in Article II-112(3) and which provides Article 52(3) shall ‘not prevent Union 
law providing more extensive protection’ than the ECHR, would mean the limitation 
provisions in the ECHR could also be more strictly construed by the ECJ.132  Such an 
interpretation would be welcome as permitting a higher standard of protection to be 
                                                 
129 ERT, cited above n. 97, and Case C-368/95, Vereinigte Familapress Zeitungsverlags- und Vertreibs 
GmbH v. Heinrich Bauer Verlag [1997] ECR I-3689. In such cases, the ECJ also subjects the application 
of a derogation to the principle of proportionality and a narrow construction of the grounds for exercising 
such derogations:  Krombach v. Bamberski, cited above n. 24, at paras. 21 and 37.   
130 See the Charter Explanations, above n. 7, at 48. For a detailed analysis of Article 52(1) of the Charter 
and the relevant ECJ case law see Peers, in Peers and Ward (eds.), above n. 20, at pp. 154-155 and pp. 166-
169. 
131 WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p. 7. The Charter Explanations, above n. 7, also follow this 
interpretation, although adding: ‘… without thereby adversely affecting the autonomy of Community law 
and that of the Court of Justice ..’, at p. 48. 
132 WGII Final Report provides this provision serves to clarify that Article 52(3) of the Charter:  ‘does not 
prevent more extensive protection already achieved or which may subsequently be provided for (i) in 
Union legislation and (ii) in some articles of the Charter which, although based on the ECHR, go beyond 
the ECHR because Union law acquis had already achieved a higher level of protection (e.g., Article 47 on 
effective judicial protection, or Article 50 on the right not to be punished twice for the same offence)’. 
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developed by the ECJ.133 As regards rights in the Charter that correspond to the non-
derogable rights set out in the ECHR,134 it seems reasonable to argue by analogy that 
they should be construed as not being capable of restriction under Article II-112(1) on 
the basis such restriction would breach the minimum equivalent standard of Article II-
112(3).  
 
As regards Charter rights derived from the EC Treaty or the TEU,135 Article 52(2) of the 
Charter was retained substantially unamended as Article II-112(2): ‘Rights recognized by 
this Charter for which provision is made in other Parts of the Constitution shall be 
exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by these relevant Parts.’  
WGII recommended retention of Article 52(2), subject to the necessary technical drafting 
amendments to reflect the Charter’s incorporation,136 to ensure ‘complete compatibility 
between the statements of the rights in the Charter and their more detailed regulation as 
currently found in the EC Treaty’.137  In contrast to Article II-112(3), therefore,  Charter 
rights which correspond to an EC or EU Treaty right  pursuant to Article II-112(2) may 
be subject to the same restrictions and ‘do not enjoy broader protection than the original 
                                                 
133 See in this sense, Peers, in Peers and Ward (eds.), above n. 20, at p. 170. 
134 These are, pursuant to Article 15 ECHR, the right to life (Article 2), the prohibition of torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 3), the prohibition of slavery or servitude (Article 
4(1)) and the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal laws (Article 7): see J. Fitzpatrick, in Henkin and 
Lawrence (eds.), above n. 122, at p. 209. The corresponding Charter rights are set out in Articles 2, 4, 5 
and 49 of the Charter. In Schmidberger, cited above at n. 127, at para. 80, the ECJ referred to the non-
derogable rights in the ECHR in terms that implied that the non-derogability would be carried through into 
those rights as general principles. The same reasoning would no doubt apply to the corresponding Charter 
rights. 
135 ‘These relate to rights to freedom of movement, almost all the rights in the “citizenship” chapter of the 
Charter (right to vote, access to documents, right of petition, etc.) and the clauses relating to non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality and equality between the sexes’: Working Document 9 of WGII of 
July 18, 2002, at p. 3. Available on the European Convention website. See also Peers, in Peers and Ward 
(eds.), above n. 20, at p. 169. 
136 Working Document 9 of WGII, ibid., at p. 5.  WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p. 6, considers the issue 
of amending the Charter chapter on Citizens’ rights in the event of incorporation to align it with the 
corresponding articles in the Constitution. However, this was not considered necessary since the Charter 
was incorporated in a separate part of the Constitution and only minor amendments were made in Article 
II-101 and Article II-102.  
137 WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p. 6.  
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rights’.138 Finally, Article 54 of the Charter, which is based on Article 17 ECHR, is 
retained unamended as Article II-114.139 
 
5.5.2.3  Union Derogation from the ECHR 
Until the Union accedes to the ECHR it obviously cannot avail of the specific derogation 
provisions in Article 15 ECHR.140 The accession treaty of the Union to the ECHR will 
have to address the terms on which the Union can avail of Article 15 ECHR. Although 
the CDDH Report proposed that terms referring specifically to states in the ECHR should 
apply mutatis mutandis to the Union, without redefining each such term so as ‘to tailor 
them to the EC/EU, which would be a highly complicated exercise’,141 it is doubtful that 
that such a broad-brush approach could be applied to the criteria established by the 
ECtHR to control the exercise of derogations under Article 15.142 Rather than relying on 
the ECtHR to develop a new version of the Lawless formula to apply to the Union, it 
would be preferable for the accession treaty to establish separate derogation criteria 
appropriate for the Union. 
 
5.5.3 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Incorporation of the Charter and accession by the Union to the ECHR would provide 
substantial benefits in clarifying and strengthening the law applicable to derogations from 
                                                 
138 Lenaerts and Smijter, above n. 38, at p. 283. The authors analyse the scope of application of Article 
52(2) of the Charter, and in particular to those Charter rights which are derived from sources additional to 
the EC and EU Treaties: ibid at 282-290.  
139 Article II-114: ‘Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any 
activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognised in this 
Charter or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for herein.’ 
140 A question to be resolved is whether the Charter rights derived from the ECHR or the ECHR rights 
forming part of the Union’s general principles would also be covered by a derogation obtained by the 
Union under Article 15 ECHR. 
141 Study of Technical and Legal Issues of a Possible EC/EU Accession to the ECHR  (CDDH Report), 
Steering Committee for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, 25-28 June 2002; CDDH(2002)010 
Addendum 2. DG-II(2002)6: at p. 15.  
Available at: < http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/wd2/1711.pdf>. 
142 ‘An exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a 
threat to the organized life of the community of which the State is composed’: Lawless v Ireland (No 3) 
(1961) 1 EHRR 15, at para. 28. The size of the territory of the enlarged Union would in itself make such a 
test impractical. See for analysis of the ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 15 ECHR:  Gross, above n. 123, 
at pp. 455-456. 
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fundamental rights in Union law.143 Article II-112(1) would codify and entrench144 the 
case law of the ECJ on controlling restrictions on fundamental rights in respect of 
Charter rights and accession to the ECHR will provide a well established control 
mechanism for any derogation by the Union under Article 15 ECHR from its ECHR 
obligations. However, the overlapping sources of fundamental rights protection provided 
for in Article I-9 of the Constitution and the new provisions introduced in Articles II-
112(5)-(6) unnecessarily complicate the framework for the control of derogations in 
Union law.  In the event the Constitution is not bought into force, the issue of derogations 
will remain one that requires addressing in any re-negotiation of the Constitution or 
alternative framework for the future structure of the Union. 
 
5.6 ENFORCEABILITY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
  
5.6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationship of fundamental rights to the legal order has long been debated and in 
particular whether a necessary connection to effective enforcement mechanisms must 
exist for fundamental rights to progress beyond, in Jeremy Bentham’s phrase, ‘nonsense 
on stilts’.145  In the Union’s political process, however, fundamental rights discourse 
fulfills a number of functions, some of which are not dependent on legal enforcement 
mechanisms.146 For example, the role played by the European Parliament in promoting a 
coherent fundamental rights policy in the Union also served as a means of expanding ‘its 
powers and responsibilities to topics which did not actually fall within its normal 
                                                 
143 Peers, after an exhaustive analysis of the Charter provisions on limitations, concludes that despite their 
complexity they represent an improvement on the current standard applied by the ECJ in its general 
principles case law but argues that the ECJ should apply the higher ECHR standard to ECHR rights in 
Union law: above n. 20, at pp. 178-179.  
144 On entrenchment, see section 5.8 below. 
145 For Bentham’s downbeat assessment of human rights as set out in the 1789 French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man see: ‘Nonsense upon Stilts, or Pandora's Box Opened, or the French Declaration of Rights 
Prefixed to the Constitution of 1791 Laid Open and Exposed’, in Philip Schofield, Catherine Pease-Watkin, 
and Cyprian Blamires (eds.), Rights, Representation, and Reform:Nonsense upon Stilts and Other Writings 
on the French Revolution  (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2002).   
146 F.I. Michelman finds in the Massachusett Constitution an example of ‘obligations of law, which 
nevertheless defy judicial enforcement’: ‘The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political 
Justification’ (2003) 1 Int. J. Constitutional Law, pp. 13-34.  
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remit’.147 However, it is generally agreed that effective judicial enforcement mechanisms 
is a key element in promoting the effective protection of fundamental rights in the 
Union.148   
 
5.6.2 REFORMS TO THE ENFORCEABILITY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 
5.6.2.1 The European Convention’s Reform Proposals   
WGII had the primary mandate from the European Convention to examine reforms to the 
structure of fundamental rights protection in the Union.149 However, a number of 
proposals to improve access to justice in Union law fell outside its core remit of advising 
on Charter incorporation and Union accession to the ECHR. These additional reform 
proposals included:150 relaxation of the standing requirements under Article 230(4) EC 
Treaty;151 the creation of an individual human rights complaint procedure;152 and access 
to the ECJ for public interest institutions.153 WGII, in addition to its primary 
                                                 
147 Rack and Lausegger, ‘The Role of the European Parliament: Past and Future’, in Alston (ed.), The EU 
and Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp. 801-837, at p. 800. 
148 See in this sense the paper prepared for WGII by F.G. Jacobs on ‘Necessary changes to the system of 
judicial remedies’, Working Document 20, at p. 2. Available on the European Convention website. It has 
been argued that the Union should also improve other non-judicial mechanisms for securing protection of 
fundamental rights: see Alston and Weiler, ‘An “Ever Closer Union” in Need of a Human Rights Policy: 
The European Union and Human Rights’, in Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 
1999), pp. 3-66, at pp. 19-20. However, see Von Bogdandy’s critique of aspects of Alston and Weiler’s 
thesis, above n. 75, at pp. 1316-1317.  
149 Working Group X (WGX) established by the European Convention had the mandate to reform the 
jurisdictional aspects of the AFJS. See Section 6.2.8 of Chapter six for details of WGX’s 
recommendations. 
150 See for an outline and analysis of the various reforms proposals prior to the European Convention: de 
Witte, in Alston (ed.), above n. 32, at pp. 887-897. See also the discussion papers prepared for WG II: 
CONV 116/02 of 18 June 2002; and Working Document 20 of 27 September 2002. Both available on the 
European Convention website. 
151 See Section 6.2.8 of Chapter six. 
152 See J. Schwarze, ‘The Legal Protection of the Individual against Regulations in European Union Law’ 
(2004) 10 EPL, pp. 285-303, at pp. 301-303. 
153 The current consultation process on extending the mandate of the European Monitoring Centre on 
Racism and Xenophobia in order to convert it into a Fundamental Rights Agency do not envisage the 
Agency having a right to bring cases before the ECJ. In any event, the Constitution would have to be 
amended to allow such a competence. However, this does not exclude granting the Fundamental Rights 
Agency a power to fund applications by individuals or intervening in ECJ proceedings: see de Witte, in 
Alston (ed.), above n. 32, at p. 897. However, only the NGOs currently support such an approach: see  the 
Commission’s,  ‘Preparatory study for impact assessment and ex-ante evaluation of Fundamental Rights 
Agency: analysis of responses to public consultation.’ 19 January 2005. Available at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/news/consulting_public/fundamental_rights_agency/analysis_wri
tten_contributions_en.pdf.> 
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recommendations in favor of Union accession to the ECHR and incorporation of the 
Charter, briefly considered these other reforms. However, it rejected the idea of creating 
a special procedure for the protection of fundamental rights before the ECJ154 and did not 
address the issue of locus standi for public interest institutions. While it examined the 
issue of reform of Article 230(4) EC Treaty, it did not consider the matter fell within its 
remit and referred the matter to the European Convention.155  WGII Final Report also 
briefly referred to the ‘possibility of a provision in the Treaty on the obligation of 
Member States, as spelt out in the recent case law, to provided for effective remedies for 
rights derived from Union law’.156 This suggestion was incorporated as Article I-
29(1).157 
Convention.159  A modified version of this proposal was adopted as Article III-365(4). In 
     
 
A discussion circle on the Court of Justice (the ECJ Discussion Circle) was established to 
evaluate the proposals of the European Convention that affected the ECJ and to allow the 
ECJ to present their views on the proposals.158 As regards the right of access to justice, 
the ECJ Discussion Circle in its final report focused on the proposals for reform of 
Article 230(4) EC Treaty and recommended a revised text to the European 
                                            
154 WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p.15.  
155 Ibid.,  at p.16.  WGII referred, in n.3 on p. 16 of WGII Final Report, to the various contributions made 
to it on this issue, which are discussed in greater detail in Working Document 21 of 1 October 2002, by A. 
Vitorino: ‘The question of effective judicial remedies and access of individuals to the European Court of 
Justice’. Available on the European Convention website.  See for an analysis of this document: Varju, ‘The 
alidity of such an act.’ The reference in WGII Final Report 
Ombudsman: see doc. CONV. 221/02 and 
n Convention website. 
Debate on the Future of the Standing under Article 230(4) TEC in the European Convention’ (2004) 10 
EPL, pp. 43-56, at pp. 48-49. 
156 WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p. 16, refers to paras. 41 and 42 of the judgment in UPA v. Council, 
Case C-50/00P [2002] ECR I-6677 which read: ‘Thus it is for the Member States to establish a system of 
legal remedies and procedures which ensure respect for the right to effective judicial protection. In that 
context, in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty, 
national courts are required, so far as possible, to interpret and apply national procedural rules governing 
the exercise of rights of action in a way that enables natural and legal persons to challenge before the courts 
the legality of any decision or other national measure relative to the application to them of a Community 
act of general application, by pleading the inv
was prompted by a proposal by Mr. Söderman, the European 
Working Document 21, above n. 155, at p. 7. 
157 See for analysis of Article I-29(1), Section 5.6.2.2.3  below. 
158 The final report of the ECJ Discussion Circle was published on 25 March 2003 (CONV 636/03). The 
final report and the ECJ Discussion Circle documents are available on the Europea
Varju discusses the proposals of the ECJ discussion circle and the other proceedings in the European 
Convention that led to the drafting of Article III-365(4): above n. 155, at pp. 48-53. 
159 The ECJ Discussion Circle’s  discussions and recommendations relating to Article 230(4) are at pp. 6-
10 of its final report. The recommended text reads: ‘Any natural or legal person may, under the same 
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addition, the ECJ Discussion Circle recommended extending the scope of judicial review 
proceedings under Article 230 EC Treaty to cover the legal acts of bodies or agencies of 
the Union.160 This recommendation was implemented in a modified form in paragraphs 
(1) and (5) of Article III-365.161  
 
5.6.2.2  Constitutional Reform of Judicial Remedies  
5.6.2.2.1 Introduction 
In the following sub-sections the principal reforms in the Constitution to the Union’s 
system of judicial remedies are analysed in the context of their contribution to the 
effective protection of fundamental rights.162 The impact of the two primary reforms of 
Union accession to the ECHR and incorporation of the Charter is assessed in the first two 
sub-sections. The third sub-section assesses the reforms in Article III-365 and I-29(1) to 
determine how far they ameliorate the current deficiencies of Article 230 EC Treaty as a 
judicial review mechanism. 
 
5.6.2.2.2 Union Accession to the ECHR 
In the context of improved judicial redress, the most significant benefit from Union 
accession to the ECHR pursuant to Article I-9(2) would be the introduction of the 
individual right of application under Article 34 ECHR.163 This benefit was, however, 
only briefly referred to in the deliberations of WGII that focused on the potential impact 
of Union accession on the autonomy of the ECJ.  The CDDH Report limited its 
discussion of Article 34 ECHR to the technical aspects of the participation of the Union 
in proceedings before the ECtHR, and in particular the joinder of the Union and Member 
                                                                                                                                                 
conditions, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual 
concern to him, and against [an act of general application][a regulatory act] which is of direct concern to 
him without entailing implementing measures.’  See also Working Document I of 26 February 2003 on the 
reform of Article 230(4) EC Treaty prepared by the Secretariat of the European Convention for the ECJ 
Discussion Circle. Available on the European Convention website.  
160 See the final report of ECJ Discussion Circle, above n. 158, at paras. 24-27; based on Working 
Document 9 of 10 March 2003. 
161 See for analysis Section 5.6.2.2.4. below. 
162 See Chapter seven for the reforms in the Constitution to the ECJ’s jurisdiction over the AFSJ. 
163 The question of whether the Union should be entitled to bring inter-state cases under Article 33 ECHR, 
or have such cases bought against it, is considered in the CDDH Report, above n. 141, at pp. 20-21.  
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States as co-defendants.164 In principle, subject to resolution of these procedural aspects, 
no amendment to Article 34 ECHR should be necessary upon Union accession.  
 
However, certain questions of interpretation may arise in respect of the Article 35 ECHR 
admissibility criteria.165 As regards Article 35(1) ECHR it is not clear how the 
exhaustion of remedies requirement will apply in the context of the Union’s system of 
remedies.166 Direct proceedings before the ECJ would clearly have to be treated as 
‘domestic remedies’ requiring exhaustion.167 However, it is less clear whether, in the 
absence of a direct right of action against an act of the Union, an applicant would be 
obliged first to institute national proceedings in order to secure a preliminary reference 
under Article III-369 on the validity of the Union act before instituting an Article 34 
ECHR application against the Union. In Jégo-Quéré v Commission, the ECJ in such 
circumstances considered that instituting national proceedings to obtain a preliminary 
reference fell within the scope of the Union’s ‘complete system of legal remedies and 
procedures designed to ensure review of the legality of acts of the institutions’.168 The 
decision of the ECtHR in Holzinger v Austria supports the view that in such 
circumstances an applicant may be first obliged to institute national proceedings 
notwithstanding the delays and uncertainties associated with the preliminary reference 
rocedure:  
                                                
p
 
164 The CDDH Report, above n. 141, at pp. 17-20. The CDDH Report includes in Appendix I a possible 
new Article 35bis ECHR to address this issue. See also para. 1 of the ECHR Protocol set out in Section 
5.7.2. of this Chapter. 
165 See Section 4.2.4.5 of Chapter four for an analysis of Article 35(2)(b) ECHR both pre- and post Union 
accession to the ECHR. 
166 See para. 49 of the CDDH Report, above n. 141, for a brief analysis. See also the views of Professor 
Arnull on whether if the ECJ determined an ECHR point on a preliminary reference ‘domestic’ remedies 
would be exhausted by that ruling under Article 35(1) ECHR: cited in the House of Lords European Union 
Committee, 6th Report (2002/2003), above n. 5, at para. 131. 
167 Even in the absence of Union accession to the ECHR, the ECommHR indicated obiter that a remedy 
before the ECJ would form part of domestic remedies for the purposes of Article 35(1) (ex-26) ECHR: 
Dufay v. European Communities, Decision of 19 January 1989; App. No. 13258/87. This point was noted 
by Walter Kälin, ‘The EEA Agreement and The European Convention for The Protection of Human 
Rights’ (1992) 3 EJIL, pp. 341-353, at p. 349, n. 33. 
 168 Case C-263/02P, Jégo-Quéré et  Cie SA v. Commission [2004] ECR I-3425, at para. 30. This analysis 
of the effectiveness of national proceedings as a route to contest the validity of Union acts had been 
contested by AG Jacobs in UPA, above n. 156, at paras. 38-44, and by the CFI in Jégo-Quéré v. 
Commission, Case T-177/01[2002] ECR II-2365, at para. 45. See also J. Usher, ‘Direct and Individual 
Concern – an Effective Remedy or a Conventional Solution’ (2003) 28 EL. Rev., pp. 575-600, at pp. 586-
595. See further Section 5.6.2.2.4 below for the potential impact of Article I-29 of the Constitution. 
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h ast, in case of doubt as to the effectiveness of a remedy, it has to be used 
..’.169  
n of right of application under Article 34 
CHR into Union law would be undermined. 
ereas Union accession would confer on them the 
tatus of directly effective rights.172  
                                                
‘Thus, the effectiveness of a remedy which has to be used for the purposes of 
Article 35 may depend on whether it has a significant effect on the length of the 
proceedings as a whole. However, as the Convention organs have repeatedly held 
in t e p
 
However, if an individual were to be required to institute national proceedings in such 
circumstances, the benefits of the introductio
E
 
A further benefit from Union accession to the ECHR as regards improved legal redress 
will be that the ECtHR would be able to assess the conformity of the Union’s system of 
remedies with Articles 6 and 13 ECHR that had been contested by the CFI in Jégo-
Quéré.170 The political sensitivity over the potential impact of Article 13 ECHR on the 
national system of remedies may be judged from the exclusion of Article 13 ECHR from 
the definition of ‘Convention rights’ incorporated by the UK’s Human Rights Act 
1998.171  In addition, Union accession to the ECHR would enhance the normative status 
of the provisions of the ECHR that guarantee a right of effective legal redress, and in 
particular Articles 5¸ 6, and 13 ECHR. These provisions currently have the status of 
general principles of Union law wh
s
 
169 Holzinger v. Austria (No. 1), App. No. 23459/94, 30 January 2001, (2001) ECHR 66, at para. 22. 
170 In its judgment in Jégo-Quéré, above n. 168, at para. 47, the CFI held that the procedures in Article 234 
EC Treaty and Articles 235 and the second paragraph of 288 EC Treaty ‘can no longer be regarded, in the 
light of Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as 
guaranteeing persons the right to an effective remedy enabling them to contest the legality of community 
measures of general application.’ The ECJ in overruling the CFI’s judgment impliedly rejected this 
interpretation since it expressly referred to the right to effective judicial protection of Community rights as 
being protected as a general principle of Union law both derived from the common constitutional traditions 
of the Member States and Articles 6 and 13 ECHR: above n. 168, at para. 29. It is noteworthy that in the 
recent case of Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Şіrketi v. Ireland, the Grand Chamber of 
the ECtHR in its analysis of the EC’s system of remedies was satisfied they provided ‘equivalent 
protection’ to that required under the ECHR: App. No. 45036/98, Judgment of 30 June 2005. See Section 
3.3.2.3 of Chapter three. 
171 1998, c. 42. Article 1 ECHR is also excluded from the definition of ‘Convention rights’. But for a more 
benign view , see S. Foster: ‘The reasons for these omissions are that the passing of the Act is seen in itself 
as an adequate measure to ensure that everyone enjoys their Convention rights.’: Human Rights and Civil 
Liberties (Harlow, Pearson, 2003), at p. 147. 
172 See further Section 5.7 below. 
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5.6.2.2.3 Incorporation of the Charter  
The effect of incorporation of the Charter on creating justiciable rights for individuals is 
more problematic than ECHR accession in view of the uncertainties surrounding the 
scope of application of Charter rights under the Constitution.173 However, the benefits of 
incorporation may prove more extensive: ‘The Charter is a first step and a positive one 
insofar as the remedial rights it contains are more expansive than those contained in the 
European Convention on Human Rights and prior EC law.’174 In particular, Shelton 
argues that Article 47 of the Charter provides more ‘expansive’ protection than Article 13 
CHR.175  
tly of ‘an accessory instrument which violates a rights 
cluded in the Charter’.177  
 
                                                
E
 
Incorporation of the Charter would, according to WG II, make ‘the Union’s present 
system of remedies available’.176  This makes the point that incorporation of the Charter 
would result in Charter rights being directly justiciable by the ECJ and national courts 
applying Union law rather than, as presently, indirectly as a source for general principles 
of Union law. In addition, the extension of the ECJ’s jurisdiction under the Constitution 
over AFSJ measures would materially enlarge the scope of the justiciability of Charter 
rights.  However, the retention of a modified version of Article 51(1) of the Charter in 
Article II-111(1) retain the fundamental structure of the Charter as an instrument of 
judicial review rather than conferring on individuals a remedy for an alleged violation of 
a Charter right independen
in
 
173 See Section 5.2.3 above. 
174 Dinah Shelton, ‘Remedies and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’ in Peers and 
Ward (eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004), pp. 349-364, at p. 
363. 
175 Ibid., at pp. 356-357.  
176 WGII Final Report, above n. 5,  at p. 15: ‘The Group underlines, however, the great benefit which 
citizens would gain from a possible incorporation of the Charter into the Constitutional Treaty architecture, 
thereby making the Union’s present system of remedies available.’ 
177 Betten, above n. 35, at p. 695.  See generally Betten’s perspicacious comments on the Charter as an 
instrument for constitutional review of Community acts: ibid , at  pp. 694-697.  
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Since the introduction of an independent remedy based on an alleged violation of 
fundamental rights was not incorporated in the Constitution,178 applicants seeking a 
judicial remedy for a breach of a Charter right would still have to bring themselves 
within the scope of one of the judicial remedies provided for in the Constitution. The 
deficiencies in these remedies set out by AG Jacobs in the UPA case would only be 
partially remedied by the amendments in the Constitution.179 However, the ECJ in Jégo-
Quéré did not expressly refer to Article 47 of the Charter in its decision and thus its 
conclusions in that case could be open to review upon incorporation of the Charter. 
 
5.6.2.2.4  Reforms to the Union’s Existing Remedies 
The principal reforms to the existing remedies in Union law in the Constitution are a 
relaxation of the locus standi rules for private applicants under Article 230(4) EC Treaty, 
the imposition in Article I-29(1) of an obligation on Member States to provide remedies 
‘sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law’, and 
the extension of the range of Union bodies the legal acts of which are subject to judicial 
review.  Each of these reforms is considered in turn.  
 
Article III-365(4) is a substantially modified version of Article 230(4) EC Treaty to take 
account of the change in the denomination of the Union’s legal instruments180 and to 
introduce a limited abolition of the requirement for ‘individual concern’:  
 
‘Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in paragraphs 1 
and 2, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of 
direct and individual concern to him or her, and against a regulatory act which is 
of direct concern to him or her and does not entail implementing measures.’ 
 
                                                 
178 Schwarze has proposed the introduction of a free-standing ‘Fundamental Rights Complaint’ on the lines 
of the Grundrechtsbeschwerde in German law: ‘Accordingly, the introduction of a Charter of fundamental 
rights of the Union would completely fulfill its purpose only if accompanied by an adequate remedy.’: 
above n. 152, at p. 303. 
179 See Section 5.6.2.2.4 below. For a summary of the divergent views of Professor Papier, Professor 
Dutheil de la Rochère, Ms Iliopoulou, Professor Arnull and Professor Besselink on the compatibility of the 
Union’s system of remedies with Article 47 of the Charter and Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, see: The Future 
Role of the European Court of Justice, House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, 6th 
Report, HL Paper 47, Session 2003-2004, printed 2 March 2004, at paras. 133-137.  
180 See for analysis of the reforms in the Constitution of the Union’s legal instruments:  Final Report of 
Working Group IX on Simplification, above n. 22, and Sections 6.2.8 and 6.2.9 of Chapter six. 
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The drafting of Article III-365(4) reflects the most conservative option discussed by the 
ECJ Discussion Circle for relaxing the Article 230(4) locus standi requirements.181 
 
The critical distinction between an ‘act’ and a ‘regulatory act’ is based on the new 
categories of Union instruments set out in Chapter 1 of Title V of Part I of the 
Constitution (Articles I-33 to I-39). The relaxation of locus standi is limited to a 
regulatory act which is not a term employed in the provisions defining the Union’s legal 
acts but presumably encompasses delegated European Regulations under Article I-36 and 
European implementing regulations under Article I-37.182 The existing requirement for 
‘direct and individual’ concern therefore continues to apply under Article III-365(4) to 
judicial review of European laws and framework laws.183 A further restriction on an 
applicant’s ability to bring Article III-365 proceedings is the new requirement that the 
regulatory act does not entail implementing measures.184 In conclusion, the reform of 
Article 230(4) in Article 365(4) is conservative and does not remove the obstacles to an 
effective mechanism for individual applicants to challenge directly the validity of 
European laws. As a result the effectiveness of alternative remedies before the national 
courts will remain a critical issue. 
 
The role of national courts in supplementing the direct judicial remedies is addressed in 
paragraph 2 of Article I-29: ‘Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure 
effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law.’ This provision buttresses 
the obligation of sincere co-operation incumbent on the Member States under Article I-
                                                 
181 See the final report of ECJ Discussion Circle, above n. 158, at p. 7. 
182 See the criticism of the terminology in Article III-365(4) by Professor Toth and M. Errera: cited in The 
Future Role of the European Court of Justice, above n. 179, at para. 147.  
183 However, Article III-365(4) is an improvement on Article 230(4) EC Treaty insofar as by referring to an 
‘act’ it incorporates the case law of the ECJ that any act capable of producing legal effects vis-s-vis the 
applicant may be challenged:  Case 60/81, IBM v. Commission (1981) ECR-2639. This revised  
terminology was recommended in the final report of the ECJ Discussion Circle, above n. 158, at p. 8.  
184 This addition was recommended by the ECJ Discussion Circle in its final report: ‘The addition of the 
words “without entailing implementing measures” aims to ensure that the extension of a private 
individual’s right to institute proceedings would apply only to those (problematical) cases where the 
individual concerned must first infringe the law before he can have access to a court. This wording enables 
private individuals to contest before the Court (CFI) an act containing, for example, a prohibition, but no 
implementing measure, as the individual concerned can apply for its annulment if he can demonstrate that 
he is directly concerned by the regulatory act in question.’: ibid, at para. 21. 
 159
5(2) and codifies the existing case law of the ECJ.185 Tridimas has given the following 
explanation to paragraph 2 of Article I-29:  
 
‘It serves to underlie that national courts play an important role in the application 
and enforcement of Union rights. It also seeks to counter-balance the restrictive 
locus standi under Article 230(4). It mandates Member States to fill the remedial 
gap left by the strict interpretation of direct and individual concern.’186  
 
However, the monopoly of the ECJ to declare Union acts unlawful means that the 
preliminary reference procedure will continue to be the only available avenue to 
challenge European laws and framework laws before national courts and the deficiencies 
in that procedure have not been addressed in the Constitution.  
 
Thirdly, the scope of a number of the Union’s judicial remedies has been extended in 
sub-section five of Chapter one Title VI of the Constitution in order to encompass the 
legal acts of bodies, offices and agencies of the Union.187 These reforms go beyond the 
recommendations in the final report of the ECJ Discussion Circle insofar as they extend 
the ambit not only of actions for annulment under Article III-365 but also the remedies 
for failure to act under Article III-367, the plea of illegality under Article III-378, and 
preliminary references under Article III-369(b). However, there is no provision extending 
the right of action in damages under Article III-370 and the second paragraph of Article 
III-431 to bodies, offices and agencies of the Union. The reforms also apply to bodies, 
offices and agencies of the Union and not only those created under the EC Treaty.188 
                                                 
185 See references at p. 7, n. 16 in WGII Working Document 21 of 1 October 2002, above n. 155, to Case 
C-50/00P, UPA v. Council [2002] ECR I-6677 and Case T-172/98, Salamander v Parliament and Council 
[2000] ECR II-2487. 
186 Cited in the The Future Role of the European Court of Justice, above n. 179, at para. 153.  Tridimas’ 
analysis was based on an earlier draft of Article I-29 that referred to an obligation on Member States to 
provide ‘rights of appeal’ in place of ‘redress’.  
187 Articles III-365(1) and (5), Article III-367, III-368, III-369((b), and III-378. 
188 The Commission has proposed the following definition of an agency: ‘Community agency is a body 
governed by European public law; it is distinct from the Community Institutions (Council, Parliament, 
Commission, etc.) and has its own legal personality. It is set up by an act of secondary legislation in order 
to accomplish a very specific technical, scientific or managerial task which is specified in the relevant 
Community act.’: at < http://europa.eu.int/agencies/index_en.htm>.  The Commission lists sixteen agencies 
which meet that definition. Europol and  Eurojust are not included in that list but are each treated as a body  
of the Union. Article 1 of the Council Decision establishing Eurojust specifically describes it as a ‘body of 
the Union’: [2003] OJ L63/2. Europol was established under the 1995 Europol Convention and Article 1 
simply specifies the Member States ‘establish’ Europol. Working Group X on ‘Freedom. Security and 
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These reforms are significant in that they give effect to WGX’s recommendation that acts 
of Eurojust and Europol be bought within the jurisdiction of the ECJ.189  
 
5.6.3 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The reforms in the Constitution represent a significant improvement in the means of 
judicial address available in Union law for violation of fundamental rights. Accession to 
the ECHR will provide an effective and proven mechanism for individual applicants to 
establish under Article 34 ECHR the conformity of Union action with ECHR standards. 
In particular the adequacy of the judicial remedies available in Union and national law 
for a violation of ECHR fundamental rights within the scope of Union law will be subject 
to external scrutiny. However, the benefits of accession may be undermined if the ECtHR 
adopts an onerous interpretation of Article 35(1) ECHR in respect of the requirement to 
exhaust both Union and national remedies. Incorporation of the Charter will necessitate 
the ECJ examining the compatibility of the Union’s system of legal remedies with 
Article 47 of the Charter. However, it will not provide any additional remedies to those 
provided for under existing Union law. The reform of the locus standi rules under Article 
III- 365(4)) falls short of what was necessary to provide an effective direct right of 
redress for individual applicants against Union primary legislation and it remains to be 
seen how far the national legislatures and courts will respond to the new obligation 
requirement in the second paragraph of Article I-29(1) to provide effective national 
remedies to make up for this deficiency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Justice’ (WGX) in its final report of 2 December 2002 recommended that the 1995 Europol Convention be 
converted into a regulation: CONV 424/02 of 29 November 2002, at p. 8, n. 1. Article III-276(2) of the 
Constitution provides European laws shall determine Europol’s ‘structure, operation, field of action and 
tasks’. The status of Europol as a body of the Union could be specified in such a European law. 
189 See Section 7.4.1 of Chapter Seven. 
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5.7 UNION ACCESSION TO THE ECHR: A CHANGE IN NORMATIVE 
STATUS 
 
5.7.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Convergence between the institutions of the EEC, ECSC and Euratom and those of the 
Council of Europe had already been discussed at the time of the founding of the 
Communities.190  Although the original EEC treaty did not incorporate any reference to 
the ECHR, or indeed to any fundamental rights standards, the ECJ in a series of cases 
beginning with Rutili made explicit reference to the ECHR.191  The European Parliament, 
Council and Commission issued a Joint Declaration of 5 April 1977 confirming their 
respect for the fundamental rights protected under the ECJ’s case law on general 
principles, including those derived from the ECHR.192  In 1979 the Commission reversed 
its earlier opposition to accession to the ECHR.193  Article F(2) TEU introduced by the 
1992 Maastricht Treaty, and renumbered as Article 6(2) TEU by the 1997 Amsterdam 
Treaty, enshrined the fundamental rights protected by the ECHR as general principles of 
Community law.  In November 1993 the Council submitted the issue of accession by the 
Community to the ECHR for an opinion under Article 300(6) EC Treaty but the ECJ 
concluded that the Community did not have competence to accede to the ECHR and 
accession would require amendment of the EC Treaty under Article 236 EC Treaty (now 
Article 48 TEU).194  The intergovernmental conferences leading up to the Amsterdam 
and Nice Treaties did not, however, amend the Treaties to permit accession. The issue of 
                                                 
190 See T. Freixes and J.C. Remotti, Le Futur de l’Europe: Constitution et Droits Fondamentaux, European 
Institute of Law, at p. 3, n. 2: <http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/other/oth001101bis_fr.pdf>. 
Accessed  September 2005. 
191 Case 36/75, Rutili v Minister for the Interior [1975] ECR 1219.  For subsequent references see: Hartley, 
above n. 34, at p. 141, n. 32. 
192 Joint Declaration concerning the Protection of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1977] OJ C103/1. See Rack and Lausegger, 
in Alston (ed.), above n. 147, at p. 805. 
193 Accession of the Communities to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 4 April 1979, EC Bulletin, Supplement 2/79. 
194 Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms  [1996] ECR I-1759.For an analysis, see G. Gaja, ‘Opinion 2/94’ (1996) 33 CML 
Rev., pp. 973-989; and Alston and Weiler, in Alston (ed.), above n. 148, at pp. 24-27. 
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the accession to the ECHR was raised at the Laeken European Council meeting of 
December 2001 and submitted for consideration by the European Convention.195 
 
5.7.2 ARTICLE I-9(2) AND THE ECHR PROTOCOL 
 
The recommendation of WGII to include a constitutional authorisation enabling the 
Union to accede to the ECHR196 was in this context hardly controversial.197 The 
European Convention accepted this recommendation and the authorisation for the Union 
to accede was subsequently strengthened under the Italian Presidency of the IGC to an 
injunction in Article I-9(2): ‘The Union shall seek accession to the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Accession to that 
Convention shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the Constitution.’  
Under Article III-325(6)(a)(ii) conclusion by the Council of the accession treaty  is 
subject to the consent of the European Parliament. Moreover, the original requirement for 
unanimity in the Council was subsequently modified during the Italian Presidency of the 
IGC so that the Council acts under Article III-325(8) by qualified majority throughout the 
accession procedure.198  
 
However, political agreement to Union accession to the ECHR was made subject during 
the IGC process to the introduction of Protocol No. 32 (the ECHR Protocol) on Article I-
9(2) to meet the concerns of Member States over the potential impact of accession on the 
                                                 
195 See the Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, above n. 16. 
196 WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p. 13. 
197 The arguments in favour of accession are listed at pages 11-12 of WGII Final Report, above n. 5. The 
modalities of accession by the Union were addressed in the CDDH Report, above n. 141.  Weiler and Fries 
have pointed out that even those Member States which voiced opposition to Union accession had done so 
on grounds of competence rather than the principle of accession: ‘A Human Rights Policy for the European 
Community and Union: The Question of Competences’, in Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights 
(Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp. 147-165, at p. 150, n. 11. 
198 WGII had recommended that a requirement for a unanimous decision of the Council and assent of the 
European Parliament to the terms of accession be included in the constitutional authorization: WGII Final 
Report, above n. 5, at p. 13. The Commission in its comments on the Constitution has proposed the 
Council decision on accession be taken by Qualified Majority Voting: Section II.7 of the Commission’s 
Opinion on the Constitution of 17 September 2003: COM(2003)548. Available on the European 
Convention website.  
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terms of their membership of the ECHR and the potential extension of Union 
competence.199 The ECHR Protocol provides: 
 
‘Article 1. The agreement relating to the accession of the Union to the European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and fundamental Freedoms 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘European Convention’) provided for in Article I-
9(2) of the Constitution shall make provision for preserving the specific 
characteristics of the Union and Union law, in particular with regard to:  (a) the 
specific arrangements for the Union's possible participation in the control bodies 
of the European Convention; (b) the mechanisms necessary to ensure that 
proceedings by non-Member States and individual applications are correctly 
addressed to Member States and/or the Union as appropriate. Article 2. The 
agreement referred to in Article 1 shall ensure that accession of the Union shall 
not affect the competences of the Union or the powers of its institutions. It shall 
ensure that nothing therein affects the situation of Member States in relation to 
the European Convention, in particular in relation to the Protocols thereto, 
measures taken by Member States derogating from the European Convention in 
accordance with Article 15 thereof and reservations to the European Convention 
made by Member States in accordance with Article 57 thereof. Article 3.  
Nothing in the agreement referred to in Article 1 shall affect Article III-375(2) of 
the Constitution.’  
 
The ECHR Protocol sets out the parameters for negotiation of the accession treaty. 
However, it is submitted that the limitations imposed in the ECHR Protocol on the terms 
of the accession treaty were unnecessary from a legal perspective. Article 1 of the ECHR 
Protocol addresses the issue of retaining the autonomy of Union law notwithstanding 
accession and in particular the technical modalities of Union participation in the ECHR 
political and judicial structures and procedures. However, these technical issues had 
already been addressed by the CDDH Report and were not considered to have raised any 
threat to the autonomy of Union law.200  
 
Article 2 of the ECHR Protocol expands on the second sentence of Article I-9(2) 
specifying that Union accession ‘shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in 
                                                 
199 The text of the ECHR Protocol was subject to negotiation during the IGC.  See Section 1 of this Chapter 
for references to the relevant IGC documents. In addition a Declaration on Article I-9(2) on the issue of the 
autonomy of the ECJ was agreed during the IGC: see Section 3.4.2 of Chapter three for details. 
200 See Section 5.7.3 below for analysis of these issues. The technical aspects of Union participation in the 
Committee of Ministers for the purposes of supervising the execution of judgments of the ECtHR pursuant 
to Article 46(2) ECHR is considered in the CDDH Report, above note 141, at paras. 34-39.  
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the Constitution’. This latter provision was included on the recommendation of WGII 
and was one of three ‘technical devices’ it recommended to ensure the ‘Union’s 
accession to the ECHR does not modify the allocation of competences’ between the 
Union and the Member States.201  WGII was concerned to ensure that accession by the 
Union to the ECHR ‘would thus not lead to any extension of the Union’s competences, 
let alone to the establishment of a general competence of the Union on fundamental 
rights’.202 However, WGII never set out how accession to the ECHR could lead to such 
results and indeed acknowledges that the preparatory work for accession proceeded on 
the opposite assumption.203  Similarly, irrespective of the ECHR Protocol, Union 
accession to the ECHR would not have any effect on the Member States’ signature and 
ratification of the ECHR Protocols,204 derogations under Article 15 ECHR,205 or 
reservations to the ECHR.206    
 
Finally, Article 3 of the ECHR Protocol prohibits the Union accession treaty from 
affecting Article III-375(2). Article III-375(2), which corresponds to Article 292 TEC, 
provides: ‘Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation 
or application of the Constitution to any method of settlement other than those provided 
for therein.’ This provision is designed to address concerns that Member States might 
utilise Article 33 ECHR as a mechanism for adjudication of a dispute with another 
                                                 
201 The other two being a statement upon accession ‘stressing the Union’s limited competence in the area of 
fundamental rights’ and a mechanism allowing the Union and a Member State to appear jointly as ‘co-
defendants’ before the ECtHR to avoid any ruling by the ECtHR on the allocation of competences between 
the Union and the Member States: WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at pp. 13-14. See on these proposals the 
CDDH Report, above n. 141, at paras. 26 and 57-62 respectively. 
202 WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p. 13. 
203 As WGII Final Report acknowledges at p. 13, note 2.  The CDDH Report states: ‘The “scope” of 
EC/EU accession would be limited to issues in respect of which the EC/EU has competence’, above n. 141, 
at para. 26. 
204 The ECHR Protocols are listed in Annex two.  
205 The UK had notified on 18 December 2001 a derogation from its obligations under Article 5(1) ECHR 
in respect of the detention without trial provisions of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
pursuant to Article 15 ECHR but withdrew that derogation with effect from 16 March 2005 when those 
provisions were repealed as of 14 March 2005 by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. 
206 Reservations made under Article 57 ECHR are listed on the Council of Europe website at: 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=09/05/05&CL=
ENG&VL=1>. The House of Lords Committee on the European Union was also unconvinced by 
Government claims that the issue of existing reservations, declarations and derogations to the ECHR by the 
Member States might pose a problem for Union accession: 6th report (2002/2003), above n. 5, at paras. 
120-123. See also in the same sense, WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at pp. 14-15. 
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Member State involving issues of Union law as well as a breach of the ECHR. WGII was 
advised that in these circumstances Article 292 EC Treaty would prohibit a Member 
State taking action against another Member State ‘as regards the application of 
Community law’.207 The CDDH Report considered that while proceedings under Article 
33 ECHR should be available as a means of collective enforcement of the ECHR 
between the Union and the Member States it was unnecessary to exclude specifically 
cases involving Union law as this was a matter to be resolved by a special agreement 
between the Union and the Member States provided the agreement did not infringe 
Article 55 ECHR.208  
  
5.7.3 THE MODALITIES, SCOPE AND NORMATIVE EFFECT OF ACCESSION 
 
Article I-9(2) adopts the option of Union accession to the ECHR by way of accession 
treaty rather than by the alternative mechanism also considered in the CDDH Report 
involving a two-stage procedure of an amending Protocol followed by Union accession 
to the amended ECHR.209 Once the ECHR accession treaty has been concluded by 
decision of the Council pursuant to Article III-325(2) no additional measure of 
transposition should be necessary.210 However, implementing measures may be 
necessary to resolve various technical issues such as the relationship of the Member 
States and the Union in proceedings before the ECtHR.211  
                                                
 
Once the accession treaty is in force it is submitted that the ECHR rights and freedoms 
should be treated as directly effective rights. It is arguable that the ECHR would satisfy 
the criteria established by the ECJ for establishing the direct effect of international 
 
207 CONV 116/02, above n. 40, at p. 20, n. 2. The Discussion Document also considered Article 10 EC 
Treaty (Article I-5(2)) prohibits the Member States and the Union referring disputes between them to the 
ECHR. 
208 Above n. 141, at paras. 63-65. For an analysis of Article 55 ECHR, see Section 3.4.3 of Chapter three. 
209 CDDH Report, above n. 141, at pp. 5-10. 
210 On the basis of existing Union practice, it is highly unlikely that the Union would adopt a similar 
method of ‘incorporation’ of the ECHR to that adopted by dualist states such as the UK and Ireland in, 
respectively, the Human Rights Act 1998 (c.42) and the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 
(no. 20). See for an analysis of existing Union practice in respect of the conclusion of international 
agreements under the Article 300 EC Treaty procedure: Eeckhout, External Relations of the European 
Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations (Oxford, OUP, 2004), at pp. 277-278. 
211 See the CDDH Report, above n. 141, at pp. 17-21. 
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agreements following Union accession since the ECHR is intended to confer rights on 
individuals and its provisions are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional and do not 
require further implementation. However, even if the conditions for direct effect applied 
in the context of commercial international agreements are not satisfied by the ECHR it is 
submitted that direct effect should be recognized.212  
 
Two critical issues not addressed either in the CDDH Report or by WGII is the ECHR 
Protocols to which the Union will accede and whether the Union will enter any 
reservations under Article 57 ECHR upon signature or ratification. The Union signature 
of the ECHR Protocols will depend on negotiation within the Council over interpretation 
of the prohibition in Article I-9(2), reinforced by the ECHR Protocol, that Union 
accession shall not affect the Union’s competences under the Constitution. It is 
submitted, however, that Union accession to an ECHR Protocol does not in itself extend 
the competences of the Union and that the preferred option would be for Union accession 
to all the ECHR Protocols even though in some cases the relevance to the Union’s 
competences may be moot.213 As regards reservations under Article 57 ECHR it is 
submitted no such reservations should be made. The ECHR Protocol only restricts the 
terms of the accession treaty insofar as it affects the Member States’ reservations to the 
ECHR. The Union is thus free to accede to the ECHR and the ECHR Protocols without 
entering any reservations. 
                                                 
212  See for detailed analysis of the criteria for the direct effect of international agreements in Union 
law, and in particular the WTO agreements: Eeckhout, above n. 210, at pp. 274-324; and Uerpmann, 
‘International Law as an Element of European Constitutional Law: International Supplementary 
Constitutions’ (2003), Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 9/03, at pp. 10-19; available at: 
<http://www.jeanmonnet-program.org/papers/03/030901-02.html>. Weiler has argued for the 
application of less restrictive conditions for the direct effect of fundamental rights norms in the context 
of the ECJ’s protection of fundamental rights as general principles: ‘The individual is not relying on 
the challenged measure for his or her rights but on the human rights norm. In relation to this norm, it is 
always assumed that it has direct effect in the sense of allowing the individual to rely on it. If this were 
not so, the whole human rights protection would practically disappear since so many of the human 
rights which the Court asserts do not satisfy the trilogy of conditions for direct effect.’: J. Weiler, 
‘Thou Shalt Not Oppress a Stranger: On the Judicial Protection of the Human Rights of Non-EC 
Nationals – A Critique’ (1992) 3 EJIL, pp. 65-91, at p. 78. 
213 ECHR Protocols No. 6 and 13 relating to the abolition of the death penalty are such  Protocols. 
However, Union accession to these Protocols would send out a powerful signal of the Union’s commitment 
to the abolition of the death penalty and be in line with its policy in respect of non-member states.  See: 
Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union to Mark the Entry into Force of Protocol 
No. 13 to the European Convention on Human Rights, Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in all 
Circumstances. Brussels 14 July 2003, 11249/03, P83/03. Available on: < http://www.eurunion.org/>. 
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5.7.4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
A number of important issues will have to be addressed in the negotiation of the 
accession treaty of the Union to the ECHR. The technical modalities of Union accession 
have been clearly and simply laid out in the CDDH Report and it is submitted that these 
should be followed. Union accession membership should be to all the ECHR Protocols 
and without any Union reservations so as to maximize the benefits of Union accession. 
This approach would send out a strong signal as to the Union’s commitment to the 
protection of ECHR rights in Union law as well as its promotion of fundamental rights in 
its external relations.214 Union accession to the ECHR and to the ECHR Protocols will be 
neutral as regards the attribution of competence between the Union and the Member 
States, which would be governed solely by the Constitution, and this issue should not be 
allowed to impact on the terms of the accession treaty at the expense of maximizing the 
protection of fundamental rights in the Union’s legal order. 
 
5.8  INCORPORATION OF THE CHARTER: AN ENTRENCHED BILL OF 
RIGHTS? 
 
5.8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The primary impetus for the development of a constitutional set of fundamental rights for 
the Union was provided by the European Parliament.215  The 1984 Spinelli Report, 
prepared during the negotiations for the 1986 Single European Act, was adopted by the 
European Parliament on 10 February 1984 as a draft Treaty establishing the European 
Union216 and contained references in Articles 4(3) and 7 to international fundamental 
rights standards.217    The Single European Act, however, did not incorporate these 
                                                 
214 For a critical analysis of the relationship between the human rights policy of the Union internally and 
externally and the ECHR system, see A. Williams, EU Human Rights Policies: A Study in Irony (Oxford, 
OUP, 2004), at pp. 118-121. 
215 Rack and Lausegger, in Alston (ed.), above n. 147, at pp. 805-807.  
216 Resolution of the EP on the draft Treaty establishing the European Union: [1984] OJ C77/53.  
217 Rack and Lausegger, in Alston (ed.), above n. 147, at p. 805. 
 168
provisions but limited its reference to fundamental rights to the third Preamble.218 The 
next significant development was the adoption on 12 April 1989 by the European 
Parliament of a Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, based on the De 
Gucht report, which contained for the first time a detailed catalogue of rights based on 
the UNDHR, the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the ECHR and the European Social Charter. 219   
The linkage between constitutionalism and fundamental rights was reaffirmed by the 
adoption by the European Parliament’s Committee on Institutional Affairs on 10 
February 1994 of a further draft constitution based on the Herman Report which set out 
in Title VIII a list of human rights guaranteed by the Union.220  
 
The failure of the Amsterdam Treaty to incorporate a charter of fundamental rights was 
criticised both by the European Parliament221 and the Commission which established a 
Group of Experts on Fundamental Rights which published a report in February 1999 
recommending the inclusion of social rights in the Treaties.222 The European Council at 
Cologne of 3- 4 June 1999 set out the case and parameters for the development of a 
charter of fundamental rights for the Union.223  The European Parliament passed a 
resolution supporting this decision and setting out proposals on the composition of the 
drafting authority for the Charter.224 
 
 
                                                 
218 ‘Determined to work together to promote democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights recognized 
in the constitutions and laws of the Member States, in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Social Charter, notably freedom, equality and social justice’. 
[1987] OJ L169/2. 
219 Resolution of the EP adopting the Declaration of  Fundamental Rights and Freedoms: [1989] OJ 
C120/51. The full text of the Declaration is available at: 
<http://www.europarl.eu.int/charter/docs/pdf/a2_0003_89_en_en.pdf>. 
220 [1994] OJ C61/155. The full text is available at: 
<http://www.europarl.eu.int/charter/docs/pdf/a3_0064_94_en_en.pdf>. The rights listed substantially 
followed those set out in the 1989 Declaration, above n. 219, but in the case of social and environmental 
rights were listed in a truncated version. 
221 Resolution on the Amsterdam Treaty [1997] OJ C371/99. 
222 Rapport du Groupe d'Experts concernant les Droits Fondamentaux. Affirmation des droits 
fondamentaux dans l'Union Europeéne: L'heure d'agir est arrivée. European Commission. DG Emploi et 
Affaires Sociaux, Brussels, February 1999. ISBN 92-828-6606-8. 
223 See Annex IV to the Presidency Conclusions at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/annexe_en.htm#a4>.  
224 [2000] OJ C54/93. See also the European Parliament resolution of 16 March 2000 on the drafting of a 
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights: A5-0064/2000, C5-0058/1999 – 1999/2064(COS). 
Available at:  <http://www.europarl.eu.int/charter/docs/text3_en.htm>. 
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5.8.2 THE DRAFTING AND PROCLAMATION OF THE CHARTER 
 
At the Tampere meeting of 15-16 October 1999, the European Council specified the 
composition and working methods of the body entrusted with drafting the Charter.225  
The Convention set up to draft the Charter (Charter Convention) was chaired by Roman 
Herzog and consisted of 62 members with 16 representatives of the European Parliament, 
30 representatives selected by the national parliaments, 15 representatives of the 
governments of the Member States and a single Commission representative with 
observers from the other Community institutions and two representatives from the ECJ 
and the Council of Europe.226  The composition of the Charter Convention has been 
criticised for the weighting in favour of the interests of the Member States, with 45 of the 
members nominated by the national parliaments and the governments, and its under-
representation of women.227 The applicant states were also not given any formal 
representation in the drafting of the Charter, although ‘an appropriate exchange of views’ 
was mandated by the Cologne European Council between the Charter Convention and 
the applicant states.228 This imbalance of representation in the Convention was reflected 
in a number of significant controversies over the text of the Charter.229 
 
The final version of the Charter was approved by the European Council at Biarritz in 
October 2000 and subsequently solemnly proclaimed by the European Parliament, the 
                                                 
225 See the Annex to the Presidency Conclusions at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/oct99/oct99_en.htm#annex>. 
226 Details of the representatives and consultative bodies are listed at:  
<http://www.europarl.eu.int/charter/composition_en.htm>.   
227 See Freixes and Remotti, above n. 190, at p. 13. However, the authors cite the wide variety of interest 
groups, NGOs, and other  organisations who contributed to the debate over the Charter: ibid., at p. 14, n. 
28.   See also the list of NGO contributions at: < http://www.europarl.eu.int/charter/civil/civil0_en.htm>. 
228 Cologne Presidency conclusions, above n. 223. 
229 See Freixes and Remotti, above n. 190, at pp.  15-18. They cite the following issues: a reference to the 
European religious heritage was removed at the final stage at the insistence of France and replaced by a 
reference to the Union’s ‘spiritual and moral heritage’ in the second preamble; the inclusion of social rights 
was opposed by several Member States and  a number of such rights were only finally incorporated as 
general principles under Chapter IV headed ‘Solidarity’;  Article 23 of the Charter, on equality between 
men and women, was only included at the final negotiating session as a result of pressure from 
representatives of over two hundred women’s groups;  and the  ‘transversal’ provision in Article 53 
ensuring the Charter did not derogate from existing human rights protection  was only included at the final 
stages of drafting. 
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Council and the Commission at Nice on 7 December 2000.230 The Preamble set out the 
parameters of the fundamental rights standards to be protected by the Charter: 
 
‘This Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the 
Community and the Union and the principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they 
result, in particular from the constitutional traditions and international obligations 
common to the Member States, the Treaty on European Union, the Community 
Treaties, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Community and by 
the Council of Europe and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities and of the European Court of Human Rights.’ 
 
The limitation of the scope of the Charter to a reaffirmation of existing rights, albeit 
without providing an exclusive list of the sources of such rights, reflected the political 
boundaries set by the European Council at Cologne and Tampere.231  
 
The current legal status of the Charter has given rise to controversy, although it is has 
been argued that notwithstanding the fact the Charter was not formally incorporated into 
Union law it nevertheless constitutes an ‘authoritative consolidation’ of existing Union 
law on fundamental rights.232  A review of judicial references to the Charter has 
confirmed the ambiguous legal status of the Charter with some Advocates-General 
‘stressing the democratic and substantive (added) value of the text’ and others the 
‘formally legally non-binding status of the Charter’.233 The CFI has included the Charter 
as a source of ‘confirmation’ of the traditional sources of human rights drawn on by the 
                                                 
230 [2000] OJ C364/1 of 18 December 2000. 
231 The drafting of the Charter was according to the Commission to be ‘a task of revelation rather than 
creation, of compilation rather than innovation’:  Commission Communication on the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 13 September 2000, COM (2000) 559 Final, at p. 3. See 
also John Morijn, ‘Judicial Reference to the EU Fundamental Rights Charter’, at pp. 2-5:  at 
<http://europa.eu.int/constitution/futurum/documents/other/oth000602_en.pdf >. Accessed  September 
2005. 
232 Agustín Menéndez, ‘Exporting rights: The Charter of Fundamental Rights, membership and foreign 
policy of the European Union’, Arena Working Papers, WP 18/2002, at p. 4 at: 
<http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2002/papers/02_18.xml >. Accessed September 
2005. 
233 Morijn, above n. 231, at p. 28. See also Ward, in Peers and Ward (ed.), above n. 28, at pp. 126-130 and 
pp. 365-366 (Appendix 1) for a list of references in Opinions of  the Advocates General to the Charter. 
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CFI.234 The Charter is also used as a benchmark by the Union’s institutions for verifying 
the conformity of legislative proposals with Charter standards and by other bodies for 
assessing Union compliance.235 
 
The future legal status of the Charter was left open by the Nice intergovernmental 
conference, although Declaration 23 attached to the Nice Treaty on the future of the 
Union provides at paragraph 5 that the European Council meeting at Laeken in December 
2001 would agree on a declaration including a statement on the status of the Charter.  
The Laeken declaration provided that both the question of whether the Charter should be 
included in the constitutional treaty to be drafted by the European Convention and 
whether the Union should accede to the ECHR should form part of the European 
Convention’s deliberations.236 The European Convention established WGII to report on 
the technical and legal aspects237 of both these issues and WGII Final Report 
recommended that, subject to the political decision on incorporation, the Charter should 
be incorporated ‘in a form which would make the Charter legally binding and give it 
constitutional status.’238 Article I-9(1) of the Constitution gave effect to this 
recommendation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
234 See Morijn, above n. 231, at p. 28; and the CFI cases cited in Appendix 1 in Peers and Ward (eds.), The 
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights: Politics, Law and Policy (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2004), at pp. 366-367.  
235 See Gráinne de Búrca and Jo Beatrix Aschenbrenner, ‘European Constitutionalism and the Charter’, in 
Peers and Ward (eds.), The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights: Politics, Law and Policy 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing. 2004), pp. 3-34, at pp. 14-19. See also the references to the Charter in Union 
legislative measures listed in Appendix 1 of Peers and Ward (eds.), The European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: Politics, Law and Policy (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004), at pp. 367-369. The Report 
on the Situation of Fundamental Rights in the European Union and its Member States in 2002 adopts the 
Charter as its reference instrument:  Available at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/cfr_cdf/doc/rapport_2002_en.pdf>. 
236 See Laeken Declaration, above n. 16. See also H.C. Kruger and J. Polakiewicz, ‘Proposals for a 
coherent human rights protection system in Europe: The ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights’ (2001) 22 HRLJ,  pp. 1-13; and P. Drzemczewski, ‘The Council of Europe’s position with respect 
to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2001) 22 HRLJ, pp. 14-32. 
237 WGII, as mandated, left the political decision on both incorporation of the Charter and accession by the 
Community/Union to the ECHR to the European Convention plenary: see pp. 2 and 11 of WGII Final 
Report, above n. 5. 
238 WGII Final Report, above n. 5, at p. 2. 
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5.8.3 THE INCORPORATED CHARTER: A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR THE UNION? 
 
‘[A] bill of rights is a formal commitment to the protection of those rights which 
are considered, at that moment in history, to be of particular importance. It is, in 
principle, binding upon the government and can be overridden, if at all, only with 
significant difficulty. Some form of redress is provided in the event that 
violations occur’.239   
 
This section evaluates whether incorporation of the Charter would provide the Union 
with a bill of rights according to Alston’s definition.240 While this assessment overlaps 
with issues previously discussed, it provides a useful overall test of the contribution 
incorporation of the Charter would make to strengthening the Union’s constitutional 
order from the perspective of the protection of fundamental rights.241 
 
The Charter satisfies Alston’s first criterion of formal commitment to rights of critical 
importance both in the form it was adopted in December 2000 and, a fortiori, if 
incorporated on the terms set out in the Constitution. The fourth paragraph of the 
Charter’s Preamble clearly affirms its claim to modernity through its mission to 
‘strengthen the protection of fundamental rights in the light of changes in society, social 
progress and scientific and technological developments by making those rights more 
visible in a Charter’ and the potential breadth of the rights recognized by the Charter has 
been acknowledged.242  
 
                                                 
239 P. Alston, ‘A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Bills of Rights’ in P. Alston (ed.) Promoting 
Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives (Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp. 1-14, at p. 10. 
240 For a study of Charter rights in the context of the ECJ’s existing case law on fundamental rights, see: 
Lenaerts and de Smijter, above n. 38, at pp. 278-290.  
241 See de Búrca and Aschenbrenner, in Peers and Ward (eds.), above n. 235, at pp. 20-23. See also the 
report of the EP’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs of 12 October 2000, On the Constitutionalisation of 
the Treaties:  A5-0289/2000 (Final).  
242 See the contributions on ‘The Charter and Substantive Policy Areas of EU Regulation’ in Peers and 
Ward (eds.), The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights: Politics, Law and Policy (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2004), pp. 183-348. On the potential impact of the Charter on the protection of economic and 
social rights in the Union, see: Diamond Ashiagbor, ‘Economic and Social Rights in the European Charter 
of Fundamental Rights’ (2004) 1 EHRLR, pp. 62- 72. On the relationship of Charter rights to rights 
protected under other international human rights instruments, see Dominic McGoldrick, The Charter and 
United Nations Human Rights Treaties’ in Peers and Ward (eds.), The European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: Politics, Law and Policy (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004), pp. 83-122.  
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As regards the second criterion, the binding nature of the Charter on the Union’s 
government, this would be achieved through the combined effect of Article I-9(1) and the 
reformulated version of Article 51(1) of the Charter set out in Article II-111(1). Article I-
9(1) requires the Union to ‘recognise the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the 
Charter’ and the second sentence of Article II-111(1) obliges the institutions, bodies and 
agencies of the Union and the Member States, when implementing Union law, in respect 
of provisions of the Charter to ‘respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the 
application thereof  in accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits 
of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the other Parts of the Constitution’.243 It 
is difficult to justify the differences in terminology between Article I-9(1) and II-111(1) 
other than by reference to the perceived political imperative of retaining and 
strengthening the jurisdictional elements of Article 51(1) of the Charter. Nevertheless, it 
is submitted that that the incorporated Charter would create binding legal obligations on 
the Union’s governing institutions and any failure to fulfill those obligations within the 
parameters set out in the Constitution would found an action for judicial review of acts 
adopted in breach of those obligations.244 Incorporation of the Charter on the terms of the 
Constitution would alter the normative status of the Charter by allowing direct judicial 
reference to the Charter rather than through the indirect route of the general principles 
case law.245 
 
‘So that it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from reason, and from 
Scripture, that the sovereign power, whether placed in one man, as in monarchy, 
or in one assembly of men, as in popular, and aristocratical commonwealths, is as 
great, as possibly men can be imagined to make it.’246   
 
While Thomas Hobbes would clearly have needed some persuading of the merits of 
entrenching constitutional fundamental rights,247 incorporation of the Charter on the 
                                                 
243 These provisions employ less emphatic terminology than that employed in Article 1 ECHR: ‘The High 
Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in 
Section 1 of the Convention’. 
244 See Section 5.6.2.2.3 above for analysis of the effect of incorporation on the availability of remedies.  
245 For a less optimistic view on the clarity of the normative status of the Charter under Article I-9(1), see 
the editorial comments in: (2003) 28 EL Rev., at p. 450. 
246 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. J.C.A. Gaskin (Oxford, OUP, 1998), at p. 138.  
247 For an excellent discussion of the arguments for and against entrenchment of bills of rights see:  M. 
Darrow and P. Alston, ‘Bills of Rights in Comparative Perspective’, in Alston (ed.), Promoting Human 
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terms of the Constitution would achieve entrenchment as defined by Alston. Article IV-
443 elaborates on the current procedure for amending the TEU and EC Treaty under 
Article 48 TEU but retains in Article IV-443(3) the core requirements that any 
amendments to the Constitution require firstly the ‘common accord’ of the conference of 
the representatives of the governments of the Member States and secondly the ratification 
of the amendments by each of the Member States ‘in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements’.248  Both from the perspective of historical precedent and the 
Union’s enlargement, it would be difficult to argue against the proposition that overriding 
the Charter rights by amendment to the Constitution could only be done ‘with significant 
difficulty’.  
 
The final characteristic of a bill of rights according to Alston’s definition, requiring some 
form of redress to be provided in the event that violations of rights occur, is the most 
problematic under the Charter’s existing status and would so remain, albeit to a more 
limited extent, if the Charter were to be incorporated on the terms of the Constitution.249  
In particular, the limitation of the scope of application of Charter rights under Article 51 
of the Charter, as strengthened in Article II-111 of the Constitution, would pose real 
problems of effective judicial redress:  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives (Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp. 465-524; and  Walker, 
in Campbell, Ewing and  Tomkins (eds.), above n. 81.  
248 Article IV-443(4) provides a mechanism whereby if four fifths of the Member States have ratified the 
amending treaty and one or more have encountered difficulties the matter is referred to the European 
Council. This procedure has not been invoked following the rejection of the Constitution by referenda in 
France and the Netherlands since the necessary four-fifths threshold has not been reached. It may, 
however, still play a role depending on the review by the European Council of the ratification process in 
the first half of 2006: see Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the 
European Union on the Ratification of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe of 18 June 2005: 
available at: <http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/Docs/pressData/en/ec/85325>. Article IV-444 provides for 
a simplified amendment procedure for the transition from unanimous to qualified majority voting in the 
Council (but not in military or defence areas) and for transition to the codecision procedure from a special 
legislative procedure. In both cases, Article IV-444 provides for the unanimous adoption of a European 
decision by the European Council after obtaining the consent of the EP. Any national parliament may block 
the procedure. See Denis Staunton, ‘Get ready for the passarelle: an EU power grab or a sensible reform?’, 
The Irish Times, 10 May 2005, at p. 11. 
249 The distinction drawn between rights and principles in the Charter, which would be reinforced by 
Article II-112(5) of the Constitution, may also raise issues of justiciability, in particular in the context 
of the economic and social rights protected by the Charter. See: D. Ashiagbor, ‘Economic and Social 
Rights in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2004) 1 EHRLR, pp. 62- 72, at pp. 70-72; and 
Section 4.2.3.3 above. 
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‘Insofar as the Charter contains rights which are not based on the EC Treaty or 
EU Treaty, these rights can offer legal protection only to the extent that they 
relate to the current exercise of powers by the Community, the Union or the 
Member States implementing Union law. The statement of rights that cannot be 
linked to such an exercise of power mainly has a political function.’250  
 
There may therefore be an infringement of Charter rights which, independently of the 
issue of the adequacy of Union remedies for breaches of fundamental rights, will not be 
subject to legal redress since it falls outside the competence of Union law. While it could 
be argued that there is no infringement, since Article II-51 of the Charter and Article II-
111 define Charter rights so as to exclude their application in such a situation, such an 
argument is unattractive since, instead of making the Charter rights ‘more visible’,251 
incorporation threatens to make them more illusory.   
 
In conclusion, the incorporation of the Charter on the terms of the Constitution falls at 
the last hurdle when measured against the criteria for a bill of rights identified by Alston.  
While such a restriction on the scope of the Charter rights may have been necessary to 
maintain the jurisdictional balance between the Union and the Member States and render 
the Charter politically acceptable,252 the Charter rights could nevertheless have been 
redrafted to take account of the Union’s competences under the Constitution. However, 
such a task was outside the remit of WGII and never a political option in the light of the 
opposition of a number of key Member States to any extension of the Charter’s scope. 
 
5.9 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
Incorporation of the Charter and Union accession to the ECHR would provide a more 
transparent, principled and securely entrenched constitutional basis for the protection of 
                                                 
250 Lenaerts and de Smyter, above n. 38, at p. 289. See also Section 5.4.2 of this Chapter for an analysis of 
Article 51 of the Charter and  Article II-111 of the Constitution. 
251 Paragraph four of the preamble to Part Two of the Constitution. 
252 As Schwarze points out Article 51(2) was deliberately included in the Charter to ‘increase its chance of 
acceptance, in particular in Germany.’: above n. 98, at p. 29.  
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fundamental rights in Union law.253 Accession by the Union to the ECHR would provide 
an autonomous system of control over the protection of fundamental rights and an 
important additional bulwark against any abuse of the Union’s enhanced powers, 
particularly in the AFSJ. While incorporation of the Charter and Union accession to the 
ECHR had been actively promoted for many years,254 the continued opposition of some 
Member States to either or both of these measures meant that WGII adopted a 
conservative approach to the terms on which the Charter should be incorporated and the 
Union should accede to the ECHR. As a result, several of WGII’s subsidiary 
recommendations were prompted more by a desire to smooth the passage of the primary 
recommendations than a principled reflection on the role of fundamental rights protection 
under the Constitution. In particular, the retention of general principles as a source of 
fundamental rights under the Constitution would undermine the benefits of having a 
codified system of protection in the Charter and the ECHR.  In a similar vein, the 
drafting amendments to the Charter incorporated in the Constitution were driven by the 
need to assuage Member State sensibility as to the allocation of competences in the field 
of fundamental rights protection and detract from the existing text of the Charter. 
 
The IGC did not focus on the detailed amendments to the Charter proposed by WGII. 
Indeed, the amendments were welcomed as additional ‘safeguards’ against an 
encroachment of Union competence in the protection of fundamental rights and a useful 
armory to deploy in the struggle to secure ratification of the Constitution. The IGC rather 
concentrated on strengthening the status of the Charter Explanations and ensuring 
through the ECHR Protocol and Declaration that the ECHR accession treaty would not 
affect the autonomy of Union law or the position of the Member States under the ECHR.  
                                                 
253 For a positive assessment of the reforms in the Constitution on fundamental rights, see: A. Young, ‘The 
Charter, Constitution and Human Rights: is this the Beginning or the End for Human Rights Protection by 
Community Law?’ (2005) 11 EPL, pp. 219-240. 
254 ‘They seem like two Loch Ness monsters of EU human rights protection: attractive to some and 
repulsive to others but intriguing to all, and yet so elusive’: de Witte, in Alston (ed.), above n. 32, at p. 889. 
However, even academic support for the Charter was not universal: ‘The Charter simply adds an 
unnecessary further tier which lacks the subtlety and flexibility of the current system of negotiation.’: R. 
Bellamy, ‘Constitutive Citizenship versus Constitutional Rights: Republican Reflections on the EU Charter 
and the Human Rights Act’, in Campbell, Ewing and Tomkins (eds.), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights 
(Oxford, OUP, 2001), pp. 15-37, at p. 33.  See also J.H.H.Weiler, ‘Editorial: Does the European Union 
Truly Need a Charter of Rights?’ (2000) 6 ELJ, pp.  95-97. 
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In this context, the principle of incorporation of the Charter and a mandate for the Union 
to accede to the ECHR were not challenged. While the ‘technical’ amendments resulting 
from WGII Final Report may seem of minor significance in comparison to the benefits 
accruing from incorporation of the Charter and ECHR accession, it is regrettable the IGC 
failed to take full advantage of the opportunity to establish a unified, coherent and 
simplified constitutional basis for the protection of fundamental rights in the Union. The 
stalling, and potential derailing, of the ratification process following the negative 
referenda results in France and the Netherlands provides an opportunity for a more 
principled and transparent approach to the reform of fundamental rights in the Union’s 
legal system. Such a process could result in reforms that could be promoted, 
independently of the fate of the Constitution as a whole, as a valuable contribution to the 
protection of fundamental rights and the strengthening of a European identity.255  
 
255 See Chapter nine for a summary of potential reforms. 
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6 
THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE: GENESIS AND 
CHARACTERISTICS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter outlines the development of the AFSJ from a limited form of inter-
governmental cooperation into a priority area of Union activity. This outline provides 
the necessary background for understanding the scope of the AFSJ and the constraints 
the Member States have imposed on the involvement of the Union’s institutions.1 In 
particular, it provides the framework for the analysis in Chapter seven of the 
restrictions on the application of fundamental rights protection in the AFSJ and the 
reforms in the Constitution.  This Chapter also explores the development and 
significance of the notions of ‘freedom, security and justice’ in the context of Union 
policy in the AFSJ and questions to what extent this formula has been used to mask 
the underlying security agenda which has driven the development of the AFSJ.2   
The selection of the AFSJ as the area of Union policy most appropriate for 
investigating the normative status of international fundamental rights in the Union’s 
legal order is driven by three characteristics of the AFSJ. Firstly, the AFSJ covers 
criminal justice and refugee and asylum policy where the effective protection of 
fundamental rights is of critical importance to individuals and the maintenance of key 
values of the Union. Secondly, on the grounds of protecting national security interests 
and sovereignty, the Member States have ensured that the AFSJ has developed 
substantially outside the institutional and legal framework of the EC Treaty with a 
substantial deficit in democratic decision-making, accountability and judicial control. 
While the Treaty of Amsterdam partially addresses these deficiencies, the provisions 
on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters in Title VI TEU (Third Pillar) 
                                                 
1 For an overview of the role of the Union’s institutions, see Jörg Monar, ‘Decision-making in the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice’, in Arnull and Wincott (eds.), Accountability and Legitimacy in the 
European Union (Oxford, OUP, 2002), pp. 63-80. 
2 ‘In particular, there is a growing concern about the fact that security has been the overriding 
imperative, largely crowding out freedom and justice.’: Hans Lidahl, ‘Finding a Place for Freedom, 
Security and Justice: the European Union’s Claim to Territorial Unity’ (2004) 29 EL Rev., pp. 461-484, 
at p. 461.  
 180
continue to be subject to restrictions on justiciability that are incompatible with the 
requirements of justice in the sense developed in Chapter two.  
Thirdly, key Union measures adopted in the AFSJ, and in particular those adopted 
after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, have been the object of sustained 
criticism for prioritising security over justice and freedom. The terrorist attacks in 
London of 7 July and 21 July 2005, and the consequent legislative proposals of the 
UK Government,3 have further highlighted the tension between these potentially 
competing values in a legal order. The structural characteristics of the AFSJ in this 
context assume a particular importance in assessing the robustness of the Union’s 
legal order in protecting international fundamental rights standards.  This Chapter 
investigates the genesis and structure of the AFSJ, both under the existing twin 
‘pillar’ structure and in light of the reforms in the Constitution, in the context of these 
specific characteristics. 
6.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AFSJ: FROM PERIPHERY TO CENTER 
STAGE 
6.2.1 PRE-MAASTRICHT : INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION 
 
The original EEC Treaty provided no specific legislative basis for action in the field 
of justice and home affairs (JHA). Particular problems which required a European 
response were addressed through non-EC based intergovernmental structures. In 1976 
the Trevi Group was set up to deal with international terrorist threats by a decision of 
the Council of Justice and Interior Ministers.4 The Trevi Group continued to operate 
on an ad hoc basis until 1993 and initially evolved three working groups dealing with 
police liaison on terrorism, public order and combating organised crime.5 A fourth 
group, Trevi '92, was added in December 1988 to address issues related to the Single 
European Market (SEM) program following the 1986 Single European Act which 
came into force on 1 July 1987.  In 1988 the Rhodes European Council set up a group 
                                                 
3 See the letter of Charles Clarke, Home Secretary, of 15 September 2005 outlining the proposals: 
The Guardian of 16 September 2005; available at: 
<http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Politics/documents/2005/09/15/letterplusannexe.pdf>. 
4 See European Parliament Directorate General for Research, Cooperation in the Fields of Home 
Affairs and Justice, 1976 (PE162.500). 
5 Ben Tonra, ‘The Politics of Justice’, in Gavin Barrett (ed.) Justice Cooperation in the European 
Union (Dublin, Institute of European Affairs, 1997), pp. 49-58. 
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of coordinators consisting of national representatives to address the complexities of 
eliminating internal frontier controls which led in 1990 to the Trevi Programme of 
Action which specified methods for cooperation between police and security services 
for the implementation of the SEM.6  
 
Chancellor Kohl promoted the establishment of a European police capability at the 
1991 Edinburgh Council to combat transnational organised crime and in August 1991 
a special Ad Hoc Working Group on Europol was established.  In December 1991, 
the Trevi Ministers adopted a Report on the Development of Europol that set out a 
programme for the establishment of Europol,7  initially concentrating on illegal drugs 
trafficking with the establishment of the European Drugs Intelligence Unit (EDIU).8 
The 1992 Lisbon European Council authorised the preparation of a draft convention 
to provide a legal basis for Europol and the 1993 Hague European Council decided 
that the Hague would be the permanent location for Europol.9  
 
In the field of immigration control, separate intergovernmental groups were set up, 
most notably the Schengen Group which followed on from the Franco-German 
Saarbrucken agreement of 1984 and led to the 14 June 1985 Schengen Agreement on 
the gradual abolition of checks at common borders and the Schengen Implementing 
Convention of 19 June 1990.10 The Schengen Implementing Convention addressed 
the relationship of the Schengen arrangements with EC law by providing in Article 
134 that the provisions of the Convention only applied insofar as they were 
compatible with Community law.11   
 
                                                 
6 Val Flynn ‘Europol - A Watershed in EU Law Enforcement Cooperation?’ in G. Barrett (ed.), Justice 
Cooperation in the European Union (Dublin, Institute of European Affairs, 1997), pp. 79-113.  
7See the 1995 Statewatch Pamphlet, On the Europol Convention, by Tony Bunyan, at p.1. 
Available at: <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/aug/europol1.pdf>. 
8 Subsequently replaced in 1995 by the Europol Drugs Unit (renamed European Drugs Unit) (EDU) 
whose responsibilities were in turn assumed by Europol as from 1 July 1999. 
9 See generally, Flynn, in Barrett (ed.), above n. 6,  passim. 
10 The 1985 Schengen Agreement and the 1990 Schengen Implementing Convention are published in 
(1991) 30 ILM 68 and (1991) 30 ILM 84 respectively. 
11 Diarmaid McGuiness and Eileen Barrington, ‘Immigration, Visa and Border Controls in the 
European Union’, in Barrett (ed.), Justice Cooperation in the European Union (Dublin, Institute of 
European Affairs, 1997), pp. 155-169, at p. 166. 
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The Dublin Convention of 15 June 1990 was another intergovernmental initiative 
developed outside the EC structures but to which all the Member States adhered.12 
The Dublin Convention, which establishes rules for allocating responsibility for 
determining asylum applications according to criteria based on a state's connection to 
an asylum seeker's presence in the Community, entered into force on 1 October 
1997.13  The Dublin Convention was replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No 
343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national.14 
 
6.2.2 TREATY OF MAASTRICHT: CREATION OF THE THIRD PILLAR 
 
The Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed at Maastricht in February 1992 and 
which entered into force on 1 November 1993, contained in Title VI the first wide-
ranging set of provisions on justice and home affairs (JHA) which became referred to 
as the Third Pillar of the Union.15 No general definition is provided of the scope of 
the ‘justice’ and ‘home affairs’ program but instead Title VI TEU listed nine areas to 
be treated as of common interest.  Article K.1 provided that, without prejudice to the 
powers of the European Community, the Member States are to regard the following 
nine issues as matters of common interest: asylum policy; rules governing the 
crossing by persons of the external borders of the member states and the exercise of 
controls thereon; immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries; 
combating drug addiction; combating fraud on an international scale; judicial 
cooperation in civil matters; judicial cooperation in criminal matters; customs 
                                                 
12 Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in 
One of the Member States of the European Communities: [1977] OJ C 254/1. 
13 [1997] OJ C254/1. See for detail, Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs (Harlow, Longman, 2000), at 
pp. 112-117. 
14 [2003] OJ L050/1 (Dublin II Regulation). Denmark, pursuant to Protocol (No. 5) attached to the 
TEU, is not currently subject to the Dublin II Regulation, and remains bound by the Dublin 
Convention in its relations with the other Member States (recitals 18 and 19 of the Dublin II 
Regulation) and Norway and Iceland. However, by a Council Decision of 2 February 2005 approval 
was given for signature of an agreement with Denmark for its participation in the Dublin II regulation:  
Council Document 5949/05. Available on the register of Council documents. Ireland and the United 
Kingdom elected to be bound pursuant to Protocol (No. 4) attached to the TEU. Iceland and Norway, 
parties to the Dublin Convention, have also acceded to the system established by the Dublin II 
Regulation. 
15 [1992] OJ C191 of 29 July 1992. 
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cooperation; and police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating 
terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international crime.16  
However, the principal instruments provided for in Title VI TEU to achieve these 
objectives - joint positions, joint actions and conventions- proved ill-suited to address 
the requirements for legal certainty in the JHA arena.17  
 
Title VI TEU continued the pre-Maastricht pattern of confining the form of 
cooperation in the JHA field to intergovernmentalism but nevertheless formalised a 
limited role for the Union’s institutions, except for the ECJ whose role ‘can best be 
described as minimal’.18 The Council was assigned primary responsibility for 
implementing the Third Pillar, taking over the role previously played by 
intergovernmental ministerial meetings outside the EC Treaty framework.  The 
Commission was restricted to a joint right of initiative with the Member States to 
propose specific measures, as opposed under the EC Treaty to an exclusive right to 
propose legislative measures, and in the field of customs cooperation, police 
cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters even this right was 
excluded.19 The European Parliament's role was restricted under Article K.6(2) TEU 
to ‘very limited rights to be informed, to be consulted and to have its views taken into 
consideration’.20  
 
The retention of an intergovernmental basis for JHA cooperation was mitigated in 
formal terms by Article L.9 TEU which established a ‘passarelle’  procedure for the 
transfer of powers from the TEU to the EC Treaty in the JHA field. However, since 
such a transfer was dependent both on a unanimous Council vote and the adoption by 
the Member States of a decision in accordance with their constitutional requirements 
it was not exercised.21 The TEU also introduced or extended a number of EC powers 
in fields related to the JHA within the first pillar constituted by the EC Treaty.22 
Since some of these areas overlapped with Union competences under the Third Pillar 
                                                 
16 Barrett, ‘Co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs in the European Union - An Overview and 
Critique’, in Barrett (ed.), Justice Cooperation in the European Union (Dublin, Institute of European 
Affairs, 1997), pp. 3-47, at p. 8. 
17 See Peers, above n. 13, at pp. 27-30. 
18 See Barrett, in Barrett (ed.), above n. 16, at p. 26. 
19 Article K.3(2) TEU. See Barrett, ibid., at p. 9. 
20 Ibid, at p. 9. 
21 Ibid, at p. 10. 
22 See for a summary of these changes: Barrett, ibid, at p. 12. 
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this created the potential for conflicting jurisdictional claims.23  However, in 
Commission v. Council (Transit Visas Case) the ECJ interpreted Article M (now 
Article 47) TEU combined with Article L TEU as conferring jurisdiction on it to 
police the boundaries between the EC Treaty and the TEU.24 However, the ECJ found 
that a Joint Action on airport transit arrangements adopted by the Council under 
Article K.3 TEU did not encroach on the Commission’s powers under Article 100c 
x) EC Treaty.  
cognised the compatibility of the Schengen system with 
itle VI TEU by providing: 
 
cooperation does not conflict with, or impede, that provided for in 
this Title’. 
the Final Act of the TEU setting out the activities and functions of 
uropol/EDU.  
JHA Council and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER).25 The 
                                                
(e
 
Article K.7 TEU formally re
T
‘… the provisions of the Title shall not prevent the establishment or 
development of closer cooperation between two or more member states in so 
far as such 
 
Article K1(9) TEU provided further impetus to the development of Europol/EDU by 
referring to the organisation of a Union-wide system for the exchange of information 
within a European Police Office in the context of police cooperation for the purpose 
of preventing and combating  terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious 
forms of international crime. It was supplemented by the Declaration on Police 
Cooperation in 
E
 
The Trevi Group was replaced by the K.4 Committee which operated with three 
steering groups in the fields of Immigration/Asylum, Police and Customs 
Cooperation and Judicial Cooperation and Criminal Matters under the control of the 
 
23 Ibid, at p. 13; and see Peers, above n. 13, at pp. 30-33.  
24 Case C-170/96 [1998] ECR I-3655, at paras. 14-17. See: T. Tridimas, ‘The European Court of 
Justice’, in P. Lynch, N. Neuwahl and G. Wyn Rees (eds.), Reforming the European Union: From 
Maastricht to Amsterdam (Harlow, Longman, 2000), pp. 74-84, at p. 75; and Brendan Smith and 
William Wallace, ‘Constitutional Deficits of EU Justice and Home Affairs: Transparency, 
Accountability and Judicial Control’, in Jorg Monar and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), The European 
Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam (New York, Continuum, 2001), pp. 125-149, at p. 140.  This 
jurisdiction was reaffirmed post-Amsterdam Treaty in Case T-338/02 Segi et al. v. Council [2004], 
Order of 7 June 2004, at para. 41. Not yet reported. 
25 Flynn, in Barrett (ed.), above n. 6, at pp. 91-93. 
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K.4 Committee was entrusted with setting up Europol/EDU and preparing the related 
draft Europol Convention.26    
 
6.2.3  MAASTRICHT TO AMSTERDAM  
 
The experience of application of the Title VI TEU provisions confirmed what had 
been widely predicted: 
 
‘The paucity of measures adopted reflects the difficulty of making progress 
through the inefficient, five-layer, decision-making structure of the Third 
Pillar, in particular where there are fundamental differences in approach by 
various member states.’27  
 
In the field of asylum policy, the main measures adopted under Title VI TEU were 
'soft-law' measures:28 the 1992 London Resolutions On a Harmonised Approach to 
Questions Concerning Host Third Countries and On Manifestly Unfounded 
Applications  for Asylum;29 the Council Resolution of 20 June 1995 On Minimum 
Guarantees for Asylum Procedures;30 the Council Resolution of 25 September 1995 
On Burden-Sharing with Regard to the Admission and Residence of Displaced 
Persons on a Temporary Basis;31 and the Joint Position of 4 March 1996 On The 
Harmonised Application of The Definition of the Term 'Refugee' in Article 1 of The 
1951 Geneva Convention.32 
 
                                                 
26 The negotiation process of the Europol Convention was lengthy and contentious with the signature 
of the Convention on 26 July 1995 and a voluntary Protocol on the role of the ECJ being signed in 
June 1996: see Flynn, above n. 6, at pp. 91-95. On 26 July 1995 the Council signed the Act drawing up 
the Convention based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union: [1995] OJ C316/1. The 
Europol Convention entered into force on 1 October 1998. The Protocol on the role of the ECJ is 
published in [1996] OJ C299/1. For an analysis of the Protocol, see Peers, above n. 13, at p. 26. 
27 Bill Shipsey, ‘Asylum Policy and Title VI of the Treaty on European Union’, in Barrett (ed.), Justice 
Cooperation in the European Union (Dublin, Institute of Foreign Affairs, 1997), pp. 171-180, at p. 
173. 
28 See Hannah R. Garry, ‘Harmonisation of Asylum Law and Policy within the European Union: A 
Human Rights Perspective’ (2002) 20 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, pp. 163-184, at 169-
170. On the legal status of soft law measures adopted under Title VI TEU, see Peers, above n. 13, at 
pp. 30-31.  
29  Documents WG I 1283 and WG I 1282 REV 1; listed in the Commission's Acquis of the European 
Union in the Field of JHA; consolidated version; update December 2004: available at 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/intro/docs/jha_acquis_1204_en.pdf>.  The two 
London Conventions are published in Bunyan (ed.) Key Texts on Justice and Home Affairs in the 
European Union, Vol. 1 (London, Statewatch, 1997), at p. 64. 
30 [1996] OJ C274/13. 
31 [1995] OJ L63/1. 
32 [1996] OJ L63/2. 
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The same approach was followed in the politically sensitive JHA fields of migration, 
which covers the admission, readmission and expulsion of third-country nationals, 
anti-terrorism and police cooperation.33 The lack of accountability and transparency 
resulting from the Maastricht system for the JHA left both the European Parliament 
and the national parliaments dissatisfied with the degree of control and supervision 
they could exercise over this critical area.34  In addition a number of external factors, 
notably the proposals for enlargement and the rise in refugees resulting from the 
Balkans conflicts and other international crises,35 added urgency to the development 
of Union action. A number of Member States were therefore sympathetic during the 
1996-1997 IGC preceding the Treaty of Amsterdam to reform proposals designed to 
address the ‘democratic deficit’ in the Third Pillar. These included an increased role 
for the ECJ, strengthening the role of the European Parliament and national 
parliaments in supervising JHA measures,36 and transferring to the EC Treaty 
elements of the JHA programme.  
 
6.2.4 TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AND CREATION OF THE AFSJ  
 
6.2.4.1 A New Objective: An ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ 
In the event the Third Pillar emerged from the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam as the most 
fundamentally restructured area of Union policy both in terms of being endowed with 
a strategic direction and in terms of a significant transfer of JHA responsibilities from 
the Third to the First Pillar.37 Article 2 TEU, fourth indent, provided the strategic 
direction by including as an objective of the Union:  
 
‘… to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and 
justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with 
appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, 
immigration and the prevention and combating of crime’.  
                                                 
33 See for detailed list of the measures adopted in each field, Acquis of the European Union in the Field 
of JHA, consolidated version; update December 2004, above n. 29.  In areas such as drugs and customs 
cooperation, decisions and conventions were also adopted under Title VI TEU: see Peers, above n. 13, 
at p. 29.  
34 Smith and Wallace, in Monar and Wessels (eds.), above n. 24, at pp. 126-127. 
35 Smith and Wallace, ibid., at pp. 126-127. 
36 Smith and Wallace, ibid., at pp. 128-131.   
37 [1997] OJ C340/01.  The Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force on 1 May 1999. See J. Monar, 
‘Justice and Home Affairs after Amsterdam: The Treaty Reforms and the Challenge of their 
Implementation’ in Monar and Wessels  (eds.), The European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(New York, Continuum, 2001), pp. 267-295.  
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The adoption in Article 2 TEU of the criteria ‘freedom, security, and justice’ to assess 
progress in the former JHA arena implicitly recognised the linkage between human 
rights issues and law enforcement measures in this field.38  The association of the 
objective of assuring the free movement of persons, which was firmly entrenched as a 
field of exclusive EC competence, to the spheres of border controls, asylum, 
immigration and crime prevention, which had until then been primarily restricted to  
intergovernmental cooperation, established the necessary role for Community action 
in this field.39  
 
6.2.4.2 Partial Communitarisation of Justice and Home Affairs 
The former JHA competences transferred to the EC Treaty were, except for customs 
cooperation and protection of the financial interests of the EC,40 inserted into the new 
Title IV EC Treaty relating to ‘Visas, Asylum, Immigration and other Policies related 
to Free Movement of Persons.’ Article 61 EC Treaty sets out measures to be adopted 
by the Council, adopting the same objectives as Article 2 TEU, ‘in order to establish 
progressively an area of freedom, security and justice’. Article 61(a) EC Treaty 
established a five year deadline, which expired on 1 May 2004, for the 
implementation of measures to ensure the free movement of persons in accordance 
with Article 14 EC Treaty together with ‘directly related flanking measures with 
respect to external border controls, asylum and immigration’ in accordance with 
Articles 62(2) and (3) EC Treaty and Article 63(1)(a) and 2(a) EC Treaty, and 
‘measures to prevent and combat crime’ in accordance with Article 31(e) TEU.41   
                                                 
38 The connection between justice and fundamental rights is explored in Section 2.5 of Chapter two.  
The connection between liberty and fundamental rights is perhaps more evident and clearly stated in 
the 1998 Vienna Action Plan considered in Section 6.2.5 below. For a discussion of the significance of 
the concepts of freedom, security and justice in the AFSJ, see:  Lidahl, above n. 2, passim. For a 
discussion of elements of coherence linking the issues covered by the AFSJ, see Neil Walker, ‘In 
Search of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A Constitutional Odyssey’, in N. Walker (ed.), 
Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Oxford, OUP, 2004), pp. 3-40. 
39 For a contrary interpretation of Article 2 TEU, fourth indent, which argues the linkage of JHA 
measures to free movement of persons unduly restricts future action in the JHA field: see Monar, in 
Monar and Wessels  (eds.), above n. 37, at pp. 269-270. 
40 Article 280 EC Treaty was amended to cover the fight against fraud affecting the Community's 
financial interests and a new Title X EC Treaty on Customs Cooperation was added: see Monar, ibid., 
at  pp. 273-274. 
41 The wording of paragraph (a) of Article 61 EC Treaty can be interpreted to tie only the first set of 
‘directly related flanking’ measures to those ensuring the free movement of persons, but not the 
measures to prevent and combat crime. However, for an opposite view, see Monar, in Monar and 
Wessels  (eds.), above n. 37, at p. 271.   
 188
The other JHA measures to be adopted pursuant to Article 61(b)-(e) TEC are not 
subject to a deadline nor directly linked to the free movement of persons.42  
 
Article 62 EC Treaty sets out, but without fixing a deadline for implementation, 
measures to be adopted by the Council relating to the crossing of internal and external 
Union borders. Article 63 EC Treaty establishes measures to be adopted in relation to 
the determination of Member State responsibility for asylum applications and 
minimum standards applicable to refugees and asylum seekers (Article 63(1)), 
measures on refugees and displaced persons (Article 63(2)), measures on specified 
aspects of immigration policy (Article 63(3)), and measures defining the rights and 
conditions under which nationals of third countries legally resident in a Member State 
may reside in other member States (Article 63(4)).43  Article 65 EC Treaty lists a 
series of measures to be taken by the Council in the field of ‘judicial cooperation in 
civil matters having cross border implications’ and ‘insofar as necessary for the 
proper functioning of the internal market.’ Finally, Article 66 EC Treaty obligates the 
Council to take measures to ensure administrative cooperation between the Member 
States and the Commission in the areas covered by Title IV EC Treaty.  
 
The Title IV EC Treaty objectives adopted at Amsterdam have been criticised, despite 
their individual importance, for failing to establish a common policy framework in 
the field of immigration and asylum.44  This criticism, however, presupposes that 
such a common policy was desirable, which is doubtful given the limitations of Title 
IV EC Treaty in respect of democratic decision-making, transparency, accountability 
and judicial control.45 Indeed, as explored in Chapter eight, the measures adopted in 
pursuit of the Union’s goal of achieving a Common European Asylum System, set by 
the European Council at its Tampere meeting in October 1999, have given rise to 
substantial concerns relating to compliance with international fundamental rights 
standards. 
                                                 
42 Although Monar argues that, as part of the AFSJ, such measures ‘remain subject to the general 
objective of Article 2 TEU with its emphasis on free movement related measures’: ibid., at p. 271. This 
interpretation seems an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of both Article 2 TEU and Article 61 
EC Treaty. 
43 Article 63 EC Treaty measures are subject to the 1 May 2004 deadline except for those contained in 
Articles 63(2)(b), (3)(a) and (4).  
44 Monar, in Monar and Wessels  (eds.), above n. 37, at p. 272. 
45 See on these aspects of the Treaty of Amsterdam:  Smith and Wallace, in Monar and Wessels (eds.), 
above n. 24, passim. 
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Article 64(1) EC Treaty, as in the case of Article 33 TEU, sets the parameters for EC 
action under Title IV EC Treaty: ‘This Title shall not affect the exercise of the 
responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law 
and order and the safeguarding of internal security.’  This provision is buttressed by 
Declaration 19 of the Treaty of Amsterdam which allows the Member States to take 
into account foreign policy considerations ‘when exercising their responsibilities 
under Article 64(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community’. The second 
paragraph of Article 64 EC Treaty, but without prejudice to paragraph (1), provides 
for the Council to adopt by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission 
provisional measures for up to six months in the event of an ‘emergency situation 
characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries’. These provisions are 
subject to construction by the ECJ and in accordance with its established case law on 
other derogation provisions in the EC Treaty relating to public safety they would be 
subject to a restrictive interpretation.46 
 
Article 67 EC Treaty sets out the decision-making procedure under Title IV EC 
Treaty with Council unanimity required until 1 May 2004, acting on a proposal from 
the Commission or on the invitation of a Member State and after consulting the 
European Parliament.47 This procedure is subsequently replaced under Article 67(2) 
EC Treaty by the standard Community procedure whereby the Commission has the 
sole right of legislative proposal, although it is still required to examine a request 
from a Member State. Article 67(2) further enables the Council, acting unanimously, 
to provide for all or parts of Title IV EC Treaty to be governed by the Article 251 EC 
Treaty co-decision procedure. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 67 EC Treaty derogate 
from these rules by providing that rules on three-month maximum visas establishing 
the list of countries requiring visas and a uniform format for visas are subject to 
Council majority voting from 1 May 1999 and that as from 1 May 2004 measures 
                                                 
46 See, in the context of the public safety derogations in the EC Treaty in Articles 30, 39, 46, 296 and 
297, Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the RUC [1986] ECR 1651, at para 26: ‘… because of 
their limited character those Articles do not lend themselves to a wide interpretation and it is not 
possible to infer from them that there is inherent in the Treaty a general proviso covering all measures 
taken for reasons of public safety.’  
47 See Case C-257/01 Commission v Council, which rules on the powers of the Council and the 
Member States to adopt implementing measures under Title IV EC Treaty: Judgment of 18 January 
2005, not yet reported.   
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establishing the procedures and conditions for issuing visas by Member States and 
rules on a uniform visa will automatically be subject to the co-decision procedure. 
 
6.2.4.3 Third Pillar Changes: Title VI TEU 
Title VI TEU was retitled ‘Provisions on Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters’ to reflect the transfer of powers to the EC under Title IV EC Treaty. Article 
29 TEU sets out the new objective of the Union under Title VI TEU: 
 
‘Without prejudice to the powers of the European Community, the Union’s 
objective shall be to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area 
of freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the 
Member States in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters and by preventing and combating racism and xenophobia.’  
 
This objective broadened the remit of Union policy in the JHA field from a defensive 
approach centered on addressing the security and law enforcement issues arising from 
the dismantling of internal borders under the Schengen arrangements to an approach 
that for the first time incorporated the values of freedom and justice into the policy 
arena and specifically identified the fight against racism and xenophobia as a priority 
objective of Union policy.48     
 
The second paragraph of Article 29 TEU sets out the necessary means for achieving 
the objective set out in the first paragraph: 
 
‘That objective shall be achieved by preventing and combating crime, 
organised or otherwise, in particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and 
offences against children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit arms trafficking, 
corruption and fraud, through: closer cooperation between police forces, 
customs authorities and other competent authorities in the Member States, 
both directly and through the European Police Office (Europol), in 
accordance with Articles 30 and 32; closer cooperation between judicial  and 
other competent authorities of the Member States in accordance with Articles 
                                                 
48 The Treaty of Amsterdam also introduced Article 13 EC Treaty which conferred powers on the EC 
to combat, inter alia, discrimination based on race or ethnic origin. See for a critique of the Union’s 
policies against racism post-Amsterdam: Williams, EU Human Rights Policies: A Study in Irony 
(Oxford, OUP, 2004), at pp. 86-88; and Conor A. Gearty, ‘The Internal and External ‘Other’ in the 
Union Legal Order: Racism, Religious Intolerance and Xenophobia in Europe’ in Alston, Bustelo and 
Heenan (eds.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp. 327-358, especially at pp. 345-
356. 
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31(a) to (d) and 32; approximation, where necessary, of rules on criminal 
matters in the Member States, in accordance with Article 31(e).’49  
 
Articles 30 and 31 TEU specify in detail the areas of common action in the field of 
police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.50 Article 30(2) TEU 
requires the Council to promote cooperation through Europol and set a deadline of 1 
May 2004 for adopting specific measures to facilitate such cooperation, although 
Europol’s powers under Article 30(2) TEU fall short of enabling it to carry out 
autonomous operational activities.51 Article 32 circumscribes the scope of operation 
of Articles 30 and 31 by providing: ‘The Council shall lay down the conditions and 
limitations under which to competent authorities referred to in Articles 30 and 31 may 
operate in the territory of another Member State in liaison and in agreement with the 
authorities of that State.’ As mentioned above, Article 33 TEU further restricts the 
scope of Title VI TEU.52  
 
The inadequacy of the measures available for implementing JHA policy under the 
Treaty of Maastricht was in part remedied by the Treaty of Amsterdam whereby the 
full range of EC instruments was made available for JHA matters transferred to Title 
IV of the EC Treaty and the measures available to the Council in respect of the 
residual Title VI TEU competences were strengthened. Article 34(2) TEU, while 
retaining common positions53 and conventions,54 introduces in subparagraph (b) the 
                                                 
49 Article 7 of the Treaty of Nice replaced the words in italics by the following: ‘closer cooperation 
between judicial and other competent authorities of the Member States, including cooperation through  
the European Judicial Cooperation Unit (‘Eurojust’), in accordance with the provisions of Articles  31 
and 32.’  
50 Declaration No. 7 to the Treaty of Amsterdam provides: ‘Action in the field of police co-operation 
under Article 30 of the Treaty on European Union, including activities of Europol, shall be subject to 
appropriate judicial review by the competent national authorities in accordance with rules applicable in 
each Member State.’ 
51 See on the development of Europol, Cyrille Fijnaut, ‘Police Co-operation and the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice’ in Walker (ed.), Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(Oxford, OUP, 2004), pp. 241-282. For a list of subsequent Protocols amending the Convention on 
the establishment of a European Police Office ([1995] OJ C316 of 27 November 1995), see the 
Commission’s Acquis of the European Union in the Field of JHA, above n. 29, at p. 12.  
52 See further Section 7.2 of Chapter seven. 
53 Formerly joint positions. Article 34(2)(a) TEU states common positions define ‘the approach of the 
Union to a particular matter’. They are neither justiciable by the ECJ (Article 35(1) TEU) nor subject 
to a requirement for consultation with the EP (Article 39(1) TEU) and seem designed for purely 
political acts: see Monar, in Monar and Wessels  (eds.), above n. 37, at p. 276. 
54 Article 34(2)(d) TEU.  Article 34(2)(d) TEU introduces a requirement for Member States to start the 
ratification process for a convention within a time limit set by the Council. The final paragraph of 
Article 34(2) TEU further provides that a convention may, unless it otherwise provides, enter into force 
as soon as it is adopted by at least half the Member States.   
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‘framework decision’ which has the purpose of ‘approximation of the laws and 
regulations of the Member States’ and which shall be ‘binding upon the Member 
States as to the result to be achieved but shall leave to the national authorities the 
choice of form and methods’ and ‘shall not entail direct effect’. The joint action is 
replaced in subparagraph (c) by the adoption of ‘decisions for any other purpose 
consistent with the objectives of this Title’ and which shall be binding but again shall 
not entail direct effect. Article 34(2) TEU measures must be adopted by the Council 
acting unanimously on the initiative of the Commission or any Member State, 
although measures implementing decisions ‘at the level of the Union’ shall be 
adopted by the Council acting by a qualified majority. As a result of these 
innovations, the ground was laid for the development of a corpus of legal instruments 
in the JHA field both at the level of the acquis communautaire and at the Union 
level.55  
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam also introduced in Article 38 TEU a new power for the 
Union to act internationally in the JHA field by providing that international 
agreements referred to in Article 24 TEU in the context of a common foreign and 
security policy may also cover matters falling under Title VI.56 The same procedure 
is therefore applicable to Title VI TEU agreements as provided for in Article 24 TEU 
for CFSP agreements whereby the Council unanimously authorizes the Presidency, 
assisted by the Commission as appropriate, to negotiate the agreement. A unanimous 
vote by the Council is then required for the conclusion of such an agreement. The first 
agreements concluded under Articles 24 and 38 TEU, on extradition and mutual legal 
assistance in criminal matters between the Union and the USA, demonstrate the 
significance of the new powers of the Union under Article 38 TEU in terms of the 
substantial concerns raised both by the procedures adopted for conclusion of the 
agreements and their content.57 
                                                 
55 See the Commission's Consolidated Acquis of December 2004, above n. 29, for the measures 
adopted in the field covered by Title VI TEU which demonstrates the rapid growth in such measures 
since the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
56 See generally Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional 
Foundations (Oxford, OUP, 2004), at p. 161. 
57 The agreements are annexed to Council Decision 2003/516 concerning the signature of the 
Agreements between the European Union and the United States of America on extradition and mutual 
legal assistance in criminal matters, [2003] OJ L181/25. For an analysis of the agreements see: Jan 
Wouters and Frederik Naert, ‘Of Arrest Warrants, Terrorist Offences and Extradition Deals: An 
Appraisal of the EU’s Main Criminal Law Measures against Terrorism after “11 September”’ (2004) 
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Article 37 TEU requires the Member States to defend the common positions adopted 
under Title VI TEU within international organisations and at international 
conferences in which they take part. This requirement has been strengthened by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam through the application  ‘as appropriate’ of Articles 18 and 19 
TEU, which regulate the role of the Presidency in representing the Commission and 
co-ordination of Member States’ actions in the international arena under the CFSP,  to 
Third Pillar matters.  
 
Another substantial development at Amsterdam was provision in the second Protocol 
annexed to the TEU and the EC Treaty for the future integration of the Schengen 
acquis into the framework of the European Union (the Schengen Protocol).58 The  
allocation of the legal basis for each element of this substantial  acquis, which was 
listed in summary form in an Annex to the Schengen Protocol,  as between the TEU 
and the EC Treaty was left to the Council to decide acting unanimously, ‘in 
conformity with the relevant provisions of the Treaties’.59  In addition to the opt-out 
arrangements provided for in the Amsterdam Protocols for the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark,60 the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced provision for other cases of 
differentiated application of Union law to a sub-set of Member States. Title VII TEU 
introduces provisions on closer cooperation for a group of Member States making use 
for this purpose of the institutions, procedures and mechanisms of the TEU and the 
                                                                                                                                            
41 CML Rev., pp. 909–935, at pp. 930-935; and Theodore Georgopoulos, ‘What kind of treaty-making 
power for the EU? Constitutional problems related to the conclusion of the EU-US Agreements on 
Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance’ (2005) 30 EL Rev., pp. 190-208. 
58 For details see: Monica den Boer, ‘The incorporation of Schengen into the TEU: a bridge too far?’, 
in Monar and  Wessels (eds.), The European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam (New York, 
Continuum, 2001), pp. 296-320; P. Kuiper, ‘Some Legal Problems Associated with the 
Communitarization of Policy on Visas, Asylum and Immigration under the Treaty of Amsterdam and 
the Incorporation of the Schengen Acquis’ (2000) 37 CML Rev., pp. 345-366; and S. Peers, ‘Caveat 
Emptor?: Integrating the Schengen Acquis into the European Legal Order’ (2000) CYELS, pp. 87-123. 
59 Article 2(1) of the Schengen Protocol. This process was completed by Council Decision 
1999/435/EC of 20 May 1999 determining, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and the Treaty on European Union, the legal basis for each of 
the provisions or decisions which constitute the Schengen acquis: [1999] OJ L176/1. 
60 Protocols  attached to the EC Treaty and the TEU by the Treaty of Amsterdam establish specific 
derogations for Ireland and the United Kingdom from the application of Article 14 EC Treaty and Title 
IV EC Treaty (Protocols 3 and 4) and Denmark from the application of Title IV EC Treaty (Protocol 
5): see Monar, in Monar and Wessels  (eds.), above n. 37, at pp. 285-6; and Maria Fletcher, ‘EU 
Governance Techniques in the Creation of a Common European Policy on Immigration and Asylum’ 
(2002) 9 EPL, pp. 544-562, at pp. 543-550.   
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EC Treaty.61 Article 40 TEU makes specific provision for such closer cooperation in 
the Title VI TEU area with the objective of ‘enabling the Union to develop more 
rapidly into an area of freedom, security and justice’.  Finally, Belgium was granted 
partial exemption from the Protocol attached to the EC Treaty on asylum for nationals 
of the Member States.62 These provisions led some commentators to emphasise the 
Treaty of Amsterdam’s role in promoting ‘flexibility’ in the sense of ‘institutional 
rules whereby not all Member States have the same rights and obligations in certain 
policy areas’.63  
 
6.2.5 THE VIENNA ACTION PLAN: THE MEANING OF ‘FREEDOM, SECURITY 
AND JUSTICE’ 
 
The Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted on 3 December 1998 the Vienna 
Action Plan (VAP) on implementation of the Treaty of Amsterdam provisions 
establishing an area of freedom, security and justice.64  Part II of the VAP sets out a 
list of priorities and measures to be adopted to achieve the AFSJ in the fields of 
asylum and immigration policy and police cooperation and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters.65  In Part I of the VAP the Union sets out for the first time to 
elucidate the notions of ‘freedom, security, and justice’ as employed in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam:  
 
‘These three notions are closely interlinked. Freedom loses much of its 
meaning if it cannot be enjoyed in a secure environment and with the full 
backing of a system of justice in which all Union citizens and residents can 
have confidence. These three inseparable concepts have one common 
denominator ‘people’ and one cannot be achieved in full without the other 
                                                 
61 See for details Philippe de Schoutheete, ‘Closer Cooperation: Political Background and Issues in the 
Negotiation’, in Monar and Wessels (eds.), The European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam (New 
York, Continuum, 2001), pp. 150-166. 
62 See Section 8.3.3.5 of Chapter eight for an analysis of this Protocol. 
63 Eric Philippart and Monika Sie Dhian Ho, ‘Flexibility after Amsterdam: Comparative Analysis and 
Prospective Impact’, in Monar and Wessels (eds.), The European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(New York, Continuum, 2001), pp. 167-206, at p. 168. 
64 [1999] OJ C 19/1. It was based on the Commission’s  Communication ‘Towards an area of freedom, 
security and justice’: Bulletin of the European Union 7/8, p. 152:COM (1998) 459 (1998 Commission 
Ccommunication). Available at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/9807/p202001.htm#anch0597>. See for an analysis of the 
1998 Commission Communication: Lidahl, above n. 2, especially at pp. 465-467. 
65 See for details: Monar, in Monar and Wessels  (eds.), above n. 37, at pp. 286-289. 
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two. Maintaining the right balance between them must be the guiding thread 
for Union action.’66  
 
The subsequent discussion in the VAP of the concepts of freedom, security and 
justice, however, justifies the conclusion that security rather than ‘people’ was the 
common denominator driving the AFSJ agenda. However, the most significant 
connection between the three concepts is made in the preparatory 1998 Commission 
Communication: 
 
‘It is in the framework of the consolidation of an area of freedom, security 
and justice that the concept of public order appears as a common denominator 
in a society based on democracy and the rule of law. With the entry into force 
of the Amsterdam Treaty, this concept which has hitherto been determined 
principally by each individual Member State will also have to be assessed in 
terms of the new European area. Independently of the responsibilities of 
Member States for maintaining public order, we will gradually have to shape 
a ‘European public order’ based on an assessment of shared fundamental 
interests.’67 
 
The critical issue for the purposes of this research is the significance and status 
attributed to international fundamental rights in this process of shaping a European 
public order.68 Only if fundamental rights are guaranteed a secure and effective status 
in the AFSJ would a European public order emerge which could lay claim to being 
‘just’ in the sense elaborated in Chapter one. In its analysis of the concept of liberty, 
the  VAP locates ‘the full range of fundamental human rights, including protection 
from any form of discrimination as foreseen by Articles 12 and 13 TEC and 6 of the 
TEU’ as a complement to an extended concept of freedom which extends ‘beyond 
free movement of people across internal borders’ to embrace ‘freedom to live in a 
law-abiding environment in the knowledge that public authorities are using 
everything in their individual and collective power (nationally, at the level of the 
Union and beyond) to combat and contain those who seek to deny or abuse that 
                                                 
66 VAP, at para. 5. See for an analysis of this proposition as originally set out in the 1998 Commission 
Communication: Lidahl, above n. 2, at pp. 466-467. 
67 Above n. 64. This passage, somewhat surprisingly, appears in a section of the 1998 Commission 
Communication entitled ‘area of justice’. However, as Lidahl points out, the concept of a European 
public order, in the field of immigration and asylum policies at least, may be characterised  rather by 
the deprivation of fundamental rights and suspension of the rule of law: above n. 2, at pp. 480-483. 
68 Lidahl analyses this passage in the context of the Union’s immigration and asylum policies: above n. 
2, at pp. 480-483. 
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freedom.’69 It is noteworthy that this notion of freedom is negative rather than 
positive, in terms of the classic analysis of liberty made by Isaiah Berlin, and 
reinforces the view that the VAP focused on the security aspects of the AFSJ.70 The 
VAP gives the notion of ‘justice’ a restricted and ancillary meaning tied to the 
administration of justice rather than the promotion of justice as an independent value: 
 
‘Justice must be seen as facilitating the day-to-day life of people and bringing 
to justice those who threaten the freedom and security of individuals and 
society. This includes both access to justice and full judicial cooperation 
among Member States. What Amsterdam provides is a conceptual and 
institutional framework to make sure that those values are defended 
throughout the Union.’71 
 
In this conception of justice, fundamental human rights play a subordinate role 
limited to specific areas of implementation of the area of justice, such as procedural 
guarantees in criminal and civil proceedings. The restricted notions of liberty and 
justice adopted in the VAP, and the dominant role assigned to security, undermines 
the potentially radical scope of the three concepts of freedom, security and justice to 
anchor fundamental rights in this developing and sensitive area of Union policy. This 
ambivalence towards the scope and role of fundamental rights in the AFSJ has 
resulted in concerns as to the compatibility of anti-terrorism and asylum and refugee 
measures adopted by the Union with international fundamental rights standards.72 
The notions of liberty and justice as developed by the Union institutions in the 
context of the AFSJ predominantly reflect the specific security agenda of the Union 
and the Member States.73 While this approach is perhaps explicable in terms of the 
                                                 
69 VAP, at para. 6.  
70 I. Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford, OUP, 1969), pp. 118-172. 
71  VAP, at para. 19. 
72 On the Union’s anti-terrorism measures, see: The Balance between Freedom and Security in the 
Response by the European Union and its Member States to the Terrorist Threats, EU Network of 
Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights, 31 March 2003: available at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/cfr_cdf/doc/obs_thematique_en.pdf>. On Union measures in 
the asylum and immigration field, see sections 8.3 and 8.4 of Chapter eight. 
73 The Commission is aware of this criticism and in its final report of 2 June 2004 on the 
implementation of the Tampere programme placed increased emphasis on the role of fundamental 
rights: ‘This sensitivity to crises, such as the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and 11 March 2004, 
have sometimes given rise to criticism that progress is made in an unbalanced way overemphasising 
security aspects.  While this is the impression that may be given by certain media reports, European 
integration in this area is based on a rigorous concept of the protection of fundamental rights, and the 
Commission has always been at pains to ensure balance between the freedom, security and justice 
aspects. In addition, the Union must guarantee a high level of security so that the freedoms can be 
exercised to the full.’ Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament: Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere Programme and future 
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specific legislative program being developed by the Union institutions in 
implementation of the AFSJ, it reinforces the need for independent definitions of the 
notions of ‘freedom’ and ‘justice’ to assess the legitimacy of Union action in the 
AFSJ. It is a central contention of this study that international fundamental rights 
provide the most appropriate measure of justice in the AFSJ. 
                                                                                                                                           
 
6.2.6  TAMPERE TO THE TREATY OF NICE   
 
Political backing for accelerated progress in the JHA field led to the summoning of a 
special European Council meeting in October 1999 at Tampere to address future 
progress in implementing the Treaty of Amsterdam provisions on the AFSJ and the 
VAP. The conclusions of the Tampere European Council focused on the following 
areas:74 the development of a common EU asylum and migration policy; the 
establishment of a ‘European Area of Justice’ with emphasis on access to justice and 
mutual recognition of judicial decisions; the fight against organised and transnational 
crime; and increased external action by the Union in the AFSJ.75 As part of the 
program to fight organized crime, the decision was made to create Eurojust composed 
of national prosecutors, magistrates and police officers.76 Finally, the Tampere 
European Council established the composition, method of work and practical 
arrangements for the body set up to elaborate the draft EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.77 Under instructions from the Tampere European Council, the Commission 
has prepared a regularly updated scoreboard of progress on the various measures 
required for implementation of the Tampere conclusions.78 
 
 orientations COM(2004) 4002 final, at  p.4. Available at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/intro/docs/bilan_tampere_en.pdf>. 
74 Council Doc. SN 200/99. Available at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/oct99/oct99_en.htm>. 
75 See Monar, in Monar and Wessels  (eds.), above n.  37, at pp. 289-93. 
76 See Christine Van den Wyngaert, ‘Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor in the Corpus Juris 
Model: Water and Fire?’, in Walker (ed.), Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Oxford, 
OUP, 2004), pp. 201-240. 
77 See further Section 5.4 of Chapter five. 
78 A list of the bi-annual scoreboards presented by the Commission is available at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/wai/scoreboard_en.htm>. On 2 June 2004, the 
Commission presented its final report on the implementation of the Tampere programme:  
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere Programme and future orientations  COM(2004) 
4002 final. Available at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/intro/docs/bilan_tampere_en.pdf>. On the basis 
of this Commission Communication, and a Recommendation adopted by the European Parliament on 
14 October 2004 (P6_TA-PROV (2004) 0022 A6-0010/2004), the European Council adopted the 
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The Treaty of Nice,79 which was agreed by the Heads of State or Government of the 
Member States on 11 December 2000 at the conclusion of the Intergovernmental 
Conference and formally signed on 26 February 2001, had a less substantial impact 
on the policy areas covered by AFSJ than the Treaty of Amsterdam.  This is in part 
attributable to the success of the Treaty of Amsterdam in establishing a firm basis for 
Community and Union action in the AFSJ and in part to the different priorities at 
Nice, not least of which was the proposed enlargement of the Union.  The most 
significant changes in the Treaty of Nice relating to the AFSJ are: the extension of 
qualified majority voting and the co-decision procedure to areas of Title IV of the EC 
Treaty;80 the introduction of a specific reference in Article 29 EC Treaty to Eurojust 
and establishing a list of its principal tasks in Article 31(2) TEU; and amendment of 
the cooperation procedure established by the Treaty of Amsterdam  and renamed 
‘enhanced cooperation’ and regulated under Title VII TEU and Article 11 EC 
Treaty.81 In addition, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the 
Charter) was proclaimed by the EP, the Council and the Commission on 7 December 
2000.82 
 
The Treaty of Nice did not address the deficiencies in the AFSJ structure relating to 
the lack of democratic accountability, transparency in decision-making and judicial 
control.83 The Declaration (No. 23) ‘On the Future of the Union’ annexed to the 
                                                                                                                                            
Hague Programme on Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in The European Union at its 
meeting in Brussels on 4-5 November 2004. Available as Annex 1 to the Presidency Conclusions 
(14292/04) (Hague Programme): available at 
<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/82534.pdf>. 
The Commission issued a new five year Action Plan based on the Hague Programme on 10 May 2005: 
The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years: The Partnership for European renewal 
in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice. COM(2005) 184 final. Available at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/news/information_dossiers/the_hague_priorities/doc/com_20
05_184_en.pdf>. 
79 [2001] OJ C/80/1. The Treaty of Nice entered into force on 1 February 2003. 
80 The rules on the application of  qualified majority voting to Title IV EC Treaty and other changes 
made by the  Treaty of Nice are discussed in Jörg Monar, ‘Continuing and Building on Amsterdam: 
The Reforms of the Treaty of Nice’ in Monar and Wessels (eds.), The European Union after the Treaty 
of Amsterdam (New York, Continuum, 2001), pp. 321-334.  
81 In particular the right of veto of a single Member State was removed by the Treaty of Nice in respect 
of First and Third Pillar, but not Second Pillar, policy areas.  See generally: John A. Usher, ‘Enhanced 
Cooperation or Flexibility in the Post-Nice Era’, in Arnull and Wincott (eds.), Accountability and 
Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford, OUP, 2002), p. 98-112. 
82 [2000] OJ C364/1. The Charter is discussed in Chapter five. 
83 For a succinct critique of the AFSJ, see Henri Labayle’s exposé to Working Group X on ‘Freedom, 
Security and Justice’; CONV 346/02 of 16 October 2002, pp. 1-6. Available on the European 
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Treaty of Nice recognised that further reforms were needed.84 The Declaration 
proposed a public process for debating the future of the Union leading to a further 
IGC in 2004, with specific reference to the delimitation of powers between the Union 
and the Member States, the status of the Charter, a simplification of the Treaties, and 
the role of the national parliaments in the European architecture.85 In this context, the 
Declaration recognised the ‘need to improve and to monitor the democratic 
legitimacy and transparency of the Union and its institutions, in order to bring them 
closer to the citizens of the Member States.’86  
 
6.2.7  SEPTEMBER 11 TO THE LAEKEN DECLARATION 
 
Prior to the European Council meeting at Laeken in December 2001 for formalising 
the process for the debate on the future of the Union, the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001 on the United States radically altered the international security 
context with substantial repercussions for both international law, Union law and the 
law of the Member States in respect of shifting the balance between the protection of 
fundamental rights and security in favor of security objectives.87 The European 
Council met at an extraordinary session in Brussels on 21 September 2001 to discuss 
the Union’s response and established a Union policy to combat terrorism based on: 
enhancing police and judicial cooperation through accelerated implementation of the 
programme agreed at Tampere; developing international legal instruments to combat 
terrorism, and in particular supporting the drafting of a general UN Convention 
against terrorism;88 measures to combat the funding of terrorism; strengthening air 
                                                                                                                                            
Convention website. See also Cristina Polo’s Working Paper of 17 July 2002 for the European Policy 
Centre ‘ Should Pillar III be abolished and if so how?’.  Available from the European Policy Centre: 
<http://www.theepc.be/home.asp>. 
84 Available at:  
< http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12001C/htm/C_2001080EN.007001.html>. 
85 Ibid , at para. 5.  
86 Ibid., at para. 6. 
87 See: Philip A. Thomas, ‘September 11th and Good Governance’ (2002) 53 Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly, pp. 366-390; Michael Byers, ‘Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law after 11 
September’ (2002) 51 ICLQ, pp. 401-414; A. Cassese, ‘Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial  
Legal Categories of International Law’ (2001) 12 EJIL, pp. 993-1001; and Anthea Roberts, ‘Righting 
Wrongs or Wronging Rights? The United States And Human Rights Post-September 11’ (2004) 15 
EJIL, pp. 721-749.  
88 There are twelve UN Conventions and Protocols on issues directly related to terrorist activities: 
listed at <http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp>. In addition, The International Convention 
for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was adopted at New York on 13 April 2005. It 
was opened for signature on 14 September 2005 and enters into force upon ratification by 22 
states. A general convention on terrorism is under negotiation under the direction of the Ad Hoc 
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security; and coordinating the Union’s response to terrorism.89 This programme 
resulted in the accelerated adoption of existing proposals in the JHA field, and in 
particular the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest 
Warrant and the Surrender Procedures between Member States90 and the Council 
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism,91 and the 
introduction of a series of new JHA measures both internally and externally.92 
                                                                                                                                           
 
In the context of this programme of anti-terrorism related measures, it was surprising 
that only a passing reference was made to September 11 in the European Council’s 
Laeken Declaration of 15 December 2001 on the Future of the European Union and 
that the text followed closely the parameters set in Declaration No. 23 to the Treaty of 
Nice.93 Indeed, the Laeken Declaration can be characterized in the context of the 
post-September 11 political environment as a liberal and progressive document with a 
strong emphasis on Europe as a continent of ‘humane values’ and whose ‘one 
boundary is democracy and human rights.’94 This separation of security issues from 
the process of constitutional reform was beneficial to the final outcome of the 
Constitution from the perspective of the protection of fundamental rights. However, 
in the context of the AFSJ, security re-emerged as the primary concern in the reform 
proposals submitted by Working Group X to the European Convention.95 The Laeken 
Declaration, in addition to confirming the specific issues to be addressed, also 
established the composition of the European Convention, the length of its 
 
Committee on Terrorism of the UN General Assembly, although progress is being hampered by 
failure to agree on a definition of terrorism.   
89 Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 
2001: available at: < http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/140.en.pdf>. 
90 [2002] OJ L190/1. See Section 8.3.3.6 of Chapter eight for an analysis of this Framework Decision. 
91 [2002] OJ L164/3. 
92 A list of JHA measures adopted and under negotiation is available at: 
<http://ue.eu.int/cms3_applications/docCenter.ASP?expandID=146&lang=en&cmsID=245>. For an 
analysis of the principal measures, see: S. Peers, ‘EU Responses to Terrorism’ [2003] 52 ICLQ, pp. 
227-243; Wouters and Naert, above n. 57; and Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, ‘The Rule of Law in the 
European Union – Putting the Security into the “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”’ (2004) 29 EL 
Rev., pp. 219-241. 
93 The Laeken declaration is annexed to the Presidency Conclusions of the Laeken European Council 
meeting of 14/15 December 2001: available at: 
<<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/68827.pdf>>. 
94 See for an analysis of the objectives set out in the Laeken Declaration: Frank Vibert, ‘Developing a 
Constitution for the Union’, in Arnull and Wincott (eds.), Accountability and Legitimacy in the 
European Union (Oxford, OUP, 2002), pp. 167-182. The relationship between the objectives for the 
Union established in the Laeken declaration and the fundamental rights reforms in the Constitution is 
explored in Chapter five. 
95 See Section 6.2.8 below. 
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proceedings, from 1 March 2002 to 1 March 2003, and its working methods including 
participation of organisations representing civil society. 
 
6.2.8   THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION: REFORM PROPOSALS  
 
Working Group X on ‘Freedom, Security and Justice’ (WGX) was set up by the 
European Convention following a plenary debate on the AFSJ on 6-7 June 2002 with 
John Bruton as its Chair.96 The mandate of WGX established four key areas for its 
deliberations on reform of the AFSJ:97 improvements to the EC Treaty and the TEU; 
improvements to instruments and procedures; improved definition of Union 
competences in criminal law matters; and review of Union competences in the field of 
asylum and immigration. The mandate of WGX overlapped with other Working 
Groups established by the European Convention, and in particular with the work of 
Working Group II on ‘Incorporation of the Charter/Accession to the ECHR’ (WGII)98 
and Working Group IX on Simplification (WGIX).99 The mandate of WGX 
recognized the need to ‘maintain an appropriate balance’ between security 
requirements and respect for fundamental rights100 but the primary focus of WGX’s 
deliberations was on the effectiveness of the Union’s policy from a security 
perspective and this priority is reflected in its final report (WGX Final Report).101  
In its introduction to WGX Final Report, WGX emphasised the equal importance of 
liberty, security and justice in the development of AFSJ policy and that ‘this policy 
                                                 
96 John Bruton was Taoiseach from 1994-1997. He is currently the Union’s ambassador to the United 
States. A note of the plenary meeting of 6-7 June 2002 is set out in CONV 97/02 of 19 June 2002: 
available on the European Convention website. A general report on the JHA and its problems from the 
Praesidium to the Convention is set out in CONV 69/02 of 31 May 2002: available on the European 
Convention website. 
97 CONV 258/02 of 12 September 2002: available on the European Convention website. 
98 See Chapter five for the proposals of WGII.  
99 See: Final Report of Working Group IX on Simplification, CONV 424/02 of 29 November 2002: 
available on the European Convention website. 
100 CONV 426/02, at p. 4: available on the European Convention website. 
101 Final Report of Working Group X of 2 December 2002: CONV 426/02: available on the European 
Convention website. The focus of WGX on security issues is reflected in the professional background 
of the majority of experts invited by WGX and the themes of the discussions at the five meetings in 
which they participated: see CONV 274/02 of 17 September 2002 for the agenda for the meetings of 
WGX (available on the European Convention website); for a list of experts appearing before WGX see 
the Annex to WGX Final Report.  The short three month period between the setting up of WGX and its 
Final Report further limited its ability to undertake an in-depth reassessment of the Union’s policy in 
the AFSJ. These shortcomings were also identified in the 26th Report of the European Scrutiny 
Committee of the House of Commons on Working Group X’s Final Report: Session 2002/2003, 
published on 25 June 2003; available at: 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmeuleg/63-xxvi/6302.htm>. 
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should be rooted in a shared commitment to freedom based upon human rights, 
democratic institutions and rule of law’.102 It also pursued the idea of creating a 
‘European public order’:103 
 
‘Indeed, it is important that the citizens feel that a proper sense of “European 
public order” (“ordre public européen”) has taken shape and is actually 
visible today in their daily lives. In this respect, the principles of transparency 
and democratic control are of utmost importance. The establishment of a 
European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is also closely linked with 
respect of the rights of citizens and the principle of non-discrimination 
(Articles 12 and 13 TEC).’104  
 
However, an analysis of the concrete proposals in WGX Final Report reveals that 
WGX considered that the principal focus of the AFSJ should be the prioritisation of 
security over freedom and justice and the notion of a European public order in the 
progressive sense advanced was not developed.  
 
The most fundamental reform proposed by WGX was to abolish the Third Pillar and 
create a single legal and institutional framework for the AFSJ.105   However, WGX 
did not propose the full adoption of the ‘Community method’ but in the field of Title 
VI TEU policies it recommended retaining special mechanisms and procedures to 
take account of the ‘specific features of the area of police and criminal law.’106 In the 
area of asylum and refugee policy governed by Title IV EC Treaty, WGX 
recommended the following reforms to facilitate achievement of the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS):107 the extension of qualified majority voting and 
                                                 
102 WGX Final Report, ibid., at p. 2. 
103 As discussed in Section 6.2.5, the concept of a European public order was introduced in the 
Commission’s 1998 Communication to the Council in preparation for adopting the VAP.  
104 WGX Final Report, above n. 101, at p. 2.  
105 The relevant provisions of the Constitution which implement recommendations in WGX Final 
report are indicated in the footnotes to the following summary and analysis of WGX Final Report. If a 
recommendation was not adopted this is also stated.  
106 WGX Final Report, above n. 101, at p. 3. Article III-258 goes beyond this by providing the 
European Council shall ‘define the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning’ 
throughout the AFSJ whereas under Article I-21(1) the European Council’s role is generally limited to 
defining the ‘general political directions and priorities’ of the Union. Article I-42 refers to the specific 
provisions relating to the AFSJ in Chapter IV of Part III of the Constitution. In addition to those 
specific references, Article III-259 provides for national parliaments to ensure measures relating to 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation comply with the principle of 
subsidiarity. 
107 WGX Final Report, above n. 101, at pp. 3-7. 
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co-decision to all Union legislation in the field;108 the creation of a general legal base 
to allow for Union competence not only in respect of refugees protected by the 
Refugee Convention but also complementary forms of protection;109 and formal 
recognition of the principle of solidarity and burden-sharing.110 
 
In the Third Pillar area, WGX proposed replacement of the existing legislative 
instruments by the standard Union instruments resulting from the proposals of 
Working Group IX (WGIX) on Simplification and conversion of the existing 
Conventions concluded under Article 34 TEU into European laws.111 WGX also 
recommended the broadening of the Union’s competence to act in the fields of police 
and judicial cooperation from the current basis in Articles 30 and 31 TEU. In 
particular, it proposed broadening the competence for the Union to approximate both 
defined areas of substantive criminal law and elements of criminal procedure.112 It 
also recommended the extension of the principle of mutual recognition of all forms of 
judicial decisions and a specific legal basis for the Union to support the action of the 
Member States in the field of crime prevention.113 While WGX recommended a 
significant extension of qualified majority voting and co-decision in the Third Pillar 
areas, it recognized that unanimity should be retained in particularly sensitive areas 
relating to the exercise of police powers and approximation of the substantive 
criminal law.114 On the issue of whether the Member States should retain a joint right 
                                                 
108 Implemented, since under Article I-34 the co-decision procedure under Article III-396 applies 
unless otherwise provided in the Constitution and no such provision is made in Section 2 of Chapter IV 
of Part III of the Constitution that regulates Union policies in the CEAS.  
109 Implemented by Article III-266(1). 
110 Implemented by Articles III-257 and III-268. 
111 WGX Final Report, above n. 101, at pp. 7-8.  Article I-34 provides for European laws and 
framework laws as the only legislative acts of the Union. The Final Report of WGIX, CONV 424/02, 
29 November 2002, is available on the European Convention website. A list of the Conventions 
concluded by the Member States in the areas covered by the Third Pillar is available at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/criminal/doc_criminal_intro_en.htm>. See 
generally: Peers, above n. 13, at pp. 27-28; Peers, ‘Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law in the 
European Union: Has the Council got it Wrong?’ (2004) 41 CMLR, pp. 5-36; and Meri Rantala, ‘A 
Treaty Labyrinth of Legal Co-operation in Criminal Matters: Can Europe find Ariadne’s Thread?’, in 
Kronenberger (ed.), The European Union and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony? 
(Hague, Kluwer, 2001), pp. 519-552.  WGX refers specifically to the Europol Convention signed on 26 
July 1995, which was based on Article K TEU, as an urgent example of a convention which needed to 
be converted: [1995] OJ C316/1.  
112 WG X Final Report, above n. 101, at pp. 9-1. Implemented by Articles III-270 and III-271. 
113 Ibid, at pp. 11-12. Implemented by Articles I-42(1)(b), III-269, and III-270 and by Article III-272 
respectively. 
114 Ibid., at pp. 13-15. Articles III-271, III-274(1), III-275(3) and III-277 provide for unanimous voting 
in the Council in specified areas previously covered by the Third Pillar. Article I-23(3) provides the 
Council shall act by qualified majority unless otherwise provided in the Constitution. 
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of initiative with the Commission in legislative proposals in the Third Pillar, WGX 
proposed a compromise whereby a quarter of the Member States would have to 
support such an initiative.115 
 
In the second part of its report, WGX set out proposals for reforming operational 
collaboration in the AFSJ mainly designed to promote increased efficiency in the 
security sphere rather than a substantive improvement in transparency and 
accountability. It recommended that the powers of the Coordinating Committee 
established under Article 36 TEU should be redrafted to focus on operational rather 
than legislative proposals but failed to set out measures to ensure the operation of the 
Committee is subject to transparency in its proceedings or effective control by the 
European Parliament and national parliaments.116  On the management of the Union’s 
borders, WGX proposed a legal basis in the Constitution for the gradual development 
of a common European border guard.117 
 
In relation to Europol and Eurojust, WGX recommended inserting in the Constitution 
a more extensive legal basis for developing their activities.118 In the case of Europol, 
WGX recognizes that its activities will ‘need in the future to be subject to democratic 
accountability to the European Parliament and to the Council, as well as to judicial 
control by the ECJ in accordance with the normal Treaty rules’.119 Although WGX 
made no equivalent recommendation in respect of Eurojust, Article III-273(1) 
provides that European laws shall ‘determine arrangements for involving the 
European Parliament and national Parliaments in the evaluation of Eurojust’s 
actions.’ WGX failed to reach a common position on the creation of a legal basis in 
the Constitution for a European Public Prosecutor (EPP) or the scope of such a body’s 
                                                 
115 Ibid, at p. 15. Recommendation adopted in Article III-264. 
116 Ibid, at pp. 16-17. Recommendation implemented  by Article III-261. 
117 Ibid, at p. 17. Recommendation partially implemented by Article III-265(1)(c) which refers to an 
‘integrated management system for external borders’. However, Article III-265(3) provides Article III-
265 shall not ‘affect the competence of the Member States concerning the geographical demarcation of 
their borders, in accordance with international law.’ 
118 Ibid, at pp. 18-19. Implemented by Articles III-273and III-276 respectively. 
119 Ibid, at p. 18. The current supervision mechanisms over Europol, which do not involve the ECJ, and 
the immunities of its staff are analysed by Fijnaut, in Walker (ed.), above n. 51, at pp. 256-257.  Article 
34(1) of the Europol Convention provides: ‘The Council Presidency shall each year forward a special 
report to the European Parliament on the work of Europol. The European Parliament shall be consulted 
should this Convention be amended in any way.’ Article III-276(2) provides that European laws ‘shall 
lay down the procedures for scrutiny of Europol’s activities by the European Parliament, together with 
national Parliaments’.  
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powers.120 However, Article III-274 allows for the creation of such a post by 
unanimous decision of the Council after obtaining the consent of the EP.  Initially, 
Article III-274(1) limits the powers of the EPP to offences against the Union’s 
financial interests but Article IIII-274(4) allows the European Council, after 
consulting the EP,  to adopt by unanimity a European Decision to extend the EPP’s 
powers to include ‘serious crime having a cross-border dimension’. 
 
The final section of WGX Final Report addresses general issues relating to the 
operation and control of AFSJ policy and legislation. Firstly, it proposed improved 
implementation by the Member States of Union policy in the AFSJ by a system of 
mutual evaluation121 and by extending the Commission’s powers to take proceedings 
under the Article 226 EC Treaty mechanism if a Member State breaches an obligation 
under the Third Pillar.122 Secondly, WGX proposed measures to increase the role of 
national parliaments in monitoring and developing AFSJ policy and ensuring respect 
for the principle of subsidiarity.123 Thirdly, on the respective competence of the 
Union and Member States to conclude international conventions in the AFSJ, WGX 
deferred to the recommendations of Working Group VII on External Action and left 
open the future role of the Member States in negotiating international agreements 
independently of the Union in the area of judicial cooperation.124 Fourthly, WGX left 
                                                 
120 Ibid., at p. 20.  
121 WGX Report, above n. 101, at p. 21. Recommendation implemented by Article III-260. 
122 Recommendation implemented by Article III-360 which provides power for the Commission to 
commence the equivalent of the Article 226 EC Treaty procedure for a failure of a Member State to ‘to 
fulfil an obligation under the Constitution’. 
123 WGX Final Report, above n. 101, at pp. 22-23. WGX’s proposals were partially implemented in 
Article III-259, which requires national parliaments to ensure proposals in the field of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation respect the principle of subsidiarity, and Article 
III-260. However, Article III-258, which confers on the European Council the duty to define the 
strategic guidelines in the AFSJ, does not follow WGX’s recommendation for involvement of national 
parliaments in this task. Article III-276(2) follows WGX’s recommendation and provides for 
provisions to be made in European laws for the scrutiny of Europol’s activities by the EP and national 
parliaments. See also Article I-42(2). 
124 WGX Final Report, above n. 101, at pp. 24-25. See also the Final report of WGVII on External 
Action of 16 December 2002: CONV 459/02. Available on the European Convention website. WGVII 
recommended that international agreements in the area currently covered by the Second and Third 
Pillar should be concluded on a single legal basis: ibid. at pp. 9-10 and p. 30. The Constitution does not 
have an express provision equivalent to Article 38 TEU which permitted Second Pillar agreements 
concluded under Article 24 TEU to include matters under the Third Pillar. International agreements 
relating to the AFSJ will therefore generally have to be concluded under Article III-323(1) which 
authorises the Union to conclude an agreement where it ‘is necessary in order to achieve, within the 
framework of the Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in this Constitution, or is provided 
for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope.’ However, 
Article III-267(3) specifically provides for the conclusion of readmission agreements with third 
countries. Annex 27 to the Constitution addresses the issue of continuing Member State competence: 
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open the future of the opting-in or opting–out arrangements in relation to the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark under the Treaty of Amsterdam in respect of Title IV 
EC Treaty and the Schengen acquis to the Convention.125 Finally, the majority of 
WGX proposed that the current restrictions on the jurisdiction of the ECJ in Title IV 
EC Treaty and Title VI TEU be removed.126   
 
6.2.9 THE CONSTITUTION AND REFORM OF THE AFSJ  
 
The Constitution incorporates the majority of WGX’s recommendations, although 
detailed negotiation in the IGC continued up until the final agreement reached by the 
IGC on 18 June 2004 on specific issues related to judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, the EPP, judicial cooperation in civil matters, Eurojust, and the negotiation 
and conclusion of international agreements by Member States in the AFSJ.127 The 
acceptance by the IGC of WGX’s principal recommendations is surprising insofar as 
the terms of reference for the European Convention in the Laeken declaration did not 
provide for such a wholesale restructuring of the AFSJ. The reforms of the AFSJ in 
the Constitution reflect a compromise between those Member States in favour of 
further substantial integration and those determined to preserve the national identity 
of their criminal justice system.128 However, both sides finally agreed that the 
existing structure of the AFSJ, with separate rules and procedures for the Third Pillar, 
was indefensible both on grounds of operational efficiency and public legitimacy and 
that in the critical areas of immigration and asylum and anti-terrorism and organized 
criminality joint action at the Union level was essential. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
‘The Conference confirms that Member States may negotiate and conclude agreements with third 
countries or international organisations in the areas covered by Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Chapter IV of 
Title III of Part III of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe insofar as such agreements 
comply with Union law.’ 
125 WGX Final Report, above n. 101, at p. 24. Protocols 17-20 of the Constitution set out these 
arrangements on substantially unchanged terms. 
126 WGX Final Report, above n. 101, at pp. 24-25. This proposal and the relevant provisions in the 
Constitution are analysed in Sections 7.4 of Chapter seven. 
127 See for the detailed text subject to negotiation in these areas: Annexes 23-27 of CIG 81/04 of 16 
June 2004. Available on the IGC website. 
128 See for a valuable analysis of the conflicting positions on the reform of the AFSJ: Walker, in 
Walker (ed.), above n. 38, at pp. 28-31. 
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The principal issue for the purposes of this study is whether the reform of the AFSJ 
would create a robust and effective constitutional structure.129 The reforms in the 
Constitution constitute a significant improvement over the existing structure in 
providing a secure legal basis for achieving this objective. In particular, the abolition 
of the Third Pillar and the establishment of a common legal framework for legislative 
and administrative action in the AFSJ would normalize the AFSJ by aligning its 
treatment in the Union’s legal order with that of other shared Union competences.130  
Furthermore, Article III-257(1) introduces an explicit requirement for respect of 
fundamental rights in the AFSJ.131 When read in the context of the other reforms in 
the Constitution for the protection of fundamental rights, and in particular 
incorporation of the Charter and Union accession to the ECHR, the Constitution 
provides a firm constitutional basis for the effective protection of fundamental rights 
in the AFSJ. 
 
However, this positive conclusion has to be counter-balanced by the effect of the 
provisions in the Constitution that retain or reinforce the priority accorded to security 
within the AFSJ. These provisions have the potential to undermine the positive 
aspects of the reform of the AFSJ. Article I-5, which regulates relations between the 
Union and the Member States, introduces a new provision which includes in 
paragraph (1), second sentence, the obligation for the Union to respect the ‘essential 
State functions’ of the Member States, ‘including ensuring the territorial integrity of 
the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security.’ In the 
specific context of the AFSJ, this obligation is reinforced in Article III-262 which, 
adopting the same wording as Article 33 TEU and Article 64(1) EC Treaty, provides 
that the provisions in Chapter IV of Title III of Part III of the Constitution ‘shall not 
affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard 
to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.’  
 
                                                 
129 See Section 1.1 of Chapter one for analysis of the criteria proposed for evaluating the robustness 
and effectiveness of a constitutional structure. 
130 However, differences in legislative procedure and institutional involvement are retained in specific 
areas as detailed in section 6.2.8 of this Chapter.  For a commentary on the changes to the AFSJ as set 
out in the July 2003 version of the draft Constitutional Treaty, from the perspective of operational 
capacity and accountability, see Walker, in Walker (ed.), above n. 38, at pp. 31-35. 
131 ‘The Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for fundamental 
rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States.’ 
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These provisions continue the substantial uncertainty as to the respective scope of the 
competences of the Union and the Member States. In particular it is unclear how the 
notions of ‘law and order’ and ‘internal security’ and ‘national security’ would be 
interpreted.132 The fact that Article 64(1) EC Treaty was included in Title IV EC 
Treaty dealing with asylum and immigration policy indicates the potential for an 
interpretation of security extending beyond the more obvious areas of the AFSJ 
relating to judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation. The 
retention of such a broad and undefined exclusion of Union competence in the AFSJ 
may also give rise to jurisdictional disputes between the ECJ and the national courts 
in determining the boundaries between the national and Union legal order.133 
 
 
6.3 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The chequered history of the development of the AFSJ reveals the ambivalence of the 
Member States to ceding competences in key areas of national sovereignty to the 
Union institutions. The recent and somewhat unexpected consensus, most radically 
expressed in the reforms of the AFSJ in the Constitution, for a significant transfer of 
powers in such contentious areas as police cooperation and asylum and immigration 
policy reflects two unrelated but contemporaneous series of events: the enlargement 
process and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The enlargement of the Union 
to twenty-five members, and the potential for further enlargement, focused attention 
on the need to establish minimum standards at a Union level to address issues of 
criminal justice and immigration and asylum.   The terrorist attacks of 11 September, 
followed by the attacks in Madrid of  11 March 2004 and in London on 7 and 21 July 
2005, have created an environment where cross-border cooperation on anti-terrorism 
measures is accepted by the Member States as essential. In both contexts, a transfer of 
competences to the Union has been agreed both from a policy perspective and as a 
key ingredient in promoting the advantages of the Union to its citizens. 
 
However, this political consensus has preceded a commensurate development in the 
democratic and legal structure of the AFJS that has remained mired in the 
                                                 
132 See further Section 7.4.2 of Chapter Seven.   
133 See Section 3.3 of Chapter three for the related issue of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz.  
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intergovernmentalism that characterised its development. In particular, the security 
element of the AFSJ has predominated to the detriment of justice and liberty. The 
reform of the AFSJ in the Constitution reflected the concerted pressure of NGOs, and 
the broad consensus of academic opinion, for radical improvements to the role of the 
institutions of the Union, and in particular that of the ECJ and the EP, in providing 
democratic and judicial control over AFSJ measures and their implementation. These 
reforms were further bolstered by the reform of fundamental rights protection in the 
Constitution, and in particular the incorporation of the Charter and Union accession to 
the ECHR. The stalling of the ratification process is therefore of particular concern as 
regards the AFSJ from a fundamental rights perspective since the political pressures 
arising from enlargement and terrorism have not abated. It is in this context that 
Chapter seven examines in detail the protection of fundamental rights in the AFJS 
and the proposed reforms in the Constitution.  
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7  
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE AFSJ: A FLAWED SYSTEM OF 
JURISDICTION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter analyses the jurisdictional basis for the protection of fundamental rights in 
the AFSJ in respect of Third Pillar measures and measures adopted under Title IV EC 
Treaty. It assesses the deficiencies of the present system from the perspective of 
compliance with the rule of law and argues that these deficiencies undermine the 
legitimacy of the Union’s legal order. In particular it analyses the negative consequences 
for legitimacy arising from the restrictions on justiciability in respect of Third Pillar 
measures in light of recent case law of the ECJ and the ECtHR on the basis enforceability 
is a key criterion of the effectiveness of a legal system’s protection of fundamental 
rights.1 Finally, it assesses the genesis and effectiveness of the reforms in the 
Constitution. 
The key issue for assessing how just is the AFSJ both under its existing split structure 
and under the unified regime in the Constitution is the effectiveness of the Union’s legal 
order in providing recognition and enforcement of international fundamental rights. The 
deficiencies of the existing regime both with respect to the Third Pillar provisions on 
justiciability and, to a more limited extent, the restrictions in Title IV EC Treaty, has 
attracted sustained criticism from both within and outside the Union’s institutions and 
demands that the ECJ be granted full jurisdiction over all areas of the AFSJ on the same 
conditions as other areas of Union law.2 However, it was far from certain that the 
                                                 
1 See: W. van Gerven, ‘Remedies for Infringements of Fundamental Rights’ (2004) 10 EPL, pp. 261-284; 
and Thomas Eilmansberger, ‘The Relationship Between Rights and Remedies in EC Law: In Search of the 
Missing Link’ (2004) 41 CML Rev., pp. 1199-1246.   
2 See the various submissions on the deficiencies in judicial control presented by the expert witnesses to 
Working Group II (WGII): listed in Working Document 21 of 1 October 2002, at p. 3, n. 7. Available on 
the European Convention website.  See also: The Joint Submissions made to Working Group X (WGX) by: 
The Standing Committee of Experts on International Immigration, Refugee and Criminal Law; the 
Immigration Law Practitioners Association; Statewatch; and the European Council of Refugees and Exiles 
(ECRE), of 14 November 2002, edited by D. Curtin and S. Peers: available at:  
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/nov/CM02-10%20jtsub.pdf>; and the experts cited in The Future 
Role of the European Court of Justice, Sixth Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on European 
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Member States would accede to such a substantial extension of the jurisdiction of the 
ECJ in an area where security requirements had taken precedence over access to justice 
and the protection of fundamental rights at the national and Union level.3 The extension 
of ECJ jurisdiction over the AFSJ, albeit subject to potential continuing limitations in the 
security domain, therefore constitutes one of the principal achievements in the 
Constitution.  
 
The following analysis of fundamental rights protection in the AFSJ is divided into four 
sections.4  The first section examines the status of fundamental rights in the Third Pillar, 
with a particular focus on the Union, national and ECHR jurisdictional mechanisms 
available to challenge the validity of Third Pillar and implementing national measures.  
The second section analyses the restrictions on ECJ jurisdiction in Title IV EC Treaty. 
The third section outlines the jurisdictional provisions for review of the incorporated 
Schengen acquis for its compatibility with fundamental right.  The final section analyses 
WGX’s reform proposals in the area of ECJ control over the AFSJ and assesses the 
potential effectiveness of the new regime under the Constitution in remedying the 
deficiencies of the current structure and strengthening justice as a key component of the 
AFSJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Union, at paras. 115-127: session 2003/2004, printed on March 2004. Available at: 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldselect/ldeucom/47/4702.htm>. 
3 In the case of the United Kingdom, for example, there was parliamentary and ministerial opposition to the 
reforms proposed by WGX in this area: see Working Group X’s Final Report: 26th Report of the House of 
Commons European Scrutiny Committee, Session 2002-2003, printed 25 June 2003, at paras. 59-71. 
4 The complex issues of accountability and supervision at both the political and judicial level of 
Eurojust, Europol, OLAF and, if established, the European Public Prosecutor (EPP) are not addressed. 
For a detailed analysis of the existing structures and the proposed reforms resulting from Working 
Group X, see: C. Van den Wyngaert, ‘Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor in the Corpus Juris 
Model: Water and Fire?’, in Walker (ed.), Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Oxford, 
OUP, 2004),  pp. 201-240; and C. Fijnaut, ‘Police Co-operation and the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice’ in Walker (ed.), Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Oxford, OUP, 2004), pp. 
241-282.  
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7.2 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, JURISDICTION AND THE THIRD PILLAR 
 
 
7.2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This section concentrates on the scope and deficiencies of the fundamental rights 
protection currently built into the TEU as it affects Title VI TEU measures.5 Since 
enforceability of fundamental rights is a prerequisite to their effectiveness, this inquiry is 
inextricably linked to the powers of the ECJ to control the legality of Title VI measures 
by reference to international fundamental rights standards. However, the provisions on 
the jurisdiction of the ECJ in respect of the Third Pillar are complex and purposively 
restrictive. These features reflect the policy of key Member States to prevent the ECJ 
from exercising effective control over measures adopted by the Union and the Member 
State within the scope of the Third Pillar.6  
 
This approach would have been less open to criticism if Third Pillar measures were 
subject to effective scrutiny by national courts and the ECtHR. However, recent case law 
involving challenges to Union anti-terrorism measures in the immediate aftermath of 
September 11 2001 have cast serious doubts on the availability of such remedies. In Segi 
and Gestoras Pro-Amnistía v. Germany, the ECtHR accepted the characterization of 
Third Pillar measures as intergovernmental cooperation and thereby limited the scope for 
                                                 
5 This section draws on the pioneering work in this field by Steve Peers: ‘Human Rights and the Third 
Pillar’ in Alston, Bustelo and Heenan (eds.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp. 167-
186; ‘Who’s Judging the Watchmen? The Judicial System of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ 
(1998) 18 Yearbook of European Law; and EU Justice and Home Affairs (Harlow, Longman, 2000). See 
also: Jorg Monar, ‘An “area of freedom, justice, and security”? Progress and deficits in justice and home 
affairs’ in Philip Lynch, Nanette Neuwahl and G. Wyn Rees (eds.), Reforming the European Union: From 
Maastricht to Amsterdam (Harlow, Longman, 2000), pp. 142-161, at pp 151-152. 
6 For example, the UK Government in its submissions on the scope of  the ECJ’s jurisdiction under the 
Maastricht Treaty to review a decision refusing the applicant access to Council documents adopted under 
the JHA argued: ‘Justice and Home Affairs fall outside the scope of the EC Treaty and are matters for 
inter-Governmental cooperation… It follows from Article L of the EU Treaty that the provisions of the EC 
Treaty concerning the powers of the Court do not apply to Title VI of the EU Treaty.  Accordingly the 
jurisdiction of the Court is excluded as much in procedural matters as in matters of substance.’: Case T-
174/95, Svenska Journalistförbundet v. Council [1998] ECR II-2289, at para. 71. The French Government 
supported the UK in arguing against the applicant’s action to annul the decision of refusal. The Swedish, 
Danish and Netherlands Governments supported the applicant. 
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effective control of Third Pillar measures by the ECtHR.7 In Segi v. Council, the CFI 
concluded that the applicants were ‘probably’ deprived of any effective remedy before 
the courts of the Union or the Member States in respect of their listing as a terrorist 
organization in a Third Pillar measure.8 The following sections identify the jurisdictional 
provisions governing judicial review of Third Pillar measures and analyses the 
deficiencies in the existing structure.  
 
7.2.2  ECJ JURISDICTION OVER THIRD PILLAR MEASURES 
 
Article L TEU of the Treaty of Maastricht had excluded the ECJ from any jurisdiction 
over the Third Pillar, save for Article K.3 TEU that had provided for an optional 
jurisdiction in respect of JHA conventions.9 The Treaty of Amsterdam, as part of the 
restructuring of the JHA into the AFSJ, introduced in Article 46 TEU provisions for 
limited jurisdictional powers for the ECJ over the TEU. Article 46 TEU provides that the 
provisions of the EC Treaty and Euratom Treaty governing the powers of the ECJ and 
their exercise shall apply, inter alia,10 only to the following listed TEU provisions: 
 
 ‘… (b) provisions of Title VI, under the conditions provided for by Article 35; 
… (d) Article 6(2) with regard to the action of the institutions, insofar as the 
Court has jurisdiction’ under the EC Treaty and the TEU; and … (f) Articles 46 
to 53.’11   
 
                                                 
7 Segi and Gestoras Pro-Amnistía v Germany et al. (Application No. 9916/02), admissibility decision of 23 
May 2002; English translation; not yet reported.  
8 Case T-338/02, Segi et al. v. Council, Order of 7 June 2004, at para. 38. Unreported.  
9 See for a detailed critique of ex-Article L TEU: J. Barrett, ‘Co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs in 
the European Union - An Overview and Critique’, in Barrett (ed.), Justice Cooperation in the European 
Union (Dublin, Institute of Foreign Affairs, 1997), pp. 3-47, at pp. 26-28. 
10 Article 46(c) TEU confers jurisdiction on the ECJ in respect of the provisions on enhanced cooperation 
in Title VII TEU under the conditions provided for by Articles 11 and 11a of the EC Treaty. Articles 40 
TEU and Article 46(e) TEU confer limited jurisdiction on the ECJ in respect of the ‘purely procedural 
stipulations’ in Article 7 TEU establishing a procedure for dealing with a serious breach by a Member State 
of the principles in Article 6(1) TEU.  For an analysis of these provisions, see:  T. Tridimas, ‘The European 
Court of Justice’, in Lynch, Neuwahl and Rees (eds.), Reforming the European Union: From Maastricht to 
Amsterdam (Harlow, Longman, 2000), pp. 74-84, at pp. 75-76. The Treaty of Nice amended Article 46 
TEU in respect of these jurisdictional powers of the ECJ but not otherwise.  
11 The most relevant of these provisions to Third Pillar jurisdictional issues is Article 47 TEU which 
confers jurisdiction on the ECJ to adjudicate on the boundaries between the TEU and the TEC. 
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There is, however, no conferral of jurisdiction on the ECJ to interpret Article 6(1) TEU,12 
Title V TEU regulating the CFSP, or the common provisions in Title I TEU other than 
Article 6(2) and Article 7. The following sections analyse the scope of Article 46(d) TEU 
and Article 46(b) TEU respectively in determining the scope of the ECJ’s powers of 
judicial review over Third Pillar measures on grounds of violation of fundamental rights. 
 
7.2.3  SCOPE OF ARTICLE 46(d) TEU 
 
The purpose of Article 46(d) TEU was to remedy the anomalous situation under the 
Maastricht Treaty that the ECJ was technically prevented by Article L TEU from 
applying Article F(2) (now Article 6(2)) TEU as a formal basis for its case law on 
fundamental rights as general principles.13  The deletion in the Treaty of Amsterdam of 
the former Article K.2(1) TEU  reinforced the significance of Article 6(2) TEU in respect 
of Third Pillar measures.14  However, the terms on which Article 46(d) TEU defines the 
scope of application of Article 6(2) TEU substantially restricts its effectiveness as a basis 
for judicial review over Third Pillar measures.  
 
Firstly, Article 46(d) TEU restricts the ECJ’s jurisdiction in respect of Article 6(2) TEU 
to jurisdictional powers expressly conferred elsewhere in the TEU or the EC Treaty. 
Article 6(2) TEU cannot therefore serve as the basis for any extension of the ECJ’s 
                                                 
12 Article 6(1) TEU, introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, provides: ‘The Union is founded on the 
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, 
principles which are common to the Member States.’ 
13 See de Witte, ‘The Role of the ECJ in Human Rights’, in Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights 
(Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp. 859-897, at p. 885. Although Article 6(2) TEU refers to ‘general principles of 
Community law’, Peers argues persuasively on the basis of Article 46(d) TEU that the reference to 
Community law in should be read as to Union law: ‘Since the amendments to the Treaty are clearly an 
attempt to authorize the Court’s jurisdiction over human rights principles in the first and third pillars, it is 
submitted that the reference to ‘Community law’ in Article 6(2) is vestigial, and that the Article should be 
read as referring to Union law.’: in Alston (ed.), above n. 5, at p. 171. The formulation by the ECJ of 
fundamental rights as forming an ‘integral part of the general principles of law whose observance the Court 
ensures’ encompasses both Community and Union law: Krombach v., Bamberski [2000] ECR I-1935, at 
para. 25. 
14 Article K.2(1) provided that the subject-matter of JHA co-operation  listed in Article K.1 (now Article 29 
TEU) shall be dealt with in compliance with the ECHR and the Refugee Convention and having regard to 
Member States’ protection of persons persecuted on political grounds.  Reference to the Refugee 
Convention is now contained in Article 63(1) EC Treaty. See for an analysis of Article K.2(1) TEU, Peers, 
in Alston (ed.), above n. 5, at p. 168. 
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jurisdiction over Third Pillar measures beyond those jurisdictional powers specified in 
Article 35 TEU. This interpretation has recently been confirmed by the CFI in Segi v. 
Council15 where the applicants sought compensation for being listed as a terrorist 
organization in the Annex to Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on 
the application of specific measures to combat terrorism.16 However, the CFI ruled that 
the claim for compensation failed on the grounds that such a cause of action was not 
provided for in the exhaustive list provided for in Article 35 TEU and that Article 46(d) 
TEU did not create an additional basis of jurisdiction.17 
 
Secondly, Article 46(d) TEU provides that the jurisdictional provisions of the EC Treaty 
concerning the powers of the ECJ and their exercise apply to Article 6(2) TEU ‘with 
regard to action of the institutions’. The reference to ‘action of the institutions’ is open to 
the interpretation that the action of the Member States in implementing or derogating 
from Third Pillar measures is not subject to judicial review by the ECJ on grounds of 
violation of Article 6(2) TEU. Such an interpretation would lead to the disapplication of 
Article 6(2) TEU to situations where the ECJ has established that the Member States in 
implementing or derogating from Union law remain subject to the obligation to comply 
with Union fundamental rights standards.18  While such a restrictive interpretation of 
Article 46(d) TEU is not supported by the travaux préparatoires to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam19 and would conflict with the ECJ’s practice of expansively interpreting its 
jurisdictional powers,20 it is supported by the general context of the Third Pillar’s 
                                                 
15 Above n.  8. 
16 [2001] OJ L344/93. 
17 Segi v. Council, above n. 8, at paras. 36-37. 
18 ‘Where national legislation falls within the scope of Community law, the Court, in a reference for a 
preliminary ruling, must give the national court all the guidance as to interpretation necessary to enable it 
to assess the compatibility of that legislation with the fundamental rights - as laid down in particular in the 
Convention - whose observance the Court ensures. However, the Court has no such jurisdiction with regard 
to national legislation lying outside the scope of Community law.’: Case C-299/95, Kremzow v Austrian 
State [1997] ECR I-2629, at para. 15.  For a summary of the ECJ’s case law see: de Witte, in Alston (ed.), 
above n. 13, at pp. 870-874. On this issue, Peers argues that ‘at least national implementation of 
Community or Union acts must still fall within the Court’s jurisdiction, because such implementation is 
inseparable from interpretation of the acts themselves’: in Alston (ed.), above n. 5, at p. 174.  
19 De Witte, in Alston (ed.), above n. 13, at p. 885. 
20 Peers argues, in the context of the interpretation of pre-Amsterdam conventions, for a ‘general 
interpretative principle of ‘wide jurisdiction’ for the ECJ, with the effect that the ECJ’s jurisdiction can 
usually only be restricted or ousted by express, unambiguous wording’: in Alston (ed.), above n. 5, at p. 
172. 
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emphasis on limiting the powers of the Union to interfere with the Member State’s 
sovereign rights in the field of internal security.21 
 
Thirdly, even in respect of Third Pillar measures over which the ECJ has jurisdiction 
under Article 35 TEU, the narrow formulation of Articles 6(2) TEU and 46(d) TEU has 
resulted in Article 6(2) TEU being treated by the ECJ as a simple affirmation of its 
existing case law on fundamental rights as general principles rather than providing an 
enhanced normative status for ECHR rights and the common constitutional principles.22  
So even in the restricted circumstances in which Article 6(2) TEU applies to Third Pillar 
measures, the provision adds little or no substantive value to the ECJ’s general principles 
case law.23  Moreover, the general principles case law is itself subject to significant 
limitations in ensuring international fundamental rights standards are given effective 
recognition in Union law.24 
7.2.4 ECJ JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 35 TEU  
Article 35 TEU establishes three exhaustive categories of ECJ jurisdiction over Third 
Pillar measures.25 The first category consists of an optional preliminary reference 
procedure that is significantly more restrictive than the equivalent Article 234 EC Treaty 
procedure. Article 35(1) TEU provides that the ECJ:  
                                                 
21 Lenaerts makes this point to underpin his view that Article 46(d) TEU was intended by the Member 
States to exclude application of Article 6(2) TEU to their action in implementing or derogating from Third 
Pillar and Title IV EC Treaty measures: ‘Fundamental Rights in the European Union’ (2000) 25 EL Rev., 
pp. 575-600, at pp. 588-589. 
22 For an analysis of Article 6(2) TEU, and its relationship to the general principles case law, see Section 
5.2.2 of Chapter five. 
23 See in this sense, de Witte, in Alston (ed.), above n. 13, at p. 885: ‘The irony, however, is that Article 6 
[TEU] states that fundamental rights are protected as ‘general principles’ so that, in fact, nothing much will 
change.’ 
24 See Section 4.2.4 of Chapter four. 
25 Segi v Council, above n. 8, at para. 36. In the same case, the CFI also rejected the applicant’s submission 
that the CFI had a general jurisdiction to declare a violation by the Council of fundamental rights as 
general principles of Union law: at para. 48. In Spain v Eurojust the Grand Chamber confirmed that Article 
35 TEU is the sole basis for ECJ jurisdiction over Title VI TEU measures: Case C-160/03 of 15 March 
2005 (unreported), at para. 38. In that case, the ECJ rejected an Article 230 EC Treaty action by Spain to 
annul recruitment notices published by Eurojust since they constituted Title VI TEU measures and fell 
outside the scope of Article 230 EC Treaty. The ECJ, however, held the measures were not exempt from 
judicial review since an applicant could have challenged them under the relevant Staff Regulations of 
Officials of the European Communities.  
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‘shall have jurisdiction, subject to the conditions laid down in this Article, to give 
preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of framework decisions and 
decisions, on the interpretation of conventions established under this Title [Title 
VI] and on the validity and interpretation of the measures implementing them’.26  
The scope of Article 35(1) TEU is restricted since common positions adopted under 
Article 34(2)(b) TEU are not subject to the preliminary ruling procedure and the ECJ 
may only rule on the interpretation and not the validity of conventions adopted under 
Article 34(2)(d) TEU.27  Furthermore, since Article 34(2)(b) TEU provides that 
framework decisions ‘shall not entail direct effect’, it will be difficult for an individual 
applicant to invoke a framework decision in the context of national proceedings.28 As a 
result, the opportunities for the national courts to refer the legality of framework 
decisions to the ECJ will be correspondingly restricted.29 Where a reference may be 
made, the grounds for a ruling on the legality of a qualifying Third Pillar measure under 
Article 35(1) TEU would include review of its conformity with Article 6(2) TEU, on the 
                                                 
26 Tridimas points out that although Article 35(1) TEU does not explicitly confer jurisdiction on the ECJ to 
interpret the provisions of Title VI TEU, such a power must necessarily be implied to give effect to the 
ECJ’s power to interpret and rule on the validity of Third Pillar measures: in Lynch, Neuwahl and Rees 
(eds.), above n. 10, at p. 79. It is unclear whether the reference to measures implementing ‘them’ in Article 
35(1) TEU refers to framework decisions, decisions and conventions or only conventions. It is submitted, 
applying the jurisdictional principle advocated by Peers (in Alston (ed.), above n. 5, at pp. 171-172), that 
implementing measures in respect of all three categories should be subject to reference under Article 35(1) 
TEU.  
27 This exclusion of jurisdiction to rule on the validity of Third Pillar conventions follows from, and 
provides support for, the proposition examined in Section 3.3 of Chapter three that the ECJ does not have 
jurisdiction to rule on the validity of primary Union law. See in this sense Tridimas, in Lynch, Neuwahl 
and Rees (eds.), above n. 10, at p. 79. Peers argues, in respect of applying fundamental rights principles to 
the interpretation of pre-Amsterdam Third Pillar conventions where jurisdiction was conferred on the ECJ, 
that, notwithstanding the absence in the Maastricht Treaty of a jurisdiction on the ECJ to interpret Articles 
F(2) and K.2(1) TEU, the same principles should apply as to the review of post-Amsterdam Third Pillar 
measures: in Alston (ed.), above n. 5, at pp. 171-2. 
28 The scope of the doctrine of direct effect is disputed. Prechal has given the following definition: ‘.. direct 
effect is the obligation of a court or another authority to apply the relevant provisions of Community law, 
either as a norm which governs the case or as a standard for legal review.’: ‘Does Direct Effect Still 
Matter?’ (2000) 37 CML Rev., pp. 1047-1069, at p. 1048. See also: Craig and de Búrca, EU Law: Text, 
Cases and Materials (3rd edn.) (Oxford, OUP, 2003), at pp. 178-182; and Bruno de Witte, ‘Direct Effect, 
Supremacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order’ in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.) The Evolution of EU law 
(Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp. 177-213. 
29 The national court will by application of the principle in Foto-Frost be precluded from ruling a 
framework decision invalid: Case 314/85 [1987] ECR 4199. 
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basis of Article 46(d) TEU, and with the fundamental rights protected as general 
principles of Union law under the ECJ’s case law.30   
Article 35(2) TEU provides that the jurisdiction will only apply to Member States who 
by declaration accept it and Article 35(3) TEU requires a Member State accepting the 
ECJ’s jurisdiction under Article 35(1) to specify either that references may be made by a 
court of tribunal ‘against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law’ 
or by any court or tribunal of the Member State.31  Since only twelve Member States 
have made a Declaration under Article 35(2) TEU,32 and within those twelve the scope 
of the obligation to refer varies significantly, the structure of the Article 35 TEU 
preliminary reference procedure has resulted in a significant variation in the standard of 
judicial protection.33 This divergence significantly restricts access to justice in the 
Union’s legal order since the preliminary reference procedure is the only means for an 
individual to challenge the validity of a Third Pillar measure since direct review 
proceedings under Article 35(6) TEU are restricted to a Member State or the 
Commission.  
Secondly, Article 35(6) TEU provides the ECJ shall have jurisdiction to review the 
legality of framework decisions and decisions in actions bought by a Member State or the 
Commission within two months of the publication of the measure on grounds of lack of 
competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the 
TEU or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers. The grounds of 
                                                 
30 See Peers, in Alston (ed.), above n. 5, at p. 174, n. 46. Hartley argues general principles constitute 
grounds of review of legality under Article 234 EC Treaty: The Foundations of European Community Law 
(5th edn.) (Oxford, OUP, 2003), at pp. 418-420. 
31 The list of Declarations made by the Member States party to the Treaty of Amsterdam pursuant to 
Article 35 TEU is published in [1999] OJ C120/24.  The subsequent Declaration by the Czech Republic is 
annexed to the Final Act to the Treaty of Accession to the EU 2003: [2003] OJ L236/98. A number of 
Member States in those declarations (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic Germany, Spain, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and Netherlands) reserve the right to make a reference obligatory from a court against whose 
decisions no judicial remedy lies.  
32 Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain and Sweden.  Spain’s Declaration confers jurisdiction in accordance with Article 35(3)(a) 
TEU and the other listed Member States in accordance with Article 35(3)(b) TEU. 
33 Although, on the assumption the doctrine of supremacy applies equally to Union as to EC law, it could 
be argued that a court in a Member State which has not agreed to references under Article 35(2) TEU may 
be bound to follow a ruling of the ECJ on a Third Pillar measure on a reference from a Member State 
which has so agreed. 
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review under Article 35(6) TEU, which replicate the grounds of review set out in the 
second paragraph of Article 230 EC Treaty save for the reference to infringement of the 
TEU in lieu of the EC Treaty, encompass the fundamental rights protected as general 
principles as developed by the ECJ and, by virtue of Article 46(d) TEU, as protected by 
Article 6(2) TEU.34 
The restrictions on locus standi in Article 35(6) TEU are particularly onerous since under 
Article 34(2) TEU framework decisions and decisions must be adopted unanimously by 
the Council acting on the initiative of any Member State or the Commission. The only 
realistic challenge is therefore likely to by the Commission in the event of a proposal by 
a Member State. However, the failure to grant the EP locus standi in Article 35(6) TEU 
may, at least in respect of an action to protect the EP’s institutional powers under the 
TEU,35 be overridden by the ECJ by analogy to its Chernobyl decision granting the EP’s 
locus standi in such circumstances notwithstanding the lack of any express conferral in 
Article 230 EC Treaty prior to the Maastricht Treaty.36  
An individual applicant is, however, excluded from access to the ECJ under Article 35(6) 
TEU.37 An individual applicant’s only potential redress in Union law would therefore be 
to seek a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 35(1) TEU on the validity of a 
framework decision or decision or on the validity of measures implementing them. 
However, as discussed above, there are substantial obstacles to obtaining such a 
reference. In addition an applicant would be faced with the same general problems 
associated with the preliminary reference procedure under Article 234 EC Treaty.38  
                                                 
34 See Peers, in Alston (ed.), above n. 5, at p. 174. Peers argues (ibid.) that notwithstanding the apparently 
restrictive reference in Article 46(d) TEU to ‘action of the institutions’ the ECJ is entitled to exercise its 
‘offensive jurisdiction’ at least to control the action of the Member States in implementing Third Pillar 
measures.  
35 Article 39 TEU establishes the role of the EP in the Third Pillar. In particular, Article 39(1) requires the 
council to consult the EP before adopting framework decisions, decisions and conventions. 
36 Case C-70/88, European Parliament v. Council [1990] ECR I-2041. See for this argument Tridimas, in 
Lynch, Neuwahl and Rees (eds.), above n. 10, at p. 80. 
37 Since Article 35(6) TEU is primary Union law the ECJ is precluded from ruling on its conformity with 
the right of access to justice guaranteed in international fundamental rights instruments for the reasons 
explored in Section three of Chapter two.   
38 For an analysis of the deficiencies of the Article 234 EC Treaty procedure, see AG Jacob’s Opinion 
of 21 March 2002, at paras. 40-44, in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores: [2002] ECR I-6677. 
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Alternatively, an individual applicant could challenge the validity of implementing 
national measures, if any, or challenge the framework decision or decision in the national 
courts and ultimately the ECtHR for a breach of the right of access to justice guaranteed 
by Articles 6 and 13 ECHR.39   
Thirdly, Article 35(7) TEU provides the ECJ shall have jurisdiction to rule on any 
dispute between Member States regarding the interpretation or the application of acts 
adopted under Article 34(2) TEU whenever the Council cannot settle a dispute within six 
months of its being referred to the Council by one of its members. Article 35(7) TEU 
provides the ECJ shall ‘also have jurisdiction to rule on any dispute between Member 
States and the Commission regarding the interpretation or the application of conventions 
established under Article 34(2)(d)’ TEU.40  However, Article 35(7) TEU does not confer 
jurisdiction on the ECJ to rule on the validity of Third Pillar measures. Furthermore, by 
restricting the dispute resolution procedure to the Council and Member States, and in the 
case of conventions, the Commission, Article 35(7) fails to address the lack of 
democratic control resulting from the exclusion of the EP and does nothing to address the 
onerous restrictions on the individual applicant’s right of access to justice in respect of 
Third Pillar measures. 
The jurisdiction of the ECJ under Article 35 TEU is subject to Article 35(5) TEU which 
provides the ECJ:  
‘shall have no jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of operations 
carried out by the police or other law enforcement services of a Member State or 
the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to 
the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.’   
 
                                                 
39 See Section 7.2.5 below for analysis of the potential remedies under the ECHR. See on the potential 
impact of the Charter: Angela Ward, ‘Access to Justice’ in S. Peers and A. Ward (eds.) The European 
Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004), pp. 123-140, especially at p. 137. 
40 Tridimas points out that Article 35(7) TEU grants ECJ jurisdiction to give rulings on disputes as to the 
interpretation or application of Third Pillar measures in abstracto: in Lynch, Neuwahl and Rees (eds.), 
above n. 10, at p. 80. 
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The scope of this exclusion has to be read in conjunction with the more general provision 
in Article 33 TEU demarcating the limits of Union competence in the Third Pillar.41  
While the ouster of jurisdiction in Article 35 TEU is drafted in broad terms its scope is 
nevertheless subject to certain limitations. Firstly, as a provision of Title VI TEU, the 
ECJ has jurisdiction to interpret its scope under Article 46(b) TEU if it is relied upon in 
an action falling within Article 35 TEU. Secondly, as a limitation on the jurisdiction of 
the ECJ, Article 35(5) TEU should be interpreted restrictively.42 On this basis, the 
concept of ‘internal security’ should, for example, be given a narrower scope than that of 
public security.43 Support for such an approach may be found in Svenska 
Jounalistförbundet v. Council: ‘The case-law of the Court of Justice shows that the 
concept of public security does not have a single and specific meaning. Thus the concept 
covers both the internal security of a Member State and its external security …’.44  
Thirdly, Article 35(5) TEU only excludes ECJ jurisdiction in respect of action 
undertaken by the Member States and not in respect of Third Pillar measures adopted by 
the Council.45 In this respect, Article 35(5) TEU is less objectionable than Article 68(2) 
EC Treaty that also applies to measures adopted pursuant to Article 62(1) EC Treaty.46  
However, notwithstanding these limited control mechanisms, Article 35(5) TEU in 
conjunction with the other restrictions on the ECJ’s jurisdiction in Article 35 TEU 
substantially and detrimentally restricts the availability of judicial review proceedings to 
                                                 
41  Article 33 TEU provides Title VI: ‘… shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent 
upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal 
security’.  See, for the corresponding provisions in the Constitution, Section 7.4.2 of this Chapter. 
42 See: Peers, in Alston (ed.), above n. 5, at p. 172; and Tridimas, in Lynch, Neuwahl and Rees (eds.), 
above n. 10, at p. 77. 
43 Public security is a basis for derogations under Articles 30, 39, 46, 296, and 297 EC Treaty. The ECJ has 
held in respect of these provisions that they : ‘… deal with exceptional and clearly defined cases. It is not 
possible to infer from those articles that there is inherent in the Treaty a general exception excluding from 
the scope of Community law all measures taken for reasons of public security. To recognise the existence 
of such an exception, regardless of the specific requirements laid down by the Treaty, might impair the 
binding nature of Community law and its uniform application …’: Case C-285/98, Kreil v. Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland [2000] ECR 1-69, at para. 16.  
44 Case T-174/95 [1988] ECR II-2289, at para. 121. The judgment was given in the context of a challenge 
to the refusal of the Council to disclose certain documents relating to Europol on grounds of the ‘public 
interest’ which was defined to include, inter alia, ‘public security’ in Article 4(1) of Council Decision 
93/731/EC on public access to Council documents (OJ 1993 L340/43). 
45 See Peers, in Alston (ed.), above n. 5, at p. 175.  
46 See Section 7.3.2 below. 
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test the conformity of Third Pillar measures and implementing national action with 
fundamental rights standards and their legitimacy.47 The absence of such an ouster of 
jurisdiction in the Constitution is therefore a positive contribution to a more effective 
system for the protection of fundamental rights in the AFSJ.48 
7.2.5 THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THIRD PILLAR 
MEASURES 
   
In the absence of adequate jurisdictional powers for the ECJ to review Third Pillar 
measures, the individual applicant seeking to challenge their validity is obliged to seek a 
remedy before the national courts or make an application to the ECtHR. However, recent 
case law of the ECtHR has cast doubts on the availability of such remedies. In Segi and 
Gestoras Pro-Amnistía v. Germany, the ECtHR declined to assume jurisdiction to control 
the conformity with the ECHR of anti-terrorism measures adopted by the Union 
following September 11 2001.49 The ECtHR declared inadmissible the application on 
behalf of the Basque youth movement Segi and others in respect of the Common Position 
of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism 
adopted under Articles 15 and 34 TEU (2001/931 Common Position)50 for violation of 
Articles 6, 6(2), 10, 11 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 1 of ECHR Protocol No. 1.51 The 
ECtHR held that Article 4 of the 2001/931 Common Position did not affect the applicants 
directly and that in consequence they were not ‘victims of a violation of the Convention 
within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention.’52 The ECtHR justified its decision 
on the basis that Article 4 of the 2001/931 Common Position did not in itself confer 
additional powers exercisable against the applicants and that national or Community 
                                                 
47 ‘Proportionality is used as a criterion for deciding whether an interference with fundamental rights is 
legitimate;’ de Witte, in Alston (ed.), above n. 13, at p. 861. See also Lenaerts, above n. 21, at p. 589.  
48 See further Section 7.4 of this Chapter. 
49 Cited above n. 7.  
50 2001/931/CFSP: [2001] OJ L344/93. 
51 The critical measure was Article 4 of the 2001/931/Common Position. Articles 2 and 3 of the 2001/931 
Common Position were implemented by Council Regulation (EC) 2580/2001: [2001] OJ L344/70. The 
applicant also unsuccessfully sought redress for the same alleged ECHR violations in respect of Common 
Position 2001/930/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on combating terrorism: [2001] OJ L344/90.  
52 Segi and Gestoras, cited at n. 7 above, at p. 9. Article 4 of the 2001/931 Common Position provided an 
obligation for Member States to employ Title VI TEU police and judicial cooperation to prevent terrorist 
acts and in particular in respect of enquiries and proceedings in respect of persons, groups and entities 
listed in the annex to the 2001/931 Common Position, which included the applicants. 
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measures implementing Article 4 would ‘be subject to the form of judicial review 
established in each legal order concerned, whether international or national.’53 The 
ECtHR also questioned, albeit obiter, whether the applicants had exhausted ‘the remedies 
which the European Union could offer them, such as a compensation claim or even an 
application for annulment’ in the light of the CFI’s judgment in Jégo-Quéré v 
Commission.54 
 
It is submitted that the ECtHR’s judgment in  Segi and Gestoras Pro-Amnistía v. 
Germany underestimates the detrimental consequences for an organisation of being listed 
in the Annex to the 2001/931 Common Position55 and overestimated the potential for 
judicial review of implementing measures, at least as regards redress at the Union and 
Community level.56  In particular, the basis for the ECtHR’s assessment of the 
availability of Union remedies was undermined when the ECJ reversed the CFI’s 
decision in Jégo-Quéré57 and the CFI in Segi v. Council ruled there was no jurisdiction 
under Article 35 TEU for a compensation claim in respect of a Third Pillar measure such 
as Article 4 of the 2001/931 Common Position.58 Indeed, in Segi v. Council the CFI 
expressed doubts as to whether the applicants had access to any effective remedy whether 
                                                 
53 Segi and Gestoras , ibid., at p. 9. The reference to international judicial review clearly extends to the role 
of the ECtHR in reviewing national measures implementing Third Pillar measures. This aspect is 
considered further below.  For a discussion of the respective merits of pursuing judicial remedies available 
in Union and national law for challenging the listing of organisations under the 2001/931 Common 
Position: see B. Bowring and D. Korff, ‘Terrorist Designation with Regard to European and International 
Law: The Case of the PMOI’, Joint Opinion presented at the International Conference of Jurists on 10 
November 2004; available at: <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/feb/bb-dk-joint-paper.pdf>; and  I. 
Cameron ‘European Union Anti-Terrorist Blacklisting’  (2003) 3 Human Rights Law Review, pp. 225-256. 
54 Ibid., at p. 6. The ECtHR was referring to the CFI’s decision in Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA v 
Commission [2002] ECR II-2365, which reformulated the test for ‘individual concern’ under paragraph 
four of Article 230 EC Treaty in a manner favourable to individual applicants.  
55 The decision of the ECtHR itself refers to the measures adopted three months previously by the Spanish 
investigating judge suspending Segi’s activities and detaining eleven of its leaders pending trial: Segi and 
Gestoras, ibid., at p. 2.  While these measures may or may not have had a link to the contested 2001/931 
Common Decision, the ECtHR’s reference to being listed in the annex thereto as a terrorist organisation as 
merely ‘embarrassing’ seems unrealistic: ibid. at p. 9. See also on the consequences of blacklisting: 
Bowring and Korff, above n. 53, at pp. 15-16. 
56 The extent to which national courts directly apply Union law fundamental rights principles to control the 
legality of national measures implementing Union law has not been researched in detail: see de Witte, in 
Alston (ed.), above n. 13, at pp. 873-874. Bowring and Korff argue that a strategy based on exhausting 
national remedies and then applying to the ECtHR is preferable to seeking redress before the CFI or ECJ: 
above n. 53, at p. 31.  
57 Case C-263/02 P Jégo-Quéré v Commission [2004] ECR I-3425.  
58 Segi v. Council, cited above at n. 8.  
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before the Community or national jurisdictions for their listing in the Annex to the 2001 
Common Position.59 However, the CFI was effectively precluded by the ECJ decision in 
Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council  (UPA) from adopting its reasoning in Jégo-
Quéré or that of AG Jacobs in UPA that such a denial of access to justice was 
incompatible with the guarantees in Articles 6 (1) and 13 ECHR and Article 47 of the 
Charter.60 In those circumstances, the CFI stated that the only grounds on which the 
claim for compensation could succeed would be if it was established that Article 4 of the 
2001/931 Common Position should have been adopted under the EC Treaty rather than 
Article 34 TEU thereby grounding a claim for compensation under Articles 235 and 288 
EC Treaty. However, since no such wrongful use of legal basis was demonstrated, the 
application was rejected as manifestly unfounded.61   
 
In conclusion, Segi and Gestoras Pro-Amnistía v Germany and Segi v. Council 
demonstrates the potential for jurisdictional ‘black holes’ in respect of Third Pillar 
measures in terms of effective legal redress for individuals in respect of a violation of 
fundamental rights both within the Union legal order, the national legal orders and under 
the ECHR. The absence of ECJ jurisdiction to review the legality of secondary Union 
law may on an extensive interpretation of the Matthews judgment also ground 
jurisdiction for the ECtHR to review the measure.62 It is submitted that the ECtHR 
should revise its conclusions in Segi and Gestoras Pro-Amnistía v Germany in the light 
of the decisions of the ECJ in Jégo-Quéré and the CFI in Segi v. Council and review the 
conformity with the ECHR of Third Pillar measures not subject to scrutiny by the ECJ.  
                                                 
59 Ibid., at para 38.  
60 Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA) v. Council of the European Union  [2002] ECR 
I-6677. See generally: J. Schwarze, ‘The Legal Protection of the Individual against Regulations in 
European Union Law’ (2004) 10 European Public Law, pp. 285-303; and  J. Usher, ‘Direct and individual 
concern – an effective remedy or a conventional solution’ (2003) 28  EL. Rev., pp. 575-600. See Section 
5.6.2.2.4 of Chapter five for analysis of the limited reform in Article III-365(4) of the Constitution of the 
‘individual concern’ test for regulatory acts. The reform proposals before the European Convention are 
considered by M. Varju, ‘The Debate on the Future of the Standing under Article 230(4) TEC in the 
European Convention’ (2004) 10 European Public Law, pp. 43-56. 
61 Segi v. Council, above n. 8, at paras. 41-47.  See Section 3.2.2 of Chapter three for the jurisdiction of  the 
ECJ to ‘police’ the boundaries of the EC Treaty and the TEU under Article 47 TEU. 
62 See Section 3.3.2.3 of Chapter three. This point was not directly at issue in Bosphorus Hava Yollari 
Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Şіrketi v. Ireland (Grand Chamber), App. No. 45036/98. Judgment of 30 June 
2005. Unreported. However, the logic of the ECtHR’s decision in Bosphorus supports the view that, in the 
absence of an effective remedy in Union law, the ECtHR will assume jurisdiction to control the legality of 
a Union act with the ECHR. 
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In the absence of jurisdiction to review directly Third Pillar measures, the scope of the 
ECtHR’s jurisdiction to control the conformity with the ECHR of implementing 
measures adopted by the Member States may be critical in providing an alternative 
method of redress. In Cantoni v France the ECtHR considered the conformity with 
Article 7(1) ECHR of Article L. 511 of the French Public Health Code prohibiting the 
sale of medicinal products outside of pharmacies and which implemented Directive EEC 
65/65 of 26 January 1965.63 The ECtHR found no violation of Article 7(1) ECHR since 
the relevant provision was sufficiently clear in the light of the relevant case law of the 
ECJ and the French Court of Cassation.64 Although it only ruled on the compatibility of 
the French legislation with Art. 7(1) ECHR and not that of the 1965 Directive,  the 
ECtHR stated: ‘The fact, pointed to by the Government, that Article L. 511 of the Public 
Health Code is based almost word for word on Community Directive 65/65 … does not 
remove it from the ambit of Article 7 of the Convention.’65  
 
This reasoning has led Peers to argue on the authority of Cantoni that, at least in respect 
of third-pillar framework decisions and national measures ratifying third-pillar 
conventions, the ECtHR could exercise jurisdiction over national implementing 
measures.66  Indeed, the ECtHR in Segi and Gestoras Pro-Amnistía v. Germany stated 
that national measures implementing the 2001 Common Position would be subject to 
judicial review for conformity with the ECHR.67 The guiding principle in the AFSJ 
should be that the ECtHR has jurisdiction to review the compatibility with the ECHR of 
national measures implementing Third Pillar measures in any case where the Third Pillar 
measures are not themselves subject to review by the ECJ.68  
                                                 
63 Case 45/1995/551/637. ECHR Reports (Judgements and Decisions) 1996 V-1614. Directive 65/65 is 
published in OJ L369 and was subsequently amended.  
64 Ibid., at para. 34. The original opinion of the ECommHR found a violation of Article 7(1) ECHR. The 
Opinion is reported as an annex to the judgment cited supra.   
65 Ibid., at  para. 30. 
66 Peers, in Alston (ed.), above n. 5, at p. 175. However, he considers ECtHR jurisdiction over Third Pillar 
decisions in the absence of national implementing measures is more problematic.  Waite and Kennedy v. 
Germany, (2000) 30 EHRR 261, supports Peers’ argument for ECtHR jurisdiction to control the relations 
of the Member States with international organisations.        
67 Above  n. 7, at p. 9. 
68 See in this sense, Lenaerts, above n. 21, at p. 589. 
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7.3 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND TITLE IV EC TREATY 
 
7.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam transferred a number of critical policy areas relating to visas, 
asylum, immigration and related free movement of persons competences from the Third 
Pillar to Title IV TEC.69 Judicial control over the transferred competences had been 
largely excluded under the Treaty of Maastricht by ex-Article L. One would have 
anticipated that the Treaty of Amsterdam would have substantially aligned the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ over Title IV EC Treaty with its jurisdiction over other EC policy 
areas. However, notwithstanding the transfer of competences to the First Pillar, the 
jurisdictional provisions set out in Article 68 EC Treaty fail not only to provide the same 
standard of judicial protection as under the other Titles of the EC Treaty but in certain 
critical respects even fall short of the enhanced but still restricted judicial protection 
afforded over Title VI TEU by Article 35 TEU. This failure emphasises the prominent 
degree to which national security interests still featured in the structuring of the AFSJ at 
the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
 
7.3.2  SCOPE OF ARTICLE 68 EC TREATY  
 
The scope of Article 68 EC Treaty is uncertain. Although Article 68 EC Treaty is 
headed: ‘Jurisdiction of ECJ to hand down preliminary rulings’, only Article 68(1) is 
unambiguously related to the preliminary reference procedure as set out in Article 234 
EC Treaty.70 The question therefore arises whether Article 68 EC Treaty is a form of lex 
specialis that restricts the application of the general jurisdictional clauses in the EC 
Treaty.71 It is submitted that Articles 68(1) and 68(3) EC Treaty should not be construed 
as in any way limiting or excluding the other jurisdictional powers of the ECJ in the EC 
                                                 
69 See Section  6.2.4 of Chapter six. 
70 Article 35(1) TEU also establishes a preliminary ruling procedure as detailed in Section 7.2.4 of this 
Chapter. 
71 In particular, the judicial review powers of the ECJ under Article 230 EC Treaty. This uncertainty in 
scope is noted by Tridimas, in Lynch, Neuwahl and Rees (eds.), above n. 10, at p. 77. 
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Treaty over Title IV EC Treaty, other than the restrictions on the Article 234 EC Treaty 
procedure specified in Article 68(1), since neither the heading to Article 68 EC Treaty 
nor the text of those Articles supports such an interpretation. This interpretation is 
supported by the ECJ’s policy to facilitate access to justice in the absence of an express 
limitation in the EC Treaty.72  
 
However, in respect of Article 68(2) EC Treaty it is more difficult to sustain the 
argument that its scope should be limited to exclude ECJ jurisdiction to give a ruling 
requested under Article 68(1) or 68(3) EC Treaty on a measure or decision taken 
pursuant to Article 62(1) EC Treaty.73 Article 68(2) EC Treaty restricts the scope of the 
ECJ's jurisdiction in relation to measures controlling the free movement of persons across 
internal Union borders, by providing it shall not rule ‘on any measure or decision taken 
pursuant to Article 62(1) relating to the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security’.74 Although Article 68(2) EC Treaty employs the term 
‘rule’, which arguably refers to the use of the term ‘ruling’ in Articles 68(1) and (3) EC 
Treaty, the overall thrust of Article 68(2) is more general in scope since it excludes ECJ 
jurisdiction ‘in any event’ to rule on ‘any measure or decision taken pursuant to Article 
62(1) relating to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal 
security’.  Article 64(1) EC Treaty provides further support for an extensive 
interpretation of the scope of Article 68(2) EC Treaty.75 If such an interpretation is 
confirmed by the ECJ, Article 68(2) EC Treaty creates a substantial lacuna in the system 
of judicial protection over measures adopted in a sensitive area of EC policy making.76 
Article 68(2) is more restrictive than the equivalent provision in Article 35(5) TEU since 
                                                 
72 See the cases cited by Tridimas:  ibid., at p. 83, n. 17. 
73 Tridimas argues that Article 68(2) should not apply to restrict the jurisdiction of the ECJ under Article 
68(3) EC Treaty since a reference is less sensitive in such circumstances as it is made by a Member State, 
the Council or the Commission:  ibid., at p. 77. 
74 Article 62(1) EC Treaty provides for the adoption by the Council by 1 May 2004 of: ‘measures with a 
view to ensuring, in compliance with Article 14, the absence of any controls on persons, be they citizens of 
the Union or nationals of third countries, when crossing internal borders;’.  
75 Article 64(1) provides: ‘This Title [IV] shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent 
upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal 
security.’ 
76 Tridimas characterises the exclusion of jurisdiction in Article 68(2) as follows: ‘It poses serious 
problems of constitutionality, sets a bad precedent, and contradicts the principles of protection of 
fundamental rights, the rule of law, and democracy, commitment to which is affirmed in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam.’ : in Lynch, Neuwahl and Rees (eds.), above n. 10, at p. 77. 
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it excludes ECJ jurisdiction over Community measures whereas Article 35(5) TEU is 
limited to Member State action. A fortiori, the arguments for the ECtHR holding the 
Member States accountable apply if excluded measures adopted under Article 62(1) EC 
Treaty are not in conformity with the ECHR.77 
 
The second point is that Article 68(1) EC Treaty restricts the ECJ to giving a ruling on 
the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community based on Title 
IV EC Treaty. The validity of acts of the Member States implementing such acts is 
therefore not within the jurisdictional scope of Article 68(1) EC Treaty.78  In contrast, 
Article 35(1) TEU confers jurisdiction on the ECJ not only to give preliminary rulings on 
the validity and interpretation of framework decisions and decisions and to interpret 
conventions but also on the validity and interpretation of the measures implementing 
them.79  
 
7.3.3  ECJ JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 68 EC TREATY 
 
Article 68 EC Treaty provides, subject to Article 68(2), two grounds of jurisdiction for 
the ECJ. Firstly, Article 68(1) provides for a modified and more restrictive preliminary 
ruling procedure whereby Article 234 EC Treaty applies to Title IV EC Treaty subject to 
the condition that a reference for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Title IV or 
on the validity of acts of the EC institutions based on Title IV may only be made ‘in a 
case pending before a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial 
remedy under national law’.80 Although the Article 68(1) EC Treaty reference procedure 
is wider than that in Article 35(1) TEU in the sense it applies to all Member States and 
                                                 
77 See Lenaerts, above n. 21, at p. 589.  
78 In this sense, Article 68(1) is following Article 234(b) EC Treaty that also only confers jurisdiction on 
the ECJ to give preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of acts of institutions of the 
Community and the ECB. However, as Craig and de Búrca point out, the doctrine of supremacy of Union 
law may result in an obligation for the national court to disapply national law which conflicts with the 
ECJ’s interpretation of a Union measure: above n. 28, at pp. 434-435. 
79 See section 7.2.4 below. 
80 In Magali Warbecq and Ryanair Ltd., The ECJ by order dated 10 June 2004 held it had no jurisdiction to 
rule on a reference from the Charleroi Labour Court on the interpretation of Article 19 of Regulation No 
44/2001 adopted under Article 61(c) EC Treaty as it was not a final court of appeal for the purposes of 
Article 68(1) EC Treaty: Case C-555/03 [2004] ECR I-6041. 
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makes a reference from the final national court of appeal compulsory, it is more 
restrictive for those Member States who have made an optional declaration pursuant to 
Article 35(3)(b) permitting references from lower courts.81 The existing gaps and 
deficiencies in the scope of protection provided by the direct remedies available to a 
litigant under the EC Treaty often oblige an individual to rely on the Article 234 EC 
Treaty procedure to challenge indirectly the validity of an EC measure. It is therefore 
unacceptable that the existing inadequacies of the Article 234 EC Treaty procedure are 
compounded by the more restrictive reference procedure in Article 68 (1) EC Treaty in 
an area of Union policy where the protection of an individual’s right to challenge the 
validity of Community measures for violation of fundamental rights should be 
paramount.82  
  
Secondly, Article 68(3) EC Treaty provides an additional ground of jurisdiction to those 
otherwise specified in the EC Treaty. It empowers the Council, the Commission or a 
Member State to request the ECJ to rule on a question of interpretation of Title IV EC 
Treaty or of acts of the EC institutions based on Title IV but excludes the application of 
such a ruling to judgments of courts or tribunals of the Member States which have 
become res judicata.  Since the ECJ may not rule on the validity of Title IV EC Treaty 
measures under Article 68(3) EC Treaty, and neither the EP nor individual applicants 
have locus standi, Article 68(3) EC Treaty does not add significantly to the effective 
judicial or democratic scrutiny of Title IV EC Treaty measures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
81 See Section 7.2.4 for details.  
82 See the Opinion of AG Jacobs in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores for a detailed critique of the EC’s 
system of judicial remedies, including Article 234 EC Treaty as an alternative remedy to Article 230 EC 
Treaty. Tridimas heavily criticises Article 68(1) EC Treaty on both practical grounds and principle: in 
Lynch, Neuwahl and Rees (eds.), above n. 10, at pp. 76-77. See also Final Report of Working Group X on 
‘Freedom, Security and Justice’  (WGX Final Report);  CONV 424/02, 2 December 2002, at p. 25.  
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7.3.4 THE SCHENGEN ACQUIS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
The Schengen acquis was integrated as of 1 May 1999 into the EC Treaty and TEU. 83 
The 1997 Protocol integrating the Schegen acquis into Union law annexed to the TEU 
and the EC Treaty provides in Article 2(1) that the Council shall determine the legal basis 
for each of the provisions or decisions that constitute the Schengen acquis.84 In the 
absence of a determination, Article 2(1) of the Protocol provides the relevant provisions 
or decisions shall be regarded as acts based on Title VI TEU.85 The implementing 1999 
Council Decision listed in Annexes, insofar as necessary, the relevant legal basis for each 
provision or decision. Article 2(1) of the 1997 Protocol also establishes the basis for the 
ECJ’s jurisidiction over the incorporated Schengen acquis by providing that: ‘With 
regard to such provisions and decisions and in accordance with that determination’, the 
ECJ ‘shall exercise the powers conferred upon it by the relevant applicable provisions of 
the Treaties.’ Therefore, the ECJ’s jurisdiction to review the provisions of the Schengen 
acquis is determined according to the allocation of a measure to either the EC Treaty or 
the TEU and is subject to the respective restrictions applicable to those treaties as 
analysed in the preceding sections.86  
 
                                                 
83 The Schengen acquis was defined by Council Decision 1999/435/EC of 20 May 1999 concerning the 
definition of the Schengen acquis for the purpose of determining, in conformity with the relevant 
provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Treaty on European Union, the 
legal basis for each of the provisions or decisions which constitute the acquis: [1999] OJ L176/1.  The 
integration of the Schengen acquis preserved  the existing special arrangements relating to Denmark and to 
the UK and Ireland: Kuijper, ‘Some Legal Problems associated with the Communitarization of Policy on 
Visas, Asylum and Immigration under the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Incorporation of the Schengen 
Acquis’ (2000) 37 CML Rev, pp. 345-366, at pp. 350 and 354-356. 
84 Implemented by Council Decision 1999/436/EC of 20 May 1999, allocating the Schengen acquis: [1999] 
OJ L176/17. 
85 This default mechanism was used in respect of provisions of the 1990 Schengen Implementing 
Convention relating to the Schengen Information System (SIS) where the Member States could not agree 
whether allocation should be to Title IV EC Treaty or Title VI TEU: see Kuijper, above n. 83, at p. 349. 
86 A number of references have been made pursuant to Article 35(1) TEU in respect of Articles 54-58 of 
the 1990 Schengen Implementing Convention regulating the non bis in idem principle which were 
allocated by Council Decision 1999/436/EC of 20 May 1999 to Articles 31 and 34 TEU: Case C-469/03 
Filomeno Mario Miraglia of 10 March 2005 (not yet reported); and Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 
Gözütok and Brügge [2003] ECR I-1345.  
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On similar terms to Article 64 TEC and Articles 33 and 35(5) TEU, Article 2 of the 1997 
Protocol provides that the ECJ shall have ‘no jurisdiction on measures or decisions 
relating to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security’.87 
The scope of this exclusionary provision is subject to the same uncertainty and criticisms. 
Peers argues persuasively that the additional fundamental rights principles guaranteed by 
Article 6(2) TEU should apply to the incorporated Schengen acquis.88  On that basis, 
Article 6(2) TEU applies to a measure or decision allocated by the implementing 1999 
Council Decision, either expressly or by default, to Title VI TEU or expressly to Title IV 
EC Treaty.89 However, the effectiveness of the protection afforded by Article 6(2) TEU 
is itself subject to substantially the same limitations as the ECJ’s case law on 
fundamental rights as general principles.90  
 
 
7.4 JURISDICTION OVER THE AFSJ UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 
 
7.4.1  REFORM PROPOSALS OF WORKING GROUP X 
 
In the light of the substantial deficiencies in respect of the ECJ’s jurisdiction to review 
Third Pillar measures and Title IV EC Treaty measures, there was substantial pressure 
for reform of this area of the AFSJ in the European Convention process. The mandate of 
WGX did not specifically refer to reform of the judicial architecture but such reform was 
implicit in the reference to striking a better balance ‘between security requirements and 
                                                 
87 The wording of Article 2(1) of the 1997 Amsterdam Protocol is potentially wider since it refers to 
‘measures or decisions’ without specifying if they are taken by the Member States or the Union authorities 
whereas Articles 33 and 35(5) TEU and Article 64(1) EC Treaty only refer to the actions of the Member 
State authorities. Preamble five to Council Decision 1999/436/EC of 20 May 1999 provides: ‘Whereas the 
determination of a legal basis in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Treaties for each of the 
provisions or decisions which constitute the Schengen acquis does not affect the exercise of the 
responsibilities incumbent upon the Member States according to Article 64 TEC and Article 33 TEU with 
regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.’ See also the first 
Statement of the Council annexed to Council Decision 1999/436/EC.   
88 The Schengen implementing Convention of 19 June 1990 contains reference to a number of specific 
international fundamental rights instruments but not to the ECHR or the common constitutional principles 
of the Member States: see  Peers, in Alston (ed.), above n. 5, at pp. 172-173. 
89 However, the ECJ did not in either Filomeno Mario Miraglia  or Gözütok and Brügge, cited at  n. 86 
above, refer to Article 6(2) TEU or indeed to its fundamental rights case law in interpreting Article 54 of 
the 1990 Schengen Implementing Convention.  
90 See Section 4.2.4 of Chapter four. 
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respect for fundamental values’ and pursuing the Laeken objective of simplification of 
the ‘particularly complex institutional and legal systems’ in the JHA.91 WGX therefore 
concluded, after receiving expert advice,92 that a fundamental reform of the ECJ’s 
jurisdiction was necessary to remedy the defects both in respect of the Article 35 TEU 
jurisdictional system and the Article 68 EC Treaty preliminary reference procedure:  
 
‘The Working Group takes the view that the limited jurisdiction of the Court is 
no longer acceptable concerning acts adopted in areas (e.g. police co-operation, 
judicial co-operation in criminal matters) which directly affect fundamental 
rights of the individuals. The same view applies to the limited judicial control 
foreseen in Article 68 TEC.’93  
 
WGX therefore recommended that the specific mechanisms in Article 35 TEU and 
Article 68 EC Treaty should be abolished and that ‘the general system of jurisdiction of 
the ECJ should be extended to the area of freedom, security and justice, including action 
by Union bodies in this field’.94   
 
On the issue of the restrictions on the ECJ’s jurisdiction under Article 35 (5) TEU and 
Article 68(2) EC Treaty relating to the ‘maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security’, WGX agreed that Article 68(2) should be abolished in 
view of the significance for fundamental rights of measures relating to the free movement 
of persons adopted under Article 62(1) EC Treaty. However, opinion was divided in 
WGX on abolishing Article 35(5) TEU, with some members arguing for its retention and 
others of the view that the incorporation in the Constitution of the text of Article 33 TEU 
was sufficient ‘to make clear that national acts taken under these responsibilities lie 
outside the scope of Union law, and consequently outside the jurisdiction of the Court.’95 
 
                                                 
91 Mandate of WGX of 12 September 2002, CONV 258/02, at p. 3. Available on the European Convention 
website. 
92 See in particular recommendations for reform in the presentations made by Henri Labayle, Christine van 
den Wyngaert and Gilles de Kerchove summarised in CONV 346/02 of 16 October 2002. Available on the 
European Convention website. 
93 WGX Final Report, above n. 82, at p. 25. 
94 Ibid. The reference to Union bodies is to Europol and Eurojust: see pp. 18-20 of WGX Final Report, 
above n. 82. 
95 Ibid., at p. 19. 
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7.4.2 THE AFSJ JURISDICTIONAL STRUCTURE  IN THE CONSTITUTION 
 
The Constitution incorporates the principal recommendations in WGX Final Report on 
judicial control of the AFSJ by abolishing the special jurisdictional rules in Article 35 
TEU and in Article 68 EC Treaty.96  AFSJ measures adopted under Chapter IV of Title 
III of Part III of the Constitution are therefore generally subject to the same jurisdictional 
grounds of review as other Union policy areas.97 The direct actions in Articles 230, 232, 
235 and 288(2) EC Treaty are retained on substantially the same terms in Articles III-
365, III-367 and III-431(2) and (3) respectively and will apply to AFSJ measures.98  
The general preliminary reference procedure set out in Article III-369 also applies on the 
same conditions to all AFSJ measures. However, the Constitution introduces an 
additional procedural protection in the final paragraph of Article III-369 that provides 
that if a question is raised ‘in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State 
with regard to a person in custody, the Court shall act with a minimum of delay’.99 
Furthermore, a Member State that fails to fulfill an obligation under the AFSJ is subject 
to an enforcement action by the Commission under Article III-360 or another Member 
State under Article III-361.100  
 
The simplification of the Union’s legal measures in the Constitution resulting from the 
recommendations of WGIX on Simplification significantly contributes to the radical 
improvement in the justiciability of AFSJ measures adopted under the Constitution.101 
The various types of Third Pillar measures listed in Article 34(2) TEU are eliminated and 
AFSJ measures adopted under the Constitution are to be the standard Union legislative 
                                                 
96 See Sections 6.2.8 and 6.2.9 of Chapter six for a general analysis of the reforms of the AFSJ in the 
Constitution. 
97 The CFSP, however, continues to be subject to special jurisdictional rules set out in Article III-376 of the 
Constitution. See for analysis of an earlier draft of Article III-376: Dougan, ‘The Convention’s Draft 
Constitutional Treaty: bringing Europe closer to its lawyers?’ (2003) 28 EL Rev., pp. 763-793, at p. 791.  
98 The reforms of these procedures consist in an improvement in the locus standi rules for non-privileged 
applicants in Article III-365(4) and the extension of remedies to ‘bodies, offices and agencies of the 
Union’. See further  Section  5.6.2.2 of  Chapter five. 
99 Dougan points out that such a procedure would ‘probably mean the expedited procedure provided for by 
Art. 104a Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice’: above, n. 97, at p. 792 n. 85. 
100 Article 226 or 227 EC Treaty enforcement procedures do not currently apply to the Third Pillar. WGX 
recommended that these procedures be so extended: WGX Final Report, above n. 82, at p. 21. 
101 See Final Report of Working Group IX on Simplification; CONV 424/02, 29 November 2002. For an 
analysis of the reform of the Union’s legal instruments, see Dougan, above n. 97, at pp. 781-787. 
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acts: European laws, framework laws, European decisions and delegated European 
regulations.102  However, existing measures adopted under the AFSJ will remain in force 
pursuant to the provisions on legal succession and continuity in Article IV-438 of the 
Constitution until they are repealed, annulled or amended in implementation of the 
Constitution.103 
 
A major concession to the security and sovereignty concerns of the Member States was 
Article III -377 that contains a modified version of Article 35(5) TEU: 
 
‘In exercising its powers regarding the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of Chapter 
IV of Title III relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union shall have no jurisdiction to review the validity or 
proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law enforcement 
services of a Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon 
Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security.’104  
 
However, Article 68(2) EC Treaty was not retained. The retention of Article 35(5) 
divided WG X with some members arguing that Article III-262 that re-enacts the existing 
text in Article 64(1) EC and in Article 33 TEU would have sufficed.105  
 
                                                 
102 The legal acts of the Union are set out in Articles I-33 to I-37 of the Constitution. The specific type of 
instrument to be adopted under the AFSJ is determined in accordance with the AFSJ provisions in Chapter 
IV of Title II of Part III of the Constitution. 
103 The same applies to the AFSJ Conventions adopted by the Member States under the TEU or the EC 
Treaty and to other measures constituting the acquis of the Union: Article IV-438(3) of the Constitution. 
Article IV-438 does not clarify how the new rules of jurisdiction in the Constitution will apply to the 
existing AFSJ measures pending their replacement by new measures adopted under the Constitution.  Since 
Article IV-437(1) repeals the EC Treaty and the TEU, subject to paragraph two of that article (which is not 
relevant for these purposes), the solution would be to allocate the existing AFSJ measures to one of the 
new legal instruments by reference to the appropriate instrument specified in Chapter IV, Title IV of Part 
III of the Constitution. Article IV-438(5) may provide authority for this exercise: ‘Continuity in 
administrative and legal procedures commenced prior to the date of entry into force of this Treaty shall be 
ensured in compliance with the Constitution. The institutions, bodies, offices and agencies responsible for 
those procedures shall take all appropriate measures to that effect.’ 
104 Sections 4 and 5 of Chapter IV cover the AFSJ matters in Title VI TEU: namely judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters (section 4) and police cooperation (section 5).   
105 Article III-262 provides: ‘This Chapter shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent 
upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal 
security.’ 
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The reforms in the Constitution to the jurisdictional powers of the ECJ over the AFSJ 
measures substantially address the criticisms of the existing AFSJ. When considered in 
conjunction with the other major reforms of the structure of fundamental rights 
protection in the Constitution, namely the mandate for the Union to accede to the ECHR 
under Article I-9(2) and the incorporation of the Charter under Article I-9(1),106 the 
Constitution provides a significant enhancement in the level of recognition and protection 
of fundamental rights in the AFSJ. However, the retention in Article III-377 of an 
exclusion of ECJ jurisdiction over Member State action in the field of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation has the potential to undermine the 
benefits of these reforms. It is therefore incumbent on the ECJ to interpret Article III-377 
in a manner that ensures due respect for fundamental rights standards is guaranteed in 
AFSJ measures whether adopted by the Union institutions or implemented by the 
Member States. 
 
7.5 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
The complexity of the provisions introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam on the scope of 
application of fundamental rights protection to the AFSJ combined with the instability 
created by the delayed ratification process of the Constitution has meant the AFSJ 
provides a confusing and ineffective legal structure for fundamental rights protection. 
This situation has been exacerbated by a political and security environment conditioned 
by terrorist attacks, including those of 11 September 2001 in the United States, 11 March 
2004 in Madrid, and 7 and 21 July 2005 in London. As a result, there are serious and 
legitimate concerns as regards proper access to justice for individuals and effective 
judicial control over the raft of AFSJ measures adopted and proposed.  
 
The recent decisions of the CFI and the ECtHR relating to Union measures adopted 
against Segi have confirmed the AFSJ deficiencies in terms of judicial protection. The 
reforms in the Constitution are therefore critical in providing a structure for the AFSJ that 
respects the rule of law and provides a coherent framework for the protection of 
                                                 
106 See generally Chapter five for analysis of reforms in the Constitution,. 
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fundamental rights. The postponement, if not abandonment, of the Constitution leaves a 
legitimacy deficit that coincides with proposals from national governments for anti-
terrorist measures that undermine basic freedoms protected under the UN and European 
Conventions.107 While proposals for repressive anti-terrorist measures have so far 
principally originated at the national level, the focus may shift to the adoption of such 
measures at the Union level.108 In the absence of implementation of the reforms in the 
Constitution, a more activist judicial approach to the application of international 
fundamental rights is required to counter-balance the political pressure for security to 
preempt justice as the primary objective of the AFSJ. 
 
 
 
107 UK Government proposals include expulsion of non-nationals to countries with a record of human 
rights abuses, including Jordan and Algeria, on the basis of memoranda of understanding that deportees 
would not be executed or subject to torture, and the issuing of instructions to the judiciary on interpretation 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 to facilitate such actions: see: Mary Riddell, ‘Tony Blair’s comic opera’, 
The Observer, 14 August 2005, at p. 24. 
108 See the Acquis of the European Union in the field of JHA; consolidated version; update December 2004. 
available at: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/intro/docs/jha_acquis_1204_en.pdf>. 
See also the Hague Programme on Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in The European Union, 
annexed to the European Council Presidency Conclusions of 4/5 November 2004 available at: 
<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/82534.pdf>.  
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8 
 
THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT: A CASE STUDY ON JUSTICE 
IN THE AFSJ 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
‘But of course, like some well-known theological concepts, the Community is, in 
some senses, its Member States; in other senses separate from them.’1 This 
observation applies par excellence to the complex and shifting boundaries of the 
division of powers between the Member States and the Union in the area of refugee 
and asylum law.2   The allocation of competences between the Union and the 
Member States in the field of asylum and refugee policy and law-making shifted 
substantially under the Treaty of Amsterdam in favour of the Union.3 International 
relations theory has identified a number of reasons for the Member States agreeing to 
this decisive shift from intergovernmental cooperation to communitarisation of 
asylum and refugee policy,  albeit subject to specific restrictions on justiciability and 
decision-making procedures.4 The dynamic towards a common Union policy  on 
immigration and asylum has strengthened since the Treaty of Amsterdam.5 The 
                                                 
1  Weiler and Fries, ‘A Human Rights Policy for the European Community and Union: The Question of 
Competences’, in  Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp. 147-165, at p. 
161.   
2 See Hannah R. Garry, ‘Harmonisation of Asylum Law and Policy within the European Union: A 
Human Rights Perspective’ (2002) 20 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights,  pp. 163-183. 
3 See Section 6.2.4. of Chapter six. 
4 For a detailed discussion of the relative merits of  neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism as 
theories to explain this shift, see: Philip Myers, European Union and Justice and Home Affairs, Ph.D 
Thesis (Sussex, 1999); and Arne Niemann, The Internal and External Dimensions of European Union 
Decision-making , Ph.D Thesis (Cambridge, 2000). See also: Elspeth Guild, ‘Seeking Asylum: Storm 
Clouds between International Commitments and EU Legislative Measures’ (2004) 29 EL. Rev., pp. 
198-218; Kay Hailbronner, ‘Asylum law in the Context of a European Migration Policy’, in Walker 
(ed.),  Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Oxford, OUP, 2004), pp. 41-88;  and C. 
Harvey, ‘The Right to Seek Asylum in the European Union’ (2004) 1 EHRLR, pp. 17-36. 
5 In October 1999 the European Council at Tampere established as a long-term goal the creation of a 
Common European Asylum System  (CEAS), Presidency Conclusions of 15-16 October 1999, Council 
Doc. SN 200/99. Available at:  <http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/oct99/oct99_en.htm>.  See 
also: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Towards a 
common asylum procedure and a uniform status, valid throughout the Union, for persons granted 
asylum, 22 November 2000, COM/2000/0755 final; available at:  
<http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2000/com2000_0755en01.pdf>; and the 2004 
Hague Programme on Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in The European Union , 4-5 
November 2004, Annex 1 to the Presidency Conclusions (14292/04); available at: 
<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/82534.pdf>. 
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Constitution reflects this process by integrating asylum and refugee measures into the 
mainstream of Union policy-making although as an area of shared competence.6 
                                                
 
The normative consequences of the transfer of powers to the Union in refugee and 
asylum policy has been masked by the principal method of legal integration adopted:  
harmonisation by the adoption of minimum standards.7 However, the Union plans to 
replace this system based on minimum standards by a ‘common procedure and 
uniform status for persons benefiting from asylum or subsidiary protection before the 
end of 2010.’8 If this plan is implemented, which is to some extent dependent on the 
enlarged competences in this area provided in the Constitution, the role of the Union 
in the internal and external aspects of refugee and asylum policy will be 
correspondingly strengthened. In the context of this extension of Union competences, 
the recognition and effective implementation of international norms for the protection 
of refugees and asylum seekers in the Union’s legal order is critical to guaranteeing 
the rights of those seeking protection. 
 
In the exercise of its refugee and asylum powers, the Union has been under sustained 
pressure from Member States to adopt measures restrictive of the rights both of 
asylum seekers and those seeking subsidiary protection.9  The sources and normative 
scope of the legal constraints under which the Union operates therefore justify careful 
analysis to determine how far the Union’s action is compatible not only with its 
rhetoric on fundamental rights protection but also international norms. This Chapter 
applies the methodology set out in Chapter one to a case study based on measuring 
the justice of  the refugee and asylum component of the AFSJ by reference to the 
 
6 Article I-14(2)(j) of the Constitution. See generally Sections 6.2.8 and 6.2.9 of Chapter six. 
7 See for an analysis of the methods of legal integration in the context of migration control policy: F. 
Pastore, ‘Visas, Borders, Immigration: Formation, Structure, and Current Evolution of the EU Entry 
Control System’, in Walker (ed.), Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Oxford, OUP, 
2004), pp. 89-142, at pp. 104-107. 
8 The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years: The Partnership for European renewal 
in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice, 10 May 2005, COM/2005/184 final, at p. 8. 
9 See: Martin Kjærum, ‘Refugee Protection Between State Interests and Human Rights: Where is 
Europe Heading?’ (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly, pp. 513-536; and Guild, above n. 4. Subsidiary 
protection here refers to those who do not benefit from the protection of the Refugee  Convention but 
may be protected under Article 3 ECHR as they face a risk of ill-treatment if returned to their home 
state. For detailed analysis, see Jane McAdam, ‘The European Union proposal on subsidiary 
protection: An Analysis and Assessment’, New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 74, 
December 2002, UNHCR, Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit. Available on the UNHCR website at: 
<http://www.unhcr.ch>. Documents on the UNHCR website are not further referenced. 
 239
principle of non-refoulement.10 The principle of non-refoulement as determined by 
international fundamental rights standards has been selected because it is an essential 
component of the protection of the fundamental rights of  refugees and asylum 
seekers. In the context of the war against terrorism, the prohibition against 
refoulement  provides an essential mechanism  for deterring states from transferring  
suspected terrorists to countries where they are subject to interrogation under torture 
or holding them accountable for violations of the prohibition.11     
The Chapter is divided into three sections. The first section examines the principle of 
non-refoulement in international law with specific reference to international 
instruments of particular relevance to the Union and Member States. It focuses on the 
treatment in those instruments of five key issues which provide the basis for the 
subsequent assessment of the conformity of Union measures with international 
standards on non-refoulement: non-refoulement as an absolute principle; the 
‘accountability’ or ‘protection’ theory; indirect refoulement; non-admittance at the 
frontier as refoulement; and non-refoulement and extradition.  The second section 
examines the status of the principle of non-refoulement in Union law. Firstly, it 
analyses the protection afforded to the principle as a fundamental right in Union law 
by application of the general principles of law doctrine, as confirmed in Article 6(2) 
TEU, by Article 63(1) EC Treaty, and by Articles 4 and 18 of the Charter. Secondly, 
it analyses refugee and asylum measures of primary and secondary Union law for 
their conformity with the principle of non-refoulement. The third section consists of a 
study of the 2004 Refugee Qualification and Status Directive (RQSD)12. 
 
                                                 
10 ‘Non-refoulement encompasses any measure attributable to the state that may lead to the return of 
the asylum seeker or refugee to the frontier of territories where his life or freedom could be threatened 
or where he or she is at risk of persecution, including interception, rejection at the frontier, or indirect 
refoulement.’: Dallal Stevens, UK Asylum Law and Policy  (London, Thomson, 2004), at pp. 140-141. 
This definition is based on the UNHCR sponsored Global Consultations on International Protection, 
Summary conclusions- the principle of non-refoulement (Cambridge, 9-10 July 2001). Available on the 
UNHCR website.  For a similar exercise in reviewing Council practice in applying international 
fundamental rights obligations in respect of JHA measures  in the fields of data protection, 
telecommunications interception, trial rights and the non bis in idem principle see: Peers, in Alston 
(ed.), above n. 5, at pp. 175-186. 
11 For evidence of this practice, see Robert Fisk, ‘ We are all complicit in these vile acts of torture - but 
what can we do about it?’, The Independent of 18 June 2005. Available at: 
<http://news.independent.co.uk/world/fisk/story.jsp?story=647669>. 
12 Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of refugees 
third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international 
protection and the content of the protection granted  [2004] OJ L 304/12 (RQSD). 
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8.2 THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
8.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
‘Non-refoulement is a concept which prohibits States from returning a refugee 
or asylum-seeker to territories where there is a risk his or her life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opinion.’13  
 
While the exact scope of the principle in international law is debated,14 it is of 
primary importance in the protection of refugees and asylum seekers from expulsion 
by the state where they are seeking refuge directly or indirectly to another state where 
their fundamental rights are threatened with violation. In the context of the ‘war on 
terror’ the principle has provided an essential bulwark against the temptation for a 
state to rid itself of a suspected terrorist regardless of the potential harmful 
consequences of such expulsion on the individual concerned.15  
 
This section analyses the scope and content of the principle of non-refoulement in 
international law.  In particular, a comparative analysis is made of the following  
international instruments: Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR);16 Article 3(1) of the 1967 General Assembly Declaration on Territorial 
Asylum (1967 Territorial Asylum Declaration);17 Article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention;18 Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
                                                 
13 Legal opinion of 20 June 2001 provided for the UNHCR by E. Lauterpacht and D. Bethlehem on 
The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement, at para. 2. Available on the UNHCR 
website and in E. Feller, V. Türk, and F. Nicholson (eds.), Refugee Protection in International Law 
(Cambridge, CUP, 2003), pp. 87-177. 
14 See Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (2nd edn.) (Oxford, OUP, 1996), at 
pp. 134-137; J. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Toronto, Butterworths, 1991); J. Hathaway, 
The Rights of Refugees Under International Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2005); and K. Röhl, ‘Fleeing 
violence and poverty: non-refoulement obligations under the European Convention of Human 
Rights’ New Issues in Refugee Research, UNHCR Working Paper No. 111 of January 2005; 
available on the UNHCR website. 
15 See R. Bruin and K. Wouters, ‘Terrorism and the Non-Derogability of Non-Refoulement’ (2003) 15 
IJRL, pp. 5-29; and O. Okafor and P. Okoronkwo, ‘Re-configuring non-refoulement? The Suresh 
decision, ‘security relativism’, and the international human rights imperative’ (2003) 15 IJRL, pp. 30-
67.  
16  GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948). Art. 14(1) UDHR: ‘Everyone has the right to 
seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.’ Art. 14(2) UDHR: ‘This right may not 
be invoked  in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.’ 
17 Article 3(1) of the 1967 Territorial Asylum Declaration, while not in itself legally binding, contains 
the principle of non-refoulement: ‘No person referred to in Article 1, paragraph 1, shall be subjected to 
measures such as rejection at the frontier or, if he has already entered the territory in which he seeks 
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(ICCPR);19 Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT);20 and Article 3 of the European  
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)21 (collectively referred to as the International 
Instruments). The International Instruments are not an exhaustive list of international 
instruments which have provisions of relevance to the principle of non-refoulement. 22 
However, the International Instruments are considered to be of the most direct 
relevance to the Union on the basis of the participation of the Member States in their 
                                                                                                                                            
asylum, expulsion or compulsory return to any state where he may be subjected to persecution.’: GA. 
Res. 2312 (XX11), 22 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 81, UN Doc. A/6716 (1967). ‘This ‘non-rejection’ 
terminology, first used in the 1933 Convention [relating to the International Status of Refugees], can be 
regarded as an important extension of the principle of non-refoulement’: Stevens, above n. 10, at p. 
137. 
18 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, signed 28 July 1951, in force 22 April 1954: 
189 UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention). Art. 33(1): ‘No Contracting State shall expel or return 
(“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion.’ 
Art. 33(2): ‘The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom 
there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or 
who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes 
a danger to the community of that country.’ 
19 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 December 1966, in force 23 March 
1976: 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). Art. 7:  ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to 
medical or scientific experimentation.’ 
20 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading  Treatment or Punishment, 
adopted 10 December 1984, in force 26 June 1987: 1465 UNTS 85 (CAT). Art. 3(1): ‘No State Party 
shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds 
for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.’ Art. 3(2): ‘For the purpose of 
determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account all 
relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent 
pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.’ 
21 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed 4 
November 1950, in force 3 September 1953: ETS 5 (ECHR).  Art. 3: ‘No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ 
22 The 1987 European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, signed 26 November 1987, in force 1 February 1989, ETS 126, is not considered 
separately from the ECHR since its Preamble specifies that Article 3 ECHR is the normative standard 
by which the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
of Punishment measures alleged violations.  Article 3 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC), UN GA Res. 44/25 of 20 November 1989, in force 2 September 1990, 28 ILM 1448, and 
to which all Member States are signatories, requires the best interests of the child to be a ‘primary 
consideration’ in all actions concerning children and  has been relied upon by the Swedish courts  in 
determining refugee claims. See McAdam, above n. 9, at p. 4, n. 24. Further conventions of relevance 
include: the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons; the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness; the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD); and the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). For references to these Conventions see Annex 1.  The 
1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees adopted by ten Latin American States is also an important 
source of international refugee law: OAS/Ser. I/V/II.66, doc. 10, rev. 1, pp. 190-193. For a list of  
international instruments containing standards establishing the principle of non-refoulement:  see 
Lauterpacht and  Bethlehem: above n. 13, at paras. 4-10. For international agreements of general 
relevance to  refugee and asylum law, see Goodwin-Gill, above n. 14, at pp. 296-313. 
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drafting and adoption.23 The status of the principle of non-refoulement as a rule of 
customary international law  and as a peremptory norm is also considered.24 
 
8.2.2 THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF NON-REFOULEMENT  
 
8.2.2.1 Introduction 
This Section analyses the scope and content of the principle of non-refoulement in the 
International Instruments in five defined areas: the absolute character of the principle; 
the ‘accountability’ or ‘protection’ theory as its basis; indirect expulsion; rejection at 
the frontier; and the relationship between extradition and non-refoulement. Each area 
has been selected on the basis that it is subject to controversy as to the scope of 
protection in international law and is of particular relevance to determining the 
legality of anti-terrorist measures adopted or proposed in the aftermath of 11 
September 2001 and subsequent terrorist attacks. This analysis provides the basis for 
the assessment by reference to the International Instruments of the normative status of 
the principle of non-refoulement in both primary and secondary Union law in  
Sections 8.3 and 8.4. 
 
8.2.2.2 Non-Refoulement as an Absolute Principle 
A distinction may be drawn between the International Instruments that prohibit 
refoulement in absolute terms and those that provide for exceptions. The prohibition 
under Article 3 ECHR is absolute25 and is not dependent on the status or conduct of 
the person seeking protection from expulsion, deportation or extradition.26  Article 3 
CAT contains an absolute prohibition on removal of a person to another state where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that person would be in danger of torture.27 
                                                 
23 Annex 1 to the Opinion of Lauterpacht and Bethlehem lists the ‘Status of Ratifications of the Key 
International Instruments which include a Non-Refoulement Component’, above n. 13.  The Member 
States are all party to the Refugee  Convention, the ICCPR, the ECHR and the CAT. 
24 See Section 2.3 of Chapter two for an analysis of customary international law as a source of 
international fundamental rights law. 
25 No derogation may be made from Article 3 under Article 15 ECHR and, by implication, no 
reservation may be made in respect of Article 3 under Article 57 ECHR. See Michael K. Addo and 
Nicholas Grief, ‘Does Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Enshrine Absolute 
Rights?’ (1998) 9 EJIL, pp. 510-524.  
26 See Chahal v UK (1996) 23 EHRR 413 and Ahmed v Austria (1997) 24 EHRR 278. 
27 Article 3 CAT only refers to the danger of being subjected to torture while Article 3 ECHR also 
refers to ‘inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.  Article 7 ICCPR refers to torture or to 
‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. In practice this distinction has not prevented 
the CAT Committee from developing a substantial case law on Article 3 in the context of protection 
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In Paez v Sweden, the CAT Committee held even if the refusal to grant asylum to the 
applicant was justified under Article 1F of the Refugee  Convention:  
 
‘The Committee considers that the test of article 3 of the Convention is 
absolute  … The nature of the activities in which the person engaged cannot 
be a material consideration when making a determination under article 3 of 
the Convention.’28 
 
Article 7 ICCPR is also absolute in the sense it is non-derogable29 and no restrictions 
are permitted.30 The procedural rights against expulsion in Article 13 ICCPR are, 
however, subject to exception ‘where compelling reasons of national security 
otherwise require’. Under Article 33(1) of the Refugee  Convention, protection will 
be forfeited if the refugee loses their status as a refugee31 or is subject to Article 
33(2).32 Article 14(2) of the UNDHR also removes the right to invoke the right to 
seek and enjoy asylum from persecution under Article 14(1) ‘in the case of 
prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations.’ Article 1(2) of the 1967 Territorial 
                                                                                                                                            
against refoulement: see J. Rehman, International Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach (Harlow, 
Longman, 2003),  at pp. 416-418.  
28 Communication No. 39/96, CAT/C/18/D/39/1996 (1997), at para. 14.5. 
29 Article 4(2) ICCPR.  See: HRC General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), 31 
August 2001: U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 11 (2001). On 23 December 1988 the UK 
Government derogated from its obligations under Article 9 ICCPR pursuant to Article 4(3) ICCPR 
in respect of certain provisions of  the prevention of terrorism legislation then in force. A copy of 
the letter of derogation is available at:  
<http://www.law.qub.ac.uk/humanrts/ehris/ni/derog/derogiccpr.htm>. This derogation has now 
lapsed. The UK subsequently made a derogation in December 2001 in respect of Article 9(3) 
ICCPR on the grounds a public emergency existed following the events of September 11 2001: see 
for details: <http://www.dca.gov.uk/hract/ngo/reviews/appendix6.pdf>.  
30 UN HRC General Comment No. 24 of 4 November 1994, Issues relating to reservations made upon 
ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to 
declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant.  CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, at para. 8. Although the 
validity of General Comment No. 24 has been challenged,  this seems unlikely to extend to its 
prohibition on reservations to Article 7 ICCPR on the basis that a reservation  would contravene 
Article 19(1)(c) of the 1969 VCLT. See generally: S. Joseph, J. Schultz and M. Castan, International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (2nd edn.) (Oxford, OUP, 
2004), at pp. 797-819.  
31 Articles I(C), (D), (E) and (F) of the Refugee  Convention list the grounds on which a refugee may 
be denied or lose the protection of the Convention. See for detailed analysis of Articles 1(F)(a), 1(F)(c) 
and 1(F)(b): J. Hathaway and C. Harvey, ‘Framing  Refugee Protection in the New World Disorder’, 
(2001) 34 Cornell Int’l L.J., pp. 257-320, at pp. 266-286.  
32 Art. 33(2) provides: ‘The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed 
by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the 
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious 
crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.’ See for analysis of Article 33(2), 
Hathaway and Harvey, above n. 31, at pp. 286-296. 
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Asylum Declaration expands on the grounds for non–application of Article 14(1) 
UNDHR by providing: 
 
‘The right to seek and to enjoy asylum may not be invoked by any person 
with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has 
committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity, as 
defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect 
of such crimes’.  
 
Article 3(2) of the 1967 Territorial Asylum Declaration only permits exception to the 
non-refoulement obligation in Article 3(1) ‘for overriding reasons of national security 
or in order to safeguard the population, as in the case of a mass influx of persons’. In 
such a case,  Article 3(3) requires the state availing of the exception to consider the 
possibility of permitting the persons concerned the opportunity of going to another 
state. 
 
8.2.2.3 The Accountability or Protection Theory  
The second area relates to the extent to which the relevant provision of the 
International Instruments has been construed as prohibiting  refoulement to a territory 
only where the state authorities in that territory can be held accountable for a 
threatened violation of a protected right (the accountability theory) or as prohibiting  
refoulement to a territory in any situation where the protected right of an asylum 
seeker is threatened in that territory independently of state involvement or 
acquiescence (the protection or persecution theory).  
 
The most controversial instance of this difference in interpretation of the basis of the 
principle of non-refoulement is in respect of Article 1A(2) of the Refugee  
Convention where a minority of signatory states, and notably Germany and France,  
have adopted the accountability theory in respect of determining refugee status 
whereas the majority of signatory states, including the UK, have adopted the 
protection theory.33 This difference in interpretation has given rise to specific 
                                                 
33 Article 1A(2) provides: ‘A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "refugee" shall 
apply to any person who  … (2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to  
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.’ A lucid description of the accountability and 
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problems in the context of the 1990 Dublin Convention34 and the Dublin II 
Regulation35 under which there may be an obligation to return an asylum seeker to 
another Member State which adopts a more restrictive interpretation of Article 1A(2) 
of the Refugee  Convention than the returning state.36 Indeed, one of the weaknesses 
of the Refugee  Convention is the lack of an authoritative tribunal to settle 
definitively its meaning.37 
 
Article 1(1) CAT refers expressly to a requirement that the torture be inflicted ‘by or 
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity.’ In this context, Articles 1 and  3 CAT have been 
interpreted by the CAT Committee, referring to the ECtHR decision of Ahmed v 
Austria,38 to prohibit refoulement to Somalia since there was a danger of the applicant 
being subjected to torture at the hands of militia in Mogadishu who de facto exercised 
governmental prerogatives.39 However, in G.R.B. v Sweden  the CAT Committee held 
Articles 1 and  3 CAT did not prohibit refoulement to Peru since the Peruvian state 
                                                                                                                                            
protection theories, and countries which adopt them, is given by Lord Hope of Craighead in Horvath v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 AC 489; reproduced in (2001) 13 IJRL, pp. 174-
201, at p. 177. The case is commented on by Hélène Lambert, ‘The Conceptualization of ‘Persecution’ 
by the House of Lords: Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home Department’ (2001) 13 IJRL,  pp. 
16-31. See also:  R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Adan  and ex p. Aitseguer 
[2001] 2 AC 477; and  Adan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1999] 1 AC 293. For a 
summary of the construction of the term ‘persecution’ in the Refugee   Convention in other signatory 
states see the submission by UNHCR in T.I. v. United Kingdom (2000) 12 IJRL 244, at paras. 19-20. 
34 Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in 
One of the Member States of the European Communities of 15 June 1990, in force 1 September 1997: 
[1997] OJ C 254/1. 
35 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms 
for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of 
the Member States by a third-country national, [2003] OJ L50/1. 
36 This situation arose in Adan and Aitseguer, above n. 33,  where the UK authorities were seeking to 
return Adan to Germany and Aitseguer to France under the 1990 Dublin Convention.  Under German 
and French asylum law this may have resulted in the return of Adan and Aitseguer to Somalia and 
Algeria respectively in circumstances which would have been in breach of the interpretation of Article 
1(A)2 of the Refugee  Convention adopted by the English courts. The House of Lords decided in those 
circumstances return was prohibited under Section 2(2) of the 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act 
which incorporated the non-refoulement obligations in the Refugee  Convention.  See Section 8.3.3.4. 
below for analysis of the 1990 Dublin Convention and Dublin II Regulation and non-refoulement. 
37 The UNCHR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Geneva, 1992) 
to some extent fulfils this role but lacks binding authority.  Article 38 of the Refugee  Convention 
provides for a dispute between the parties to be referred to the ICJ but this jurisdiction has never been 
exercised. The ECtHR has specifically disclaimed such a role: ‘it is not its function to examine asylum 
claims or to monitor the performance of Contracting Parties with regard to their observance of their 
obligations under the Geneva Convention on Refugees.’ : T.I.  v UK, above n. 33, at p. 262. See Tom 
Clark, ‘Rights Based Refuge, the Potential of the 1951 Convention and the Need for Authoritative 
Interpretation’ (2004) 16 IJRL, pp. 584-608. 
38 Cited above n. 26. 
39 Elmi v Australia, Communcation No. 120/98, CAT/C/22/D/120/1998 (1999). See Lambert, above n. 
33, at p. 23.  
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continued to exercise effective sovereignty over the whole territory notwithstanding 
the actions of the ‘Shining Path’ guerrillas.40 The construction of Article 7  ICCPR by 
the HRC is likely to be consistent with the case law of the CAT Committee.41 Article 
3(1) of the 1967 Territorial Asylum Declaration simply refers to ‘persecution’ 
without imposing any restriction as to the identity of the agent of persecution. 
 
As regards the obligation of non-refoulement under Article 3 ECHR, The ECtHR has 
adopted the protection theory:  
 
‘The Court’s  case-law further indicates that the existence of this obligation is 
not dependent on whether the source of the risk of the treatment stems from 
factors which involve the responsibility, direct or indirect, of the authorities 
of the receiving country. Having regard to the absolute character of the right 
guaranteed, Article 3 may extend to situations where the danger emanates 
from persons or groups of persons who are not public officials, or from the 
consequences to health from the effects of serious illness’.42  
 
However, in HLR v France the ECtHR qualified the scope of the protection against 
refoulement under Article 3 ECHR: ‘However, it must be shown that the risk is real 
and that the authorities of the receiving state are not able to obviate the risk by 
providing appropriate protection.’43 In the case of countries, such as the UK, which 
have  adopted the protection theory in interpreting Article 1A(2) of the Refugee  
Convention there is unlikely to be any substantial difference in a non-refoulement 
claim under Article 3 ECHR and under the Refugee  Convention.44 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Communication No. 83/97, CAT/C/20/D/83/1997 (1998). See Joseph,  Schultz and Castan, above n. 
30, at  paras. 9.13 and 9.15. 
41  See for this argument: Joseph, Schultz, and Castan, above n. 30, at para. 9.02. 
42 T.I. v UK, above n. 33, at pp. 259-260. 
43 HLR v France (1997) 26 EHRR 29, at para. 40. See also D. v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 423; and T.I. v 
UK, above n. 33, at pp. 259-260.  
44 See in this sense R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p. Bagdanavivius [2005] 
UKHL 38, at para. 30. The only judgment, delivered by Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, 
contains a detailed analysis of the ECtHR’s case law on the scope of the non-refoulement obligation 
under Article 3 ECHR. In particular, Lord Brown rejects the applicant’s argument that the harm 
threatened on his return to Lithuania originating from non-state actors was in itself grounds for 
refusing expulsion under Article 3 ECHR but rather found that there had to be a risk of treatment 
contrary to Article 3 ECHR which required a failure by the state to provide reasonable protection 
against such harm: ibid., at para. 24. 
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8.2.2.4  Indirect Refoulement 
The third area of analysis is the scope of the protection against non-refoulement in 
respect of forced removal to a third party state where there is a risk of subsequent 
removal to a prohibited state. Article 3 ECHR, read in conjunction with Article 1 
ECHR,45 guarantees an individual protection against extradition, expulsion, or 
deportation from the territory of a signatory state to another state if ‘substantial 
grounds had been shown for believing that the person concerned, if expelled, faced a 
real risk of being subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment in the receiving country’.46 The ECtHR in T.I. v UK  indicated that the 
scope of  protection under Article 3 ECHR included the situation where a person is 
removed to another state, even if there is no risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 
ECHR in that state, if that removal is ‘one link in a possible chain of events which 
might result’ in the person’s return to a state where it is alleged he would face the real 
risk of such treatment.47  
 
The CAT Committee has endorsed the view that the phrase ‘another State’ in Article 
3 CAT includes reference to a transit state where a person runs a real risk of being 
expelled or returned to a prohibited state.48 Article 7 ICCPR is likely to be interpreted 
in the same sense.49 While Article 33(1) of the Refugee  Convention does not 
explicitly address indirect refoulement, Lauterpacht and Bethlehem consider it is 
covered:  
                                                 
45 Article 1 ECHR requires each signatory to ‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in Section of this Convention’. 
46 Al-Adsani v UK  (2002) 34 EHRR 11, at para. 39.  See also Soering v UK  (1989) 11 EHRR 439. See 
generally, Ralf Alleweldt, ‘Protection against expulsion under Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2002) 4 EJIL, pp. 360-376. 
47 Cited above at n. 31, at p. 260. In T.I., above n. 33, the ECtHR held the application to be manifestly 
unfounded since there was no likelihood of the applicant being returned by the German authorities to 
Sri Lanka. 
48 See CAT General Comment No. 1 of 21 November 1997: Implementation of Article 3 of the 
Convention in the context of Article 22: A/53/44, annex  IX, at para. 2. Available on the UNHCR 
website.  See also Korban v Sweden, Communication No. 88/97, CAT/C/21/D/88/1997  (1998), at 
para. 7; and Tala v Sweden, Communication No. 43/1996, CAT/C/17/D/43/1996 (1996), at para. 11. In 
A..S. v. Sweden, the CAT Committee stated: ‘the Committee is of the view that, in the prevailing 
circumstances, the State party has an obligation, in accordance with article 3 of the Convention, to 
refrain from forcibly returning the author to Iran or to any other country where she runs a risk of being 
expelled or returned to Iran’: Communication No. 149/1999, CAT/C/25/D/149/1999 (2001), at para. 9.  
49 The HRC has, in the context of the right to life protected under Article 6 ICCPR, adopted such a 
formulation: ‘If a State party extradites a person within its jurisdiction in circumstances such that as a 
result there is a real risk that his or her rights under the Covenant will be violated in another 
jurisdiction, the State party itself may be in violation of the Covenant.’: Kindler v Canada, 
Communication No. 470/91, CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (1993), at para. 13.1. 
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‘Having regard to these factors, the prohibition of refoulement in Article 
33(1) of the 1951 Convention must be construed as encompassing the 
expulsion, return or other transfer of a refugee or asylum-seeker both to a 
territory where he or she may be at risk directly and to a territory where they 
may be at risk of subsequent expulsion, return or transfer to another territory 
where they may be at risk’.50   
 
8.2.2.5  Non-Admittance at the Frontier  
The extent to which a person is guaranteed a right of entry to a state if refusal to enter 
would result in a risk either of persecution or a risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment has given rise to conflicting standards under the 
International Instruments. Lauterpacht and Bethlehem argue Article 33(1) of the 
Refugee  Convention encompasses at least a right to limited protection against 
rejection:  
 
‘As regards rejection, or non-admittance at the frontier, the 1951 Convention 
and international law generally do not contain a right of asylum. This does 
not mean, however, that States are free to reject at the frontier, without 
constraint, those who have a well-founded fear of persecution. What it does 
mean is that, where States are not prepared to grant asylum to persons who 
have a well-founded fear of persecution, they must adopt a course that does 
not amount to refoulement. This may involve removal to a safe third country 
or some other solution such as temporary protection or refuge. No other 
analysis, in our view, is consistent with the terms of Article 33(1).’51  
 
However, the majority view is that Article 33 (1) of the Refugee  Convention only 
applies to those asylum seekers who have entered the territory of a signatory state, 
whether legally or illegally and not to those rejected at the frontier.52 
 
The extent to which Article 3 ECHR offers protection against non-admittance or 
rejection at the frontier in the case of a risk of  torture or inhuman or degrading 
                                                 
50 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n. 13,  at para 121. 
51 Ibid., at para. 76. This construction of the principle of non-refoulement under the Refugee  
Convention is controversial: see Stevens, above n. 10, at pp. 138-141. 
52 See the judgment of Lord Bingham in R. (ex p. European Roma Rights Centre and others) v. 
Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and Another [2004] UKHL 55, at para. 17. The decision in that 
case was based on the narrower ground that Article 33(1) of the Refugee  Convention did not apply 
since the applicants had not left the jurisdiction of the country of their nationality (the Czech 
Republic).  
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treatment or punishment is unresolved.53 In Jabari v Turkey  the ECtHR reiterated the 
right of contracting states: 
 
‘…as a matter of well-established international law and subject to their treaty 
obligations, including the Convention, to control the entry, residence and 
expulsion of aliens. Moreover, the right to political asylum is not contained in 
either the Convention or its Protocols’.54  
 
However, in Jabari itself the ECtHR held deportation of the applicant from Turkey to 
Iran would constitute a violation of Article 3 ECHR since there was a real risk of her 
being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 on the grounds of adultery.55 While 
the case law of the ECtHR has so far been concerned with the issue of expulsion, 
there seems, in the light of the absolute character of Article 3 ECHR, no valid reason 
to distinguish between protection against expulsion and non-admittance in 
circumstances where the risk to the individual is the same.  
 
As regards Article 3 CAT, the CAT Committee has determined:  
 
‘…its authority does not extend to a determination of whether or not the 
claimant is entitled to asylum under the national laws of a country or can 
invoke the protection of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees. Under Article 3 of the Convention, the Committee must decide 
whether expulsion or extradition might expose an individual to the risk of 
being tortured.’56  
 
However, although Article 3 CAT only specifically refers to expulsion, return 
(refoulement) or extradition, in Aemei v Switzerland the CAT Committee held that 
while a finding of a violation of Article 3 CAT was declaratory and did not require a 
state to modify its decision concerning the grant of asylum by the national authorities, 
it did require them to ‘take all necessary measures’ to comply with Article 3 which 
                                                 
53 See: K. Hailbronner, ‘Non-Refoulement and “Humanitarian” Refugees: Customary International Law 
or Wishful Legal Thinking?’ in  (1985/1986) 26 Virginia Journal of International Law, pp. 857-896, at 
p. 893; and Stevens, above n. 10,  at pp. 151-153. In the Roma case, the House of Lords rejected a 
claim based on a breach of the ECHR on the basis that the applicants were not within the jurisdiction 
of the UK authorities within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR or, even if that were the case, there had 
been no violation of either Article 2 or 3 ECHR: above n. 52, at para. 73. 
54 ECHR 2000-VIII, p. 308, at para. 38.  
55 Ibid., at para. 42. 
56 X  v. Spain, Communication No. 23/1995, CAT/C/15/D/23/1995 (1995), at para. 7.3.  
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might include ‘a decision to admit the applicant temporarily’.57  This reasoning 
indicates that Article 3 CAT may also include a right of admittance for the purpose of 
temporary protection.  
 
Article 7 ICCPR, although offering in principle wider substantive protection than 
Article 3 CAT since it applies not only to torture but also cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, is likely to be construed in line with the jurisprudence on Article 3 CAT. 
Indeed, General Comment No. 20 of the HRC on the principle of non-refoulement 
under Article 7 ICCPR tracks Article 3 CAT insofar as it refers to the protection of 
individuals from the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment upon return to another country by way of their ‘extradition, expulsion or 
refoulement’.58  
 
Finally, it has been argued that the customary international law principle of non-
refoulement both in the context of refugees, which corresponds largely to that under 
Article 33 of the Refugee  Convention,  and in the more general human rights context,  
extends to non-admittance at the frontier.59  In European Roma Rights Centre,60 the 
House of Lords decided that there was no customary rule of international law 
requiring British customs officers conducting pre-clearance operations at Prague 
airport on persons seeking entry to the UK to consider the merits of a claim for 
asylum.61  However Lord Bingham in that case did provide support for the narrower 
rule: 
 
‘There would appear to be general acceptance of the principle that a person 
who leaves the state of his nationality and applies to the authorities of another 
state for asylum, whether at the frontier of the second state or from within it, 
should not be rejected or returned to the first state without appropriate 
                                                 
57 Communication No. 34/95, CAT/C/18/D/34/1995 (1997), at para. 11. 
58 General Comment No. 20: Concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment 
(Article 7), 10 March 1992, at para. 9. 
59 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n. 13, at paras. 218(b) and 252.  Lauterpacht and Bethlehem’s 
definition of the principle of non-refoulement in the human rights context offers more extensive 
protection since it is not subject to exception: ibid., at para. 252. 
60 Above n. 52. 
61 The applicants in the Roma case relied on paragraphs 61 and 67 of the Opinion of Lauterpacht and 
Bethlehem, above n. 13, in support of such a customary rule of law. However,  Lord Bingham 
concluded that their views were not supported by state practice: above n. 52, at para. 27. 
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enquiry into the persecution of which he claims to have a well-founded 
fear.’62 
 
8.2.2.6  Non-Refoulement and Extradition 
The complex interrelationship between extradition and the principle of non-
refoulement provides a example of an area where the International Instruments 
provide differing standards of protection.63 It is established that notwithstanding the 
absence in Article 33(1) of the Refugee  Convention of an express reference to 
extradition, the prohibition on refoulement extends to extradition.64 The prohibition 
against refoulement in Article 3(1) CAT expressly refers to extradition and the case 
law of the HRC  has established the prohibition in Article 7 ICCPR extends to 
extradition.65 The ECtHR has reached the same conclusion in respect of Article 3 
ECHR.66 The principle distinction to be drawn between protection against extradition 
if it amounts to refoulement under the Refugee  Convention and under the 
ECHR/CAT/ICCPR is that protection under the latter conventions admits of no 
exception.  
 
However, the prohibition against refoulement, whether based on  treaty or customary 
international law, may come into conflict with principles of international law 
requiring extradition. While there is no clearly established obligation to extradite 
under customary international law,67 there is a growing recognition in international 
treaties, both bilateral and multilateral, that certain crimes require extradition:  
 
‘With regard to certain offences, the legal basis for extradition can be found 
in international law. This is the case, in particular, with regard to war crimes 
and certain crimes against humanity, acts considered to be terrorism and other 
types of transnational crime.’68  
                                                 
62 Ibid, at para. 26. This view was obiter since the applicants had not presented themselves at the 
frontier of the UK. 
63 For a detailed study see: Sibylle Kapferer, The Interface between Extradition and Asylum,  UNHCR, 
Legal And Protection Policy Research Series  (2003). Available on the UNHCR website.  
64 Ibid, at para. 223. See in support of this conclusion: Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n. 13, at 
paras. 71-75. 
65 See Chitat Ng v. Canada,  Communication No. 469/1991, CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (1994), at para. 
6.2. The procedural guarantees against expulsion in Article 13 ICCPR also apply to extradition: 
Kindler v Canada, above n. 49, at para. 6.6. 
66 See Soering v UK, above n. 46, at para. 88. 
67 ‘Customary international law will neither force nor prevent extradition, …’: Claire de Than and 
Edwin Shorts, International Criminal Law and Human Rights  (London, Thomson, 2003), at p. 46.  
 68 Kapferer, above n. 63, at para. 21. In paras. 23-31, Kapferer details the various international 
instruments requiring or permitting extradition.   
 252
 
In the event of a conflict between the obligation to extradite under international law 
and the principle of non-refoulement, it has been persuasively argued that the 
principle of non-refoulement prevails on the basis either it is a peremptory norm of 
international law or by application of Article 103, in combination with Articles 55(c) 
and 56, of the UN Charter.69   
 
8.2.3  NON-REFOULEMENT AS A PRINCIPLE OF CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUS COGENS 
 
The principle of non-refoulement is generally accepted to be a rule of customary 
international law.70 It has been argued that the principle of non-refoulement has also 
acquired the status of a peremptory rule of international law. The UNHCR in its 
submission to the ECtHR in the case of T.I. v United Kingdom argued: 
 
‘In view of its general widespread acceptance at both the international and 
regional levels, and based on the consistent practice of States with the 
recognition that the principle has normative character, UNCHR considers that 
non-refoulement, as part of the international system for refugee protection, 
constitutes a rule of international customary law which is progressively 
acquiring the character of a peremptory rule of international law’.71 
 
If non-refoulement is established as a peremptory norm of international law, no 
reservations to provisions of international treaties giving effect to the principle may 
be permitted.72 
                                                 
69 Kapferer, above n. 63, at paras. 229-232. 
70 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem concluded the principle of non-refoulement is a principle of customary 
international law, above n. 13, at para. 216. However, a more restrictive view is adopted by 
Hailbronner, above n. 53, at pp. 866-873.  For a discussion of the status of the principle of non-
refoulement both under the Refugee  Convention and the CAT as a principle of customary international 
law, see Goodwin-Gill, above n. 14, at pp. 134-137. 
71 Above n. 33, at para. 7. The ECtHR did not rule on this issue in its judgment. Shelton refers in 
support of such a norm to the amendment to the Swiss Constitution prohibiting constitutional 
amendments violating peremptory norms of international law following a decision of the Conseil 
Fédéral, ‘International Law and “Relative Normativity”’: in Evans (ed.), International Law  (Oxford, 
OUP, 2003), pp. 145-172, at p. 157. As regards the prohibition against torture, the ECtHR in Al-Adsani 
accepted that the prohibition ‘has achieved the status of a peremptory norm in international law’  but 
that the right of immunity of a state from civil suit in the courts of another state was not overruled by 
an allegation of torture: above n. 46, at paras. 60-61. 
72 In respect of the ICCPR, see HRC General Comment No. 24 of 4 November 1994, above n. 30. For 
commentary see Joseph, Schultz and Castan, above n. 30, at pp. 604-621; and Konstantin Korkelia, 
‘New Challenges to Reservations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ 
(2002) 13 EJIL, pp. 437-477. 
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8.3 THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT  IN UNION LAW 
 
8.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This section examines the normative status of the principle of non-refoulement in 
Union law.  In the absence of Union accession to the relevant international 
fundamental rights treaties,73 general recognition of the principle of non-refoulement 
in Union law is effected through one of the indirect  mechanisms for the  recognition 
of international fundamental rights in Union law, and in particular the general 
principles doctrine,74 as a binding rule of customary international law or jus cogens,75 
as a protected right under Article 63(1) EC Treaty, or under the Charter.76 The first 
part of this Section examines how far these mechanisms provide effective recognition 
to the principle of non-refoulement. The second part of this Section examines 
measures of Union primary and secondary law which raise specific issues of 
recognition and conformity with different aspects of the standards set by the 
International Instruments.  
 
8.3.2 NON-REFOULEMENT AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT  
 
8.3.2.1 General Principles of Union Law  
The International Instruments are recognised as general principles of Union law 
insofar as they qualify as  fundamental rights treaties on which the Members States 
have collaborated or of which they are signatories.77 The ECJ has referred to the 
                                                 
73 As discussed in Section 4.2.1 of Chapter four, Union membership of international fundamental 
treaties faces a number of obstacles both internal and external to the Union.  However, the mandate for 
Union accession to the ECHR in Article I-9(2) of the Constitution shows that such technical obstacles 
are considered surmountable. 
74 See Section 4.2 of Chapter four. As discussed in that section neither the International Fruit 
Company doctrine nor Article 307 EC Treaty provide an effective mechanism for recognition in Union 
law of international fundamental rights standards based on treaties. In consequence they are not 
considered further in this context. 
75 See Sections 4.3 and 4.4 of Chapter four. 
76 Although the Charter rights and principles are currently recognised as a source for general principles 
of Union law, Article I-9(1) of the Constitution provides for their incorporation into primary Union law 
in Part II of the Constitution. In view of its uncertain normative status, which is explored in Section 
seven of Chapter four, the Charter is considered separately.  
77 Case C-7/98, Krombach v. Bamberski [2000] ECR I-1935, at para. 25. Article 6(2) TEU has been 
construed by the ECJ as confirming its existing case law: see Section 4.2.4.1 of Chapter four. 
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ECHR and the ICCPR.78  Since the CAT and the Refugee  Convention have been 
signed and ratified by all the Member States they also qualify as a source of general 
principles of Union law. As a result of the extension of the Union’s competences in 
the field of  asylum and refugee policy, one would anticipate that a broader range of 
treaties will be referred to by the ECJ. However, the general principles doctrines has a 
number of drawbacks as an effective mechanism for the recognition of international 
fundamental rights derived from treaties.79 
 
8.3.2.2 Customary International Law and Jus Cogens 
The International Instruments also bind the Union insofar as they constitute principles 
of  customary international law.80  The principle of non-refoulement in the UNDHR 
and  the 1967 Territorial Asylum Declaration, notwithstanding their formal status as 
non-binding instruments, therefore bind the Union insofar as they reflect rules of 
customary international law. The Union is also bound by the principle of non-
refoulment insofar as it constitutes a peremptory norm of international law.81 
 
8.3.2.3  Article 63(1) EC Treaty  
Article 63(1) EC Treaty requires the asylum measures adopted under that Article be 
in accordance with the Refugee  Convention ‘and other relevant treaties’.82 It has 
been argued that the effect of Article 63(1) EC Treaty is more radical than that of 
Article 6(2) TEU: ‘Whilst Art. 6(2) EU merely requires a more or less narrow 
orientation towards the ECHR, Article 63(1)(1) EC demands behaviour “in 
accordance with” international law. The Refugee  Convention thus becomes a direct 
                                                 
78 For ECJ references to the ECHR, see Section 3.4.2 of Chapter three. In Case C-249/96, Grant v 
South-West Trains Ltd. [1998] I-621, the ECJ referred to the HRC’s decision in Toonen v. Australia,  
Communication No. 488/1992 (4 April 1992), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D488/1992 (1994), at paras. 44-
47.  
79 See Section 4.2.4 of Chapter four. 
80 ‘It is well-established that conventional principles can, and frequently do, exist side-by-side with 
customary principles of similar content.’: Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n. 13, at p. 62. See 
generally their Opinion for a detailed analysis of the ‘norm-creating character’  of each of the 
International Instruments: ibid.,  at pp. 196-216. See Section 2.3 of Chapter two for analysis of the 
status of the UDHR and the UN Charter in international law.  
81 See Section 4.4 of Chapter four.  
82 Article III-266(1) of the Constitution expands on Article 63(1) EC Treaty but retains the key 
requirement that Union policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection ‘must be in 
accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating 
to the status of refugees and other relevant treaties’.  
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standard of decision.’83 The reference to ‘other relevant treaties’ in Article 63(1) EC 
Treaty has to be read in the context of the phrase ‘measures on asylum’ but as 
discussed the range of international treaties with relevance to asylum is extensive. 
Moreover, unlike conventions forming part of the general principles of Union law, 
there is no requirement in Article 63(1) EC Treaty for the Member States to have 
contributed, or been signatories, to the relevant treaties, although the ECJ may 
consider these facts to be of importance in determining which treaties are ‘relevant’.  
 
The restriction of the reference in Article 63(1) EC Treaty to the Refugee  Convention 
and other relevant treaties to asylum measures within the areas specified in Article 
63(1) EC Treaty is artificial since asylum and refugee issues overlap.84 Thus although 
Article 63(1) EC Treaty refers generally to the adoption of measures on asylum, 
Article 63(1)(c) refers to the adoption of minimum standards on the qualification of 
nationals of third countries as refugees and Article 63(1)(d) refers to minimum 
standards on procedures in Member States for granting or withdrawing refugee status. 
Moreover, while Article 63(2) EC Treaty refers to measures on refugees and 
displaced persons, measures adopted under Article 63(3) EC Treaty relating to 
immigration policy will often raise asylum issues. Therefore, for the sake of 
consistency in protection, the fundamental rights protection guaranteed under Article 
63(1) EC Treaty should be construed as applying to any measure adopted under 
Article 63 EC Treaty.85 
 
8.3.2.4 The Charter and Non-Refoulement 
Notwithstanding the current uncertain legal status of the Charter,86 the provisions of 
the Charter are relevant in establishing the constraints under which the Community 
operates in legislating under Article 63 EC Treaty in the field of refugee and asylum 
policy. The Commission assesses the compatibility of all legislative proposals for 
                                                 
83 Uerpmann , ‘International Law as an Element of European Constitutional Law: International 
Supplementary Constitutions’ (2003)  Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 9/03; available at: 
<http://www.jeanmonnet-program.org/papers/03/030901-02.html>, at p. 41.  
84 ‘Asylum law deals with the stage prior to the grant of refugee status; it is a vital component of 
refugee law, yet distinct from it.’:  Stevens, above n. 10, at p. 1. 
85 See Section 8.4.2 below for this analysis applied to the RQSD. 
86 See Section 5.8.3 of Chapter five for analysis of the current status of the Charter and the effect of 
incorporation under Article I-9(1) of the Constitution. See also Gráinne de Búrca and Jo Beatrix 
Aschenbrenner, ‘European Constitutionalism and the Charter’ in Peers and Ward (eds.), The European 
Union Charter of Fundamental Rights: Politics,Law and Policy (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004), pp. 
3-34, at pp. 14-23. 
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conformity with the Charter and any proposals with a specific link to fundamental 
rights incorporate a formal statement of compatibility with the Charter.87 A number 
of  Union measures with relevance to asylum and refugee issues adopted since 2001 
have included such a statement of compatibility.88 The following analysis of the 
Charter is limited to Articles 4 and 18 as of most direct relevance to the principle of 
non-refoulement.89 
                                                
 
The Preamble to the Charter lists the following non-exhaustive sources for the rights  
in the Charter: 
 
 ‘… the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the 
Member States, the Treaty on European Union, the Community Treaties, the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Community and by the Council 
of Europe and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities and of the European Court of Human Rights.’  
 
There is therefore considerable overlap between the Charter rights and principles 
protecting refugees and asylum seekers against refoulement and the International 
Instruments.90  
 
Article 4 of the Charter prohibits torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment on the same terms as Article 3 ECHR and therefore by virtue of Article 
52(3) of the Charter its meaning and scope is the same as that laid down by the 
ECHR.91 According to the Charter Explanations,92 Article 52(3) of the Charter 
 
87 Communication of the Commission of 13 March 2001. SEC(2001)380/3. Available on the register of 
Commission documents at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat_general/regdoc/registre.cfm?CL=en>. 
88 See the list of references in legislation and proposals to the Charter in Appendix 1, Peers and Ward 
(eds.), The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights: Politics, Law and Policy (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2004), at pp. 367-368. 
89 For a more general analysis of the Charter provisions, see Elspeth Guild, ‘Citizens, Immigrants, 
Terrorists and Others’,  in Peers and Ward (eds.), The European Union Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: Politics, Law and Policy (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004), pp. 231-246. 
90 See Section 5.8 of Chapter five for analysis of the sources and scope of the Charter. 
91 Article 52(3) of the Charter also makes clear that the equivalent ECHR rights set a  minimum 
standard and Union law may provide ‘more extensive protection’. See Section Chapter 5.2.4 of 
Chapter five for an analysis of Article 52(3) of the Charter. 
92 Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 11 October 2000, as updated under the 
authority of the Praesidium of the European Convention , Declaration No. 12 to the Constitution: 
[2004] OJ C310/424-459. See Section 5.2.3.5 of Chapter five for the status of the Charter Explanations 
under Article II-112(7) of the Constitution. 
 257
requires account to be taken of the case law of the ECtHR and the ECJ in determining 
the scope of guaranteed  ECHR rights.  Article 19(2) of the Charter takes account of 
the case law of the ECtHR on Article 3 ECHR relating to refoulement:93  
 
‘No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a 
serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or 
other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’94  
 
The construction by the ECJ of Article 19(2) of the Charter will therefore be based on 
providing at least the same level of protection as under the ECtHR’s case law on 
refoulement under Article 3 ECHR. However,  on the basis of the wording of Article 
19(2) there is scope to enlarge significantly the scope of that protection.95   
 
Article 18 of the Charter provides:  
 
‘The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the 
Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 
relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty 
establishing the European Community.’  
 
The Charter Explanations refer to Article 63 EC Treaty as the basis for Article 18 and 
further state that Article 18 is ‘in line with’ the 1997 Asylum Protocol.96 The 
reference to Article 63 EC Treaty seems misplaced since Article 63(1), which is the 
only paragraph in Article 63  which refers to asylum, does not create a right to asylum 
but empowers the Council to adopt ‘measures on asylum’. A more appropriate 
reference would have been to Article 14 UDHR and Article 1 of the 1967  Territorial 
Asylum Declaration.  Equally, the reference to Article 18 being ‘in line’ with the 
1997 Protocol on Asylum is perplexing since, as discussed in Section 8.3.3.5, the 
                                                 
93 The Charter Explanations on Article 19(2) make specific reference to Ahmed v. Austria, above n. 26, 
and Soering v UK, above n. 46.  
94 Article 19(1) of the Charter prohibits collective expulsions and is derived from Article 4 of Protocol 
No. 4 to the ECHR and Article 13 of the ICCPR: see the Charter Explanations, above n. 92, at  p. 21.  
95 Article 19(2) extends the protection guaranteed by the ECHR case law on Article 3 under Soering 
since the protection against extradition in that case was based on the risk of Soering being exposed to 
the ‘death row’ phenomenon in the State of Virginia rather than that the death penalty per se violated 
Article 3: see para. 103 of Soering, above n. 46.  
96 On the 1997 Protocol on Asylum, see section 8.3.3.5 below. The Charter Explanations, above n. 92,  
also refer to the Amsterdam Treaty Protocols  relating to the UK, Ireland and Denmark ‘to determine 
the extent to which those Member States implement Community law in this area and the extent to 
which this Article is applicable to them.’ For a summary of these Protocols and their application to 
Title IV EC Treaty, see Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs (Harlow, Longman, 2000), at  p. 55. 
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1997 Protocol on Asylum is restrictive of the right to asylum and may well in certain 
circumstances be in conflict with the Refugee  Convention.97  However, if the ECJ 
adopts a broader construction than the Charter Explanations, Article 18 of the Charter 
could provide the basis for the development of a fully-fledged right of asylum in 
Union law.98 Such a development would constitute a significant improvement on the 
treatment of the right to asylum in existing international treaties. Neither Article 3 
ECHR nor the ECHR Protocols protect the right to political asylum.99   Nor is a right 
of asylum recognized under either Article 3 CAT or Article 7 ICCPR.100 
 
8.3.3 NON-REFOULEMENT IN UNION REFUGEE AND ASYLUM LAW 
 
8.3.3.1  Introduction 
This section examines measures of primary and secondary Union law which raise 
specific issues of conformity with the principle of non-refoulement as protected in the 
International Instruments. This examination is not an exhaustive analysis of the 
measures but is intended to demonstrate the utility of international fundamental rights 
as a standard for measuring the conformity or deficiencies of Union legislation in the 
field of refugee and asylum law. The paucity of judicial rulings in this area of Union 
law, in part arising from the constraints on the ECJ’s jurisdiction  under Title IV EC 
Treaty,101 places a particular onus on the legislative process to ensure conformity of 
Union legislation with international fundamental rights standards. The measures 
under analysis generally refer, either in the Preamble or the body of the text, to their 
compatibility with the Refugee  Convention and the ECHR, and, since 2002, the 
Charter. 
 
 However, formulaic statements of compatibility  do not necessarily correspond to 
actual conformity with international law and Union standards as is evidenced by the 
                                                 
97 Generally, the inconsistencies arising out of the Charter Explanations on Article 18 of the Charter  
reinforce the argument against the legal status conferred on the Charter Explanations in the 
Constitution. 
98 See Rehman, above n. 27, at p. 191. 
99 Jabari v Turkey, 11 July 2000, (2000) 12 IJRL 597, at para. 38. For a summary of the relevant 
provisions of the ECHR and the related case law see: Stevens, above n. 10, at pp 143-150. 
100 ‘Article 3 CAT and Article 7 ICCPR do not confer rights of asylum.’: Joseph, Schultz and Castan, 
above n. 30, at para. 9.62.  
101 See Section 7.3 of Chapter seven. 
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criticism of the measures examined both by non-governmental organizations, such as 
Amnesty International and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), 
and academic commentators. This gap between rhetoric and substance in the field of 
refugee and asylum law reflects the conflicting political pressures and legal 
constraints operating on the institutions of the Union.   Only by applying clear and 
accepted standards in assessing Union legislation can the Union be held accountable 
for flaws and deficiencies. 
 
The measures selected for examination in this section as of particular relevance to the 
principle of non-refoulement are: the Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 
on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx 
of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between 
Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof (2001 
Temporary Protection Directive);102 the Joint Position of  4 March 1996 on the 
harmonized application of the definition of the term ‘refugee’ in Article 1 of the 
Refugee  Convention (1996 Joint Position);103 the Council Regulation (EC) No. 
343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national (Dublin II 
Regulation);104 the 1997 Protocol on Asylum for Nationals of Member States of the 
European Union adopted at the Amsterdam Treaty and annexed to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1997 Asylum Protocol); the  Council Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States (2002 EAW Framework Decision);105 and 
Council Directive 2001/40/EC of 28 May 2001 on the mutual recognition of decisions 
on the expulsion of third country nationals (2001 Mutual Recognition Directive).106 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
102 [2001] OJ L212/12. 
103 [1996] OJ  L63/2.  
104 [2003] OJ L50/1. 
105 [2002]  OJ L190/1. 
106 [2001] OJ L149/34 . 
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8.3.3.2  The  2001 Temporary Protection Directive  
The 2001 Temporary Protection Directive was adopted under Article 63(2) (a) and (b) 
EC Treaty in the context of the mass displacement of population consequent on the 
conflicts in the region of the former Yugoslavia.107  The 2001 Temporary Protection 
Directive  provides temporary protection for displaced persons for a one year period 
which may be extended for a maximum period of a year.108 The right to lodge an 
application for asylum during temporary protection is guaranteed by Article 17(1) of 
the 2001 Temporary Protection Directive. Article 19 of the 2001 Temporary 
Protection Directive provides that a Member State may remove temporary protection 
while an asylum application is being considered but that if refugee status or another 
form of protection is not granted a person eligible or enjoying temporary protection is 
entitled to temporary protection for the remainder of the period of protection.  
 
Article 3(2) of the 2001 Temporary Protection Directive specifically recognises the 
non-refoulement obligations of the Member States: ‘The  Member States shall apply 
temporary protection with due respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
and their obligations regarding non-refoulement’. In addition, Article 3(1) provides 
that temporary protection shall not prejudge recognition of refugee status under the 
Refugee  Convention. Article 28 lists the grounds on which a Member State may 
exclude an individual from temporary protection, which broadly correspond to the 
grounds for denial of refugee status and the right to non-refoulement set out in Article 
1(F) and Article 33(2) of the Refugee  Convention.109  
 
                                                 
107 The deadline for implementation of the 2001 Temporary Protection Directive was 31 December 
2002 under Article 32(1).  Denmark does  not participate in the Directive but Ireland and the UK have 
opted in under the Fourth Protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam. For an analysis of the 2001 Temporary 
Protection Directive, see:  Hailbronner, in Walker (ed.), above n. 4, at pp. 68-70; and Guild, above n. 4, 
at pp. 211-213. 
108 Article 4(1) 2001  Temporary Protection Directive. 
109 Article 28(1)(a)(ii) 2001 Temporary Protection Directive elaborates on Article 1F(b) of the Refugee  
Convention by providing: ‘The severity of the expected persecution is to be weighed against the nature 
of the criminal offence of which the person concerned is suspected. Particularly cruel actions, even if 
committed with an allegedly political objective, may be classified as serious non-political crimes. This 
applies both to the participants in the crime and to its instigators;’. 
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However, in international law there are no permissible exceptions to the prohibition 
against refoulement  in the human rights context as opposed to the refugee context.110 
In order to comply with their obligations under international law regarding non-
refoulement,  the Member States should therefore ensure that national measures 
implementing Article 28 of the 2001 Temporary Protection Directive do not deny an 
individual temporary protection on any of the grounds under Article 28 of the 2001 
Temporary Protection Directive  if to do so would violate the absolute prohibition 
against refoulement in the human rights context. 
 
8.3.3.3 The  1996 Joint Position  
The Council adopted the 1996 Joint Position on 4 March 1996, under Article K3 
TEU.111  The objective of the 1996 Joint Position was to harmonise the application of 
the criteria for determining refugee status as a necessary stage in harmonisation of 
asylum policies in the Member States.112 The 1996 Joint Position states that the 
guidelines set out do not ‘bind the legislative authorities or affect decisions of the 
judicial authorities of the Member States’. However, the 1996 Joint Position has been 
referred to in Horvath and Adan and Aitseguer.113  
 
One aspect of the 1996 Joint Position of particular concern is that it proposes a 
restrictive version of the accountability theory of non-refoulement: 
 
 ‘Persecution by third parties will be considered to fall within the scope of the 
Geneva Convention where it is based on one of the grounds in Article 1A of 
that Convention, is individual in nature and is encouraged or permitted by the 
authorities. Where the official authorities fail to act, such persecution should 
give rise to individual examination of each application for refugee status, in 
accordance with national judicial practice, in the light in particular of whether 
or not the failure to act was deliberate. The persons concerned may be eligible 
in any event for appropriate forms of protection under national law.’114   
 
                                                 
110 See Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n. 13, at para. 219(2), for the permitted exceptions in the 
refugee context and, at para. 252, for the absolute nature of the prohibition in the human rights context. 
111 Article K3 TEU was replaced by the Treaty of Amsterdam and asylum matters transferred to Article 
63(1) EC Treaty.  
112 For commentary on the 1996 Joint Position, see Noll and Vedsted-Hansen, in Alston (ed.), above n. 
112, at pp. 376-381. The 1996 Joint Position will be effectively superseded by 10 October 2006 which 
is the deadline for implementation of Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004. See Section 8.4 
below for detailed analysis of this directive.   
113 Horvath, at  pp. 192-193 and p. 199 and Adan, at p. 517. Both cases are cited above at n. 33. 
114 The 1996 Joint Position, at para. 5.2.  
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In contrast to the case law of the ECtHR,115 the 1996 Joint Position does not therefore 
appear to cover inability of the state to provide protection.116  
 
8.3.3.4  The  Dublin II Regulation  
The 2003 Dublin II Regulation, adopted under Article 63(1)(a) EC Treaty, converts 
on  modified terms into Community law the 1990 Dublin Convention determining the 
Member State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the 
Member States.117 The Dublin II Regulation proceeds on the basis that transfers of 
asylum applicants as between Member States118  do not raise the issue of non-
refoulement: ‘In this respect, and without affecting the responsibility criteria laid 
down in this Regulation, Member States, all respecting the principle of non-
refoulement, are considered as safe countries for third-country nationals.’119 
However, the criteria for the allocation of responsibility between the Member  States 
for examining applications for asylum has been strongly criticised for failing to take 
account of the differences in the standards of protection to refugees in the Member 
States.120 In particular, application of the criteria in the Dublin II Regulation  may 
result in an applicant for asylum in one Member State being removed to another 
Member State responsible for examining the application under those criteria where 
the principle of non-refoulement is construed in a more restrictive manner than in the 
transferring Member State.  
 
Indirect refoulement arose as an issue in Adan and Aitseguer where the UK Home 
Department, in application of the rules of the 1990 Dublin Convention, was seeking 
                                                 
115 See Section 8.2.2.3 above. 
116 Clapham has commented on para. 5.2 of the 1996 Joint Position: ‘Its effect is that people fleeing 
persecution in countries where the State has collapsed, or people fleeing factions that have no state-like 
qualities, will be excluded from refugee status.’: ‘Human Rights in the Common Foreign Policy’ in 
Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp. 627-683, at p. 662. Clapham cites 
similar criticism of the 1996 Joint Position by the UNHCR and ECRE, ibid., at pp. 662-663, n. 102.  
See also Noll and Vedsted-Hansen, in Alston (ed.), above n. 112, at pp. 378-381. 
117 See Section 6.2.1 of Chapter six for the complex relationship between the 1990 Dublin Convention 
and the Dublin II Regulation. 
118 For transfers to third countries, Article 3(3) of the Dublin II Regulation provides: ‘Any  Member 
State shall retain the right, pursuant to its national laws, to send an asylum seeker to a third country, in 
compliance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention.’ 
119 Final sentence of  Recital (2) of the Dublin II Regulation. This principle is not incorporated into the 
body of the Dublin II Regulation. The Dublin II Regulation does not provide a definition of non-
refoulement but Recital (2) refers to the obligation under the Refugee  Convention to ensure ‘nobody is 
sent back to persecution’, i.e. maintaining the principle of non-refoulement.’ However, as discussed in 
Section 8.2 above, the principal of non-refoulement  is more extensive in international law.  
120 See Guild, above n. 4, at pp. 206-209. 
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to return Ms. Adan and Mr. Aitseguer to France and Germany respectively which 
both applied the accountability theory in interpreting Article 1A(2) of the Refugee  
Convention rather then the protection theory applied in the UK on the basis of the 
previous House of Lords case of Adan v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department.121 In the case of  Ms. Adan, there was a risk that as a result of the 
transfer to Germany the applicant would be deported to Somalia on the basis that her 
fear of persecution did not satisfy the criteria applied by the German authorities since 
the threat of persecution emanated from a non-governmental rebel group. In the case 
of  Mr. Aitseguer, the fear of persecution arose from the activities of  Islamic 
fundamentalist groups outside the control of the Algerian government which again 
did not meet the criteria applied by the French authorities in construing Article 1A(2) 
of the Refugee  Convention. In both cases, the House of Lords confirmed the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal that under the relevant UK legislation, which 
incorporated the standards of the Refugee  Convention, the Home Secretary was not 
entitled to return the applicants to Germany or France notwithstanding the 1990 
Dublin Convention since, in the absence of a ruling by the ICJ, the interpretation of 
Article 1A(2) of the Refugee  Convention adopted in the earlier case of Adan was the 
‘determinative decision.’122 
 
The ECtHR in T.I. v UK also established limitations on how far the Member States 
could avoid responsibility for their non-refoulement obligations under Article 3 
ECHR through the mechanism of the 1990 Dublin Convention: 
 
‘The Court finds that the indirect removal in this case to an intermediary 
country, which is also a Contracting State, does not affect the responsibility 
of the United Kingdom to ensure that the applicant is not, as a result of its 
decision to expel, exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the 
Convention. Nor can the United Kingdom rely automatically in that context 
on the arrangements made in the Dublin Convention concerning the 
attribution of responsibility between European countries for deciding asylum 
claims.’123 
 
 In T.I. responsibility for determining the applicant’s claim for asylum lay with 
Germany under the 1990 Dublin Convention but the applicant had fled to the UK 
                                                 
121 Cited above n. 33.  
122 Ibid, per Lord Hobhouse , at p. 529.  
123 Above n. 33, at p. 260. 
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after his application was refused by the German courts on the basis, inter alia, that the 
risk of torture and persecution if he returned to Sri Lanka emanated from a Tamil 
terrorist organisation outside the control of the state. However, on examination of the 
relevant German legislative and administrative regime the ECtHR declared his 
application inadmissible on the basis there was not ‘a real risk that Germany would 
expel the applicant to Sri Lanka’ and that in consequence the UK Government had 
not violated Article 3 ECHR by deciding to remove the applicant to Germany.124  
 
8.3.3.5  The 1997 Asylum Protocol  
The 1997 Asylum Protocol has been characterised  as ‘really an extradition measure 
in disguise.’125 The first paragraph of the sole Article of the 1997 Asylum Protocol 
provides:  
 
‘Given the level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms by the 
Member States of the European Union, Member States shall be regarded as 
constituting safe countries of origin in respect of each other for all legal and 
practical purposes in relation to asylum matters.’  
 
The 1997 Asylum Protocol provides that only in four cases may an asylum 
application from a national of one Member State be taken into consideration or 
declared admissible for processing by another Member State: (a) if a Member State of 
which the applicant is a national has availed of the derogation provisions of  Article 
15 ECHR;126 (b) if proceedings under Article 7(1) (ex. Art. F.1(1)) TEU have been 
initiated and the Council has not taken a decision in respect thereof; (c) if the Council, 
acting on the basis of Article 7(1) (ex. Art. F.1(1)) TEU, has determined, in respect of 
                                                 
124 The case of Adan and Aitseguer, above n. 33, was on appeal to the House of Lords at the time of the 
judgment in T.I., above n. 33. The decision of the Court of Appeal in Adan and Aitseguer, [1999] 3 
WLR 1274,  and the earlier judgment of the House of Lords in Adan, above n. 33, were cited by the 
ECtHR in T.I. and may have influenced their finding that there was no violation of Article 3 ECHR. 
125 Peers, above n. 96, at  p. 129. ‘Its sole purpose was to prevent Belgium considering asylum claims 
by Basque nationalists whom Spain wished to try for terrorist offences.’ 
126 The UK withdrew its Article 15 ECHR derogation in respect of Article 5(1) ECHR with effect 
from 16 March 2005 following the ruling of the House of Lords in A and others v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 which quashed the Human Rights Act 1998 
(Designated Derogation) Order 2001 (S.I. 2001, No. 3644). No Member State, as of 1 September 
2005,  had an Article 15 ECHR derogation in place. However, UK proposals for new anti-
terrorism legislation following  the bombing and attempted bombing in London on 7 and 21 July 
2005 respectively may lead to a further derogation: see the proposals set out in the Letter of 
Charles Clarke, Home Secretary, of 15 September 2005: The Guardian of 16 September 2005: 
<http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Politics/documents/2005/09/15/letterplusannexe.pdf>. See 
section 5.5.2.3 of Chapter five  for an analysis of Article 15 ECHR in the context of Union 
accession to the ECHR. 
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the Member State of which the applicant is a national, the existence of a serious and 
persistent breach by that Member State of principles mentioned in Article 6(1) (ex 
Art. F(1)) TEU; or (d) if a Member State should so decide unilaterally in respect of 
the application for asylum of a national of another Member State, in which case the  
Council must be immediately informed and the application dealt with on the basis of 
the presumption it is manifestly unfounded but without ‘affecting in any way, 
whatever the cases may be,  the decision-making power of the Member State’.127  
 
Declaration No. 48 to the Treaty of Amsterdam  provides the 1997 Asylum Protocol: 
‘does not prejudice the right of each Member State to take the organisational 
measures it deems necessary to fulfil its obligations under the Refugee  Convention of 
28 July 1951 relating to the status of refugees’. While the meaning of this Declaration 
is opaque, it indicates the unease with which some Member States viewed the limited 
grounds permitted for them to examine an asylum claim submitted by a national of 
another Member State.128 Declaration No. 49 to the Treaty of Amsterdam on sub-
paragraph (d) of the sole Article of the 1997 Asylum Protocol provides:  
 
‘The Conference declares that, while recognising the importance of the 
Resolution of the Ministers of the Member States of the European 
Communities responsible for immigration of 30 November/ 1 December 1992 
on manifestly unfounded applications for asylum and of the Resolution of the 
Council of 20 June 1995 on minimum guarantees for asylum procedures, the 
question of abuse of asylum procedures and appropriate rapid procedures to 
dispense with manifestly unfounded applications for asylum should be further 
examined with a view to introducing new improvements in order to accelerate 
these procedures.’  
 
Declaration No. 49 is referring to the ‘soft law ‘ measures adopted to address the 
issue of manifestly unfounded asylum applications: the 1992 London Resolutions and 
the 1995 Minimum Guarantees Resolution.129 The principal proposal for addressing 
                                                 
127 The 1997 Asylum Protocol is in substance replicated in Protocol No. 22 to the Constitution.  
128 The European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) in its Analysis of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
in so far as it relates to asylum policy of 16 July 1997 provided the following interpretation of this 
Declaration: ‘Declaration 48 …would therefore seem to provide a “get out clause” for those States who 
were unhappy with the Protocol, but were not prepared to commit themselves to a unilateral 
declaration, of the kind attached by Belgium’: available at: 
<http://www.ecre.org/research/analysis.pdf>.  
129 1992 London Resolutions on a harmonised approach to questions concerning host third countries 
and on manifestly unfounded applications for asylum: Bunyan (ed.) Key Texts on Justice and Home 
Affairs in the European Union, Vol. 1 (London, 1997), at p. 64. See also The London Declaration of 
International Law Principles on Internally Displaced Persons (2001) 12 IJRL, pp. 672-679. See 
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this issue is the proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States  for granting and withdrawing refugee status (Refugee 
Procedures Proposal).130 
 
The circumstances in which one of the four cases listed in the 1997 Asylum Protocol 
as permitting a Member State to consider an asylum application from a national of 
another Member State would apply, other than in the case of Belgium,131 are likely to 
be exceptional.132  The aim of the 1997 Asylum Protocol, outside these 
circumstances, is to create an irrebuttable presumption that the standard of 
fundamental rights protection throughout the Union is of an adequate level for the 
purposes of removing a Union citizen from one Member State to another. However, 
the 1997 Asylum Protocol may well not be construed as achieving this goal.  
 
Firstly, the Preamble to the 1997 Asylum Protocol refers explicitly to the Union’s 
obligation to respect the ECHR and to the 1997 Asylum Protocol’s  respect for the 
‘finality and objectives’ of the Refugee  Convention. The presumption set out in 
paragraph one of the 1997 Asylum Protocol should therefore also be interpreted as 
being subject to the requirements of the ECHR and the Refugee  Convention.  
 
Secondly, there is support for the view that the principle of non-refoulement under 
Article 3 CAT and Section 33 of the Refugee  Convention has acquired the status of a 
peremptory rule of international law and thus forms part of the Union’s legal order.133 
While infringement of this rule would not provide the ECJ with grounds for 
                                                                                                                                            
generally: Siobhán Mullally, Manifestly Unjust: A Report on the Fairness and Sustainability of 
Accelerated Procedures for Asylum Determination (September 2001): available at:  
<http://www.refugeelawreader.org/files/pdf/470.pdf>. ECRE, above n. 128,  commented on 
Declaration No. 49: ‘This is a very worrying footnote to the Protocol, in so far as it makes clear that a 
re-examination of these instruments would not involve the addition of further safeguards for 
individuals, but only aim to achieve acceleration.’ 
130 [2002] OJ C 291E/143. The failure to meet the deadline of 1 May 2004 set by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam for adoption of this proposal is due primarily to political disagreement about the safe 
country of origin principle. Section 29 of the Refugee Procedures Proposal lists the grounds for 
rejecting an asylum application as manifestly unfounded.  
131 Belgium, by Declaration No. 5 to the Treaty of Amsterdam, stated: ‘in accordance with its 
obligations under the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 New York Protocol, it shall, in 
accordance with the provision set out in point (d) of the sole Article of that Protocol, carry out an 
individual examination of any asylum request made by a national of another Member State.’  
132 Peers takes the view that in the light of the provisos to the Asylum Protocol, ‘it is questionable 
whether the Protocol will have much effect.’: above n. 96, at p. 130. Other commentators have taken a 
less sanguine view: see Garry, above n. 2, at pp. 176-177. 
133 See above Section 8.2.3. 
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reviewing the legality of the 1997 Asylum Protocol, since as part of the EC Treaty the 
1997 Asylum Protocol falls outside the scope of reviewable acts under Article 230 
EC Treaty,134 it would provide further grounds for construing the 1997 Asylum 
Protocol in such a way as to require Member States to ensure compliance  with the 
principle of non-refoulement notwithstanding the presumption of safe country of 
origin.135 
 
Thirdly,  Article 14 ECHR is of relevance since the Asylum Protocol discriminates 
against Union citizens as against non-Union citizens in the standard of protection 
against refoulement guaranteed by Article 3 ECHR.136 While Article 14 ECHR does 
not expressly refer to nationality as a prohibited grounds of discrimination it has been 
so treated in Gaygusuz v Austria: ‘However very weighty reasons would have to be 
put forward before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively 
on grounds of nationality as compatible with the Convention.’137 The House of Lords 
in A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department considered the scope of 
application of Article 14 ECHR in conjunction with Article 5 ECHR in the context of 
non-nationals detained indefinitely without trial in the UK as suspected terrorists 
under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.138 After analysing 
international law on the principle of non-discrimination in the context of differential 
treatment of nationals and non-nationals and the case law of the ECtHR,  the House 
of Lords concluded that the detention of non-nationals was discriminatory within the 
meaning of Articles 5 and 14 ECHR.139  
                                                 
134 See Section 3.3 of Chapter three. It is arguable, however,  that the Community as an international 
organisation would be responsible for implementing the TEU or the EC Treaty in breach of applicable 
international law: see James Crawford and Simon Olleson, ‘The Nature and Forms of International 
Responsibility’, in Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford, OUP, 2003), pp. 445-472, at pp. 446-447.  
135 In particular since Article 53 VCLT  provides  that a treaty will be void ‘if, at the time of its 
conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.’     
136 Article 14 ECHR provides: ‘The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention 
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or 
other status.’ Article 1 of Protocol 12 to the ECHR, which entered into force on 1 May 2005, replicates 
Article 14 ECHR but as a free standing obligation independent of any other violation of the ECHR. 
However, as a number of Member States have not yet signed or ratified Protocol 12 it may not yet 
qualify as a general principle of Union law.  
137 (1996) 23 EHRR 364, at para. 42.  
138 Cited above at n. 126. 
139 The discriminatory treatment was also found to violate Article 26 ICCPR which provides: ‘All 
persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of 
the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and 
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
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It is unlikely Article 21 of the Charter would provide support for a broad 
interpretation of the grounds for processing asylum claims to include respect for the 
principle of non-refoulement on the same basis for Union citizens and non-citizens.140 
Article 21(1) of the Charter does not specifically include a prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of nationality. The non-exhaustive list of grounds of 
prohibited discrimination in Article 21(1) is based on Article 13 EC Treaty, Article 14 
ECHR and Article 11 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine.141 
Insofar as Article 21(1) corresponds to Article 14 ECHR ‘it applies in compliance 
with it.’142 However, Article 21(1) refers to discrimination based on ‘ethnic or social 
origin’ rather than ‘national or social origin’ as in Article 14 ECHR.  Discrimination 
on grounds of nationality is specifically  addressed in Article 21(2) of the Charter 
which is based on Article 12 EC Treaty and ‘must be applied in compliance with the 
Treaty’.143  
 
In conclusion, Article 21(1) of the Charter must be read subject to the specific 
prohibition on discrimination on grounds of nationality in Article 21(2) and is 
unlikely to be interpreted as including a prohibition on discrimination on grounds of 
nationality. Moreover, since  Article 21(2) of the Charter  specifies the prohibition on 
discrimination on grounds of nationality is without prejudice to the special provisions 
of the EC Treaty and TEU it does not provide a basis for construing the provisions of 
the 1997 Asylum Protocol in conformity with the principle of non-refoulement. 
 
8.3.3.6 The European Arrest Warrant  
While extradition arrangements between the Member States have historically been 
governed by bilateral or multilateral treaties, albeit often negotiated within the 
                                                                                                                                            
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.’ See also General 
Recommendation No. 30 on Discrimination against Non-Citizens of the Committee on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1 October 2004: HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7/Add.1.  
140 Art. 21 of the Charter: ‘1. Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic 
or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be 
prohibited. 2. Within the scope of application of the Treaty establishing the European Community and 
of the Treaty on European Union,  and without prejudice to the special provisions of those Treaties, 
any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.’ 
141 The Charter Explanations on Article 23(1), above n. 92. 
142 Ibid. 
143 The Charter Explanations on Article 23(2), above n. 92. 
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framework of the Council Europe144 or other regional arrangements,145 recent 
developments have signified a decisive shift towards Union regulation of extradition 
between the Member States, in substance if not in form.146 This process has also been 
reflected in the bilateral Agreement on Extradition between the European Union and 
the United States of America of  25 June 2003.147  
 
The 2002 EAW Framework Decision aims to replace extradition between the 
Member States:  
 
‘The objective set for the Union to become an area of freedom, security and 
justice leads to abolishing extradition between Member States and replacing it 
by a system of surrender between judicial authorities.’148  
 
Article 31(1) of the 2002 EAW Framework Decision provides that, without prejudice 
to their application in relations between Member States and third states, in relations 
between the Member States it replaces, as from  1 January 2004, the corresponding 
                                                 
144 The principal treaties relevant to extradition negotiated under the auspices of the Council of Europe 
are:  the European Convention on Extradition, 13 December 1957, in force 18 April 1969: ETS No. 24, 
the Additional  Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition, 15 November 1975, in force 20 
August 1979: ETS No. 86; and the Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on 
Extradition, 17 March 1978, in force 5 June 1983: ETS No. 98. In addition,  the following have  
provisions on extradition: the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 27 January 1977, 
in force 4 August 1978: ETS No. 90;  the  Protocol Amending the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism, 15 May 2003, not in force: ETS No. 190; and the Council of Europe 
Convention on Terrorism, 16 May 2005, not in force: ETS No. 196. Article 23(1) of the 2005 Council 
of Europe Convention on Terrorism makes provision for the Community to sign the Convention. 
Council of Europe conventions are available at: <http://conventions.coe.int/>. For a list of instruments 
governing extradition between the Member States and other European states, see Kapferer, above n. 
63, at pp. 5-7. 
145 For example, the Benelux Treaty concerning Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, 27 June 1962, as completed and modified by the 
Protocol of 11 May 1974.  See generally Kapferer, above n. 63, at p. 6. 
146 See: the Simplified Extradition Procedure between the Member States of the European Union, 10 
March 1995: [1995] OJ C 78/1; and the Convention relating to Extradition between the Member States 
of the European Union, 27 September 1996: [1996] OJ C313/12. For the status of these Conventions,  
see Kapferer, above n. 63, at p. 6, n. 22. 
147 [2003] OJ L181/27. See the report of the EP dated 22 May 2003 on a draft version of the EU/US 
Extradition Treaty: Final A5-0172/2003. Available on the EP website. For a critique of the EU/US 
Extradition Treaty, and in particular of Article 13 of the Treaty which seeks to ensure a person being 
extradited to the US for a crime subject to the death penalty is not executed, see the report of Amnesty 
International of 31 May 2005: Human Rights Dissolving at the Borders? Counter-terrorism and EU 
Criminal Law.’ at para. 4.1.1.  Available at:  
<http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGIOR610132005>. On 25 June 2003  the Union also 
concluded an Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance between the European Union and the United 
States of America: [2003] OJ L181/34. See on both agreements: T. Georgopoulos, ‘What kind of 
treaty-making power for the EU? Constitutional problems related to the conclusion of the EU-US 
Agreements on Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance’ (2005) 30 EL Rev., pp. 190-208. 
148 Fifth preamble of the 2002 EAW Framework Decision.  
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extradition provisions in the 1957 European Convention on Extradition,  the two 
Additional Protocols, the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism, the Agreement between the Twelve Member States of the European 
Communities on the Simplification and Transmission of Methods of Transmitting 
Extradition Requests of 26 May 1989,  the 1995 Convention on Simplified 
Extradition Procedures between the Member States, and the 1996 Convention relating 
to Extradition between the Member States, and Title III, Chapter IV of the 1990 
Schengen Convention.149  Although the deadline was 1 January 2004,  
implementation of the 2002 EAW Framework Decision by all Member States was 
only achieved on 12 April 2005.150 The legality of national measures implementing 
the 2002 EAW Framework Decision are subject to review both under Union 
fundamental rights standards and national constitutional standards.151  National 
Constitutional Courts in Poland and Germany have ruled that the national measures 
implementing the 2002 EAW Framework Decision are unconstitutional.152 
 
The 2002 EAW Framework Decision, like the 1997 Asylum Protocol, is based on the 
principle that each Member State shall, unless proceedings have been initiated against 
it under Article 7(1) TEU for breach of the principles in Article 6(1) TEU, be treated 
by the other Member States as a safe destination for the purpose of the arrest and 
surrender of a requested suspect or fugitive pursuant to a European arrest warrant 
issued by the requesting state.153  However, the 2002 EAW Framework Decision 
                                                 
149 See Section 6.2.4.3 of Chapter six for analysis of the 1990 Schengen Convention.                
150 The date on which Italy implemented the 2002 EAW Framework Decision. The Commission issued 
a report on implementation of the EAW on 23 February 2005: COM(2005) 63 final. Available at: 
<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/criminal/doc/com_2005_063_en.pdf>. 
151 Although Article 34(2)(b) TEU provides that framework decisions ‘shall not entail direct effect’, 
the development of the doctrine of ‘indirect effect’ by the ECJ means limited judicial review of 
framework decisions may be possible. For the doctrine of ‘indirect effect’, see Hartley, The 
Foundations of European Community Law (5th edn.) (Oxford, OUP, 2003), pp. 219-223. On the scope 
of the ECJ’s  jurisdiction to conduct judicial review of national legislative measures, see: Iris Canor, 
‘Harmonizing the European Community’s Standard of Judicial Review?’ (2002) 8 EPL, pp. 135-166.  
152 A judgment of the Polish Constitutional Court of 27 April 2005 ruled that the implementation of the 
EAW Framework Decision violated Article 55(1) of the Polish Constitution, although the judgment 
was suspended for 18 months to allow for amendment of the Constitution. English version of report 
available at: < http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/apr/poland.pdf>.  In a judgment of 18 July 2005, 
the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany declared the European Arrest 
Warrant Act void (Europäische Haftbefehlgesetz) for violation of the freedom from extradition 
protected by Article 16.2 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz); 2 BvR 2236/04. An English summary of the 
judgment is available at: 
<http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/bverfg_cgi/pressemitteilungen/frames/bvg05-06>. 
153 See generally, Rob Blekxtoon and Wouter van Ballegooij (eds.) Handbook on the European Arrest 
Warrant (Cambridge, CUP, 2004).  
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applies not only to nationals of a Member State but to any person the subject of a 
European arrest warrant.154 The offences for which a European arrest warrant may be 
issued are listed in Article 2 of the 2002 EAW Framework Decision. The mandatory 
grounds for non-execution of the European arrest warrant are listed in Article 3 and 
the optional grounds in Article 4 but none of the listed grounds refer to non-
refoulement.  
 
Protection of the principle of  non-refoulement is to be found instead in Article 1 of 
the 2002 EAW Framework Decision and  its Preamble. Article 1(3) of the EAW 
Framework Decision provides it shall not have the effect of  modifying  the obligation 
to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles in Article 6 TEU.  
However, since Article 6(2) TEU has been construed by the ECJ as confirmation of 
its general principles case law, Article 1(3) imports the limitations of that doctrine in 
respect of the principle of non-refoulement. Recital 12 of the 2002 EAW Decision, 
after referring to respect for the fundamental rights protected by Article 6 TEU and 
the Charter, and in particular the provisions in Chapter VI of the Charter relating to 
justice, provides in its second sentence:  
 
‘Nothing in this Framework Decision may be interpreted as prohibiting 
refusal to surrender a person for whom a European arrest warrant has been 
issued when there are reasons to believe, on the basis of objective elements, 
that the said arrest warrant has been issued for the purpose of prosecuting or 
punishing a person on the grounds of his or her sex, race, religion, ethnic 
origin, nationality, language, political opinions or sexual orientation, or that 
that person’s position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons.’  
 
The formulation in the second sentence of recital 12 is wider than the grounds of 
persecution in Article 1A(2) of the Refugee  Convention. Similarly recital 13 of the 
2002 EAW Framework Decision reflects Article 19(2) of the Charter and is a wider 
formulation of the principle of non-refoulment than that contained in Article 3 
ECHR.155 However, it would have been preferable for recitals 12 and 13 to have been 
incorporated into Article 1 of the 2002 EAW Framework Decision.  
                                                 
154 A European arrest warrant has been issued and executed against Hamid Issac, a citizen of Ethiopa,  
for his return from Italy to England for his participation in the London terrorism incidents of 21 July 
2005.  
155 Recital 13 provides: ‘No person should be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is 
a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.’ 
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8.3.3.7 The 2001 Mutual Recognition Directive  
The 2001 Mutual Recognition Directive, adopted under Article 63(3) EC Treaty, aims 
to permit the recognition of an expulsion decision issued by one Member State 
against a third country national present within the territory of another Member 
State.156 The 2001 Mutual Recognition Directive may also be interpreted as applying 
to extradition orders.157 Article 3(1)(a) of the 2001 Mutual Recognition Directive 
provides for recognition by a Member State of an expulsion decision taken by the 
authorities of another Member State in respect of a third party national  based: 
 
‘… on a serious and present threat to public order or to national security and 
safety, taken in the following cases: - conviction of a third country national 
by the issuing Member State for an offence punishable by a penalty involving 
deprivation of liberty of at least one year, - the existence of serious grounds 
for believing that a third country national has committed serious criminal 
offences or the existence of solid evidence of his intention to commit such 
offences within the territory of a Member State.’ 
 
 
The 2001 Mutual Recognition Directive has to be viewed in the context of being the 
first concrete measure the developing Union policy on the return of illegal 
residents.158 As such the  2001 Mutual Recognition Directive is limited in scope and 
non-binding in the sense that it does not impose an obligation on a Member State to 
                                                 
156 Article 1 of the 2001 Mutual Recognition Directive. Article 2(a) defines a ‘third country national’ 
as anyone who is not a national of any of the Member States. Under the Protocol on the position of 
Denmark, annexed to the EC Treaty and the TEU, Denmark is not bound by the 2001 Mutual 
Recognition Directive. The UK and Ireland have opted to participate in the 2001 Mutual Recognition 
Directive. See for criticism of the 2001 Mutual Recognition Directive: Rehman, above n. 27, at pp. 
191-192. 
157 Article 2(b) of the 2001 Mutual Recognition Directive defines expulsion decision as meaning: ‘any 
decision which orders an expulsion taken by a competent administrative authority of an issuing 
Member State’. 
158 See the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a 
Community Return Policy on Illegal Residents of 14 November 2002, COM(2002) 564 final. This 
Communication led to the adoption of a Return Action Programme, Justice and Home Affairs Council 
of 28 November 2002, Doc. 14673/02. Available at:  
<http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/st14/14673en2.pdf>. For a list of  Community measures on 
return, drawn up by the Migration Policy Group, see: 
<http://www.migpolgroup.com/monitors/default.asp?action=monitorindex&MonitorID=30>. See also 
European Union return policy – enhancing practical cooperation, a report prepared by the Irish 
Presidency for  the JHA meeting of 23-24 January 2004 which points out that without an effective 
system for the exchange of information ‘the mutual recognition of expulsion decisions will be 
impossible’: available at : <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/jan/European-Returns-policy.pdf>. 
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enforce an expulsion decision of another Member State.159 Moreover, the 2001 
Mutual Recognition Directive specifically provides in the third paragraph of Article 6 
that the recognition of an expulsion decision is conditional on the enforcing Member 
State ensuring that neither ‘the relevant international instruments nor the national 
rules applicable conflict with the enforcement of the expulsion decision.’ The 
obligations of both the issuing and the enforcing Member State to comply with 
fundamental rights is further spelt out in Article 3(2): ‘Member States shall apply this 
Directive with due respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.’  The fourth 
Recital of the 2001 Mutual Recognition Directive specifically refers to the obligation 
on the issuing Member State to adopt expulsion decisions in accordance with 
fundamental rights, as safeguarded by the ECHR, and in particular Articles 3 and 8 
thereof, and the Refugee  Convention and as they result from the constitutional 
principles common to the Member States. 
 
In the context of protection against refoulement, the 2001 Mutual Recognition 
Directive is not based on the presumption of equivalent protection which underlies 
the 1997 Asylum Protocol, the 2002 EAW Framework Decision, and the Dublin II 
Regulation. In that sense,  the  2001 Mutual Recognition Directive provides a legal 
framework that is more in conformity with the principle of non-refoulement as set out 
in the International Instruments. This legal framework takes due account of  the 
difference in interpretation of the principle of non-refoulement under the Refugee  
Convention adopted by  various Member States and of the grounds for subsidiary 
protection.160 However, Union policy is to establish: ‘a legally binding framework for 
mutual recognition of all measures terminating a residence, in particular expulsion 
decisions’.161  Following adoption of the RQSD162 and the Asylum Reception 
Directive,163  and the proposed adoption of the Refugee Procedures Directive,164 the 
basic elements of a common asylum system will be in place. One can therefore 
                                                 
159 Article 1(1) refers to the purpose of the Directive being to ‘make possible the recognition of an 
expulsion decision’. Article 1(2) reserves the right of the enforcing Member State to implement an 
expulsion decision according to its own legislation. See Hailbronner, in Walker (ed.), above n. 4, at pp. 
86-87. 
160 See the Commission Report on a Community Return Policy on Illegal Residents of 14 November 
2002, above n. 158, at para. 2.3.1. 
161 Ibid, at para 2.3.1. 
162 Above n. 12. 
163 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception 
of asylum seekers [2003] OJ L31/18. 
164 Above n. 130. 
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anticipate proposals for a ‘more binding and comprehensive system’ for the 
recognition of expulsion orders against non-nationals of the Member States.165  
 
 
8.4 THE  REFUGEE QUALIFICATION AND STATUS DIRECTIVE 
 
8.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Article 63 EC Treaty required the adoption by 1 May 2004 of measures in specified 
areas in the fields of visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free 
movement of persons.  Key asylum measures adopted or proposed in implementation 
of Article 63(1) EC Treaty include the RQSD, the Refugee Procedures Proposal, and 
the Asylum Reception Directive.166  The RQSD has been selected as a key asylum 
measure with direct relevance in establishing the Union’s standard of protection 
against refoulement.  
 
An analysis of the RQSD in the context of the international standards on non-
refoulement serves three related purposes. Firstly, it aims to determine the extent to 
which a key legislative measure in the field of the Union’s asylum and refugee policy 
complies with international standards on non-refoulement. Secondly, it enables an 
assessment to be made of the RQSD both in terms of its conformity to international 
justice as defined by reference to international normative standards and in terms of its 
conformity with Union standards. Thirdly, since the RQSD establishes minimum 
legal parameters which constrain the Member States in the adoption of implementing 
measures,167  the scope of protection against non-refoulement in the RQSD provides a 
standard for assessing national implementing measures.  
                                                 
165 Hailbronner, in Walker (ed.), above n. 4, at p. 87. 
166 The Asylum Reception Directive, above n. 163, is based on Article 63(1)(b) EC Treaty; the 
proposal for a Refugee Procedure Directive, above n. 130,  is based on Article 63(1)(d) EC Treaty; 
and the RQSD is based on Articles 63(1)(c), 63(2)(a) and 63(3)(a) EC Treaty. The subject matter 
of these measures was already under discussion at the time of the Amsterdam Treaty: see Peers , 
above n. 96, at pp. 126-127. For a list of asylum measures adopted by the Union, see Acquis of the 
European Union in the Field of the JHA; consolidated version; update December 2004. Available 
at: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/intro/docs/jha_acquis_1204_en.pdf>. 
167 The RQSD, as is the case of the Refugee Procedures Proposal and the Asylum Reception Directive, 
establishes minimum standards and the Member States may introduce or retain more favourable 
standards in so far as those standards are compatible with the relevant Directive: Article 3 RQSD, 
Article 4 of the Asylum Reception Directive, and Article 4 of the Refugee Procedures Proposal. 
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8.4.2  THE OBJECT AND SCOPE OF THE RQSD 
 
The RQSD is the product of wide-ranging consultation by the Commission with the 
Member States, the UNHCR, NGOs,168 and experts in refugee law through forums 
such as the ODYSSEUS network and the International Association of Refugee Law 
Judges.169 After protracted negotiation and substantial modification during the 
legislative process, it was finally adopted at the Dublin Council meeting of 1 May 
2004 by the required fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam.170 The legal basis for the adoption of the RQSD is Articles 63(1)(c), 
63(2)(a) and 63(3)(a) EC Treaty.  However notwithstanding this multiple legal basis, 
the obligation to comply with the Refugee  Convention and other relevant treaties 
under Article 63(1) EC Treaty should be construed as applying to all provisions of the 
RQSD.171 
 
Article 1 RQSD sets out its subject matter and scope:  
 
‘The purpose of this Directive is to lay down minimum standards for the 
qualification for third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as 
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the 
protection granted.’ 
 
The scope of the RQSD was  extended to include subsidiary forms of international 
protection in line with the conclusions of the European Council in Tampere.172 
International protection is defined in Article 2(a) RQSD to include both refugee status 
                                                 
168 Including ECRE, Amnesty International,  Save the Children and  the European Women’s Lobby. 
169 See the Commission’s  Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who 
otherwise need international protection: COM(2001) 510 final of 12 September 2001 (the 2001 
Refugee Qualification Proposal). This document includes an Explanatory Memorandum and a draft of 
the directive. When a provision of this proposal is referred to the corresponding Article in the RQSD is 
cited with the article of the proposal in brackets. Further important sources for the 2001 Refugee 
Qualification Proposal are: the 1996 Joint Position; a seminar on 23/24 April 2001 at Norrköping, 
Sweden, International Protection within One Single Asylum Procedure; and the UNHCR sponsored 
Cambridge conference from 9-10 July 2001, Global Consultations on International Protection, 
Summary conclusions- the principle of non-refoulement, above n. 10. See for a detailed analysis of the 
2001 Refugee Qualification Proposal: Hailbronner, in Walker (ed.), above n. 4, at pp. 58-68. 
170 Ireland and the UK, but not Denmark, are bound by the RQSD. 
171 See Section 8.3.2.3 above. 
172 Tampere Presidency Conclusions of 15-16 October 1999, at para. 14, Council Doc. SN 200/99. 
Available at <http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/oct99/oct99_en.htm>.  
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as defined in Article 2(d) RQSD173 and subsidiary protection status as defined in 
Article 2(f) RQSD.174 The RQSD only applies to third country nationals or stateless 
persons and not to Union citizens. Recital 13 specifically states that it is without 
prejudice to the 1997 Protocol on Asylum. This exclusion of Union citizens from the 
RQSD has been criticised by the UNHCR.175 
 
Article 13 RQSD obliges Member States to grant refugee status to a third country 
national or stateless person who qualifies as a refugee under Chapters II and III of the 
RQSD.176 Article 12 RQSD lists the grounds on which a  third country national or a 
stateless person is excluded from being a refugee and those grounds broadly 
correspond to those set out in Article 1(D), (E), and (F) of the Refugee  
Convention.177 However, Article 12(2)(b) elaborates on the notion of ‘serious non-
political crime’ in Article 1F(b) of the Refugee  Convention by providing 
‘particularly cruel actions, even if committed with an allegedly political objective, 
may be classified as serious non-political crimes’.  Article 12(3) RQSD provides 
Article 12(2) ‘applies to persons who instigate or otherwise participate in the 
commission of the crimes or acts mentioned therein.’ 
 
Article 18 RQSD  requires Member States to grant subsidiary protection status to a 
third country national or stateless person eligible for subsidiary protection in 
accordance with Chapters II and V of the RQSD. Article 2(e) defines a person as 
eligible for subsidiary protection who does not qualify as a refugee but: 
                                                 
173 Article 2(d) RQSD: “‘refugee status” means  the recognition by a Member State of a third country 
national or a stateless person as a refugee.’ 
174 Article 2(f) RQSD: ‘”Subsidiary protection status” means the recognition by a Member State of a 
third country national or a stateless person as a person eligible for subsidiary protection.’  Article 2(e) 
defines a ‘person eligible for subsidiary protection’ as ‘a third country national or a stateless person 
who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for 
believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a 
stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of suffering 
serious harm as defined in Article 15, and to whom Article 17(1) and (2) do not apply, and is unable, 
or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country;’. 
175 Hailbronner, in Walker (ed.), above n. 4, at p. 59. 
176 Article 2(c) defines a refugee as: ‘a third country national who, owing to a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a 
particular social group, is outside the country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or a stateless person, who, being 
outside of the country of former habitual residence for the same reasons as mentioned above, is unable 
or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it, and to whom Article 12 does not apply;’. 
177 For the Commission’s interpretation of Article 14 of the 2001 Qualification Proposal, which 
corresponded broadly to Article 12 RQSD, see its Explanatory Memorandum, above n. 169, at pp. 24-
26. 
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‘… in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing 
that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the 
case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, 
would face a real risk of suffering serious harm as defined in Article 15, and 
to whom Article 17(1) and (2) do not apply, and is unable or, owing to such 
risk, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country.’  
 
Since the RQSD only sets minimum standards, the relatively fluid definition of 
subsidiary protection status allows scope for positive feedback from more favorable 
standards adopted by Member States into the Union’s legal order as well as for a 
progressive construction of the relevant Charter rights.178  
 
Article 17 RQSD deals with exclusion from eligibility for subsidiary protection and 
establishes additional grounds for exclusion to those set out in Article 12(2) RQSD in 
respect of refugees. Article 17(1)(b) simply refers to commission of a serious crime as 
grounds for exclusion without the temporal or non-political crime limitation in Article 
12(2)(b).179  Article 17(1)(d) provides an additional ground of exclusion if the third 
country national or stateless person ‘constitutes a danger to the community or to the 
security of the Member State in which he or she is present’.180 Article 17(2) RQSD 
provides Article 17(1) ‘applies to persons who instigate or otherwise participate in the 
commission of the crimes or acts mentioned therein.’  In addition, Article 17(3) 
permits Member States to exclude a third country national or stateless person from 
eligibility for subsidiary protection if, prior to admission to the Member State, the 
applicant: 
 
 ‘… has committed one or more crimes, outside the scope of paragraph 1, which 
would be punishable by imprisonment, had they been committed in the 
Member State concerned, and if he or she left his or her country of origin 
solely in order to avoid sanctions resulting from these crimes.’ 
 
                                                 
178 Preamble 10 to the RQSD affirms its respect for the Charter rights and principles, and in particular 
‘full respect for human dignity and the right to asylum of applicants for asylum and their 
accompanying family members.’  See Articles 1, 18 and 19 of the Charter and Section 8.3.2.4 above. 
179 As under Article 1F(b) of the Refugee  Convention, Article 12(2)(b) requires the crime to be 
committed prior to admission as a refugee which is defined in Article 12(2)(b) as ‘the time of issuing a 
residence permit based on the granting of refugee status’. 
180 Hailbronner points out that the oddity that this provision, ‘obviously intended to cover dangers of 
terrorism’, only applies to a danger posed to the country of residence but not the Union as a whole: in 
Walker (ed.), above n. 4, at pp. 65-66. 
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Article 15 RQSD specifies three categories of serious harm as the basis for eligibility 
for subsidiary protection status:  
 
‘(a) death penalty or execution; or (b) torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; or (c) serious 
and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate 
violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.’181  
 
Article 15(a) reflects the evolving attitude to the death penalty in international law.182 
In particular, the provision reflects the obligations of the Member States to abolish the 
death penalty arising under Protocols No. 6 and 13 ECHR and the Second Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR.183  Article 15(b) RQSD reproduces Article 3 ECHR which 
opens the possibility for a dynamic and evolving interpretation of the provision.184 As 
outlined in Section 2.2.2. above, it is established that Article 3 ECHR admits of no 
exception whatsoever.185 It is therefore arguable that exclusion from eligibility for 
subsidiary protection status on one of the grounds listed in Article 17 RQSD should 
be interpreted as being subject to the absolute prohibition on torture imposed by 
                                                 
181 See on the definition of ‘serious and unjustified harm’, as set out in Article 15 of the 2001 Refugee  
Qualification Proposal, ECRE’s Recommendations to the Asylum Working Party. Available at: 
<http://www.ecre.org/statements/wpcomments.shtml>. See also the Commission’s Explanatory 
Memorandum, above n. 169,  at pp. 26-27. See also McAdam, above n. 9, at pp. 12-13. The definition 
of Article 15 RQSD varies significantly from the definition in Article 15 of the  2001 Refugee 
Qualification Proposal, and in particular any generalised reference to a violation of human rights as a 
constituent of serious harm is omitted from Article 15 RQSD. See for detailed analysis of the original 
definition of harm in the 2001 Refugee Qualification Proposal and the definition as substantially 
adopted in Article 15 RQSD: Hailbronner, in Walker (ed.), above n. 4, at pp. 63-65. 
182 See for a summary of international law on extradition and the right to life, Kapferer above n. 63, at 
pp. 50-54.  
183 See Annexes 1 and 2 for references.  Protocol 13 ECHR, which came into force on 1 July 2003,  
abolishes the death penalty and has been signed by all the Member States but has not, as of 1 
September 2005,  been ratified by France, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg,  Netherlands, Poland or Spain. 
Protocol 6 ECHR, which abolishes the death penalty save in time of war, has been signed and ratified 
by all the Member States. The Second  Optional Protocol to the ICCPR abolishes the death penalty but 
permits reservations under Article 2: ‘.. made at the time of ratification or accession that provides for 
the application of the death penalty in time of war pursuant to a conviction for a most serious crime of 
a military nature committed during wartime’. As of 1 September 2005, all Member States had signed 
or acceded to the ICCPR Second Optional Protocol, except  France which has not signed and Poland 
which had not ratified.  
184 See McAdam, above n. 9, at p. 12; Hailbronner, in Walker (ed.), above n. 4, at pp. 63-64; and J. 
Vedsted-Hansen, ‘Assessment of the Proposal for an EC Directive on the Notion of Refugee and 
Subsidiary Protection from the Perspective of  International Law’, in Bouteillet-Paquet (ed.) Subsidiary 
Protection of Refugees in the European Union: Complementing the Geneva Convention? (Brussels, 
Bruylant, 2002), pp. 57-78, at p. 74. 
185 On Article 3 ECHR, and Article 3 CAT, as a basis for subsidiary protection in states practice, see: 
McAdam, above n. 9, at p. 8.  
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international law.186 Article 15 (c) RQSD is an amended version of Article 15(c) of 
the 2001 Refugee Qualification Proposal and is based on Article 2(c) of the 
Temporary Protection Directive.187 However, subsidiary protection is provided on a 
different basis from temporary protection.188 
 
While the RQSD has been characterized as being ‘not intended as a radical overhaul 
of protection but as a codification of existing state practice’,189 an analysis of the 
sources of  human rights norms incorporated explicitly or by implication in respect of 
the principle of non-refoulement in the RQSD is consistent with a more dynamic 
construction.190  Thus, for example, Article 10 RQSD expands on the reasons for 
persecution  set out in Article 1A(2) of the Refugee  Convention, and in particular  
provides as extended definition of  ‘membership of a particular social group’ in 
paragraph (d) to include a group based on a common characteristic of sexual 
orientation.191 
 
8.4.3 THE RQSD AND NON-REFOULEMENT  
 
8.4.3.1 Introduction 
The following section assesses the RQSD against the principle of non-refoulement set 
out in the International Instruments in the context of the five specific issues outlined 
in Section 8.2. This analysis employs the principle of non-refoulement in the 
International Instruments as a comparator for measuring the justice of the RQSD. 
Indeed, the Preamble to the RQSD acknowledges the critical role played by 
                                                 
186 Article 17(1)(4) of the 2001 Refugee Qualification Proposal had addressed the issue of the 
compatibility of the Article 17(1) reasons for exclusion  with international law by providing that ‘the 
application of the exclusion shall not in any manner affect obligations that Member States have under 
international law.’ However, this provision was deleted when Article 17 was amended: see 
Hailbronner, above n. 4, at p. 65. 
187 Explanatory Memorandum, above n. 169, at p. 26. 
188 Hailbronner, in Walker (ed.), above n. 4, at p. 64. 
189 McAdam, above n. 9, at p. 2. 
190 A number of the international fundamental rights conventions are referred to in the RQSD by 
implication only: for example, Recital (12) RQSD refers to the ‘best interests of the child’ with implied 
reference to Article 3 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child; and Recital (11) refers to 
‘instruments of international law to which they [the Member States] are party and which prohibit 
discrimination’.   
191 However, acts considered criminal under the national law of the Member States are excluded from 
sexual orientation. Gender related aspects may be considered without creating a presumption in favour 
of the application of Article 10 RQSD.  For a discussion of state practice on gender-based 
discrimination, and the relevant provisions of the 2001 Refugee Qualification Proposal, see McAdam, 
above n. 9, at pp.18-20. 
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international instruments in setting standards with which the Union and the Member 
States should comply in establishing and implementing the RQSD.192 The 
methodology adopted in this section is one which is therefore reflected in the 
legislative process. 
 
8.4.3.2 The RQSD and the Absolute Character of Non-Refoulement 
Article 21(1) RQSD, forming part of Chapter VII setting out the content of 
international protection, provides that the Member States ‘shall respect the principle 
of non-refoulement in accordance with their international obligations’.193  The 
principle of non-refoulement is not further defined in the RQSD.194 For the purposes 
of the RQSD its meaning is, however, a matter to be determined in accordance with 
the international obligations of each Member State and is not therefore a concept of 
Union law.195 The reference in Article 21(1) to the international obligations of the 
Member States provides the basis for a wide  interpretation of the principle to  include 
the most extensive protection provided for under international conventions to which 
each Member State is party, customary international law and jus cogens.  
 
Article 21(2) RQSD provides: ‘Where not prohibited by the international obligations 
mentioned in paragraph 1, Member States may refoule a refugee, whether formally 
recognised or not, when (a) there are reasonable grounds for considering him or her as 
a danger to the security of the Member State in which he or she is present; or 
                                                 
192 The Refugee  Convention is referred to in Recitals (2), (3), (8), (9), (10), (11) and (24) of the 
RQSD; Recital (11) refers, with respect to the treatment of persons falling within the scope of the 
RQSD,  to ‘instruments of international law which prohibit discrimination’ which would include 
CEDAW, CERD, and the ICCPR; Recitals (12) and (20) refer to principles of protection in the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child; Recital (22) refers to the UN Charter and UN Resolutions in the 
context of measures combating terrorism; and Recital (25) refers to ‘international obligations under 
human rights instruments’ as a source for the criteria for recognising those eligible for subsidiary 
protection. Recital (10) refers to respect for the rights and principles set out in Charter, which as 
mentioned in Section 8.3.2.4 above, has become standard practice in Union legislation since adoption 
of the Charter. 
193 The earlier version of Article 21(1) RQSD in Article 19 of the 2001 Refugee  Qualification 
Proposal provided: ‘The Member States shall respect the principle of non-refoulement and shall not 
expel persons enjoying international protection, otherwise than in accordance with their international 
obligations’. The Commission’s commentary on  Article 19 conflated protection  for refugees against 
refoulement under Articles 32 and 33 of the Refugee  Convention with the principle of  non-
refoulement under general human rights law: above n. 169,  at p. 29.  However, as discussed, the scope 
of the principle is not the same in each case. 
194 However, Recital two RQSD ties the principle to the context of  the Refugee  Convention.  
195 This conclusion follows from the text of Article 21(1) RQSD and is supported by Recital (2) RQSD.  
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(b) he or she, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious 
crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that Member State.’ Article 21(2) 
RQSD, which was not contained in the 2001 Refugee Qualification Proposal, 
substantially incorporates the exclusion from the principle of non-refoulement in 
Article 33(2) of the Refugee  Convention. Article 21(3) RQSD provides: ‘Member 
States may revoke, end or refuse to renew or to grant the residence permit of (or to) a 
refugee to whom paragraph 2 applies.’ However, the requirement in Article 21(2) for 
compliance with the international obligations of the Member States means that the 
absolute character of the principle of non-refoulement  as recognised in Article 3 
ECHR and Article 3 CAT will prevent refoulement of a refugee by a Member State in 
violation of those provisions even if permitted under Article 33(2) of the Refugee  
Convention.  
 
This leaves open the question of whether the construction of the permitted grounds 
for refoulement under Article 21(2) RQSD should be treated as a matter of Union law 
or whether the Member States should retain the freedom to interpret the grounds  in 
line with the prevailing construction in international law of Article 33(2) of the 
Refugee  Convention.196  Since the Member States retain the right to determine the 
principle of non-refoulement under Article 21(1) in accordance with their 
international obligations,  and refoulement under Article 21(2) is also subject to such 
obligations, it would be preferable for reasons of consistency to adopt the latter 
approach. While it may be objected that permitting the Member States to develop 
conflicting jurisprudence on the meaning of Article 21(2) undermines the purpose of 
the RQSD as set out in Article 1 to lay down minimum standards, the Refugee  
Convention provides the internationally recognized minimum standard and the 
national courts should continue to be free to refer directly to it as a source rather than 
through the intermediation of the ECJ.197  
 
In respect of non-refoulement of a person eligible for subsidiary protection, Article 
20(2) RQSD provides Chapter VII ‘applies equally to refugees and persons eligible 
for subsidiary protection unless otherwise indicated.’ Article 21(1), but not Article 
                                                 
196 However, the scope of Article 33(2) of the Refugee  Convention is disputed .  See the detailed 
analysis of Article 33(2) by Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n. 13, at paras. 145-192. 
197 Although this conclusion does not prejudice the establishment of a mechanism for an authoritative 
source of interpretation of the Refugee  Convention. See generally, Clark, above n. 37, at pp. 604-606. 
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21(2) or (3), therefore applies to a  person eligible for subsidiary protection.  The 
scope and content of the obligation of non-refoulement in respect of such a person is 
therefore determined by the international obligations of the Member States.  
 
8.4.3.3 The RQSD and State Accountability 
Article 6 RQSD addresses the issue of determining the required degree of state 
involvement in the well-founded fear of  persecution or real risk of suffering serious 
harm by providing: 
 
‘Actors of persecution or serious harm include: (a) the State; (b) parties or 
organisations controlling the State or a substantial part of the territory of the 
State; (c) non-State actors, if it can be demonstrated that the actors in (a) and 
(b), including international organisations, are unable or unwilling to provide 
protection against persecution or serious harm as defined in Article 7.’ 
 
Article 7 RQSD defines the actors who can provide protection against persecution or 
serious harm as either (a) the State or (b)  ‘parties or organizations, including 
international organizations, controlling the State or a substantial part of the territory 
of the State.’198 The inclusion of non-state actors as capable of providing protection 
has been criticised as having no basis in international law:  
 
‘These organizations and quasi-states authorities are not parties to 
international human rights treaties and therefore cannot give meaningful 
human rights guarantees or be held accountable for non-compliance with 
international refugee and human rights obligations.’199  
 
Article 6 RQSD therefore adopts the ‘protection’ theory endorsed by the ECtHR in 
respect of Article 3 ECHR and by the majority of signatories to the Refugee  
Convention200 and applies it both to refugees under the Refugee  Convention and to 
applicants for subsidiary protection.  
 
Article 9 RQSD extends the protection afforded under the 1996 Joint Position which 
requires proof of more direct state involvement.201 Member States which have not 
                                                 
198 For analysis of Article 9 of the 2001 Refugee Qualification Proposal , which was the predecessor 
versions of Articles 6 and 7 RQSD, see the Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum, above n. 169, at 
pp. 17-18.  
199 See McAdam, above n. 9,  at p. 18.  
200 See Section  8.2.2.3 above. 
201 See Section 8.3.3.3 above.   
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adopted the protection theory in respect of the Refugee  Convention,202  will therefore 
be required to conform with the standards set out in Article 6 RQSD by the deadline 
for transposition of 10 October 2006.  
 
 
8.4.3.4  The RQSD and Indirect Refoulement 
The RQSD does not provide an autonomous definition of non-refoulement.203  Article 
21(1) RQSD, however, provides the Member States must respect the principle in 
accordance with their international obligations. The principle has therefore to be 
construed in line with applicable international treaty law, customary international law 
and  jus cogens both in the context of refugee and asylum law and in the context of 
human rights law generally. Since indirect refoulement is prohibited under Article 3 
ECHR, Article 3 CAT, Article 7 ICCPR and Article 33 of the Refugee  Convention, 
and all the Member States are parties to those conventions,  Article 21(1) RQSD also 
prohibits indirect refoulement.  
 
8.4.3.5 The RQSD and Non-Admittance at the Frontier 
Article 3 of the 2001 Refugee Qualification Proposal had provided that the directive 
would apply to all  third country nationals and stateless persons who make an 
application for international protection ‘at the border or on the territory of a Member 
State’. However Article 1 RQSD, which is the successor article, does not refer to the 
place at which the application for international protection must be made and this 
omission is maintained throughout the Recitals and subsequent articles of the RQSD.  
 
Since the scope and indeed existence of an obligation for a state to admit an asylum 
seeker or refugee at the frontier is uncertain under the principal international 
conventions,204 the formulation in Article 21(1) may result in divergent 
interpretations by national courts as to the scope and content of a Member State’s 
obligations to admit at the frontier. However, in the context of the other key directives 
adopted or proposed on asylum seekers and refugees, the RQSD should be interpreted 
                                                 
202 See McAdam, above n. 9, at pp. 17-18. Her analysis of the varying positions in the Member States 
predates the enlargement to twenty-five states.  
203 As mentioned, Recital (2) RQSD ties the principle to the Refugee  Convention but this does not 
provide a basis for restricting the generality of Article 21(1) RQSD. 
204 See Section 8.2.2.5 above. 
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as applying  to those seeking international protection at the border. Article 3(1) of the 
Refugee Procedures Proposal provides: ‘This Directive shall apply to all applications 
for asylum made at the border, at port and airport transit zones or on the territory of 
Member States.’ Article 3(1) of the Asylum Reception Directive also provides that it 
shall apply to ‘all third country nationals and stateless persons who make an 
application for asylum at the border or in the territory of a Member State.’  
 
8.4.3.6  The RQSD and Extradition 
As outlined in Section 8.2.2.6, the principle of non-refoulement under the 
International Instruments and customary international law applies to extradition. 
Therefore, the principle of non-refoulement in Article 21(1) RQSD also applies to 
extradition. This construction of Article 21(1) is supported by Recital (10) RQSD that 
refers to the right to asylum recognized by the Charter.205 The protection against 
extradition in Article 21(1) RQSD is of particular significance in the context of the 
measures adopted by the Union which undermine the principle of non-refoulement  
by creating a presumption in favour of automatic surrender or extradition.206 In 
particular, Article 21(1) RQSD extends the scope of protection against refoulement in 
the 2001 Mutual Recognition Directive and the 2002 EAW Framework Decision 
respectively.207   
 
Furthermore, Article 21(1) RQSD is in conflict with Article 13 of the 2003 EU/US  
Extradition Agreement.208 Article 13 provides for extradition in circumstances where 
‘for procedural reasons’ the death penalty  is imposed provided it is not carried out. 
However, this procedure is not in conformity with Article 1 of Protocol No. 13 
ECHR: ‘The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such 
                                                 
205 Article 19(2) of the Charter expressly includes extradition as a form of refoulement. See Section 
8.3.2.4 above.  Recital (7) of the 2001 Refugee Qualification Proposal had explicitly  referred to 
protection in the event of ‘removal, expulsion or extradition’ in the context of Articles 1, 18 and  19 of 
the Charter. 
206 However, Recital (13) RQSD provides the Directive shall be ‘without prejudice’ to the 1997 
Asylum Protocol. In any event, since the 1997 Asylum Protocol only applies to nationals of a Member 
State and the RQSD only applies to third country nationals and stateless persons, Article 21(1) RQSD 
is not applicable to protect nationals of a Member State against refoulement. 
207 See Sections 8.3.3.6 and 8.3.3.7 above. The 2001 EAW Framework Decision applies to both 
nationals of the Member States and non-nationals while the Mutual Recognition Directive only applies 
to non-nationals. 
208 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on Extradition of 25 
June 2003, not in force: [2003] OJ L181/27.  
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penalty or executed.’209 Article 21(1) RQSD therefore provides a  basis in Union law 
for a Member State to refuse to extradite under the 2003 EU/US Extradition Treaty, 
unless condemnation to the death penalty is excluded.210  
 
 
8.5 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
The analysis of protection against refoulement in international law identified a 
number of differences in the scope and content of protection under the International 
Instrument, and in particular between the Refugee  Convention and the other 
International Instruments.211 These variations have specific normative consequences 
for the effective recognition of these standards in Union law since their recognition 
has not been by means of Union accession to the relevant convention. Instead the 
status of the principle of non-refoulement has to be distilled from analysis of the 
reception of the relevant provisions of the International Instruments either as general 
principles of Union law or as customary international law or jus cogens binding on 
the Union or as recognised in specific instruments of Union law. These differing 
methods for the reception of the principle of non-refoulement in Union law result in a 
complex and overlapping normative framework which is less transparent than would 
result from direct Union accession to the relevant UN and European Conventions. 
The effectiveness of protection of the principle of non-refoulement is as a result 
                                                 
209 Protocol No. 13 to the ECHR (ETS 187), adopted 3 May 2002, in force 1 July 2003. Protocol No. 
13 has been signed by all the Member States but not, as of 1 September 2005,  ratified by France, Italy, 
Latvia, Luxembourg,  Netherlands, Poland or Spain. However, the Protocol satisfies the requirements 
for   qualifying as a general principle of Union law as set out by the ECJ: see Section 4.2.4 of Chapter 
four. For a discussion of the conformity of Article 13 of the Agreement on Extradition between the 
European Union and the USA with Article 3 ECHR, see Georgopoulos, above n. 147, at pp. 198-199.  
210 It is generally agreed that ‘international norms (both general rules and treaties binding the EC)’  
take precedence over Community legislation: Peters, ‘The Position of International Law within the 
Community Legal Order’ (1997) German Yearbook of International Law, pp. 1-77, at pp. 37-38. 
However, the 2003 EU-US Extradition Agreement was concluded under Articles 24 and 38 TEU and a 
number of questions remain unresolved, both of a procedural and substantive nature, as to the validity 
and effectiveness of the Agreement in Union law and the national legal orders: see Georgopoulos, 
above n. 147, at pp 195-206. In these circumstances, it is far from clear that a national court would 
accord precedence to Article 13 of the  EU/US Extradition Agreement over conflicting  international 
and constitutional norms. At the least, the court may construe Article 13 in the light of Article 21(1) 
RQSD so as to reach an interpretation in conformity with Protocol No. 12 ECHR. 
211 For a summary of where the  scope of Article 3 ECHR may be wider than Article 33 of the Refugee  
Convention, see Stevens, above n. 10, pp 150-153. For a comparative analysis of protection against 
refoulement under the CAT, ICCPR and the Refugee  Convention, see: S. Taylor, ‘Australia’s 
Implementation of its Non-Refoulement Obligations under the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel Inhuman of Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights’ (1994) 17 University of New South Wales Law Journal, pp. 432-474. 
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primarily dependent on the robustness and integrity of the Union’s judicial system. 
 
The preceding analysis of the recognition of the principle of non-refoulement  in 
specific instruments of Union law reveals variations in the degree of conformity. The 
1997 Asylum Protocol, the 2002 EAW Framework Decision and the 2003 Dublin II 
Regulation in particular are premised on the assumption that each Member State 
offers equivalent protection to refugees and asylum seekers and therefore the transfer 
of applicants between the Member States only exceptionally raises issues of non-
refoulement. However, significant differences in interpretation of the principle of 
non-refoulement exist between the Member States and, in the absence of common 
standards, these variations will persist and may be accentuated by further enlargement 
of the Union. A further issue is the variation in treatment as regards non-refoulement 
in the Union measures on asylum of non-nationals and Union citizens. While in most 
circumstances the focus of concern is on the treatment of third country nationals, the 
1997 Protocol on Asylum provides less favorable treatment in respect of protection 
against refoulement for a national of a Member State than a non-national. Finally, and 
of most concern, is the negative potential impact of the war on terrorism on the 
overriding obligation for the Union to respect international norms on non-
refoulement. Article 13 of the EU/US Extradition Treaty provides a troubling 
example of a provision which contravenes Article 1 of Protocol No. 13 ECHR.  
 
On a more positive note, the analysis of Union asylum and refugee measures, and in 
particular the RQSD, demonstrates that the Union’s institutions attach significant 
weight in the legislative process to respect for international norms on non-
refoulement. Article 21(1) RQSD and Article 3(2) of the 2001 Mutual Recognition 
Directive provide examples of the benefits of this legislative practice in constraining 
the construction of other provisions so as to achieve conformity with the principle of 
non-refoulement. The comparison of the RQSD against the International Instruments 
also reveals a high level of compliance with international standards on non-
refoulement which supports an assessment that the normative impact of international 
standards on the Union’s legislative process is substantial in the field of refugee and 
asylum law. 
 
The Union’s institutional practice of proofing proposals  in the refugee and asylum 
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field through the contribution of both NGOs and  Union actors throughout the 
legislative procedure for respect both with internal fundamental rights norms and 
international fundamental rights norms provides the basis for the future development 
by the Union of a common  asylum policy that is in conformity with the requirements 
of international justice. However, vigilance is required to ensure that short-term 
political expediency acting under the guise of unproven security imperatives does not 
undermine this progress. Implementation of the reforms in the Constitution and 
accession by the Union to the UN and European Conventions would significantly 
diminish this risk. 
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9 
 
 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
9.1 MEASURING THE JUSTICE OF THE AFSJ: INTERNATIONAL FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS  
 
This study argues that international fundamental rights provide the most appropriate 
measure for assessing the justice of the AFSJ. This view is open to challenge on the 
grounds either that such a standard sets the bar too low for judging the Union or that 
alternative standards, such as the Charter or the common constitutional traditions of the 
Member States, provide a more appropriate basis. However, characteristics of 
international fundamental rights have been identified that confer key advantages over 
alternative standards. Firstly, international fundamental rights provide objectivity, 
neutrality and a generally recognised criterion of justice. These characteristics are not 
matched by the alternative standards. Secondly, international fundamental rights are 
widely adopted as the standard for evaluating Union measures and policies in the AFSJ 
both by external agencies and NGOs and the Union’s institutions. Thirdly, international 
fundamental rights, and in particular those based on customary international law, provide 
flexibility in adapting standards to developing consensus in the international community 
on issues such as environmental protection, the right to development, democratic 
governance, and the duty to protect.1  
 
However, this conclusion should not be interpreted in the sense that international 
fundamental rights are being proposed as an exhaustive or maximum standard against 
which to measure AFSJ measures.  Instead, they provide a standard which should be 
                                                 
1 In the UN World Summit Outcome Document, adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005, 
the responsibility of states and the international community  to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity was recognised : UN Doc. A/60/L.1, at para. 138-
140. Available at: 
<http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/unfccc_calendar/application/pdf/world_summit_n0551130.pdf>. 
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supplemented by other sources such as the Charter and developing norms that have not as 
yet achieved recognition in international law. However, the characteristics of 
international fundamental rights identified in this study provide a robust and effective 
normative framework which commands recognition both from the Union’s institutions 
and the Member States. 
 
9.2 THE AUTONOMY OF UNION LAW: A MISGUIDED OBJECTIVE   
 
This study has further argued that the normative status of international fundamental 
rights standards in Union law is undermined by the pursuit of the objective of autonomy 
of Union law, and in particular the autonomy of the ECJ. The research supports this 
hypothesis. The main characteristics of the Union’s legal order, the doctrines of 
supremacy and direct effect, developed from judicial precedent rather than a written 
constitution. However, this judicial activism was mirrored in judicial conservatism in the 
attitude adopted by the ECJ towards international law and the national constitutional 
orders of the Member States. The ECJ was determined to assert the autonomy of the 
Union’s legal order both from the infiltration of international law and the carte blanche 
acceptance of national constitutional standards. It achieved this autonomy by awarding 
itself a substantial discretion as to the terms on which international law was integrated 
into Union law through the doctrine of direct effect and by asserting the pre-eminence of 
Union law over national constitutional law. However, the assertion of the autonomy of 
Union law has had two negative consequences from the perspective of securely 
establishing international fundamental rights in Union law. 
 
Firstly, the absence in the founding Treaties of fundamental rights protection led national 
constitutional courts to refuse to sanction the transfer of sovereignty to the Union implicit 
in the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect until Union law provided equivalent 
protection of fundamental rights to that guaranteed under the national constitution. The 
ECJ responded to this challenge to its autonomy by developing a Union specific doctrine 
of fundamental rights as general principles of law based on international treaties and 
common national constitutional traditions. However, this doctrine has substantial 
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deficiencies in terms of legal certainty, transparency and the hierarchical relationship of 
such principles to national and international fundamental rights standards.  Except for the 
recognition of this doctrine in Article 6(2) TEU, the Member States failed at successive 
renegotiations of the Treaties to address these deficiencies. The declaration of the Charter 
outside the framework of the Treaties2 was a compromise solution adopted in the context 
of the proposed enlargement of the Union to twenty-five states but its uncertain 
normative status and the lack of enforceability of the Charter rights and freedoms 
severely limits its effectiveness as a bill of rights for the Union. In this context, the 
reforms to the structure of fundamental rights protection in the Constitution represent a 
milestone insofar as it is the first occasion on which the Member States have agreed on 
measures designed to establish a democratic and constitutionally entrenched basis for the 
protection of fundamental rights in Union law. 
 
Secondly, the ECJ in Opinion 2/943 closed the door on accession by the Community to 
the ECHR that had long been promoted as the logical solution to the weaknesses in 
fundamental rights protection in Union law compared to the national legal orders. It is 
reasonable, and in particular in the light of the concerns over autonomy expressed in the 
debate on accession in the European Convention, to attribute Opinion 2/94 and the 
subsequent failure by the Member States to amend the Treaties at Amsterdam or Nice at 
least in part to concerns over the impact of accession on the autonomy of the ECJ.  
 
However, the mechanisms for the recognition of international fundamental rights 
standards in Union law, as set out in Article 307 EC Treaty and as developed by the ECJ 
in International Fruit Company4 and the general principles doctrine, have been shown 
for the reasons set out in Chapter four to be unsatisfactory. Incorporation of the Charter 
would not provide a comprehensive solution since it the Charter is primarily designed as 
an instrument of judicial review of the conformity of Union legislation and national 
implementing measures with Charter rights and standards. Union accession to the ECHR 
                                                 
2 [2000] OJ C364/1. 
3 Accession to the ECHR, re [1996] ECR 1-1759. 
4 Cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit [1972] ECR 1219. 
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and the other UN and European Conventions provide the most effective mechanism for 
protecting the individual against infringement of fundamental rights by the Union or the 
Member States acting within the field of Union law. 
 
9.3 A PARTNERSHIP TO PROMOTE THE INTEGRITY OF INTERNATIONAL  LAW 
 
The analysis of the status of international fundamental rights in Union law supports the 
view that pursuit of the objective of the autonomy of Union law, and in particular the 
autonomy of the ECJ, should be abandoned in favor of a conception of the Union legal 
order that is firmly anchored in the international legal order. The pursuit of autonomy 
may have appeared justifiable in a context where increased political and economic 
integration required a commensurate development in the authority of the Union’s legal 
order. However, in the context of globalisation and the enlargement of the Union, such an 
inward looking objective is outdated. The development of the Union’s legal order in the 
21st Century should contribute to the ‘integrity’ of international law.5 International 
fundamental rights, whether derived from treaty or customary international law, should 
as a consequence be recognised in Union law independently of the doctrines of direct 
effect and supremacy. They should retain their status as international legal norms without 
precedence over fundamental rights norms protected by the national legal orders of the 
Member States. 
 
A partnership model rather than the existing hierarchical relationship should be 
developed between the ECJ and the national courts whereby the national court refer 
directly to the decisions of international tribunals for the interpretation of international 
legal norms within the scope of Union law rather than through the intermediary of the 
ECJ. Problems of divergence would be limited either by reference to the decisions of the 
relevant international adjudicating body or, in the absence of such a body, by the 
development of an autonomous interpretation based on international law. An exemplary 
demonstration of this latter interpretative method is given in the speech of Lord Steyn in 
                                                 
5 The expression is taken from the article by R. Higgins, ‘The ICJ, the ECJ and the Integrity of 
International Law’ (2003) 52 ICLQ, pp. 1- 20.  
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R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Adan  and ex p. Aitseguer as 
regards the construction of the Refugee Convention:  
 
‘The prospect of a reference to the International Court of Justice is remote. In 
practice it is left to national courts, faced with a material disagreement on an 
issue of interpretation, to resolve it. But in doing so it must search, untrammelled 
by notions of its national legal culture, for the true autonomous and international 
meaning of the treaty. And there can only be one true meaning.’6 
 
This common interpretative process would be facilitated by Union accession to the 
ECHR and the other European and UN Conventions as such accession would 
institutionalize the Union’s membership of the international fundamental rights system.  
 
9.4 THE CONSTITUTION AND BEYOND  
 
The analysis in Chapter five of the impact of the Constitution on the normative status of 
fundamental rights in Union law concludes that the ratification of the Constitution would 
be of significant benefit in achieving improved transparency, enforceability and 
entrenchment of fundamental rights. Article I-9(2) of the Constitution would clear the 
way for Union accession to the ECHR and accession would, subject to the terms of the 
accession treaty, result in a significant improvement in the status and enforceability of 
ECHR rights in Union law. Article I-9(1) would incorporate the Charter resulting in a 
major improvement in the status and enforceability of the Charter rights and freedoms. 
However, these benefits would be off-set by the confusing and unnecessary retention in 
Article I-9(3) of the fundamental rights as general principles doctrine and the new 
restrictions on the scope and interpretation of the Charter rights and freedoms introduced 
in Articles II-111(1) and 111(2) and Articles II-112(4)-(7) of the Constitution. 
 
However, the lack of constitutional legitimacy underpinning the development of the basic 
principles of the Union law has been exposed by the rejection of the Constitution by the 
French and Dutch electorate in the referenda of 29 May and 1 June 2005. While domestic 
                                                 
6 [2001] 2 AC 477, at p. 517. 
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political considerations no doubt played a part in these results, the attempt to 
constitutionalise the basic principles of the Union’s legal order, and not least the doctrine 
of supremacy in Article I-6 of the Constitution, revealed a lack of wide-spread 
understanding and support for such a project.7 The stalling of the process of ratification 
of the Constitution, however, provides an opportunity for a number of the assumptions 
underlying the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy to be reconsidered and not least 
the assumption that the autonomy of Union law is an appropriate objective for the Union 
in an era characterized by globalisation and pluralism.8 
 
If ratification of the Constitution is to be abandoned, a package of fundamental rights 
reform measures building on the existing text of the Constitution could provide an 
alternative project with greater popular resonance. The analysis in this thesis supports the 
inclusion of the following elements. Firstly, the Union should be provided with a broadly 
based competence to accede to international fundamental rights conventions, including 
the ECHR. Secondly, there should be added to the objectives of the Union a coherent and 
principled statement of the relationship of Union law to international law and national 
law in the field of fundamental rights based on the objective of fostering the integrity of 
international law.9 Thirdly, the terms of incorporation of the Charter should be 
reconsidered with less emphasis on the complex demarcation of the boundaries between 
Union and national law and more emphasis on the Charter as a guarantor of good 
governance and legislation. Fourthly, the attribution of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
and jurisdictional authority to rule on the validity of primary Union law needs to be 
addressed. One solution that should be explored is the establishment of a new 
constitutional court for the Union with representation from the judiciary of the national 
                                                 
7 In Ireland, where the proposed referendum on the Constitution has been postponed, Article I-6 gave rise 
to a heated debate between those who maintained it simply codified the existing doctrine of supremacy and 
those who argued it represented a significant extension of Union competence: see the contributions in the 
The Irish Times of 1 November 2004, ‘Vote on EU constitution should not be rushed’  by D. Scallon, and 
‘Primacy of EU law vital for citizens’ rights’ of  8 November 2004 by E. Regan. 
8 See for a discussion of these issues, the contributions in J. Weiler and M. Wind (eds.), European 
Constitutionalism beyond the State (Cambridge, 2003) and the review of the book by Nico Krisch, ‘Review 
Essay: Europe’s Constitutional Monstrosity’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 321-334. See 
also Daniel Thym, ‘The European Constitution: Notes on the National Meeting of German Public Law 
Assistants’ (1995) 6 German Law Journal, pp. 793-803. 
9 Article I-3(4) of the Constitution could provide the basis for such a provision. 
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constitutional courts.10 Finally, the reforms in the Constitution to the restricted 
jurisdiction of the ECJ over the AFSJ should be implemented in order to provide greater 
legitimacy to Union law-making in this controversial area.  
 
9.5 THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT: A CASE STUDY ON JUSTICE IN 
THE AFSJ  
 
The case study in Chapter eight was designed to evaluate compliance with the 
international law principle of non-refoulement in Community measures adopted in 
furtherance of the Common European Asylum System, and in particular the RQSD.11 As 
explained in the Introduction, the objective of the case study was not to establish a causal 
relationship between the principle of non-refoulement and a specific legislative provision, 
but rather to assess the directive force of the principle during the legislative process and 
by reference to the legal text adopted as a result of that process.12 The conclusion drawn 
from this study is that while the principle of non-refoulement has had a significant 
normative impact on the Union’s legislative process there are substantial differences 
between the various measures examined as to the degree of compliance with the 
principle. While such variance is to be expected in such a politically and socially 
controversial area of Union policy making, it confirms the importance of the Union 
developing a more secure constitutional structure for the protection of fundamental rights 
in the AFSJ. 
 
In this context, the structural deficiencies of the AFSJ in terms of access to justice and 
democratic accountability identified in Chapters six and seven confirm the validity of the 
                                                 
10 See Weiler and Haltern, ‘Constitutional or International? The Foundations of the Community Legal 
Order and the Question of Judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz’, in Slaughter, Stone Sweet and Weiler (eds.), 
The European Court and National Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change in its Social 
Context (Oxford, hart Publishing, 1998), pp. 331-364, at p. 364.  
11 Directive 2004/83/EC of 1 May 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection 
and the content of the protection granted [2004] OJ L 304/12.  
12 For a discussion of the critical literature on the use of case studies and their justification, see Roderick 
Cobley, Theory and Policy: The Impact of International relations Theory on the Foreign Policy of the 
United States during the Gulf Crisis of 1990, PhD Thesis (University of Ulster at Magee, 2003), at pp. 2-6. 
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wide-spread criticisms both of the individual measures analysed in Chapter eight and the 
overall deficiencies in the AFSJ structure. The reforms in the Constitution of the AFSJ 
substantially address the principal structural criticisms through the abolition of the Third 
Pillar and the extension of the jurisdiction of the ECJ and the role of the EP. Failure to 
ratify the Constitution would therefore raise serious ongoing concerns over the 
legitimacy of AFSJ measures and provide grounds for opposing any further extension of 
Union powers until the structural deficiencies were remedied. If the ratification process is 
abandoned, the development of a specific package of reforms for the AFSJ based on the 
provisions in the Constitution would be the minimum necessary in order to secure justice 
in the AFSJ.  
 300
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UN GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 207, UN Doc. A/44/49 (1989): 29 ILM 1464 (1990). 
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(No. 16) at 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966): 993 UNTS 3; 6 ILM 360 (1967). 
 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
adopted 18 December 1979, in force 3 September 1981, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 UN GAOR 
Supp. (No. 46), at 193, UN Doc. A/34/46 (1979): 19 ILM 33 (1980). 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, adopted 6 October 1999, in force 22 December 2000: 
G.A. Res. 54/4, 54 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 49), at 5, UN Doc. A/54/49 (Vol. I) (2000). 
 297
 
 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading  Treatment 
or Punishment, adopted 10 December 1984, in force 26 June 1987: G.A. Res. 39/46, 
annex, 39 UN GAOR,  Supp. (No. 51) at 197, UN Doc. A/39/51 (1984): 23 ILM 1027 
(1984). 
Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted 18 December 2002, not in force, G.A. 
Res. 57/199: 42 ILM 26 (2003). 
 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted 20 November 1989, in force 2 
September 1990, G.A. Res. 44/25 Annex (XLIV), 44 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, 
UN Doc. A/44/49 (1989): 28 ILM 1448 (1989).  
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of Children in Armed Conflict, adopted 25 May 2000, in force 12 February 2002, G.A. 
Res. 54/263, Annex I, 54 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 7; UN Doc. A /54/49, Vol. III 
(2000). 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of 
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, adopted 25 May 2000,  in force 
18 January 2002,  G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex II, 54 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 49) at 6; UN 
Doc. A//54/49, Vol. III (2000).263. 
 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers 
and Members of their Families,  adopted 18 December 1990; in force 1 July 2003, G.A. 
Res. 45/158, UN Doc. A/Res/45/158: 30 ILM 1517 (1991). 
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Annex 2 
Selected European Conventions 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, signed 4 November 1950, in force 3 September 1953: 213 UNTS 221: ETS 5.  
Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, adopted 20 March 1952, in force 18 May 1954: ETS 9. 
Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, adopted 16 September 1963, in force 2 May 1968: ETS 46. 
Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, adopted 28 April 1983, in force 1 March 1985: ETS 114; 22 
ILM 539 (1983). 
Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, adopted 22 November 1984, in force 1 November 1988: ETS 
117; 24 ILM 435 (1985). 
Protocol No. 11 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted 11 May 1994, in force 1 November 1998: ETS 
155; 33 ILM 960 (1994). 
Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted 4 November 2000, in force 1 April 2005: ETS 
177. 
Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted 3 May 2002, in force 1 July 2003: ETS 187. 
Protocol No. 14 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted 13 May 2004; not in force: ETS 194. 
 
European Social Charter, signed 18 October 1961, in force 26 February 1965: ETS 35. 
Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter, adopted 5 May 1988, in force 4 
September 1992: ETS 128. 
Amending Protocol to the European Social Charter, adopted 21 October 1991, not in 
force: ETS 142. 
Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of 
Collective Complaints, adopted 9 November 1995, in force 1 July 1998: ETS 158. 
European Social Charter (Revised), adopted 3 May 1996, in force 1 July 1999: ETS 
163. 
 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment signed 26 November 1987, in force 1 February 1989: ETS 
126. 
Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment adopted 4 November 1993, in force 
1 March 2002: ETS 151. 
Protocol No. 2 to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), adopted 4 November 1993, in 
force 1 March 2002: ETS 152. 
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Framework Agreement for the Protection of National Minorities, adopted 1 February 
1995, in force 1 February 1998: ETS 157. 
 
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, adopted 16 May 2005, 
not in force: ETS 197 
 
 
